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Heroes of the Nations 

Series of Biographical Studies presenting the 
lives and work of certain representative histori- 
cal characters, about whom have gathered the 
traditions of the nations to which they belong, 
and who have, in the majority of instances, been 
accepted as types of the several national ideals. 



12°, Illustrated, cloth, each . . $1.50 
Half Leather, gilt top, each . . $i«75 
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FOR FULL LIST SEE END OF THIS VOLUME 



Ifaeroes of tbe IRatfons 

EDITED BY 

1b. TRU. H>a\>fs, ab.n. 

FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD 



FACTA DUCIS VIVENT OPEROSAQUE 
GLORIA RERUM. OVID, IN UVIAM, 265 

THE HERO'S DEEDS AND HARD-WON 
FAME BHALL LIVE. 



WELLINGTON 




THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 

(After the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A. Now in the possession of 

Lord Bathurst.) 

(From a print of a negative owned by Goupil.) 



WELLINGTON 

SOLDIER AND STATESMAN 



AND THE REVIVAL OF THE MILITARY POWER 
OF ENGLAND 



BY 

WILLIAM O'CONNOR MORRIS 

SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

NEW YORK LONDON 

27 WEST TWENTV-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 

&()c |inickerbothir |$kss 
1904 



. - --1 

OCT 28 1904 
ftowrferht En»v 

i CLASS ,£, XXo. Nol 

' CO-PY 8 



>•! Copyright, 1904 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



Published, September, 1904 



J}/) 

/2- 



Ube Tftutcfccrbocfcer press, fFlew Worh 



PREFACE 

IN the case of Wellington, as in that of Napoleon, 
the correspondence of the great soldier and 
statesman contains the fullest and best record 
of his life and career. That correspondence falls 
into two parts : the exclusively military despatches 
edited by Gurwood, and the supplementary and civil 
despatches, edited by the eldest son of Wellington, 
the second Duke. This immense collection of 
papers, which contains almost innumerable accounts 
of military events and of affairs of State, and mem- 
oranda on India, on the Peninsular War, on the 
Congress of Vienna, on the Campaign of 1 8 1 5, on the 
Army of Occupation, and on Continental and Brit- 
ish politics, during nearly half a century, distinctly 
shows us what Wellington was as a general, a mili- 
tary administrator, and an illustrious public servant ; 
we can gather from it the best estimate that can be 
formed of his nature and character. But the general 
reader would be lost in this mighty maze, if it is 
not without a plan ; he properly looks to large con- 
densation and abridgment, and, besides, recourse 
must be had to other sources of information, in 
order fully to comprehend what Wellington was in 
the field, in Council, in the Cabinet, and in public 



vi Preface 

and private life. A "selection " from the military 
despatches has been made by Gurwood : it is of 
considerable value, and has often been referred to 
in this volume. 

For Wellington's exploits and career in India, in 
addition to his own correspondence, the reader may 
consult the Lives of Lord Harris and of Sir David 
Baird, and especially the despatches of Lord Welles- 
ley, which are of the very greatest importance. The 
different histories of India, relating to this period, 
may also be perused. 

The authorities on the Peninsular War are numer- 
ous, and some of sterling value. The correspondence 
of Napoleon should be compared at every point of the 
contest with that of Wellington ; the difference be- 
tween the direction of military operations at a distance 
and on the spot has seldom been so conspicuously 
made manifest. Napier's History of the Peninsular 
War is a well-known classic, but the brilliant and 
self-opinionated soldier is far from just to the British 
Government of the day ; he is almost a blind idolater 
of Napoleon, and he is far too much an eulogist 
of Soult. Mr. Oman's new History of the Penin- 
sular War as yet has only reached the end of the 
Campaign of 1809, ^ ut wnen complete it promises 
to be a work of remarkable merit ; it is especially 
useful in its descriptions of the topography of Portu- 
gal and Spain, and of the natural characteristics of 
those lands, as bearing upon the military operations 
which took place ; the research of the author is very 
commendable ; his views are usually discriminating 
and just. On the French side, Foy's Guerre de la 



Preface vii 

Peninsnle is only a fragment, but it gives us many 
details of interest ; its account of the organisation 
and the qualities of the French and the British arm- 
ies, if not without pardonable national bias, is in- 
structive, even striking. Hardly any of the French 
commanders have left us much that is profitable 
on the Peninsular War ; but the Memoirs of King 
Joseph and of Marshal Jourdan deserve attention ; 
Marmont has explained tolerably well the Campaign 
of Salamanca and the battle ; Koch's account of 
Massena's campaign in Portugal has real merit ; and 
information may be gathered from the Memoirs of 
Marbot and Thiebault. For general histories, Alison 
and Thiers may be consulted; the sieges in the 
Peninsula have been described by Jones and Belmas. 
The literature of the Waterloo campaign fills a 
library, but it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it here. 
Napoleon's account in his Commentaries is very 
incorrect, and in places disingenuous, but it traces 
the main incidents of this passage of arms with 
characteristic superiority of insight : the tendency of 
history is to confirm the views of the Emperor. I 
pass by a great collection of authorities, largely ob- 
solete and now not of much value, and shall only 
refer to two works, recently published, the Cam- 
paign of Waterloo by the late Mr. Ropes, and 
j 815 by M. H. Houssaye. These narratives are 
fully up to date, and abound in admirable comments 
and reflections ; they are, in the main, candid and im- 
partial. I may also notice my own Campaign of 
1815 which has been received with more than 
ordinary favour. 



viii Preface 

By far the best account of the political career of 
Wellington can be collected from the Memoirs 
of Greville, the English St. Simon. Much, too, can 
be learned from the correspondence of Peel, edited 
by Parker, from debates in Parliament, and from 
contemporaneous histories. 

The biographies of Wellington are not numerous, 
or of remarkable merit. That of Brialmont is, I 
think, the best ; the work of Sir Herbert Maxwell 
contains some very valuable papers taken from 
family archives and correspondence. 

William O'Connor Morris. 

26th November, 1903. 

The last proofs of this volume had been passed for the press 
before the author's death, an event which will be regretted by all 
students of the Napoleonic period. The index was to have been 
made by Judge O'Connor Morris ; but failing health prevented him 
even from commencing this task, and it has consequently been exe- 
cuted by another hand. The present volume may be regarded as 
complementary to the author's earlier study on Napoleon, than which 
few works in this series have enjoyed a wider popularity. Welling- 
ton is here treated mainly as a soldier ; and, in telling the story of 
his life, the author has taken the opportunity of discussing a number 
of disputed questions in the history of the Peninsular and Waterloo 
campaigns. The Judge's wide acquaintance with the memoirs and 
papers of the leaders on both sides led him to conclusions which, 
although they have been challenged by some high authorities, de- 
serve the attention due to acute independent study of the original 
sources of information. 

Oxford, Sept. 1, 1904. H - W. C. Davis. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 



EARLY YEARS 



PAGE 
I 



Birth and family of Wellington — The Wellesleys or Wes- 
leys in Ireland — Arthur Wesley, his boyhood — He is sent 
to Eton and Angers — He enters the army — His attention to 
his military duties, and his studies — He is placed on the 
staff of Lord Westmoreland, the Lord Lieutenant of Ire- 
land — He seconds the address in the Irish Parliament — 
The Catholic Relief Bill of 1793 — He distinguishes himself 
in the campaign of 1794 in Holland, but seeks to leave the 
army. 



CHAPTER II 



CAREER IN INDIA 



Wesley fails to get a post in the Civil Service — He is pre- 
vented from going in an expedition to the West Indies — He 
is sent with the 33rd to India — His memorandum on mili- 
tary affairs, the first instance of his sagacious views on this 
subject — Lord Mornington made Governor-General — The 
two brothers in India — State of our Empire and of the 
Company at this conjuncture — The name of Wesley changed 
back to that of Wellesley — Operations against Tippoo 
Sahib — Arthur Wellesley, as a rule, on the side of peace — 
His failure at an outpost — Fall of Seringapatam — Settle- 
ment of Mysore — Wellesley made Governor — His adminis- 
tration — Defeat of Dhoondiah Waugh — Baird sent to Egypt 
instead of Wellesley— The Mahratta War — Assaye, great 



14 



x Contents 

PAGE 

ability shown by Wellesley in the battle — Lord Lake's 
opeiations — Defeat of Monson — Wellesley leaves India for 
England. 

CHAPTER III 

IRELAND — COPENHAGEN — VIMIERO . . . -43 

Wellesley at St. Helena — He is consulted by Pitt — His 
interview with Nelson — He enters the House of Commons, 
and is made Chief Secretary for Ireland, under the Duke 
of Richmond — State of Ireland in 1807-1808 — Wellesley's 
marriage — His policy and conduct when Chief Secretary — 
He commands a division at the siege of Copenhagen — 
Napoleon's designs against the Iberian Peninsula — March 
of Junot on Lisbon — Napoleon extorts the crown of Spain 
from the Spanish Bourbons — Great national rising of Spain 
— Reverses of the French — Baylen — The British Govern- 
ment interferes — Rising of Portugal — Wellesley lands at 
Mondego Bay — Burrard — Dalrymple — Wellesley's plan of 
operations — Rolica — Vimiero — Defeat of Junot — The con- 
vention of Cintra — The Court of Inquiry. 

CHAPTER IV 

THE DOURO — TALAVERA 70 

Napoleon's authority on the Continent weakened after Bay- 
len and Vimiero — He persists in his purpose to conquer 
Spain and Portugal — His interview with the Czar at Erfurth 
— England rejects their overtures and continues the war — 
Moore at Lisbon — He marches to the assistance of the 
Spanish armies — Napoleon invades Spain — Espinosa, Tudela 
— Moore's march to Sahagun — Napoleon crosses the Gua- 
darrama, but fails to destroy Moore's army — The retreat to, 
and the battle of, Corunna — Death of Moore — Faulty dis- 
positions of the French armies after the departure of Na- 
poleon — Soult at Oporto — Victor on the Guadiana — 
Wellesley in command of a British and Portuguese army 
at Lisbon — His masterly views on the Peninsular War — 
He advances against Soult and crosses the Douro — His 
great ability in this achievement — Able retreat of Soult — 
Wellesley, after some delay, advances with Cuesta, up the 



Contents x'i 



PAGE 



valley of the Tagus — Danger of this strategy — Battle of 
Talavera — Retreat of Wellesley after a narrow escape — 
He receives the title of Wellington. 

CHAPTER V 

BUSACO, TORRES VEDRAS, FUENTES D'ONORO . . 102 

The supremacy of Napoleon on the Continent restored 
after Wagram — His efforts to extend the Continental Sys- 
tem — Spain and Portugal threatened with subjugation — 
This might have happened had Napoleon conducted the 
war in person — False operations of the French armies — 
The invasion of Andalusia — Far-sighted views of Wellington 
— His presence on the theatre of the Peninsular War of 
supreme importance — His preparations for the defence of 
Portugal — Increase and reorganisation of the Portuguese 
army — The lines of Torres Vedras — Grandeur of this con- 
ception and of the position of Wellington — Napoleon pre- 
pares to invade Portugal in complete ignorance of 
Wellington's arrangements — Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Almeida — Advance of Massena — Battle of Busaco and 
defeat of the French — Further advance of Massena — He is 
permanently arrested by the lines — His position at Santarem 
— Soult at Badajoz — Retreat of Massena — Pursuit of Well- 
ington — The French army forced back into Spain — Battle 
of Fuentes d'Onoro — The garrison of Almeida escapes — 
Disgrace of Massena. 

CHAPTER VI 

CIUDAD RODRIGO, BADAJOZ, SALAMANCA, BURGOS . 139 
Wellington's defence of Portugal again stirs opinion on 
the Continent against Napoleon — Discontent in France, 
especially with the Peninsular War — Policy of Napoleon — 
Weakness of the position of the French in Spain— Joseph 
resigns his crown — Napoleon, intent on war with Russia, 
menaces the Continent, and tries to restore the situation in 
the Peninsula, to little purpose — The Empire apparently at 
its height in the eyes of most men — Distress in England — 
Confidence of Wellington — State of the armies in the 



xii Contents 

PAGE 

Peninsula — First siege of Badajoz — Battle of Albuera — 
Second siege of Badajoz — It is raised — Junction of Soult 
and Marmont — Wellington on the Caya — The marshals 
separate — Wellington purposes to take Ciudad Rodrigo 
and Badajoz — His preparations — He is in danger at El 
Bodon — Progress of the French army in the East — Siege 
and fall of Tarragona — Suchet at Valencia — Napoleon 
directs a large part of his forces to the East — Arroyo Molinos 
— Wellington takes Ciudad Rodrigo — Reduction of the 
French armies in Spain — Third siege of Badajoz — The 
place taken after a desperate resistance — Wellington in- 
vades Spain — Operations of Marmont — Wellington out- 
manoeuvred — Great victory of Wellington at Salamanca — 
Fine retreat of Clausel — Wellington occupies Madrid — He 
besieges Burgos and fails — Soult forced to evacuate Anda- 
lusia — Wellington retreats from Burgos — He is threatened 
by the united French armies, but makes good his way to 
Ciudad Rodrigo. 



CHAPTER VII 

VITORIA 187 

The invasion of Russia in 1812 — The Retreat from Moscow 
— Great rising in Prussia after the disasters of the French 
— The Czar continues the war — Efforts of Napoleon to re- 
store his military power — Lutzen and Bautzen — Negotia- 
tions — Policy of Metternich — The armistice of Pleisnitz — 
Events in Spain largely influence the conduct of the Allies 
— Position of the French armies after the retreat from 
Burgos — They are considerably reduced — Directions of 
Napoleon for the Campaign of 1813 in Spain — They reach 
Joseph late and are imperfectly carried out — Dissemination 
of the French armies — Wellington disposes of a great mili- 
tary force — His plan for the Campaign of 1813 — He turns 
the position of the French on the Esla and the Douro — 
Joseph is surprised and compelled to fall back — Confused 
and ill-managed retreat of the French armies from Valla- 
dolid to Vitoria — Battle of Vitoria — Complete defeat of 
Joseph — Immense results of the victory. 



Contents xiii 

CHAPTER VIII 

PAGE 

FROM THE PYRENEES TO THE GARONNE . . -215 

Wellington made a Field Marshal and Duque di Vitoria — 
Soult reorganises the French army — Battles of the Pyrenees 
— Siege of San Sebastian — Fall of the place — The Cam- 
paign of 1813 in Germany — Complete defeat of Napoleon 
at Leipzig — The French armies driven across the Rhine — 
Wellington crosses the Bidassoa — Soult fortifies his lines on 
the Nivelle — The lines forced — Soult had previously called 
on Suchet to support him — Soult at Bayonne — His for- 
midable position — Wellington crosses the Nive — Danger of 
this operation — The allied army divided on the river — 
Soult concentrates his forces and attacks it — Indecisive 
battles of the 10th and 13th of December — Hostilities in 
the field resumed in February, 1814 — Difficulties of Soult 
and Wellington — Wellington attacks Soult — Passage of the 
Adour — Battle of Orthes — Retreat of Soult to Toulouse — 
Rising against Napoleon at Bordeaux — Pursuit of Welling- 
ton—Fall of Napoleon — Battle of Toulouse — End of the 
War. 

CHAPTER IX 

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA — QUATRE BRAS WATER- 
LOO 255 

Wellington made a Duke in 18 14 — He is sent as Ambas- 
sador to France — His position at the Congress of Vienna 
— Napoleon's escape from Elba — He regains the throne — 
Conduct of the Allies — The Hundred Days — Weakness of 
the Emperor's Government — His military preparations — 
The allied plan of campaign — Wellington proposes to 
invade France — Napoleon's plan of campaign — Concen- 
tration of the French army on the Belgian frontier — The 
operations of June 15, 1815 — Napoleon fails to attain 
fully his objects, but gains a distinct advantage — Bllicher 
hastily advances to encounter Napoleon with only part of 
his forces — Delays of Wellington — The battle of Ligny 
— The D'Erlon incident — Bliicher is defeated, but not de- 
stroyed — The Battle of Quatre Bras — Misconduct of Ney 



xiv Contents 

PAGE 

on the 16th of June — Tactics of Wellington — Napoleon 
and the French army on the 17th of June — Immense op- 
portunity given the Emperor — Grouchy is detached with 
a restraining wing — The night of the 17th of June — Oper- 
ations of the 1 8th of June — The battle of Waterloo — 
Fine defence of Wellington — Rout of the French army — 
Grouchy the real cause of the disaster. 



CHAPTER X 

THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION — ENTRANCE INTO PO- 
LITICAL LIFE 308 

Wellington and Blucher invade France — Intrigues of 
Fouche to effect the restoration of Louis XVIII. — Na- 
poleon practically deposed by the Chambers — Duplicity of 
Fouche — He paralyses the defence of Paris — Envoys sent 
to Wellington and Blucher — Hazardous advance of Blucher 
— Wisdom and moderation of Wellington — The capitu- 
lation of Paris— Great position of Wellington — He saves 
France from dismemberment, and does her other services 
— He commands the Army of Occupation — He enters 
political life in 1818, and is made Master of the Ordnance 
and Commander-in-Chief — The period from 1818 to 1827 
— Conduct of Wellington — His attitude to the Irish Cath- 
olic and other questions — His dispute with Canning. 

CHAPTER XI 

PRIME MINISTER OF ENGLAND ..... 329 
The Administration of Canning — Hopes formed as regards 
his policy — Death of Canning — The Goderich Ministry a 
mere stopgap — Wellington becomes Prime Minister — 
General belief that his Government would be permanent — 
Hill made Commander-in-Chief of the army — Repeal of 
the Test and Corporation Acts — Huskisson and the fol- 
lowers of Canning leave the Ministry — Vesey Fitzgerald — 
O'Connell stands for Clare — The Clare election — Great 
results — Catholic Emancipation a necessity of State — Policy 
of Peel and of Wellington — Great difficulties in their way 



Contents xv 

PAGE 

— The Emancipation Bill carried — Political consequences 
— Indignation of the high Tory party and of Protestant 
England — The question of Reform pressed to the front — 
Distress — Revolutions in France and in Belgium — The 
Reform movement adopted by the Whig party — Unwise 
speech of Wellington — Fall of his Government — Lord Grey 
and the Whigs in office. 

CHAPTER XII 

FROM 1830 TO 1841 ...... 349 

The Grey Government — It introduces the Reform Bill — 
Progress of the measures brought in — Wellington called 
upon to form an administration — He fails — The Reform 
Bill becomes law — Characteristics of the measure — Welling- 
ton steadily opposes it all through — Agitated and critical 
state of England — The Duke's life exposed to danger — 
The first Reformed Parliament — Fall of the Government 
of Lord Grey — Lord Melbourne Prime Minister — William 
IV. changes his Ministry and places Wellington at the 
head of affairs — His patriotic conduct — Peel Prime Minis- 
ter — His first short administration — The Melbourne Gov- 
ernment restored to office — Wise and moderate attitude of 
Wellington in opposition — Death of William IV. — Acces- 
sion of Queen Victoria — Soult in England — Feebleness of 
the Melbourne Government — Wellington and Peel, who 
had been estranged, are completely reconciled — Fall of 
the Melbourne Government — Peel Prime Minister. 



CHAPTER XIII 

DECLINING YEARS DEATH — CHARACTER > . 365 

Wellington in the Cabinet of Peel, but without office — He 
returns to the command of the army after the retirement of 
Hill — State of England when Peel became Minister in 
1 841 — His great fiscal and economical reforms — Policy of 
Free Trade — The Income Tax — Peel's administration 
gradually undermined — The failure of the potato in Ireland 
— Discussions in the Cabinet — Attitude of Wellington — 



XVI 



Contents 



Resignation of Peel and return to office — The ultimate 
repeal of the Corn Laws carried through Parliament — 
Wellington succeeds in passing the measure through the 
House of Lords — Fall of Peel's Ministry — The Administra- 
tion of Lord John Russell — Wellington often consulted — 
His conduct as Commander-in-Chief in his later years 
— Universal reverence felt for him — His death and funeral 
— His character as a general, as a military administrator, 
as a statesman, and in public and private life. 



INDEX 



387 




ILLUSTRATIONS 



the duke of Wellington . . Frontispiece 

After the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence, 

P.R.A. Now in the possession of Lord Bath- 

urst. From a print of a negative owned by 

Goupil. 

ROBERT STUART, VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH 

After the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence. 

PLAN OF ASSAYE ...... 

NAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY .... 

From a steel engraving. 

PLAN OF VIMIERO ...... 

SIR JOHN HOPE, EARL OF HOPETOUN 

From the painting by Sir Henry Raeburn, R.A. 

LORD WELLESLEY ...... 

From the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence. 

PLAN OF TALAVERA ..... 

MARSHAL NEY ...... 

After the painting by Gerard. 

MARSHAL SOULT ...... 

After the painting by Rouillard. 
xvii 



2 2 ''' 

/ 

5° 

66 

76 

86 

92 
94 ' 

114 



XV111 



Illustrations 



PLAN OF BUSACO . 

ANDRE MASSENA, DUKE DE RIVOLI 
After the painting by Maurice. 

BLUCHER 

From an old engraving 

PLAN OF BADAJOZ . 

PLAN OF SALAMANCA 



.A. 

r Thomas Lawrence. 



VISCOUNT ROWLAND HILL 

From the painting by H. W. Pickersgill, R 

LORD LYNEDOCH . 

After the painting by Si 

PLAN OF VITORIA . 

PLAN OF PYRENEES 

SIR GEORGE MURRAY 

After the painting by H. W. Pickersgill. 

PLAN OF LINES OF THE NIVELLE 

PLAN OF BAYONNE 

PLAN OF BATTLE OF ORTHES 

PLAN OF TOULOUSE 

PLAN OF QUATRE BRAS . 

PLAN OF WATERLOO 



NAPOLEON BY A DYING CAMP 



FIRE 



From a drawing by Charlet. 

SIR ROBERT PEEL ..... 

From the painting by John Linnell, in the National 
Portrait Gallery. 

SIR HENRY HARDING .... 
After the painting by E. Eddis. 



372 



Illustrations 

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON . 
From a steel engraving. 

MAPS 

MAP OF INDIA IN 1804 . 

MAP OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 

To illustrate the Peninsular War. 



XIX 

PAGE 
380 



42 
254 ' 




WELLINGTON 



CHAPTER I 

EARLY YEARS 

Birth and family of Wellington — The Wellesleys or Wesleys in 
Ireland — Arthur Wesley, his boyhood — He is sent to Eton and 
Angers — He enters the army — His attention to his military du- 
ties, and his studies — He is placed on the staff of Lord West- 
moreland, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland — He seconds the ad- 
dress in the Irish Parliament — The Catholic Relief Bill of 1793 
— He distinguishes himself in the campaign of 1794 in Holland, 
but seeks to leave the army. 

THERE is some uncertainty as to the date of the 
birth of Wellington, as there is with respect 
to the date of the birth of Napoleon. The 
evidence, however, is nearly conclusive that Napo- 
leon was born on the 15th of August, 1769, and 
that Wellington was born on the 1st of May in the 
same year ; " Providence," said Louis XVIII. , " gave 
us this counterpoise." The family of the future 
soldier and statesman belonged to " the English in 
Ireland," as they have been called ; it may be traced 



2 Wellington 

back to Waleran de Wellesley, a Judge of the An- 
glo-Norman Colony of the Pale in the thirteenth 
century. The descendants of the Judge had no dis- 
tinguished names; they were more fortunate than 
most of the " Old English'ry," and escaped the ef- 
fects of confiscation and conquest ; they were owners 
of large estates in Meath and Kildare when the Act 
of Settlement confirmed the Cromwellian forfeitures. 
The surname of Wellesley had, before this, been cor- 
rupted into that of Wesley about the time of the 
restoration of Charles II. Garret Wesley married a 
daughter of a gentleman of the name of Colley, of 
a family, also of English blood, which had been set- 
tled in the County of Kilkenny, since the reign of 
Henry V. The marriage of Garret having been 
childless, he transmitted his lands to a nephew, 
Richard Colley, on the condition of his taking the 
name and arms of Wesley ; and Richard Colley 
Wesley, who, like many of the Colonial caste, had 
considerable borough influence in the Irish House of 
Commons, was created Baron Mornington in the 
Peerage of Ireland in 1747. His son Garret, not a 
man of superior parts, and remarkable only for his 
skill in music, which attracted the notice of George 
III., was made Earl of Mornington in 1760; he mar- 
ried a daughter of the House of Hill, a prominent 
House of the Anglo-Irish Colony ; by her he had 
five sons and a daughter, the fourth son, Arthur, being 
the Wellington of another day. It may thus be ob- 
served that Wellington, as far as can be ascertained, 
had nothing in common with the native Irish race; 
no Celtic blood, probably, ran in his veins ; his na- 



Early Years 3 

ture was the very opposite of that of the Celt ; he 
was a scion of the English conquerors settled in Ire- 
land, identified with them in lineage and in faith; 
and through life he had strong sympathies with this 
order of men, the representatives of Protestant as- 
cendency, as it was called. 

In the case of Wellington, as in that of Napoleon, 
and indeed of many other illustrious men, the off- 
spring inherited its best gifts from the maternal par- 
ent. Lady Mornington, left a widow in 178 1, was a 
woman of no ordinary powers, and of very remarkable 
strength of character ; but her nature was imperious 
and not genial ; her temperament was rather stern 
and cold ; we see these qualities in the greatest of 
her sons. It is a singular fact that she had no per- 
ception of what Arthur, even in boyhood, must have 
been ; she thought him stupid and without a sign of 
promise. " I vow to God," she once exclaimed ; " I 
don't know what I shall do with him." There was, 
in truth, no kind of sympathy between the mother 
and the son ; in his early as in his later years, the 
domestic life of Wellington was not happy; this 
may, in part, account for what he was in the circle of 
home. The lad was sent for a short time to Eton, 
but unlike Richard, his eldest brother, a darling of 
Eton and Oxford tutors, and one of the greatest 
English masters of the Latin tongue, he made no 
mark at that celebrated school, though certainly he 
retained an affection for it ; " the cricket field at 
Eton," he once said, "had its effect at Waterloo." 
We find Arthur next at a kind of military school at 
Angers, directed by a distinguished officer of French 



4 Wellington 

engineers ; Lady Mornington seems to have gratified 
his inclination in this ; she had destined him for a 
small place in the Irish Excise ; but " nothing would 
satisfy him but to go into the army." She sent him 
to Angers to learn his calling, contemptuously re- 
marking that " he would be only food for powder." 
We know little or nothing about Wellington's life at 
Angers ; but probably he read hard and with profit : 
many years afterwards he said to a friend that he 
" had made it a rule to work some hours at his books 
from a very early age." In 1787, he obtained his 
first commission ; and, perhaps owing to family influ- 
ence, passed rapidly through the lower grades of the 
service. He was raised to the rank of major within 
six years ; this, for that age, was extremely quick pro- 
motion. We now begin to see what he really was ; 
like Turenne, with whom he had some points in 
common, he became an excellent infantry officer, and 
when a captain, had his company in the best order ; 
and he addressed himself especially to the mastery 
of the tactics of his arm, in which he has never, per- 
haps, been excelled, as Napoleon was pre-eminent 
in all that pertained to artillery. As he once ob- 
served in his characteristic fashion : " I was not so 
young as not to know that since I had undertaken a 
profession, I had better try to understand it. I be- 
lieve that I owe most of my success to the attention 
I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regi- 
mental officer. There were very few men in the 
army who knew these details better than I did ; it 
is the foundation of all military knowledge." 

Having recently obtained a troop of dragoons, 



Early Years 5 

Arthur Wesley, in the autumn of 1792, was placed 
on the staff of Lord Westmoreland, the head of 
the Irish Government. The social life of Dublin in 
those days was very brilliant ; the Protestant aris- 
tocracy, proud of the Revolution of 1782, which had 
made their Parliament independent in name, gave 
free rein to pleasure carried to excess ; their gaiety, 
their hospitalities, their high play, were famous. A 
young aide-de-camp of the Lord Lieutenant has 
always been a favourite in the Irish capital ; Arthur 
Wesley took part in the State balls, the dinners, and 
the other festivities of the time, but he was hardly 
conspicuous among his brother officers. The tradi- 
tions about him, when at the Castle, are few ; two 
anecdotes, however, may be mentioned ; he is said to 
have pointed out a house in the city, which com- 
manded a number of leading streets, and to have 
advised that it should be fortified ; and I have my- 
self heard a veteran, in extreme old age, tell how he 
was near fighting a duel with the great future war- 
rior, and how well it was that his pistol had not the 
chance of perhaps changing the fortunes of Europe ! 
Wesley had entered the Irish House of Commons 
in 1790, as a member of the pocket borough of Trim, 
an appanage of his family in the eighteenth century, 
as was the case of five-sixths of the Irish boroughs, 
petty corporations, feeble and corrupt, the mono- 
plies of the dominant lords of the soil. Nothing 
is known about his early parliamentary career; but 
we may perhaps guess what he may have thought, 
with characteristic common sense and judgment, of 
an assembly which was a mere caricature of the 



6 Wellington 

greater assembly that had its seat at Westminster ; 
which did not represent a fifth part of the Irish 
people ; and which, though it contained many re- 
markable men, abounded in factions and bad ele- 
ments ; and was the instrument of an oligarchy of 
sect at the beck of the Castle. He belonged, how- 
ever, to the party attached to the Government, which, 
practically, was supreme in College Green, and in 
fact was a dependent of the Lord Lieutenant ; we 
may rest assured that he would have denounced Irish 
parliamentary reform at this time, as he denounced 
the great Reform Bill forty years afterwards. The 
period when he was a member of the Irish Parlia- 
ment was one filled with portentous events, and of 
evil omen to Ireland and Great Britain alike. The 
French Revolution had shaken Ireland and her social 
structure to its base ; Presbyterian Ulster was dis- 
affected to the core, and was falling into the hands 
of the United Irishmen ; Catholic Ireland, still down- 
trodden and oppressed, was beginning to stir with a 
dangerous movement ; the institutions of the country, 
founded on an ascendency of race and creed, exclu- 
sive and unjust, were in no doubtful peril. At the 
same time, notwithstanding the efforts of Pitt, the 
Revolution was turning England against France ; 
and there were many signs of a tremendous im- 
pending conflict. 

When the Irish Parliament had assembled for the 
session of 1793, Arthur Wesley was put forward to 
second the Address to the Throne. A great "Roman 
Catholic Relief Bill," as it was named, was the prin- 
cipal measure before the House of Commons ; even 



Early Years 7 

now it has much historical interest. During a period 
of more than twenty years, the fetters which bound 
the Catholic Irish had been removed by degrees ; 
they had been allowed to live in peace, in their own 
country, and even to acquire lands by purchase ; 
they had been freed from the worst social disabili- 
ties imposed on them, but they were still almost with- 
out political power, — in fact, all but shut out from 
the pale of the State ; and though the illustrious 
Grattan and his followers aimed at raising them to 
the level of the Protestants in their midst, a large 
majority at College Green were still opposed to their 
claims. The condition of Ireland, however, had 
alarmed Pitt, and, probably at the instigation of 
Burke, through life a champion of the Irish Catholic 
people, the Minister had resolved to bring in a 
measure for enlarging the rights of the Catholic 
Irish, and to carry it through the Irish Parliament 
by the means in his hands. The bill, like many 
other projects of the kind, revealed the ignorance of 
Ireland characteristic of British statesmen ; it ad- 
mitted, but with great and invidious exceptions, the 
Irish Catholic to certain offices in the State ; but — 
and this was its most distinctive and worst feature 
— it gave the electoral franchise to the great body 
of the Irish peasantry — a priest-ridden multitude of 
Helot serfs — and closed the doors of Parliament to 
the Catholic peer and gentlemen, exactly reversing 
the course of what should have been a true policy. 
The measure, however, passed both Houses; the 
majority, if not without angry protests, being in- 
duced or bribed to give their assent ; but it gave 



8 Wellington 

rise to very able debates ; more than one of the Op- 
position pointed out, with prophetic insight, what — 
even if it were delayed for years — would be the 
natural, perhaps the inevitable result, of conferring 
immense political power on the Catholic masses, 
and withholding it from their superiors and leaders. 
Wesley's speech on this occasion was confined to a 
few words ; it was the speech of a young Castle offi- 
cial ; but we may speculate if the predictions he 
heard at this time did not cross his mind when the 
Clare election of 1828 — a triumph won by the 
peasantry enfranchised in 1793 — extorted Catholic 
Emancipation from his reluctant hands. It deserves 
notice that he objected to the policy of letting 
Catholics into the Irish Parliament, on the ground 
only that this project might cause disunion, and not, 
as the school of Flood did, on the ground of princi- 
ple ; this is perhaps the first instance of the spirit 
of compromise, which was characteristic of the 
statesman of another age. 

Wesley had left the Irish House of Commons 
within a few months. He had entered on his ac- 
tive military career in the early spring of 1794. He 
had been made lieutenant-colonel of the 33rd Foot 
through the influence of Lord Westmoreland and 
of his eldest brother, who had succeeded, of course, 
to his father's peerage ; he sailed from Cork under the 
command of Lord Moira to take part in the great 
war which was being waged between the League of 
Europe and revolutionary France. The conflict had 
been a fierce struggle of opposing principles; the 
aristocracies and monarchies of the eighteenth cent- 



Early Years 9 

ury had encountered a democracy formidable in its 
strength and its new ideas: a great nation, appar- 
ently on the brink of destruction, had baffled a 
coalition which seemed impossible to resist, had 
struck down a host of domestic foes, and was now 
advancing on a flood tide of victory. The situation, 
nevertheless, might have been made desperate for 
France in her agony in the later months of 1793. 
After Neerwinden, the allied armies had reached the 
camp of Caesar and were only a few marches from 
Paris, with weak and beaten levies in their path ; 
they could, without difficulty, have seized the capi- 
tal and mastered its Jacobin rulers in their seat. 
France was being invaded on all her borders ; a civil 
war was raging in the West ; Marseilles and Lyons 
were in revolt ; Toulon was assailed by a great hos- 
tile fleet ; the Girondin rising stirred whole pro- 
vinces. But the Allies were divided in mind and 
jealous of each other; there was no real unity in 
their councils; their military operations were ill-di- 
rected ; disseminated upon an immense front, they 
wasted their power in useless sieges, they never 
combined their vast forces against the common 
enemy. France was given what was, above all, 
needed, time ; a terrible dictatorship, the Commit- 
tee of Public Safety, laid hold of the resources of 
the country and of its head, Paris, and summoned the 
mass of the nation to arms. Frightful as the Reign 
of Terror was, its results were decisive. The fourteen 
armies of the Republic stemmed the tide of inva- 
sion ; the Allies were discomfited on the northern 
and the eastern frontiers ; the insurrection of La 



io Wellington 

Vendue sank in blood and ashes ; the genius of Bo- 
naparte saved Toulon ; the rebel cities of the South 
fell ; the Girondins and their adherents were crushed. 
Before the summer of 1794, the war had turned de- 
cisively against the coalition. While Prussia was hesi- 
tating in the East, Carnot had flung armed masses 
into the Low Countries : the Duke of York had 
been defeated near Tournay ; Jourdan had won a 
great battle on the plains of Fleurus ; and while the 
Duke was in full retreat in Belgium, his Austrian 
colleagues were making off for the Rhine. The 
League of Europe was, in a word, fast breaking up ; 
the Republic was advancing beyond old France; her 
arms and her evangel of liberty were spreading her 
influence far and near. 

Wesley, even before this time, seems to have been 
recognised by his superiors as a capable officer. The 
33rd Regiment was a model corps; its organisation 
and discipline were extremely good ; it was a speci- 
men of the admirable work and care of a commander 
who, in his own words, " was always on the spot, 
saw everything and did everything himself." Lord 
Moira placed the young colonel at the head of a 
brigade ; Wesley had soon given proof of military 
insight and skill. The Duke of York, driven from 
Oudenarde and the adjoining country, was now in 
full retreat to the Lower Scheldt, with Pichegru and 
Moreau on his track ; Moira and his contingent had 
landed at Ostend ; Wesley urged his chief to re- 
embark, and to join the Duke by sea, obviously 
the proper and the only safe course. Moira, how- 
ever, with remarkable want of judgment, marched 



Early Years 1 1 

from Ostend behind the screen of the Great Canal, 
exposing his flank to a victorious enemy ; he fortu- 
nately escaped, but was in grave danger; Wesley 
actually re-embarked with his brigade and had come 
into line with the Duke before his commander. It is 
unnecessary to retrace the events of the campaign 
that followed, glorious to France, most disastrous to 
the arms of the Allies. The French fortresses which 
had fallen the year before were easily recaptured 
after the late defeats of the League; Pichegru, Mo- 
reau, and Jourdan had erelong entered Brussels and 
taken possession of the whole of Belgium ; the Duke 
of York, isolated and without his supports, retreated 
behind the Lower Meuse and the Wahal ; the Aus- 
trian Clerfait, beaten on the Ourthe and the Roer, 
with difficulty escaped across the Rhine by Cologne. 
The French now advanced into Holland in triumph. 
The Prince of Orange and the aristocratic party en- 
deavoured for a time to make a stand and with part 
of the army to help the Duke, but the great body 
of the people had had sympathies for many years 
with France ; it had been leavened with the Revo- 
lutionary hopes and doctrines ; it welcomed the 
invaders as liberators from the yoke of the Stadt- 
holders, and as bringing them freedom at the point 
of their swords. The French armies swept over the 
States like a torrent, meeting hardly any resistance 
on their way ; fortress after fortress opened its gates ; 
the line of the Wahal was lost ; the Duke of York, 
who had gone back to England and given his com- 
mand to a German colleague, had left his army in 
critical straits ; it was ultimately compelled to fall 



1 2 Wellington 

back behind the Ems, and, discomfited, to embark 
for England from Bremen. Meanwhile a winter of 
extraordinary severity had set in, the great rivers of 
Holland were congealed and ceased to afford any 
lines of defence, and the campaign ended with the 
capture of Amsterdam and of the greater part of the 
renowned Dutch fleet, boarded, strange to say, by 
squadrons of Pichegru's hussars. 

Wesley played a not undistinguished part in this 
unfortunate contest in the Low Countries. He 
covered the retreat of the Army, on more than one 
occasion ; beat off the enemy, in a bloody struggle 
round Boxtel, a village not far from the Wahal, and. 
was repeatedly thanked, by his superiors, for his good 
services. He has left experiences of what he wit- 
nessed, and has written a few words on the state of 
the British Army at this time. The troops, true to 
their nature, were stubborn and brave : many of the 
regiments were well ordered, and did their duty ad- 
mirably in a most severe trial. But the tactics of the 
Army were antiquated and bad ; its formations were 
cumbrous and heavy in the extreme ; it was ill com- 
manded through nearly all its grades; " no one knew 
how to manage it," as a collective military force. 
The Army, in fact, at this period, had sunk to the 
lowest point of inferiority seen in its history. It 
gave proof, no doubt, of the great qualities of the 
race ; it often beat the French soldiery in fair fight, 
fired as these were with patriotic passions, and for- 
midable as they have always been in success. But it 
had been hastily recruited, and had few seasoned 
men ; its mechanism and organisation were very de- 



Early Years 1 3 

fective ; it had suffered from the economising policy 
of Pitt, who would not prepare for war until the last 
moment. Its leaders, from the Commander-in-Chief 
to the subaltern, had little or no knowledge of the 
military art, and gave little attention to their pro- 
fession ; the grossest favouritism prevailed in the 
service ; political interest, jobbing, anything but 
merit, were the passports to even the highest promo- 
tion. The Army, in a word, was full of abuses and 
defects; Wesley remarked that the officers in 1794 
were careless and idle; that outpost duties were 
miserably performed ; that incapacity was conspicu- 
ous even in the highest places. This, too, was nearly 
the view of Nelson about this time ; and in truth, 
after Saratoga and Yorktown, the British Army 
stood ill in opinion in England, and throughout 
Europe. Arthur Wesley appears to have had a con- 
viction that he had no opportunity to rise in such a 
calling ; he was disgusted with what he had seen in 
the Netherlands, and actually applied for a civil post ; 
for he said, " I see the manner in which military offi- 
ces are filled." Propitious Fortune, however, refused 
his prayer ; " he was to be shown to her," like the 
Roman, in a very different aspect. The destinies 
of the greatest men have thus hung upon seeming 
trifles ; Cromwell had turned his eyes to New Eng- 
land before the great Civil War ; Napoleon sought a 
mission to the Turk when on the eve of command- 
ing the Army of Italy. 




CHAPTER II 

CAREER IN INDIA 

Wesley fails to get a post in the Civil Service — He is prevented from 
going in an expedition to the West Indies — He is sent with the 
33rd to India — His memorandum on military affairs, the first 
instance of his sagacious views on this subject — Lord Morning- 
ton made Governor-General — The two brothers in India — State 
of our Empire and of the Company at this conjuncture — The 
name of Wesley changed back to that of Wellesley — Operations 
against Tippoo Sahib — Arthur Wellesley, as a rule, on the side of 
peace — His failure at an outpost — Fall of Seringapatam — Set- 
tlement of Mysore — Wellesley made Governor — His adminis- 
tration — Defeat of Dhoondiah Waugh — Baird sent to Egypt in- 
stead of Wellesley — The Mahratta War — Assaye, great ability 
shown by Wellesley in the battle — Lord Lake's operations — De- 
feat of Monson — Wellesley leaves India for England. 

WE know nothing of what occurred as to 
Arthur Wesley's attempt to enter the 
Civil Service of the State, save that, hap- 
pily, it was not attended with success. Fortune, 
too, smiled on him in another instance ; he embarked, 
with the 33rd, to take part in an expedition against 
the French settlements in the West Indies, objects 
of British attack since the beginning of the war. A 
tempest, however, put a stop to the enterprise ; 
many of the transports, the "wooden coffins" of those 

14 



Career in India 15 

days, were wrecked, a considerable number of the 
troops, perished and the 33rd and its chief were soon 
afterward despatched to the East. Wesley on the 
voyage devoted studious hours to acquiring a know- 
ledge of the affairs of India ; his natural sagacity, 
even now remarkable, made what he had thus 
mastered of sterling value. He landed at Calcutta 
in the spring of 1797; our rule in the Peninsula was 
being already threatened by rumours of war gather- 
ing in on many sides ; the reins of government were 
in the hands of Sir John Shore, one of the Viceroys, 
who adopted a timid policy in Hindustan before our 
Empire had been fully established. The Governor- 
General, however, did not perceive any immediate 
danger ; by this time, we were at war with Spain ; St. 
Vincent had been won by the genius of Nelson ; 
Wesley's services were first put in request for a pro- 
jected attack against Manila, the capital of the 
Philippine Islands, the scene of one of our triumphs 
in the Seven Years' War. The expedition never took 
place, but preparations for it gave to Wesley, then 
in his twenty-eighth year, his first opportunity to 
place on record his clear and farsighted views on 
military affairs, conspicuous for their mastery of de- 
tails of all kinds, which were distinctive features of 
his capacity in command. Erelong a change had 
passed over the situation in the East : the Peninsula 
had been stirred by echoes of French victories in 
the West ; French ambition and intrigue were at 
work against our rule ; Tippoo Sahib was intent on 
recovering the dominions he had lost ; some of our 
allies were hesitating, even ready to declare against 



1 6 Wellington 

us. In these circumstances, Sir John Shore was suc- 
ceeded by Wesley's eldest brother, Mornington. 
The new Governor-General, who had served on the 
Board of Control, but whose great powers had not yet 
been displayed, even if he was well acquainted with 
Indian affairs, reached Calcutta in May, 1798, at the 
very moment when Napoleon was about to embark 
for Egypt and to make an effort to descend from the 
Nile on the Indies, an enterprise which, extravagant 
as it may appear, he maintained, even at St. Helena, 
was quite feasible. The youthful conqueror had 
already negotiated with Tippoo Sahib, and certainly 
had designs against our Empire in the East ; but as 
he was baffled by Nelson in the Bay of Aboukir, so 
it was his destiny that Richard and Arthur Wesley 
should place that Empire on foundations which 
could defy his genius, and make subsequent plans of 
invasion hopeless, It may here be added that about 
this time the two brothers reverted to the old name 
of the family ; the more aristocratic Wellesley re- 
placed the more plebeian Wesley. 

When Lord Mornington was made chief Gover- 
nor, England had become the dominant Power in 
India, but our Empire was even yet by no means 
assured. The supremacy of the Moguls was a thing 
of the past ; a mere phantom held idle state at 
Delhi ; the Peninsula was ruled by the great Com- 
pany, or was parcelled out among Princes of differ- 
ent races, overawed by the strangers from across the 
ocean, but disunited and usually at feud with each 
other. The vast basin of the Ganges was completely 
in our hands; the Presidencies of Madras and Bom- 



Career in India 17 

bay, once the seats of insignificant trading factories, 
had extended far inland from either sea, and em- 
braced large provinces under subject chiefs ; Oude, 
a kingdom in itself, had been reduced to vassalage ; 
our authority was felt by the tribes and the peoples 
under the shadows of the Himalayas, and along the 
course of the Indus. The arms of France and the 
genius of Dupleix, for a time threatening our very 
existence in the East, had failed against Clive and 
the Lords of the Sea ; a succession of victories, 
sometimes of an extraordinary kind, Plassy, Wande- 
wash, Porto-Novo, and many more, had proved that, 
even against enormous odds, the islanders of Europe 
could crush Asiatics in fair fight. An Empire, in 
fact, to which history can show no parallel, had been 
built up, in the space of less than half a century, 
out of the wrecks of imposing but declining dynas- 
ties, by the capacity and craft of two or three master 
minds ; and a handful of Englishmen scattered in 
their midst, had become the rulers of populations of 
many millions, or kept them down by the terror of the 
English name. Our supremacy in India, however, 
was new, and, not yet deep-rooted, it was menaced 
by native foes, vanquished but still able to strike, and 
by one of the great Powers of Europe. It depended 
in part on the faith of still doubtful allies; it owed, 
in some measure, its existence and its strength to 
the jealousies and the discords of still great poten- 
tates, who, though hostile to each other for years, 
might, should an opportunity arise, combine their 
arms against it. Tippoo Sahib, from the table-land 
of Mysore, was ready, as Hyder Ali had been, to 



1 8 Wellington 

descend on our territories round Madras and Bom- 
bay, and, at the head of a great army, to avenge his 
defeats at the hands of Cornwallis. Revolutionary 
France had not forgotten the efforts of Dupleix ; she 
was eager to contend again for empire in Hindu- 
stan. Napoleon, we have seen, had stretched a hand 
to Tippoo ; French officers had organised the forces 
of several of the Indian Princes, and were awaiting 
the moment of a French invasion. The Viceroy of 
the Deccan, called the Nizam, was the only powerful 
ally on whom we could reckon, and even he was by 
no means trustworthy ; and the great confederacy of 
the Mahrattas, at one time friendly, was gradually 
becoming all but openly hostile. Tippoo and the 
Mahrattas were the most formidable of the native 
Powers ; they had often been at war with each other, 
and the chiefs of the Mahrattas were not united ; 
but events were tending to make them the foes of 
England. 

The internal government of our Indian dominions, 
though very different from what it has been for 
years, was now infinitely better than it was at its 
origin. Burke was never just to the rule of the 
Company ; it was never that of a " mere rapacious, 
peculating, and unsteady despotism"; its "posses- 
sion of Hindustan had not been like that of the 
ourangoutang and the hyaena." But, as has usually 
happened when a small body of conquerors, the off- 
spring of a great Imperial race, subdues whole 
nations of races of a less powerful type, our ascend- 
ency had not been gained without deeds of violence 
and wrong ; and the Company's reign, at its be- 



Career in India 19 

ginning, had this special evil feature: it was that of 
adventurers who made India their footstool, in order 
to amass money, and to return to England to spend 
it. Long before the Wellesleys had made their 
presence felt at Calcutta, crimes such as those which, 
in a few instances, can be fairly laid to the charge of 
Clive and Hastings, had become only memories con- 
demned by history; the measure meted out to 
Omichund and Nuncomar, the Rohilla War, the 
oppression of the Princesses of Oude, were no longer 
possible under existing conditions. The days, too 
had passed away for ever, when the administration 
of the Company could be described as a "combina- 
tion of rapine and fraud"; of "setting up king- 
doms for sale " and of " breaking treaties " ; when 
its servants could be called "birds of prey and of 
passage " ; when whole districts were given up to 
monopolists, who starved terrified populations in 
the midst of plenty ; when traders made millions by 
unlawful gains, and formed a multitude of relentless 
Shylocks ; when "boys in uniform," in Burke's 
language, could riot in tyranny without a thought 
of justice ; when the steady, systematic, and grasp- 
ing rule of the Englishman was more dreaded than 
the swoop of the Mahratta horsemen. The Com- 
pany was still the chief power in India, but it had 
been brought under the control of the State ; the 
substance of government and the authority of the 
sword had passed into the hands of proconsuls, who 
had not abused their high office, and usually had been 
worthy of it ; immense internal reforms had been 
made, conceived in a good spirit, if not always wise; 



20 Wellington 

a system of law had been established, and was ad- 
ministered by judges, sometimes mistaken in their 
views, but upright: the affairs of the Peninsula were, 
even more than now, subject to the vigilant scrutiny 
and the severe eye of Parliament. Nevertheless the 
traces of the evil past had not vanished ; if there 
was little open violence, there was much secret cor- 
ruption ; the functionaries of the Company, nay, 
British officers, were too often accessible to the worst 
kinds of bribes ; in the administration of the ordin- 
ary affairs of life, the native had little chance against 
the Englishman, should their interests happen to 
come into conflict. The dominant race was still 
dominant in a bad sense ; the subject races were, in 
its eyes, little better than serfs. 

Lord Mornington had hardly been placed at the 
head of affairs in India, when the designs of Tippoo 
Sahib had become manifest. The Governor of the 
Isle of France, Malartic, had issued a proclamation 
to the effect that the French Republic and the ruler 
of Mysore had combined to expel the English in- 
truders from Hindustan ; Tippoo, it was known, 
was in communication with him. Mornington one 
of the series of the great proconsuls, of whom Hast- 
ings and Dalhousie are conspicuous types, was de- 
sirous to seize the occasion, and to strike down 
Tippoo at once ; but the intended expedition was 
delayed for months. The finances of the Company, 
diminished by recent wars, and by the expenses of 
administration of different kinds, were by no means 
in a prosperous state ; and, as always happened, 
there was a party among the Directors thinking of 



Career in India 21 

dividends only, and eager for peace at any price. 
Arthur Wellesley never subscribed to these ignoble 
views ; but, as has often been the case with illus- 
trious soldiers, he did not wish to precipitate war; 
he had a stronger will than his more accomplished 
brother, and exercised great influence over him ; 
he urged Mornington to treat with Tippoo, and to 
afford him a golden bridge to escape, We see here 
the first instance of the different lines of policy 
recommended or adopted by these two eminent 
men ; Richard Wellesley, as a rule, was for bold, 
even aggressive measures ; Arthur, for caution, com- 
promise, and, if possible, peace. Arthur, however, 
did not hesitate when it had become apparent that 
a league of foreign enemies and of native powers, of 
which Tippoo was to be the head, was being formed 
against our rule in India. The Nizam, we have 
seen, was our strongest, perhaps our only ally ; as 
had been the case with several of the Indian Princes, 
he had employed Frenchmen to organise and train 
his army ; this was a well-equipped force of about 
16,000 men ; its French chiefs had been won over 
by the intrigues of Tippoo. A. mutiny, however, 
had broken out among the troops; the officers were 
powerless ; the Nizam was willing to shake off the 
yoke of allies he feared, and to throw in his lot 
with the Governor-General : at the instance of 
Arthur Wellesley his army was suddenly disarmed, 
and the French officers were made prisoners of war. 
The Nizam now openly declared for England ; 
Mornington made a treaty with the nominal head 
of the Mahratta chiefs, binding them not to take up 



2 2 Wellington 



& 



arms in behalf of Tippoo ; every effort was made to 
fit out an army sufficiently formidable to invade and 
conquer Mysore. The stroke which Wellesley had 
advised had proved masterly ; it was an early ex- 
ample of his judgment and insight in war. 

Tippoo may not have heard of the destruction of 
the French fleet at the Nile ; he had been buoyed 
up by a pledge given by Napoleon that " an invinci- 
ble army was on the march to join him." All efforts 
at negotiation having failed, it was resolved to in- 
vade Mysore upon two lines: General Stuart with 
about 6000 men, advancing from the seaboard of 
Bombay, General Harris with a somewhat larger 
force, moving from the low country around Madras. 
Wellesley was still the chief of the 33rd ; an accident 
gave him the temporary command of the column of 
Harris— that general had been detained for some 
weeks in the rear; and the admirable arrangements 
the colonel made for the troops elicited from his su- 
perior a tribute of well-merited praise. 1 Towards the 
middle of February, 1799, the Army of the Nizam, 
about 1 5,000 strong, had effected its junction with the 



1 This was the first occasion when Wellesley was in any kind of 
independent command. I quote these remarks of General Harris: 
"I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that the 
very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops under 
the orders of the Hon. Col. Wellesley do honour to themselves and 
to him, while the judicious and masterly arrangements as to supplies, 
which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence in 
dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Welles- 
ley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle 
him to very marked approbation." — Wellesley s Dispatches, i. , 425. 
Wellington's conduct in the Peninsular War was thus prefigured. 




ROBERT STUART, VISCOUNT CASTlEREAGH 2nd MARQUESS 

OF LONDONDERRY. 

(After the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence.) 



Career in India 23 

force of Harris ; that chief, appreciating the conduct 
of his young lieutenant, placed this large contingent 
under the command of Wellesley, a selection beyond 
all question the best, but which was bitterly resented 
by General Baird, a distinguished and a much senior 
officer. The main Army was soon on its march 
through the passes between the hills that surround 
the uplands of Mysore ; but the vast bodies of camp 
followers, and the masses of baggage always in the 
train of Asiatic forces, — ingens belli lues, in the 
phrase of Tacitus, — considerably retarded the in- 
vader's movements, and their transport service well- 
nigh broke down. Tippoo fell on Stuart in the 
first instance, but he was defeated with heavy loss; 
he then attacked Harris at a place called Malavelly, 
a short distance only from his great fortified capital, 
Seringapatam. A sharp engagement was bravely 
fought, Wellesley being in command of the left wing 
of the Army ; he turned Tippoo's right and drove 
him, routed, from the field. The march of Harris, 
however, continued to be slow, owing to the many 
difficulties in his way and the prodigious burden of 
his impedimenta : he was not before Seringapatam 
until the first week of April. 

Tippoo had had time to prepare for a defence. 
Seringapatam, he felt sure, could defy his enemy. 
Yet Cornwallis had appeared before the place a few 
years before ; his army had stormed a great en- 
trenched camp, which had been made to cover the 
fortress ; Tippoo, fearing an assault, showed himself 
willing to treat. He had now assembled the flower 
of the army of Mysore, about 22,000 men, to make 



24 Wellington 

a resistance, from which he expected a triumph; 
more than 200 guns crowned the ramparts and 
bastions. The attacking force was about 35,000 
strong, with 100 guns. Before the regular approaches 
were made, an incident occurred, which was one of 
the rare examples of failure in Wellesley's military 
career. There were two outposts held by the enemy, 
about 4000 yards from the walls ; the fire of these 
annoyed our men ; one was successfully attacked 
and occupied ; Wellesley and the 33rd were beaten off 
from the other. The effort, in fact, had been made 
after dark and without sufficient care; Wellesley 
has left it on record that this reverse taught him 
" never to attack by night a post that had not 
been reconnoitred by day." The work was cap- 
tured without difficulty within twenty-four hours; 
but, owing to a mischance, Wellesley was late in 
appearing on the scene ; Harris saved him from 
anything like a reprimand ; but during the opera- 
tions that followed he was rather under a cloud. 
This is not the place to describe the siege of Ser- 
ingapatam, one of the innumerable instances in 
which the best men of the East have gone down 
before British valour ; in truth, Wellesley had little 
part in the attack; he was left in the rear, at the 
head of the reserve. The fortress rose upon an 
islet in the Cavery, and was formidable from its 
position and its means of defence ; but Tippoo had 
chiefly directed his attention to the northern front, 
that before which Cornwallis had drawn up his 
forces; Harris, who conducted the operations with 
no little skill, concentrated his strength upon the 



Career in India 25 

southern front, where the fortified defences were 
comparatively weak. Fire opened from the trenches 
in the last days of April ; ramparts, curtains, and 
forts were swept by a tempest of shot ; sallies of 
the horsemen of Mysore made no impression on 
their foes ; a breach was declared practicable on the 
2nd of May. On the 4th, Baird led some five thou- 
sand men, partly auxiliaries, partly choice British 
troops, to the assault ; as always, he proved himself 
to be a brave and able soldier. Crossing the bed of 
the Cavery, at this moment dry, and disregarding the 
fire directed against them, the assailants had soon 
mastered the breach, though they encountered a fierce 
and stern resistance, Tippoo fighting hand-to-hand 
at the head of his guards. The ramparts had been 
won ; but there was still an obstacle, in a wide fosse, 
which appeared impassable ; nothing, however, could 
stop Baird and his exulting men ; they forced their 
way across on planks and beams ; the garrison was 
driven from point to point ; its remains surrendered 
after a murderous conflict. Tippoo had struggled 
" like an Indian tiger," to the last ; he had called on 
his warriors to do or die ; his dead body was found 
amidst heaps of the slain. 

Baird struck the decisive stroke at Seringapatam ; 
he had given proof of heroism and resource at the 
imminent deadly breach. Having left the camp to 
make his report to the General-in-Chief, Wellesley 
was placed in temporary command of the city ; scenes 
were witnessed like those which, at this period, al- 
ways occurred after a successful assault. Wellesley 
dealt with the subject with the grim, cynical coolness 



26 Wellington 

shown afterwards at Badajoz and San Sebastian ; 
he allowed pillage to run riot for several hours, he 
thought this a lawful perquisite of war ; but he 
soon repressed these excesses and restored discipline. 
" It was impossible to expect that after the labour 
which the troops had undergone in working up to 
the place, and the various successes they had had in 
six different affairs with Tippoo's troops, in all of 
which they had come to the bayonet with them, 
they should not have looked to the plunder of the 
place. Nothing, therefore, can have exceeded what 
was done on the night of the 4th. Scarcely a house 
in the town was left unplundered, and I understood 
that in camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of 
gold, etc., have been offered for sale in the ba- 
zaars of the Army by our soldiers, sepoys, and for- 
eigners. I came in to take command on the 5th, 
and by the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging, 
etc., in the course of the day I restored order 
among the troops, and I hope I have gained the 
confidence of the people. They are returning to 
their houses, and beginning to follow again their 
occupations, but the property of every one is gone." ' 
Wellesley's command was made permanent by the 
orders of his chief, who had formed a very high 
opinion of him ; this not unnaturally incensed Baird : 
he complained that he had been twice unfairly sup- 
planted. The appointment, however, was confirmed 
by the Governor-General ; the ties of blood may 
have had some influence ; but Mornington emphati- 

1 Wellesley to Lord Mornington. Quoted by Sir H. Maxwell. 
Life of Wellington, i., 35. 



Career in India 2 J 

cally approved of the selection that had been made. 
He wrote thus to Harris: "My opinion or rather 
knowledge of my brother's discretion, judgment, 
temper, and integrity, are such, that if you had not 
placed him in Seringapatam, I would have done so 
of my own authority, because I think him in every 
point of view the most proper for that service." 
In fact, Baird, though an excellent officer, was not 
the man to rule Seringapatam. Wellington wrote of 
him in these words thirty-two years afterwards, 
when the passions of the time had long been forgot- 
ten and the great Duke was at the topmost height 
of renown : " Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion- 
hearted officer, but he had no talent, no tact ; had 
strong prejudices against the natives, and he was 
peculiarly disqualified from his manners, habits, etc. 
and it was supposed his temper, for the management 
of them. He had been Tippoo's prisoner for years. 
. . . I must say that I was the fit person to be 
selected. It is certainly true that this command 
afforded me opportunities for distinction, and thus 
opened the road to fame, which poor Baird always 
thought was, by the same act, closed upon him. 
Notwithstanding this, he and I were always upon 
the best of terms." 

The spoil of war taken at Seringapatam was im- 
mense, notwithstanding the pillage after the fall of 
the place. The annihilation of the power of Tippoo 
Sahib removed the greatest obstacle to our Empire 
in the East ; with his father, Hyder AH, he had long 
been our most dangerous foe, but, as has repeatedly 
happened in the affairs of India, this triumph was 



28 Wellington 

only the prelude to future conflicts. Lord Morning- 
ton was made Marquis Wellesley for these brilliant 
achievements ; but the peace party in the Company 
uttered vexatious protests ; nay, affronted the Gov- 
ernor-General in many ways ; unworthy murmurs 
were even heard in the House of Commons. India, 
however, was in too critical a state to permit Lord 
Wellesley to leave his post, and the remaining years 
of his rule were marked by a great advance of British 
power in the East. The settlement of the kingdom 
of Mysore was the first subject that needed atten- 
tion ; it was effected in the manner of which the 
Roman Republic gave many examples in like in- 
stances, and which had been a feature, too, of our 
policy in Hindustan. Hyder Ali and Tippoo had 
been usurpers ; a child, the heir of a Rajah they -had 
dispossessed, was restored to the best part of his 
ancestral domains ; the other parts were divided 
between the Company, the Nizam, and the suzerain 
of the Mahratta League. The sons of Tippoo, 
however, received a large indemnity ; it deserves 
especial notice that Arthur Wellesley was the chief 
counsellor of his brother in making these wise ar- 
rangements, and contributed more than any one else 
to a generous act of justice. Arthur was now made 
military Governor of Mysore ; though a civilian 
Resident was placed by his side, the whole adminis- 
tration of this great territory passed into his hands. 
He was for a short time engaged in a fierce struggle 
with a predatory chief, who had been a lieutenant 
of Tippoo, and who, gathering together irregular 
bands of armed men, had proclaimed himself " the 



Career in India 29 

king of the world," and was threatening the borders 
of the lands of Mysore ; but Wellesley literally 
hunted Dhoondia Waugh down in a succession of 
marches of extreme celerity, a characteristic of most 
of his operations in the East. Wellesley's govern- 
ment of Mysore marks a turning-point in the admin- 
istration of our rule in Hindustan. He insisted on 
having a free hand to act, and on being exempted 
from the control of the Company, — "for I know 
that the whole is a system of job and corruption 
from beginning to end, of which I and my troops 
would be made the instruments" ; the results were 
in the highest degree significant. An admirable 
change passed over the service ; integrity was en- 
forced and became general ; the practice of taking 
presents and douceurs was stopped ; the spirit of 
Wellesley's conduct is seen in these words ad- 
dressed to a soldier under his command : " In re- 
spect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I 
am surprised that any man in the character of a 
British officer should not have given the Rajah to 
understand that the offer would be considered an 
insult." It is unnecessary to say that what was 
done at Mysore was done, but on a large scale, at 
Calcutta. Lord Wellesley had set an example by 
refusing to accept the great sum of ;£ 100,000, as his 
share in the prize money of Seringapatam ; like his 
brother he made war on administrative misconduct 
of all kinds, especially on the taking gifts from the 
native princes and chiefs. It has been truly re- 
marked : " Of all the changes effected by the brothers 
Wellesley, none was so vital — so valuable to British 



3<d Wellington 

ascendency in India — as the end which, between 
them, they put to the old system of private pecula- 
tion and corruption. The administrative body be- 
came for the first time what it had long been in 
name, the Honourable East India Company." ' 

The great events which had occurred in the West 
had, meanwhile, made their influence felt in Hindu- 
stan. Napoleon had become the ruler of France ; 
Marengo and Hohenlinden had been fought; the 
Continent had succumbed at the peace of Luneville. 
But England, unaided, maintained the struggle ; the 
French army in Egypt was imprisoned within its 
conquest ; a British expedition was being made 
ready to reach the Nile. Lord Wellesley resolved 
to second this enterprise ; he had placed his brother 
at the head of a force intended to descend on the 
Isle of France ; but he directed this, which he con- 
siderably increased, to take part in our operations in 
Egypt; he made Baird the commander of this de- 
tachment, Arthur Wellesley not being of sufficient 
rank in the service. This irritated the young Gov- 
ernor of Mysore, and even caused a coolness between 
the brothers ; and yet fortune favoured Arthur 
again, — the victory of Abercromby had been won 
before Baird appeared on the scene, and he took 
no part in the triumph of our arms. The con- 
quest of Mysore had been consolidated by this time; 
it had greatly strengthened our authority in the 
East ; as a natural consequence, it brought us in 
contact with the powers of India, which were still un- 



1 Sir H. Maxwell's Life of Wellington, i., 72. 



Career in India 31 

subdued. The confederacy of the Mahrattas was 
the chief of these ; it was supreme in the dominions 
which the mighty Sevajee had carved out of the 
wrecks of the Mogul Empire ; springing originally 
from a race of freebooters, spread along the hills of 
the western coast, it now extended to the confines 
of Bengal and the Deccan. The head of the League 
was called the Peishwa ; but his authority, I have 
said, was nominal only, as was the case of many 
dynasties in Hindustan ; real power centred in 
independent princes, lords of a vast territory reach- 
ing nearly from Bombay to the Upper Ganges. The 
Rajah of Berar held a great province around his 
capital, Nagpore ; the Guikwar was ruler of Baroda 
and a large adjoining region ; Scindiah was the 
master of an immense domain between the Ner- 
budda and the Chambal ; Holkar, more to the 
north, occupied the country on the banks of the 
Jumna. All these potentates could place great 
armies on foot, those of Scindiah and Holkar disci- 
plined by French officers ; their light cavalry, like 
that of Hyder Ali, was an arm not to be despised. 
If united they might have been irresistible in the 
field ; but they were always divided, and often at 
war with each other; they had been our doubtful 
allies or our secret foes ; but they had never com- 
bined to challenge our Empire. It was the fortune 
of England, as it had been of Rome, 1 to rise to 

1 Compare the pregnant language of Tacitus. De moribus Ger- 
manorum XXXIII. " Maneat quseso, duretque gentibus, si non amor 
nostri ... at certe odium sui, quando, urgentibus Imperii 
fatis, nihil jam pnestare Fortuna majus potest, quam hostium dis- 
cordiam." 



32 Wellington 

supremacy in many lands, owing to the discord of 
races which stood in her path. 

It is unnecessary to comment on the events 
which ended in a war with the chief Mahratta 
Princes. Lord Wellesley and the leading men at 
Calcutta, foreseeing that a rupture could not, per- 
haps, be avoided, and not superior to sagacious 
statecraft, — true to the principle " divide and rule," 
they had won the Guikwar of Baroda over, — were 
desirous of striking when an occasion offered ; Arthur 
Wellesley characteristically condemned this policy, 
and even wrote of it in no measured language : 
" They breathe nothing but war, and appear to have 
adopted some of the French principles on that sub- 
ject. They seem to think that because the Mahrat- 
tas do not choose to ally themselves with us more 
closely . . . it is perfectly justifiable and proper 
that we should go to war with them." ' The ani- 
mosities, however, of the Mahratta Princes precipi- 
tated a conflict already impending. The Peishwa, 
reduced almost to a puppet, like the representative 
of the Imperial Moguls, had turned to the Governor- 
General to seek his aid ; but he had been overawed 
by Scindiah who had practically made him a vassal ; 
the negotiations had proved fruitless. The in- 
fluence, however, of Scindiah over his suzerain in 
name provoked the jealousy and suspicion of Hol- 
kar ; he took the field with a great army, defeated 
Scindiah and the Peishwa in a decisive battle, and 
had soon seized the city of Poona, the supposed 



1 Supplementary Despatches ii., 255-25S. Sir H. Maxwell's Life 
of Wellington, i., 51. 



Career in India 33 

seat of the Mahratta power. The Peishwa appealed 
to British protection ; he signed the treaty of Bas- 
sein with Lord Wellesley ; Stuart, with a consider- 
able army, was despatched from the frontier of 
Mysore, and Colonel Stevenson, with a body of the 
Nizam's auxiliaries, to avenge our ally and punish 
his enemies ; Wellesley now raised to the rank of 
General, was placed in command of a detachment 
under Stuart's orders. As usual, advancing with 
great celerity, Wellesley recaptured Poona, and 
made Holkar retreat northwards; the Peishwa re- 
turned in state to his capital. But the presence, 
perhaps, of a common danger had drawn Scindiah 
and Holkar together; they induced the Rajah of 
Berar to join them ; a large army, of which Scindiah 
was the head, was assembled to confront the islanders 
on the Mahratta frontier. Hostilities had now be- 
gun in earnest ; Lord Lake had marched across the 
Jumna against Holkar, and had compelled that chief 
to defend his provinces. Wellesley had been given 
the chief command of our forces round Poona, with 
full powers to treat with Scindiah and the Rajah of 
Berar. He made a real effort to negotiate; but he 
was forced with reluctance to draw the sword. The 
words he addressed to Scindiah were characteristic of 
the man : " I offered you peace on terms of equality, 
and honourable to all parties ; you have chosen war 
and are responsible for all consequences." ' 

The campaign had begun in the summer of 1803. 
On the 8th of August, Wellesley, at the head of 



1 Despatches i., 287. 
3 



34 Wellington 

some 13,000 men, — 5000 of these were Indian 
troops, — advanced against Ahmednagar, a fortified 
town commanding the roads from Poona into the 
country inland. The place fell after a sharp resistance; 
the British General marched northwards to effect 
a junction with Stevenson, who, perhaps 6000 
strong, had marched from the Deccan to meet his 
superior. The two forces, diminished by some de- 
tachments, came into line on the 21st of September; 
the enemy, it was known, was not distant ; Wellesley 
resolved to fall upon him as quickly as possible. Two 
passes led through a range of hills which separated 
him from the hostile armies ; each was at least seven 
or eight miles from the other. Wellesley ordered 
Stevenson to advance by the eastern pass, while 
the General-in-Chief advanced on the west. In pure 
strategy this was a false movement, which might 
have been fatal before a great chief of Europe ; but 
it gave Wellesley increased freedom of action ; the 
result justified a decision which he always defended. 
On the 23rd the British Commander — he had, 
perhaps, been ill-served by his cavalry scouts — 
learned that the united forces of Scindiah and the 
Rajah, 30,000 footmen and 20,000 horse, had taken 
a position only a few miles distant. Wellesley had 
but 8000 men in hand, as the division of Stevenson 
had not joined him, but he instantly and rightly 
resolved to attack ; a retreat, he probably argued, 
would cause his ruin. The position, however, of the 
enemy, enormously superior in force as he was, was 
well chosen, and formidable in the extreme. His 
armies were covered in front by the stream of 



Career in India 35 

the Kistna, flowing between rocky banks, and 
seemingly without a ford ; his left flank and rear 
were protected by the Juah, and in part by the vil- 
lage of Assaye: it would be very difficult to dis- 
lodge him from these points of vantage. His troops, 
too, made an imposing show ; masses of infantry 
stood in well-ordered array, thousands of horsemen 
filled the surrounding plains ; more than a hundred 
guns were drawn up in grim batteries. But Welles- 
ley knew how immense was the difference between 
the British and the Asiatic soldier ; the odds against 
him were, no doubt, prodigious ; but they were less 
than those which Clive had faced at Plassy, and, as 
in the case of Clive, the course of daring was the 
course of prudence. So Hannibal had exclaimed 
two thousand years before when he beheld a multi- 
tudinous host of the East, brought within the reach 
of a few legions of Rome : " Yes that is a brave 
army, and a brave show ; it will be enough for the 
Romans, greedy as they are." 

Having reconnoitred the ground with care, Welles- 
ley quickly made his dispositions for the attack. 
The enemy's cavalry was his most formidable arm ; 
its resplendent masses spread far on his right ; his 
less trustworthy infantry held his left ; the British 
General resolved to turn and to fall on this wing. 
An accident, indicating Wellesley's admirable coup 
d'ceil on the field, determined his well-designed 
purpose ; a village on his side of the Kistna rose oppo- 
site to Assaye on the other side ; despite the assur- 
ances of his Indian guides, he calculated that there 
must be a ford connecting the two : his movements 



36 Wellington 

were made upon this assumption. ' His little army, 
with only seventeen guns, made a long flank march 
across the front of the enemy, covered indeed by the 
Kistna, but dangerously exposed had Scindiah been 
a capable chief ; it was, however, not molested in 
this critical march ; its advanced guard had soon 
safely mastered the ford. The hostile commanders 
had missed the occasion ; they had not made an at- 
tempt to get over the river, and to fall on their ad- 
versary's imperilled flank ; they only effected a great 
change of front, their inferior infantry filling the 
space between the Kistna, the Juah, and Assaye ; 
their fine cavalry was rendered well-nigh useless. 
Wellesley, his whole force now across the Kistna, 
advanced rapidly against foes showing signs of weak- 
ness ; he directed his main effort against the Mah- 
ratta right : the result was hardly for a moment 
doubtful. His few guns, indeed, were nearly 
silenced ; a destructive fire thinned his line as it 
pressed forward ; but a single Highland regiment, 
backed by a body of native troops, carried every- 
thing before it at the point of the bayonet; the 
routed enemy was soon in headlong flight. On 
Wellesley's right the struggle was more stern and 
prolonged ; the officer in command, mistaking his 
orders, attacked Assaye, making a circuitous move- 



1 Wellington's only remark on this fine tactical inspiration was : 
"That was common sense. When one is strongly intent on an 
object, common sense will usually direct one to the right means." 
Napoleon (Corr., xxxii., 11 7,) thus commented on a somewhat similar 
movement of Turenne : "Cette circonstance ne parait rien ; cepen- 
dant c'est ce rien qui est un des indices du genie de la guerre." 



Career in India 37 

ment ; a gap was opened in the British line ; a few 
of the Mahratta squadrons made a brilliant charge. 
But Wellesley pushed forward his handful of horse- 
men ; the enemy was driven back in defeat ; Assaye 
was stormed by the 78th Highlanders ; as on the 
left, the bayonet swept away every foe on the right. 
Scindiah's army was soon in full retreat ; it had lost 
all its guns and 4000 or 5000 men killed and 
wounded ; an admirably planned attack, against 
enormous odds, had led to a most decisive victory. 

The operations of Wellesley at Assaye set at 
naught the maxims of the military art, as these are 
drawn from European warfare. He ought not, ac- 
cording to these principles, to have detached Steven- 
son and divided his forces ; he ought not to have 
attacked in the absence of his lieutenant, with only 
apart of a very small army, insignificant in size com- 
pared with its enemy ; he ought not to have made 
a long flank march, so to speak, under Scindiah's 
beard, and to have forded a river in the face of over- 
whelming numbers ; these moves would have been 
fatal against an able general and really good troops. 
Nevertheless, Wellesley adopted the true course; 
a hundred fields had shown that the armed swarms 
of the East could not make a stand against the 
discipline of the West, however great the seeming 
disproportion of strength ; his decision was that of a 
master of war, and his conduct in the battle deserves 
the highest praise. He acted like Miltiades at 
Marathon, like Alexander before Arbela, like Colin 
Campbell and Havelock, during the great Mutiny ; 
the children of Shem, in all ages, save in a few 



38 Wellington 

instances, have been no match, in a fair fight, for 
the children of Japheth. And had he retreated, he 
would have been lost ; Scindiah's horsemen would 
have crossed the Kistna, would have hemmed in 
and at last destroyed the small force that alone 
stood in their way ; nothing would ultimately have 
prevailed against their overpowering numbers. A 
notable example of what such a retreat must have 
been was unfortunately given a few months after- 
wards. I shall glance at Lord Lake's operations 
against the Mahratta chiefs : here I shall only refer 
to what happened to one of his best lieutenants. 
In the summer of 1804, Lake, a very able but some- 
what incautious chief, had moved forward Colonel 
Monson with 4000 or 5000 men, to a great 
distance beyond the main army ; and Monson had 
pushed forward outside the positions he had been 
directed to hold in the lands of Malwa. Holkar 
instantly prepared to cut his enemy off; he reached 
the Chambal, no doubt, in immensely superior 
numbers ; and had Monson attacked like Wellesley 
at Assaye — and certainly he had a better chance — 
he might have plucked safety, nay, a brilliant tri- 
umph, out of danger: most unhappily he fell back 
before his antagonist ; one of the most calamitous 
of retreats followed ; the small British division was 
all but cut to pieces and ruined in a march of hun- 
dreds of miles ; a mere shattered wreck drifted under 
the walls of Agra. The comment of Wellesley was 
brief but decisive: "These are woful examples of 
the risk to be incurred by advancing too far without 
competent supplies, and of the danger of attempting 



Career in India 39 

to retreat before such an army as Holkar's. He 
would have done much better to attack Holkar at 
once, and he would probably have put an end to the 
war." 1 

Wellesley did not attempt to pursue the defeated 
army ; we may, perhaps, see here one of his pecu- 
liarities in war ; his were not the lightning strokes of 
Napoleon, in annihilating an enemy beaten in the 
field. But he successfully closed a very brilliant 
campaign. Stevenson, having joined him after 
Assaye, was despatched to overrun Scindiah's 
country ; he captured two of the Prince's strong- 
holds ; negotiations ensued, but they came to no- 
thing. Wellesley and Stevenson having come into 
line, they now advanced northwards, and met the 
hostile forces drawn up around the petty town of 
Argaum, still greatly superior in numbers. The 
British General was now at the head of 18,000 men; 
he made his arrangements for an immediate attack; 
the result of the battle was never doubtful, though 
three native battalions were struck with panic, and 
were only rallied by Wellesley himself. The enemy 
was routed with hardly any loss to the victors ; 
Wellesley laid siege to the fortress of Gawilghur, a 
point of vantage not far from Argaum ; the place 
was stormed after a feeble resistance. Meanwhile, 
Lord Lake had struck decisive blows against the 
confederacy of the Mahrattas in the north-west. 
Scindiah was supreme in the League : he had made 
Holkar and the Rajah of Berar his mere dependents ; 



1 Supplementary Despatches, iv. , 466. 



40 Wellington 

he was still a formidable and determined foe. He 
had a powerful army upon the Jumna, commanded 
by Perron, a French officer ; he had made Shah 
Alum, the Emperor in name, a vassal, and held him 
captive in the old seat of his State, Delhi ; he had 
stretched hands to the chiefs of the races in the 
lands of the Punjaub. Lake, however, breaking up 
from Cawnpore, had soon mastered the fortress of 
Allighur ; Delhi was stormed after a brilliant attack ; 
the Mogul puppet was restored to his throne ; the 
important city of Agra fell. Perron had, mean- 
while, treated, and abandoned his troops ; his sub- 
ordinates followed his example, and gave themselves 
up : the French alliance had proved worse than a 
broken reed. The remains of Scindiah's army were 
brought to bay by Lake, near the little town of 
Laswarree ; the enemy made a gallant stand, but 
the victory of the British chief was complete. Dur- 
ing these operations, though Scindiah's ally, Hol- 
kar had done little or nothing in the field : he had 
acted after the fashion of Indian Princes seldom 
really united against the common foe ; but after the 
defeat of Monson he took up arms in great force 
and even laid siege to the sacred city of Delhi. 
Before this time Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar 
had treated ; the negotiations were entrusted to the 
victor of Assaye ; he obtained for the Company im- 
mense concessions. Holkar was soon afterwards 
beaten off from Delhi, and completely defeated 
near the fortress of Dieg. The power of the Mah- 
rattas was now shattered, and though Lake failed 
against the stronghold of Bhurtpore, the confeder- 



Career in India 41 

acy which had been so threatening was broken up 
for the time ; Hindustan was at peace, from the 
Himalayas to Cape Comorin ; the ascendency of 
the British arms had been once more established, 
the borders of the Empire had been enlarged and 
strengthened. 

The spirit of the trader, however, shortsighted 
and mean, had again made its influence felt in the 
Company ; the " forward " policy of Lord Wellesley 
was condemned, — even the operations against the 
Mahrattas, which may have saved India; in Parlia- 
ment itself he was ill supported ; Pitt allowed the 
aged Cornwallis to be placed in his stead. But his 
resignation was deplored at Calcutta; addresses of 
homage and regret poured in ; history has named 
him as one of the greatest of our Proconsuls in Hin- 
dustan. He filled great offices, in after life, in the 
State ; but he thought his administration of our 
Empire in the East his best title to renown ; "Super 
et Garamantas et Indos Protulit Imperium " he de- 
signed as his epitaph. Arthur Wellesley, after the 
defeat of Holkar, had been replaced in the govern- 
ment of Mysore, but he conceived that he had not 
been well treated at home, though Parliament had 
voted him its thanks with one voice, and George III. 
had singled him out for a special mark of favour. 
His letters at this time breathe a captious spirit ; in 
truth he was a very ambitious man, and his temper 
was irritable, even if, as a rule, kept under control ; 
what we call amiability was not a part of his character. 
But the people of Mysore understood his worth ; an 
address from the natives of Seringapatam, in which 



42 Wellington 

they " implored the God of all castes and of all 
nations to hear their constant prayer ; and whatever 
greater affairs than the government of them might 
call him, to bestow on him health, happiness, and 
glory" is not the least in the splendid roll of his 
honours. During the seven years of his career in 
India, he had proved himself to be a real general 
and had given promise of great achievements in the 
field ; but his civil administration had been even 
more deserving of praise. With his brother he had 
raised the Company to a moral height, which hap- 
pily was ever afterwards maintained ; he had put an 
end to corruption within the limits of his rule ; he 
had done justice to the Asiatic as well as to the 
European ; he had set a magnificent example of 
integrity, probity, and public virtue. We may 
have some idea of what the effects of these quali- 
ties were, could we imagine one of Napoleon's 
rapacious lieutenants put in his place ; had Massena 
or Soult been governor of Mysore, the population 
would have been driven to rise in arms ; the Mah- 
rattas would have found powerful allies ; our Em- 
pire would have been in no doubtful peril. Like Lord 
Wellesley, Wellington used to look back with pride 
on India; after the reverse of Chillianwallah, when 
in extreme old age, he contemplated leading an 
army in India again, in order to restore authority 
which he feared was shaken. 



80 IV 85 V 90 VI 95 VH 





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J^ Longitude East 80 from Greenwich 



GP.PutnaTiis Sons, London. ScNewYorh. 



CHAPTER III 

IRELAND — COPENHAGEN — VIMIERO 

Wellesley at St. Helena — He is consulted by Pitt — His interview 
with Nelson — He enters the House of Commons, and is made 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, under the Duke of Richmond — 
State of Ireland in 1807-1808 — Wellesley's marriage — His policy 
and conduct when Chief Secretary — He commands a division at 
the siege of Copenhagen— Napoleon's designs against the Iberian 
Peninsula — March of Junot on Lisbon — Napoleon extorts the 
crown of Spain from the Spanish Bourbons — Great national 
rising of Spain — Reverses of the French — Baylen — The British 
Government interferes — Rising of Portugal — Wellesley lands at 
Mondego Bay — Burrard — Dalrymple — Wellesley's pian of oper- 
ations — Rolica — Vimiero — Defeat of Junot — The convention of 
Cintra — The Court of Inquiry. 

GENERAL Wellesley touched at St. Helena on 
his voyage home from India ; he had been in 
bad health for some months ; he dwelt in let- 
ters on the salubrious air of the island ; this incident 
possibly may have affected the decision of the Allies, 
many years afterwards, as to the spot that was selected 
for Napoleon's exile. On his return to England, he 
was consulted by Pitt, who had the highest opinion as 
to the sagacity of his views, on the expediency of des- 
patching a body of British troops to the seaboard of 
the North, in order to lend a hand to Prussia, already 

43 



44 Wellington 

meditating, in a half-hearted way, falling upon Na- 
poleon in his first great march on Vienna ; but Wel- 
lesley declared that the project was not feasible 1 ; 
Austerlitz had erelong decided the contest. Nelson 
at this time was about to take command of the fleet 
which was to annihilate the navies of France and 
Spain on the great and terrible day of Trafalgar; 
his only interview with Wellesley has been well de- 
scribed ; one warrior had already made England the 
mistress of the seas ; the other was to restore her 
military power on the land. Wellesley, even after 
his feats of arms in India, at first obtained only a 
brigade at home ; he not unreasonably chafed at this 
appointment ; but he was soon afterwards made full 
colonel of the 33rd, the regiment in which he had 
made his earliest mark in the field. He entered the 
House of Commons of the United Parliament for 
the Borough of Rye ; the Ministry of " All the Tal- 
ents " were now in office ; he took his seat, in the 
main, for the purpose of defending Lord Wellesley 
from the attacks of an obscure Scotsman, who was 
threatening to repeat against the great Proconsul 
charges like those made in the case of Hastings. 
These accusations, however, came to nothing ; on 
the fall of the Ministry of Fox and Grenville, due to 
the obstinacy of George III., as regards the Catholic 
claims, and when a Tory Government came again 



1 Pitt's estimate of Wellesley deserves to be quoted: "I never met a 
military officer with whom it is so satisfactory to converse. He 
states every difficulty before he undertakes any service, but never 
after he has undertaken it. " — Sir H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington, 
i., 2. 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 45 

into power, Wellesley was made Chief Secretary for 
Ireland, under the Duke of Richmond, a Viceroy 
whose only distinction was the splendid hospitality 
which still lives among the traditions of the Irish 
capital. Wellesley accepted this place on the ex- 
press condition that it was not to interfere with his 
military career ; he was erelong to be called into a 
nobler sphere of action. Some months before this 
time he had married Catherine Pakenham, the well- 
known " Kitty " of Maria Edgeworth, a lady to 
whom he had been engaged many years before, when 
he was a youthful aide-de-camp of Lord Westmore- 
land; their troth was honourably kept by both but the 
marriage can hardly be pronounced fortunate. The 
future Duchess was an amiable and affectionate 
wife, but not a woman of mental gifts ; she was not 
a fit mate for one of the greatest men of his age, 
whose nature, besides, was unsympathetic and stern. 
Ireland was in a deplorable state, and extremely 
ill-governed, when Wellesley was virtually made the 
head of the Castle. The Rebellion of 1798 had been 
suppressed, but fires were alive under the smould- 
ering ashes; the rising of Emmet was a dangerous 
symptom ; the leaders of the United Irishmen had 
been received by Napoleon, with the welcome he 
gave to men whom he wished to make his tools ; an 
Irish Legion, akin to the Old Brigade, had been 
formed ; it had been encamped along the coasts of 
Brittany to co-operate with the Grand Army in the 
projected descent on England. In the war now 
being waged between England and France, the im- 
mense majority of Irishmen might be reckoned as 



46 Wellington 

our foes ; a hostile landing in Leinster, in Munster, 
in Connaught, would have united against us five- 
sixths of the people. The Union, too, by destroying 
the Irish Parliament, had provoked widespread con- 
stitutional discontent ; the pledges which had practi- 
cally been given by Pitt, to effect a settlement of 
the Catholic cause, had been broken, partly owing 
to the Minister himself, partly to the purblind 
bigotry of a half-mad King; the Irish Catholics were 
disaffected to a man, if we except a small minority 
of the principal landed gentry. The institutions of 
the country, besides, had remained based on the bad 
assumption that a mere oligarchy of race and faith 
was to be supreme ; the Protestant establishment, 
an appanage of the men in office, and a symbol of 
confiscation and conquest, was a preserve for less 
than a fifth part of the nation ; the Catholic Church, 
representing the mass of Irishmen, was kept down 
in degraded subjection. Protestant ascendency 
monopolised all high places in the State; the Irish 
Catholics were still largely excluded from its pale. 
The condition of Ireland, at this time, was so critical 
that even Grattan, the noble champion of her rights, 
had assented to measures of severe repression ; in 
fact, the population could be only held down by 
the sword. Simultaneously Irish public opinion had 
been distorted and envenomed by the extinction of 
the Irish Parliament, an organ of national sentiment 
in a certain sense ; and the representation of the 
whole country had been made distinctly worse. The 
Liberal party, which in College Green had powerfully 
supported the Catholic claims, and other wise and 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 4 7 

enlightened reforms, had still eminent names at 
Westminster, but it was swamped by a majority of 
the United Parliament ; it was now well-nigh reduced 
to impotence. And bad as the representation of the 
country was in the Irish Parliament, it had markedly 
deteriorated in the greater Assembly. It was still 
mainly in the hands of the great Irish families; but, 
even more than ever had been the case before, it had 
become the instrument of the most odious corrup- 
tion ; Irish seats were either engrossed by the gov- 
ernment, or were shamelessly bought and sold in the 
open market. Worse than anything else, perhaps, 
the social conditions of the country were in the 
highest degree vicious, in fact, pregnant with mani- 
fold evils. The tithes of the Established Church 
were wrung from the Catholic tillers of the soil ; 
hundreds of the landed gentry never beheld their 
estates, or had sublet them to rack-renting tyrants ; 
even the resident landlords were in many instances 
the harsh superiors of a down-trodden peasantry. 
The pernicious results of this state of things were 
seen in illegal associations of many kinds, and in 
lawless and widespread disorders. 

Wellesley was at the Castle a few months only ; 
his conduct in his office was characteristic of the 
man. He was a subordinate of a Tory Ministry, en- 
gaged in an internecine and, as yet, in a not suc- 
cessful contest, and governing Ireland on the old 
bad principles, without a thought of change or re- 
form ; he faithfully carried out the instructions he 
received, and kept himself strictly within his inferior 
sphere. He was elected for Tralee, the chief town 



48 Wellington 

of the County of Kerry, through the customary 
means of corrupt patronage ; strange to say, O'Con- 
nell, then a rising lawyer, in after years an adversary 
of the most formidable kind, was already making his 
mark on the Munster Circuit ; but as yet the warrior 
and the great tribune had not crossed each other. 
Wellesley devoted his time to the manipulation of 
Irish seats for the supporters of the Government in 
the House of Commons ; he stooped to bribery and 
similar arts, as a soldier obeys his officers' commands l ; 
he framed measures of repression, as a matter of 
course ; in common with all the Tories of the day, 
he looked upon Ireland as a conquered and rebel- 
lious country, a natural ally of France, to be ruled 
by sheer force. Yet though he ran in the grooves 
of a vicious routine, his capacity as Chief Secretary 
was not wholly obscured. He laid down an excel- 
lent plan for the military defence of Ireland, on the 
assumption of French invaders landing on her 
shores, and of a general rising of a disaffected 
people ; his observations are even now of value ; the 
dream of a " Pacata Hibernia " is still an illusion" 



1 These few lines from a letter of Wellesley illustrate the Parlia- 
mentary corruption of Ireland at this time. " Evan Foulkes, Esqr., 
of Southampton Street, London, to be the member for Tralee 

Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Ilandcock and Mr. Pennefather to 
draw upon Messers. Drummond for ^5000 British cash at ten days 
sight. ... It will be convenient to us if you can delay to give 
them these directions." 

2 These remarks of Wellesley on the state of Ireland in 1807 are not 
wholly inapplicable to the state of Ireland in 1903, notwithstanding all 
that has taken place in that interval of time : " The people are dis- 
affected to the British Government, they don't feel the benefits of 
their situation ; attempts to render it better do not reach their minds." 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vim iero 49 

He waged a steady war, as Peel did a few years 
afterwards, against the jobbery for minor places, and 
the low corruption, which marked the regime of the 
Castle ; it was enough for him to traffic for Irish 
seats ; he did something to cleanse an Augean stable. 
Above all, in this far superior to Peel, who resisted 
the Catholic claims on principle, he perceived that 
Protestant ascendency was a dangerous state of 
things; he wrote sharply against absentee and unjust 
landlords, and against the abuses in the Established 
Church : he saw that something would ultimately 
have to be done for Catholic Ireland. If his utter- 
ances on the subject are not distinct, in this he was 
consistent with his attitude in 1793, and with his 
attitude, as Minister, in 1829. Wellesley gave proof, 
certainly, of ability in his present office ; but un- 
questionably his views on Irish affairs were never 
marked by the profound wisdom he displayed in 
the province of European politics ; the associations 
of Protestant ascendency clung to him to the last. 

As he had stipulated, when the occasion arose, 
Wellesley was transferred from the Castle to his 
more proper sphere, the camp. The Treaty of Tilsit 
was a hollow compact, but it made Napoleon the 
lord of nearly half of the continent ; Prussia was for 
the moment utterly crushed ; Austria had missed an 
opportunity, and meekly bowed to the conqueror ; 
Alexander had agreed to follow in the wake of the 
victor of Friedland ; and was animated, besides, by 
intense dislike of England, whose vacillating policy 
he deeply resented. In this position of affairs, the 
two potentates made professions of offering peace to 



50 Wellington 

England ; and while Napoleon had resolved to carry 
out to the utmost his audacious design of " subduing 
the land by the sea," and of excluding England 
from all commerce with Europe, by means of what 
is known as the Continental System, the new allies 
prepared to combine all the navies they could con- 
trol in a decisive attack on the Mistress of the Seas. 
This boasted league, if carried into effect, would 
give the Emperors a superiority of force on paper, 
though, probably, it would have only led to a second 
Trafalgar ; and Denmark, a nation of brave seamen 
— they had shown what they were in 1801 — pos- 
sessed a strong and well-equipped fleet, which could 
be made available should it pass into the hands of our 
enemies. Canning, when made aware of the secret 
articles of Tilsit, determined to keep this armament 
out of Napoleon's clutches ; a formidable expedition 
was sent from England to demand a surrender of 
the Danish fleet, to be held as a pledge until peace 
should have been made ; Lord Cathcart was at the 
head of a land force of 27,000 men ; Wellesley and 
his old comrade, Baird, were in command of two of 
its divisions. The Crown Prince of Denmark indig- 
nantly refused to accept terms which he deemed an 
affront, and which nothing could justify but a most 
grave crisis ; Copenhagen was invested by land and 
by sea ; the result was never for a moment doubtful. 
Wellesley fought a successful action at Roskilde, 
easily defeating levies of armed peasants. There is 
nothing remarkable in his conduct, except that, with 
the humanity which was one of his qualities, he 
wished to save Copenhagen from bombardment, and 




NAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY. 
(From a steel engraving.) 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 5 1 

to compel a capitulation by cutting off its supplies. 
Cathcart, however, adopted the sterner course ; a 
considerable part of the city was destroyed ; the 
Danes found it impossible to hold out ; their fleet 
was in a few days on its way to England. 

Napoleon, meanwhile, had been straining every 
nerve to shut England out from trade with the Con- 
tinent, and to strike a mortal blow at his one re- 
maining enemy. British merchandise was seized 
along an immense seaboard ; British subjects were 
imprisoned on different pretexts ; an attempt was 
made to raise a Chinese Wall against England in 
five-sixths of Europe. At the same time he made 
strenuous efforts to increase his naval power ; squad- 
rons were sent into the Mediterranean to threaten 
Sicily to be annexed to Joseph's kingdom of 
Naples ; from Dantzic and Riga to Trieste, all 
around the Continent, his vassals and allies were 
directed to make war upon British commerce ; his 
policy was, to some extent, furthered by the anger 
which the expedition to Copenhagen had aroused in 
the councils of the lesser maritime Powers. His eyes 
had soon turned towards the Iberian Peninsula, and 
had fastened on Portugal in the first instance. That 
little state, an ancient ally of England, had been 
tossed to and fro in the tremendous conflict which had 
raged, with scarcely an interruption, since 1793 ; but 
it had inclined at heart to its British protector ; it 
had numberless associations with British traders. 
It was now ruled by a Regent, in the place of an in- 
sane sovereign ; Napoleon peremptorily commanded 
him to close his ports against British ships, and, 



52 Wellington 

without any declaration of war, to seize the persons 
and the property of British merchants at this time 
in Portugal. The Regent, a weak and incapable 
ruler, endeavoured to make a compromise, but to no 
purpose : Napoleon resolved to invade Portugal, 
an object he had already had in view. A French 
Army, about 25,000 strong, was gradually gathered 
together at Bayonne ; it was backed by other forces 
already menacing Spain; Junot, a dashing soldier, 
was placed at its head. 1 He had crossed the Bidas- 
soa, in October, 1807 ; meantime a treaty had been 
made at Fontainebleau between the French Em- 
peror and the Court of Spain ; Portugal was to be 
dismembered and given in part to Godoy, the 
favourite of Charles IV. and his adulterous Queen ; 
a Spanish Army was to be employed to support 
Junot. Whether this compact was in any sense 
sincere, or was a mere mask to conceal the designs 
Napoleon entertained against the Spanish Bourbons 
can only be matter for conjecture ; but it secured 
Junot the aid of a Spanish contingent; he invaded 
Portugal with perhaps 40,000 men, to a considerable 
extent very inferior soldiers. He had been ordered 
to advance by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo ; but 
Napoleon changed his mind, and to ensure celerity 
bade him press forward along the banks of the 
Tagus; the invaders plunged into an almost im- 
passable country and lost thousands of men on the 
march : scarcely 2000 spectres in rags reached Lis- 
bon by the close of November, leaving a wretched 

1 The very valuable History of the Peninsular War by Mr. Oman 
begins at this point, 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vim zero 5 3 

multitude of stragglers far behind. The Regent 
ought to have crushed this handful of men ; but the 
terror of Napoleon's arms prevailed : he fled from 
his capital, and with the Court crossed the Atlantic 
under the escort of a British fleet; Junot had soon 
taken possession of Lisbon. 

By this time, Napoleon had matured his projects 
against Spain. That unfortunate land, under an 
imbecile Government, had been in decline for many 
years ; but Spain had made herself a satellite of 
France : she had lavished her resources on an exacting 
ally ; she had offered up her Navy, at Trafalgar, with- 
out hope, as a sacrifice. But Napoleon had resolved 
on annexing the kingdom ; he was partly moved 
to his purpose by the obvious reason that a Bourbon 
dynasty on the throne of Spain was a possible 
menace to Revolutionary France ; partly by a deter- 
mination to enforce the Continental System ; partly 
by a real wish to regenerate a people shamefully 
ruled ; and to create institutions in Spain of the 
Imperial type. Personal resentment, too, played a 
distinct part ; Godoy, the evil genius of the Spanish 
Monarchy, had issued a proclamation before Jena, 
calling on the Spanish nation to take up arms, and a 
threat, evidently directed against France. From this 
time the fate of Spain was resolved on ; Talleyrand 
not improbably seconded his master's policy, though 
he did not approve of the acts of fraud and violence 
that were soon to follow. In the autumn of 1807 
and the first days of 1808, French troops were 
poured into Spain on different pretexts ; the Spanish 
frontier fortresses were treacherously seized ; in a 



54 Wellington 

short time nearly 100,000 men were encamped be- 
yond the southern verge of the Pyrenees, and occu- 
pied the chief approaches to Madrid. The miserable 
intrigues of the Spanish royal family, an odious 
exhibition of squalid discord, may perhaps have 
quickened Napoleon's purpose, but it appears cer- 
tain that, long before these events, he had marked 
Spain down as a spoil for his arms. Godoy, supreme 
in the councils of Charles IV. and the Queen, got 
wind of the Emperor's evident designs ; he urged 
his dupes to imitate the example of the Portuguese 
Regent, and to take ship for Spanish America; but 
a rising at Aranjuez put an end to this scheme ; he 
was maltreated by a furious populace ; the King 
abdicated, and his son Ferdinand was placed in his 
stead. By this time the North of Spain had been 
flooded with French troops; Murat, as lieutenant 
of Napoleon, occupied Madrid ; he refused to recog- 
nise Ferdinand's title to the throne, obeying the 
Machiavellian commands of his master. Ferdinand 
was now skilfully enticed to Bayonne, where Napo- 
leon, holding the threads of an infamous intrigue, 
had gone in order to effect his object ; Charles IV., 
his consort, and Godoy fell at the conqueror's feet ; 
after dishonourable scenes of recrimination and 
passion, a renunciation of all right to the crown of 
Spain was extorted from the whole royal family, 
Napoleon, like fate, swaying his puppets to his will. 
The victims of this crime were banished into gilded 
exile in France; as if in irony Talleyrand was made 
their keeper. 

The conduct of Napoleon at this juncture was 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 5 5 

perhaps the worst of his political acts ; it was a com- 
bination of evil statecraft, and wrong ; it was far 
more censurable than what he had done at Venice. 
Years afterwards, in the solitude of St. Helena, he 
acknowledged that it was profoundly immoral, and 
that the end he proposed to himself, the regenera- 
tion of Spain, was not justified by the detestable 
means. He transferred the throne of Spain, made 
vacant in this way, to his amiable, but not able 
elder brother, Joseph, placing Murat on Joseph's 
throne of Naples; a Junta of nobles, high ecclesi- 
astics, and officials was assembled to confirm the 
choice of the conqueror. Napoleon, occupying a 
large part of the Peninsula by his armies, believed 
that his success had been completely assured ; he 
was convinced that he could exclaim with Louis 
XIV., that the Pyrenees had been effaced as a bar- 
rier. But the great despot, hitherto accustomed 
only to deal with peoples of a very different type, 
had not reckoned on the nature of a proud and ob- 
stinate race, which had held Rome at bay for more 
than a century and a half; and which, only three 
generations before this time, had risen against the 
Pretender of the House of Hapsburg, and against 
the heretic English and Dutch, when the position 
of affairs appeared desperate. The nation sprang to 
arms as a man ; the mountaineers of Asturias lit the 
flame ; it spread into Galicia and Leon ; like a con- 
flagration blazing from many a range of hills, it 
illuminated Andalusia and the Eastern Kingdoms; 
it was an ubiquitous and universal movement. The 
regular armies — they were less contemptible than 



56 Wellington 

has been supposed — were swept into the general 
rising ; self-governing Juntas established themselves; 
and though vengeance was taken, in too many in- 
stances, on the partisans of the French usurper, and 
there was a fierce outbreak of Revolutionary pas- 
sion, the insurrection was a grand, nay, an heroic 
spectacle. The results were seen in a very short 
time ; they astounded a Continent that had licked 
the feet of Napoleon. Bessieres, holding the great 
line of communication between Bayonne and Madrid, 
no doubt won a battle at Medina Rio Seco, and 
scattered in flight the rude levies of the West. But 
notwithstanding the great force which the Emperor 
had perfidiously moved into Spain, the French arms 
were unsuccessful everywhere else. Moncey was 
driven back from Valencia in defeat ; Lefebvre Des- 
noettes was foiled before Saragossa, a memorable 
name. Erelong a terrible disaster took place, which 
threw a dark shadow on the Imperial glories, and 
was execrated by Napoleon, through his life, as an 
indelible military disgrace. Dupont, after invading 
Andalusia and sacking Cordova with reckless 
cruelty, was caught on the verge of the Sierra 
Morena, and compelled to lay down his arms with 
some 20,000 men. The blow seemed for the 
moment decisive ; Joseph evacuated Madrid in hot 
haste, and took refuge behind the line of the Ebro. 
The great rising of Spain made a profound im- 
pression on England ; the leading parties and men 
in the State gave it heartfelt sympathy. It was the 
first symptom of a real national effort to shake off 
the yoke which Napoleon had laid on the Conti- 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 5 7 

nent ; Pitt had predicted before his death that there 
would be such a movement. The Junta of the 
Asturias had judiciously sent two emissaries to 
England to plead their cause ; Parliament pro- 
nounced for an armed intervention in Spain. This 
resolve was quickened by an insurrection in Portu- 
gal, not so fierce or so general as that of Spain, but 
formidable enough to menace Junot, and to embarrass 
him, cut off as he now was from France ; the British 
Ministers determined, in the summer of 1808, to 
make a descent on the Iberian Peninsula, and to send 
an armed force to support the insurgents. The 
British army was now much more powerful and 
more efficient, as an instrument of war, than it had 
been in 1793-1794, when it had made its unfortu- 
nate essays in the Low Countries. Its organisation, 
indeed, was still very defective ; the bad influence 
of favouritism still hung on it ; it was very different 
from the mighty force, which in the language of 
Wellington at a subsequent time, " could go any- 
where and do anything." But its numbers had 
been largely increased by a regular admixture with 
the militia ; it had been improved by the reforms of 
the Duke of York ; Moore, the most brilliant, per- 
haps, of living British soldiers, had done much to 
make its tactics better, more flexible, more adapted 
to modern war: as usually happens in a great and 
free country, comparatively young men had made 
their mark in it ; its discipline, if severe, was excel- 
lent ; it reckoned Alexandria and Maida among 
recent victories, in which it had fairly beaten the 
renowned legions of France. The Ministry, at this 



58 Wellington 

juncture, possessed the means of sending a consid- 
erable expedition to the Peninsula, unlike the petty 
expeditions despatched in former years, from our 
shores. Trafalgar had made invasion hopeless ; 
Wellesley was in command of 9000 men, intended 
to attack the Spanish-American Colonies ; propitious 
fortune favoured him once more; he was directed 
to sail with this force from Cork to Portugal. He 
was to be joined by General Spencer with 5000 
troops from Gibraltar and Cadiz ; Generals An- 
struther and Acland were to embark from England 
with about 4000 men, Moore was to be despatched 
from the Baltic with 10,000 men. An army, there- 
fore, nearly 30,000 strong, was to be assembled 
and to land on the Portuguese seaboard ; this was 
a bold enterprise, of which the credit was due to 
Castlereagh. 

Wellesley had been made a lieutenant-general by 
this time ; but he was the junior officer of that rank 
in the British army : remarkable as his career in 
India had been, he was to be placed under the com- 
mand of Burrard and Dalrymple, veterans of the 
past, who were to mar the operations that ensued. 
For the moment, however, he was given a free hand 
to direct his own forces and those of Spencer ; it 
was characteristic of him that, on his voyage from 
Cork, he endeavoured to make himself acquainted 
with the Spanish tongue. Having preceded the ex- 
pedition in a light vessel, he had interviews with the 
Galician Junta, and with the leaders of the rising in 
Portugal ; but he was not favourably impressed by 
their boastful reports ; he resolved to confine his 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 5 9 

movements to the interior and the seacoast of Por- 
tugal. He was now at the head of rather more than 
13,000 men, Spencer having come into line with him. 
The landing was effected at Mondego Bay, a consid- 
erable distance to the north of Lisbon ; it was com- 
pleted in the first days of August; this was the 
beginning of the great Peninsular War, with respect, 
at least, to the arms of England. Wellesley lost 
some days from a deplorable want of means of 
transport, a delay that told greatly in the enemy's 
favour, who otherwise might have been taken by 
surprise : he was in full march by the 14th of 
August ; the plan of his operations had been ar- 
ranged. His object was to attack and defeat Junot, 
known to be in Lisbon with a large part of the 
French army. Wellesley's project, though ques- 
tionable in pure strategy, was, nevertheless, essen- 
tially well conceived. He resolved to move, with 
his own force, along the coast-line, protected on his 
right flank by the British fleet ; but he knew that 
Moore with his 10,000 men was at hand ; he pro- 
posed that Moore should march inland on Santarem, 
and that the united army should converge on Lis- 
bon, bringing Junot to bay, and driving him away 
from that capital. This advance on a double line 
was opposed to the ordinary rules of the art, but it 
has long ago been justified by the best critics of war ; 
it may be compared to Napoleon's movement against 
Wurmser on both shores of the Lake of Garda, 1 



1 For Wellesley's plan of operations, see Gur wood's Selection, p. 
231, an excellent work. Napier's History of the Peninsular War, 
i., 106, Routledge Edition, completely justifies Wellesley. 



60 Wellington 

after Castiglione, and the raising of the siege of 
Mantua. It deserves special notice that Wellesley, 
one of the greatest masters of tactics, was con- 
vinced, even at this time, that the French mode of 
attack in the field would probably fail against the 
robur peditum of the British army : the Column, he 
felt assured, was no match for the Line, as the 
Carthaginian Phalanx was no match for the Roman 
Legion. ' 

By this time Junothad, since the preceding winter, 
established himself in his late conquest — Lisbon. 
He kept the capital down by threats and by force; 
his administration of it was marked by the fraudulent 
rapine and by the severities which, as a rule, dis- 
graced the French generals in Portugal and Spain, 
and were not the least causes of the Emperor's 
failure. 2 He had reorganised and strengthened his 
exhausted army, and though it was still to some ex- 
tent an assemblage of conscripts, it had several regi- 
ments of good soldiers ; the cavalry and artillery 
were efficient arms ; it had soon reached the number 
of 30,000 Frenchmen. For months Junot felt him- 

1 Wellesley's remarks to Croker are well known. See Sir H. Max- 
well's Life of Wellington, i., 97-98 : " My die is cast ; the French 
may overwhelm me, but I don't think they will outmanoeuvre me. 
First, because I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems 
to be ; and secondly, because, if what I hear of their system of 
manoeuvres is true, I think it a false one, as against steady troops. 
I suspect all the Continental Armies were more than half beaten be- 
fore the battle was begun. I, at least, will not be frightened 
beforehand." 

2 The conduct of Junot and of the French at Lisbon is well de- 
scribed by Thiebault, who was Junot's Chief of the Staff. Mdmoires, 
iv., 139, 199. 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 6 1 

self completely secure, and spent his time in idle 
pleasures in Lisbon ; but he was roused from this 
dalliance by the insurrection of Spain ; this suddenly 
made his situation one of real danger. He lost part 
of his Spanish contingent, and was compelled to dis- 
arm and imprison the remaining part ; the popula- 
tion of Lisbon became menacing, and seemed eager 
to take up arms ; Portugal had soon risen in insur- 
rection, like Spain ; he was cut off from communica- 
tion with France ; he obtained no assistance from a 
Russian fleet in the Tagus, the commander of which 
was secretly hostile ; he received intelligence that a 
British force might make a descent. His position, 
no doubt, had become critical, and he gave proof of 
a rather fitful energy ; but his measures were not 
those of a real general. He did not form an en- 
trenched camp to defend Lisbon, as Wellesley did 
on a greater occasion ; he left too many of his troops 
in the capital, — dangerous negligence in the existing 
state of affairs. Above all, he made no strenuous ef- 
forts to concentrate his army against enemies known 
to be at hand : he kept garrisons in fortresses to no 
purpose ; he allowed a detachment to remain on the 
eastern bank of the Tagus, where it could hardly be 
of any conceivable use. 1 In a word, he did not as- 
semble his forces toward the decisive scene of action, 
which he must have known would be where the British 
army would appear ; a third part at least of these 
were turned to no account and wasted. He heard, 
however, almost at once of the landing of Wellesley, 

1 For the faulty dispositions of Junot see the admirable observa- 
tions of Napoleon. Thiebault, M/moires, iv., 261, 271. 



62 Wellington 

and he prepared with his present means to confront 
his enemy ; the delay that followed the landing was 
a godsend to him. He sent forward Laborde, a 
skilful officer, with some 6000 men, to hold the 
British chief in check ; he directed a lieutenant, Loi- 
son, who had been on the other bank of the Tagus, 
to march by Santarem and to join Laborde ; he 
made ready with the main army to march out of 
Lisbon, and to offer battle to Wellesley near Torres 
Vedras. He left, however, a large detachment be- 
hind — clinging to his error at the critical moment. 

Wellesley, meanwhile, had been marching along 
the coast-line, by Leira and Alcobaca, to attack 
Junot. Laborde had advanced to meet the British 
General ; but rightly fell back to a defensive position 
in the midst of a plain enclosed by hills, through 
which the road from Obidos to Torres Vedras and 
Lisbon passes. The French General first took his 
stand on an eminence near Rolica, a petty village. 
He was assailed with greatly superior forces on the 
17th of August, Wellesley endeavouring to sur- 
round him on both flanks; but he effected his escape 
with admirable skill, and took another position a 
short way off, in the rear, on a range of wooded 
heights, by the hamlet of Columbeira. The attack 
was repeated in the same manner ; but the outflank- 
ing movement was made late ; the British suffered a 
good deal in a frontal attack ; but the second posi- 
tion was at last carried ; the French lost three guns, 
and perhaps 500 men in the combat. Laborde, how- 
ever, whose manoeuvres had deserved the highest 
praise, retreated, scarcely molested, to join his chief ; 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 63 

the loss of Wellesley was about the same as that of 
his enemy ; more than one of his subordinates might 
have done better ; in fact they were not equal to 
their adversaries in an encounter of this kind. 
Loison, meantime, after a very fatiguing march, had 
reached Torres Vedras from Santarem; Laborde had 
fallen back some miles to the southward. Junot 
had marched out of Lisbon on the 15th of August ; 
by the 19th his two lieutenants had joined him; 
Junot, on the next day, resolved to attack Wellesley, 
now at Vimiero, at a short distance. The French 
General was at the head of nearly 14,000 men ; he 
had nearly 2000 good cavalry ; his artillery num- 
bered twenty-three guns. 

Anstruther and Acland had disembarked by the 
20th of August ; they brought Wellesley a reinforce- 
ment of some 4000 men. The veteran Burrard was 
in their wake, but fortunately he did not assume the 
command ; Wellesley, now at Vimiero for two or 
three days, was allowed to make his arrangements 
for the battle at hand. The position he chose was 
one of formidable strength ; but, in the case of a re- 
versely no means free from danger. His right and 
right centre, where he placed his main force, rested 
on a line of steep and broken heights, exceedingly 
difficult to be stormed by an enemy ; but should such 
an effort prove successful, the defeated Army would 
be close to the sea, and would find it no easy task to 
retreat. Before the British centre rose an isolated 
hill, affording excellent means of defence ; Wellesley 
occupied this with some 3000 men ; it was favourable 
for the play of artillery ; it was, perhaps, the key of 



64 Wellington 

the position of the British centre. The left of 
Wellesley held his weakest ground ; this was a low 
range of hills, sinking down by degrees, and capable 
of being turned at its verge ; but it was covered by 
a kind of ravine on its front, which ran like a huge 
fosse before this part of the line. The whole of 
Wellesley 's front spread along a short space, so that 
his troops could be quickly moved from one point to 
another ; this was fortunate in the events which fol- 
lowed. He was now in command of not far from 
17,000 British troops; to these should be added 
some 2000 Portuguese, rude and ill-armed levies of 
very little value. He was, besides, exceedingly weak 
in cavalry, having only about 260 British sabres ; he 
had not more than eighteen guns. 

Clouds of dust rising along the road from Torres 
Vedras disclosed the approach of the French Army 
in the early forenoon of the 21st of August. Junot 
was recklessly impatient to begin the attack ; he may 
have learned that British reinforcements were at 
hand ; but his dispositions gave proof of precipitate 
haste. He hardly reconnoitred the ground at all ' ; 
he left detachments behind which might have joined 
him ; his soldiers were fatigued by a march under a 
burning sun ; he did not give them even an hour to 
rest. He was not, however, without coup d'oeil on 
the field ; the plan of his attack was not badly con- 
ceived, though in executing it unpardonable mistakes 
were made. He, probably, wisely avoided Welles- 



1 Napoleon fastened on this palpable error of his lieutenant. 
Thiebault, M/moires, iv., 265. " Rien ne peut justifier l'attaque 
d'une position qui n'a pas ete reconnue." 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 65 

ley's right, for this part of the position was of great 
strength ; he properly decided on turning his ad- 
versary's left, while he would fall on the British 
centre in front with the mass of his army. But the 
outflanking movement was made with much too 
small a force, and the distance to be traversed by 
the French was great and difficult ; Wellesley was 
given time to detach from his right to support his 
left, and thus to be superior to his enemy on this 
part of the field. Meanwhile Junot had marched 
against the hill in advance of the British centre ; the 
French soldiery came on in their wonted dashing 
style, but they were mown down by the destructive 
fire of the enemy's infantry, and charged by the 
overlapping line as the shaken columns fell back ; 
the attack was boldly repeated three times ; but it 
had never a chance of a successful issue. Wellesley 
made a counterstroke with his handful of cavalry ; 
but as too commonly has happened with British 
troopers, they rushed forward too far, and got out of 
control ; they were charged by a superior body of 
Junot's horsemen, which covered the retreat of the 
already broken infantry. Meantime the battle had 
gone decisively against the French on Wellesley's 
left, which had only been weakly menaced. While 
the British centre was being assailed, Junot, seeing 
that the outflanking movement had not sufficient 
support, detached a brigade of his army to second 
this attack ; but this body of men was almost de- 
stroyed by the superior forces which Wellesley had 
sent off to the aid of his left. Brennier, the leader 

of the outflanking movement, having been retarded 
5 



66 Wellington 

by the ravine he unexpectedly met, and having been 
compelled to make a long circuitous march, made a 
gallant attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day; 
but he, too, was completely beaten, in turn, and 
driven back in precipitate flight. The whole of 
Junot's army was now falling back in confusion ; its 
retreat was covered by its still nearly intact cavalry ; 
but it had lost half its guns, and fully 2300 men ; it 
would have been scattered in rout by a bold, decisive 
stroke. 

Assuredly Wellesley would have dealt this blow; 
he had lost little more than 700 men ; his troops 
were in the full flush of victory ; he could easily 
have cut Junot off from Lisbon, and driven him, in 
ruin, across the hills on Santarem, where, probably, 
he would have been forced to lay down his arms. 
But the purpose of the British commander was 
crossed by Burrard, who reached the scene when the 
battle was won ; the timid veteran forbade any at- 
tempt at a pursuit ; he announced that he would 
make a halt until he had been joined by the 10,000 
men of Moore, who, in opposition to Wellesley *s 
plan, had been ordered not to march on Santarem, 
but to come into line with the main army by sea. 
The vexation of Wellesley may be conceived ; the 
fruits of victory had been wrested from his grasp ; 
Junot and his beaten forces had been allowed to 
escape ; they reached Torres Vedras unmolested, 
and were free to return to Lisbon. Dalrymple super- 
seded Burrard on the 22nd of August ; the change 
of commanders, seldom a judicious course, made 
what was already bad enough, worse ; Dalrymple 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 6 7 

decided on prolonging the halt ; he would not even 
menace the enemy until Moore had effected his 
junction with him ; this involved a delay of eight or 
nine days, during which Junot might, perhaps, have 
made a successful stand at Lisbon. But the French 
commander, after Vimiero, had lost heart : he had 
been defeated in a battle that could have been made 
decisive ; he was isolated in a hostile country ; he 
could not expect to hold Lisbon for any time, or to 
make his way through Spain, insurgent as it was, from 
the Tagus to the Pyrenean frontier. He sent Keller- 
man, the brilliant chief of Marengo, to offer terms, 
which Dalrymple was glad to accept : the French 
army was to quit Lisbon, and to evacuate Portugal ; 
it was to be conducted to France in British transports. 
Wellesley chafed against these proposals, but could 
not resist them ; the Convention of Cintra, as it was 
called, was signed ; Junot and his army were before 
long at sea ; they were at length safely landed on 
the shores of their country. The Convention of 
Cintra was not, perhaps, the pusillanimous act it has 
generally been supposed, but it aroused a storm of 
indignation in England, where timidity in the field 
has always been fiercely condemned ; Byron has 
indicated, in bitter verses, the tone of the opinion of 
the day. A Court of Enquiry was soon held ; the 
report was cautious, undecided, and to little purpose ; 
but enough transpired to free Wellesley from blame, 
and to mark him out for future distinction. Burrard 
and Dalrymple were never placed in command again. 
The Campaign of Vimiero is of real interest; it 
was the first instance in which Wellesley commanded 



68 Wellington 

a British against a French army. His dispositions, 
if not very remarkable, were excellent, and not un- 
worthy of the victor of Assaye. He was never su- 
preme in the grand sphere of strategy, but his 
project of an advance in double lines to close round 
Junot, as if in a vice, if it has been censured, was 
worthy of high praise. His right at Vimiero was 
in danger, in a certain sense ; but the enemy did 
not dare to attack it ; he showed his characteristic 
resource in arraying his army in the field ; the 
movement by which he detached from his right to 
strengthen his left was perfectly conceived. He 
conducted the battle with judgment and insight : had 
he not been superseded by Burrard at the decisive 
moment, the French army must have been com- 
pletely routed. The arrangements of his adversary 
were, from first to last, ill-considered, and not those 
of a true commander. Junot might have assembled 
at least 20,000 men to give battle to Wellesley, had 
he understood war; he left too great a force behind 
him in Lisbon ; he never entrenched himself in a 
position outside the city. At Vimiero he was cul- 
pably rash ; he attacked his enemy without examin- 
ing the ground ; if he was correct in his idea that he 
ought to turn Wellesley's left, the execution of this 
movement was a series of mistakes. He was fortu- 
nate in escaping the fate of Dupont : had Wellesley 
been free to act, Junot would, all but certainly, have 
succumbed. As for the armies that encountered 
each other in this short passage of war, they gave 
proof of the qualities by which they were long dis- 
tinguished. The French were as yet superior in skill 



Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero 69 

in manoeuvring ; their three arms worked together 
better than those of their enemy ; they were more 
agile and ready in the field. But they had nothing 
to equal the British infantry, when on the defensive ; 
their masses were unable to contend against the 
British line, with its enveloping fire, and with its de- 
termined and steady onset. On the other hand, the 
British army was still slow when on the march : it 
was as yet very badly supplied with different appli- 
ances required in the field ; its impedimenta were 
heavy and cumbrous ; its cavalry and artillery were 
much too weak, as was to be expected in the case of 
a force, transported to a great distance from the 
British Isles. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DOURO — TALAVERA 

Napoleon's authority on the Continent weakened after Baylen and 
Vimiero — He persists in his purpose to conquer Spain and Portu- 
gal — His interview with the Czar at Erfurt— England rejects 
their overtures and continues the war — Moore at Lisbon — He 
marches to the assistance of the Spanish armies — Napoleon in- 
vades Spain — Espinosa, Tudela — Moore's march to Sahagun — 
Napoleon crosses the Guadarrama, but fails to destroy Moore's 
army — The retreat to, and the battle of, Corunna— Death of 
Moore — Faulty dispositions of the French armies after the de- 
parture of Napoleon — Soult at Oporto — Victor on the Guadiana 
— Wellesley in command of a British and Portuguese army at 
Lisbon — His masterly views on the Peninsular War — He ad- 
vances against Soult and crosses the Douro — His great ability in 
this achievement — Able retreat of Soult — Wellesley, after some 
delay, advances with Cuesta, up the valley of the Tagus — 
Danger of this strategy — Battle of Talavera — Retreat of 
Wellesley after a narrow escape — He receives the title of 
Wellington. 

NAPOLEON had marked down Spain and Por- 
tugal as an easy prey, but Baylen and Vimi- 
ero, followed by the flight of the forces of 
the invaders behind the Ebro, — a pusillanimous mili- 
tary mistake, for which King Joseph was mainly to 
blame, — had not only subverted his power through- 

70 



The Douro — Talavera J i 

out the Peninsula, but had weakened his authority 
on the subject Continent. A thrill of amazement 
and hope ran through Europe at the intelligence 
that rude Spanish levies, and a small British army, 
thrown on the coasts of Portugal, had defeated the 
legions which had been the terror of the world, and 
had completely baffled the evil policy of the con- 
queror at Bayonne. Austria, humiliated and dismem- 
bered since the rout of Austerlitz, and ever willing to 
wound, even if afraid to strike, began to increase her 
military power ; the Archduke Charles was placed at 
the head of her War Office ; her regular army was 
largely augmented, and made more national. Prussia, 
trodden under foot since Jena and Friedland, indig- 
nantly chafed in her degrading chains, and was 
deeply affected by what had occurred in Spain ; 
Germany, hitherto divided into feeble and almost 
hostile states, stirred, in the presence of her French 
oppressors, with a movement which, in the fulness of 
time, was to become a mighty patriotic rising, 
spreading from the Rhine and the Vistula to the 
Danube. In Russia the nobles and the mer- 
chants, — two powerful orders of men, — seriously 
injured in their direct and vital interests, had always 
disliked the policy of Tilsit ; even Alexander had 
ceased to be overawed and won by the fascination of 
Napoleon's personality and wiles. At the same time 
the Emperor had engaged in a quarrel with the 
Pope, and had marched an army into the Papal 
States ; his expeditions in the Mediterranean had 
failed ; the Continental System, if doing England 
much harm, had not produced decisive results; even 



72 Wellington 

in France there were symptoms of popular alarm 
and discontent. The gigantic but unnatural fabric 
of despotic force, which had been suddenly raised 
by the genius of a single man, seconded by an extra- 
ordinary succession of events, was, in a word, shaken 
by recent mischances ; signs were not wanting that 
it would not be a permanent structure. In these 
circumstances, Napoleon resolved to avenge the 
disasters that had befallen his arms beyond the 
Pyrenees, and to subjugate the whole Iberian Penin- 
sula ; but he sought in the first instance to secure 
the loyal support of his newly made ally, the great 
monarch beyond the Niemen, of whose sincerity he 
had already misgivings. 

An interview, accordingly, between the two poten- 
tates was arranged in Germany, at the town of 
Erfurt, not far from the historic battlefield of Jena. 
Princes and nobles from the Confederation of the 
Rhine and several ambassadors of foreign Powers 
graced the meeting of the Czar and Napoleon ; 
Goethe and Wieland, forgetting patriotic feelings, 
and the independence which is the glory of letters, 
bowed in admiration to the mighty conqueror ; the 
scene prefigured, in some measure, the greater scene 
which Dresden beheld four years afterwards. The 
ascendency of Napoleon again triumphed ; Alex- 
ander yielded to an overmastering spell ; he recog- 
nised Joseph as King of Spain ; he gave his ally a 
free hand in the Iberian Peninsula, and once more 
promised to maintain the Continental System. He 
obtained, however, advantages for himself ; the prize 
of Constantinople was dangled before his eyes, 



The Douro — Talavera 73 

though Napoleon had resolved that it should never 
fall into his hands ; he was permitted to do what he 
pleased in Finland, and to subdue the lands on the 
Danube which marched with his Empire. The inter- 
view, however, was most important for this, — the al- 
lied sovereigns for the second time made overtures 
to England, offering peace, though it is tolerably 
certain that, on Napoleon's part at least, this was 
either an attempt to mask his ulterior designs, or to 
win the opinion of the Continent again to his side. 
The two Emperors parted with effusive professions 
of friendship ; they were soon to become deadly 
enemies ; but Napoleon had gained what he wanted, 
a pledge for the moment that the Czar would not in- 
terfere with the conquest of Portugal and Spain. 
The British Government, as Napoleon no doubt ex- 
pected, refused to treat unless the Juntas of Spain 
should be recognised as the de facto ruling powers; 
this implied that Joseph was a mere usurper ; 
nothing remained but to continue the war. At this 
juncture the events of the last few months had, per- 
haps, unduly elated the British Ministry, and had in- 
creased the enthusiasm of the nation in behalf of 
Spain ; the Convention of Cintra was quickly forgot- 
ten ; Junot had been defeated and forced to abandon 
Portugal ; the invaders had been driven nearly to 
the verge of the Pyrenees ; every ship brought news 
of fresh Spanish triumphs, and of the irresistible 
might of the great Spanish rising. 

It was determined to invade Spain with a British 
force, to be supported by the Spanish levies ; the 
army which had won Vimiero and for some time had 



74 Wellington 

remained under the command of Dalrymple, was 
to be raised to the strength of 30,000 men at least, 
and to be placed in the hands of Moore, who, we 
have seen, had been balked in the recent campaign. 
Moore, I have said, was a distinguished soldier ; he 
had done much to improve the British infantry and 
to make its tactics and formations more efficient. 
He probably had not the profound designs of Welles- 
ley, as to the true method to cope with Napoleon in 
the Peninsula, but, be this as it may, his orders were 
to co-operate in the field with the Spanish armies. 

Moore had reached Lisbon in the first days of 
October, 1808 ; he made his preparations for the in- 
tended movement. But Dalrymple, as was his wont, 
was timid and dull-minded; he had kept his army 
around Lisbon, and had done nothing to further a 
march eastward ; above all, he had not explored the 
roads leading from Portugal into Spain. Moore, 
nevertheless, gave proof of praiseworthy diligence, 
though the organisation of his army was still defec- 
tive ; in fact, it was greatly wanting in means of 
transport, and in supplies. But he was on his way 
from Lisbon in the third week of October: he was 
to be joined by Baird with a fine division of some 
12,000 men, to be disembarked at Corunna, and to 
come into line with him ; the collective array was 
about 24,000 strong. Moore's object was to advance 
on Burgos, and to lend an effective hand to the Span- 
ish armies, still described by popular report as victori- 
ous. His movement, however, was very slow, partly 
because his impedimenta were cumbrous and bad ; 
partly because he followed the least available route 



The Douro — Talavera 75 

from Portugal ; and he detached the greater part of 
his artillery, and his whole cavalry, by a circuitous 
road, far outside the true line of march, because he 
had received information that these arms could not 
advance with the main army, — unquestionably a 
grave military mistake. He was at Salamanca by 
the last week of November, at the head of about 
15,000 men; Baird, who had marched from Corunna, 
was at no great distance, but Hope, with the horse- 
men and guns, was near the Escurial, that is, sepa- 
rated from headquarters by nearly a hundred miles 
of a mountainous and very difficult country. The 
British General could not stir for ten or twelve days, 
until he had drawn his forces together, especially 
two of his necessary arms ; meantime ominous intel- 
ligence reached him from every side. The Spanish 
armies were unable to make any real impression, even 
on the forces of Joseph behind the Ebro ; they were 
checked and defeated more than once ; and Moore, 
like most soldiers, underrated the power of the 
Spanish rising, as a means of resisting an organised 
enemy. Erelong an overwhelming tempest of war 
had burst through the Pyrenean barrier, and was 
sweeping away all obstacles in its destructive course. 
Napoleon had collected a great army, composed of 
his best and veteran troops, and fully 120,000 strong ; 
he had moved it rapidly through Germany and 
France ; he had crossed the frontier of Spain in the 
first days of November. He had hoped to surround 
and annihilate the Spanish armies; he was foiled in 
this purpose by the movements of Joseph ; but one 
Spanish army was routed at Espinosa, another met 



76 Wellington 

the same fate at Tudela ; the conqueror, having 
forced the Somo Sierra Pass, was erelong marching 
in triumph on Madrid. 

The position of Moore had become critical ; he 
could expect little or no assistance from the defeated 
Spaniards ; Napoleon might turn against him in 
irresistible force. For a short time he contemplated 
a retreat on Portugal ; but he was reluctant to take 
so untoward a step ; happily for his fame as a warrior, 
he changed his purpose. He received information 
that Madrid would make a stand, like that of Sara- 
gossa ; he resolved to make a real effort to assist the 
capital, and to fall on the line of the French com- 
munications with Bayonne, a bold and a perilous, 
but a well-conceived design. His army, still sepa- 
rated from Baird, but joined by Hope, broke up 
from Salamanca on the nth of December; Moore's 
object, for the moment, was to reach Valladolid, and 
so to draw the enemy away from Madrid. But an 
intercepted letter from Berthier induced the British 
commander to advance northwards ; Soult was iso- 
lated on the Carrion with an insignificant force; 
Madrid had fallen after a mere show of resistance ; 
Napoleon was about to march to the south, and to 
complete the subjugation of Portugal and Spain. 
Moore resolved to attack and defeat Soult, gracing 
his arms with at least a passing triumph : he concen- 
trated his whole army, perhaps 26,000 strong, and, 
assisted by a division of Spanish levies, pushed on- 
ward to Sahagun not far from the French Marshal's 
camp. But in the meantime Napoleon had changed 
his plans ; hearing of the audacious movement of 




SIR JOHN HOPE, EARL OF HOPETOUN. 
(From the painting by Sir Henry Raeburn, R.A.) 



The Douro — Talavera 7 7 

Moore, he determined on crushing an enemy he 
deemed in his grasp : he rapidly assembled a great 
army, and having crossed the Guadarrama after an 
extraordinary march, was in full pursuit of Moore 
by the last days of December. That General, how- 
ever, instantly decamped, and hastened to effect his 
retreat through Leon ; Napoleon, after many efforts, 
could not bring him to bay ; at Astorga the Emperor 
gave up the attempt, perhaps because he had learned 
that Austria was threatening to draw the sword; he 
committed the task of following Moore to Soult. 
It is unnecessary to dwell on the tale of the subse- 
quent retreat ; the British soldiery gave proof of 
their wonted valour in more than one sharp and 
bloody fight ; but they also showed their tendency to 
become demoralised under the stress of severe 
hardship and want ; there were miserable scenes of 
excess, and of a fatal lack of discipline. Moore, never- 
theless, made good his way to Corunna, and com- 
pletely beat off Soult in a well-contested battle : he 
fell gloriously in the very arms of victory. But he 
had accomplished a really great achievement ; his 
march to Sahagun had drawn away Napoleon from 
his plans of conquest, which most probably might 
have been realised ; it had a marked effect on the 
issues of the Peninsular War. 

Important, however, as the operations of Moore 
had been, the Emperor, it is likely, might have at- 
tained his object at last, had he been able to remain 
in Spain, and to have conducted the war in person. 
He had more than 200,000 soldiers beyond the Pyre- 
nees, half of these being excellent troops; the 



78 Wellington 

Spanish armies had been utterly beaten though the 
national insurrection was still full of life ; the British 
army, after Corunna, had returned to England. It 
is difficult to suppose that the greatest of warriors, 
employing forces for the time irresistible in the field, 
possessing the unity of supreme command, and the 
absolute master of submissive lieutenants, would not 
have planted his eagles at Lisbon and Cadiz, and 
have held the whole Peninsula in his grasp, had he 
been on the spot to watch the march of events, and 
to give his armies the impulse and the direction he 
alone could give. And undoubtedly, after the fall of 
Madrid, when Joseph was restored to his usurping 
throne, large classes in Spain thought the contest 
hopeless ; even lassitude of a kind was to be per- 
ceived in some parts of the kingdom. But at this 
juncture, as was often to be seen again, the war, as a 
whole, was not well conducted, regard being had to 
existing facts, though its general operations were 
controlled by Napoleon, who, however, was hun- 
dreds of miles away from its theatres. It is not easy 
to understand why immense forces were employed 
in overrunning the Eastern kingdoms, by no means 
the decisive scene of events, and were not moved 
westwards against Portugal, though all honour is due 
to Saragossa and its heroic defence, and the patriotic- 
levies in this region were not contemptible foes. But 
the French armies were disseminated over too vast 
an area, considering the still formidable power of an 
ubiquitous rising, though Napoleon believed that 
they were strong enough to effect his purpose, to 
subjugate Portugal in the first instance, and to be-, 



The Douro — Talavera 79 

come masters of Andalusia. Soult, after Corunna, 
was ordered to invade Portugal from the north, while 
Victor was to advance from Estremadura into 
Alemtejo ; Lapisse, with a division of considerable 
strength, was to maintain a communication between 
the two commanders. But Soult was harassed on 
his march by a partisan warfare, and by obstacles of 
many kinds ; he was, besides, not well supported by 
his colleague, Ney, — an early example of the divi- 
sions which in the Peninsula were so disastrous to 
France ; he did not take Oporto until the close of 
March, 1809, with an army greatly reduced in num- 
bers. Victor won a bloody battle at Medellin on the 
Guadiana ; but he, too, suffered much in his move- 
ments ; and Lapisse, instead of obeying his orders, 
joined Victor and lost all contact with Soult, The 
two French generals were now much too weak to at- 
tempt to overrun and conquer Portugal. 

The campaign of Moore, though a seeming failure, 
ended in a brilliant victory for the British arms, and 
rather stimulated English opinion to go on with the 
war. An idea was indeed abroad that the power 
of Napoleon, notwithstanding his recent success in 
Spain, was already declining, nay, might soon fall : 
great hopes were raised when Austria became hostile, 
and the Continent was stirred by a movement against 
its tyrant. The English Ministry determined to 
make a great effort ; an expedition was to be fit- 
ted out to destroy Antwerp, and even to invade the 
Low Countries ; a British army was to be sent out 
again to support the Spanish and the Portuguese 
risings. Wellesley, whose ability in Portugal was 



80 Wellington 

now fully recognised, and who in Castlereagh had a 
faithful and lifelong friend, was fortunately placed at 
the head of this new force ; he had already given 
proof of profound sagacity in considering the nature 
of the Peninsular contest, and in perceiving how it 
could be made disastrous to the arms of France and 
be turned to advantage for those of England. His 
deep-laid plans were not as yet to be realised ; but 
even now, in more than one masterly despatch, ' he 
had indicated how Portugal was exactly the theatre 
in which Napoleon was to be encountered in his 
career of conquest. England's command of the sea 
made that little country easy of access to any army 
she might land on its shores, and afforded facilities 
of retreat to that army. Portugal could only with 
difficulty be invaded by France ; at the same time it 
formed a kind of sallyport from which even a com- 
paratively small force might fall on the long line of 
the communications of the French with Spain, and 
might check and mar their operations with very great 
effect. Portugal, besides, had long been a friendly 
State ; the people, like the Spaniards, detested the 
French; and a Portuguese army could, no doubt, 
be formed, which, aided by levies of partisans, could 
give powerful assistance to a British commander. 
Portugal, in a word, was a formidable place of arms 
for England ; and if the Spanish armies in the field 
had been scattered like sheep, the Spanish insurrec- 
tion, breaking out from the Pyrenees to Cadiz, and 
wasting the strength of the invaders, wherever they 

'One of the earliest of these despatches, dated 7th March, 1809, 
will be found in the Selections, pp. 248-249. 



The Dotiro — Talavera 81 

were found, was a real, nay, a great element of 
resisting force, especially in such a land as Spain, 
with its ranges of sierras, its intricate defiles, its ill- 
cultivated and poor tracts, its numerous and difficult 
river lines, — all obstacles to the operations of regular 
armies, notably under Napoleon's peculiar system of 
war. l 

Wellesley landed at Lisbon in the last days of 
April, 1809, and was welcomed in that capital with 
general acclaim ; his conduct at Vimiero had not 
been forgotten. Time had not been lost to enable 
him to take the field ; preparations for a campaign 
had been diligently made. Sir John Cradock had a 
force of some 10,000 men in Portugal, and had done 
something to provide for transports and magazines ; 
considerable reinforcements had arrived from Eng- 
land ; the regular Portuguese army, nearly 20,000 
strong, had been organised by Beresford and other 
British officers, and there were large bodies of irregu- 
lar Portuguese levies. Wellesley was in command 
of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, 26,000 of these being 
British and German troops : he held a central posi- 
tion between Victor and Soult, now divided from 
each other by a great distance ; the first question 
for him was which of the marshals he should attack. 
Victor certainly was the enemy nearest at hand ; he 
had won two battles, besides that of Medellin ; 
he lay around Merida on the Guadiana ; with La- 
pisse and Sabastiani he was more than 30,000 strong. 



1 For an excellent account of the topography of Spain from a mili- 
tary point of view, see Mr. Oman's History of the Peninsular War, 
i., 72-89. 

6 



82 Wellington 

But he had been singularly inactive since his late 
victories ; he had refused to invade Portugal at the 
instance of King Joseph; he had shown that he had 
no wish to co-operate with Soult — another example 
of the jealousies and the discords of the French 
commanders. Wellesley resolved to make his prin- 
cipal effort against Soult ; but he took precautions 
against an offensive movement by Victor; detach- 
ments of about 14,000 men were marched towards 
the frontier to hold that Marshal in check ; Welles- 
ley set off with an army 25,000 strong — nearly 10,- 
000 were Portuguese troops — to begin his opera- 
tions against Soult. He had reached Coimbra in 
the first days of May, even now not very far from 
his enemy, who, since the fall of Oporto, after fright- 
ful deeds of blood, had remained almost inactive 
around the city, endeavouring, not in vain, to re- 
store peace and order, but apparently ignorant that 
the British General was on the march. Soult un- 
questionably was a very able man, and showed re- 
markable energy in grave crises ; but his disposition 
was somewhat indolent and remiss, faults of which 
he gave many proofs in his career. His army was 
now divided into two parts, one on the Vouga, one 
on the Tamega, feeders of the Douro on either side 
of the great river ; they were separated by a rather 
wide distance ; and he was also harassed by a kind 
of peasant warfare. He was beset, moreover, by 
another danger, of which at this moment he knew 
nothing, — a conspiracy had been formed by officers 
in his camp, with the object of returning to France, 
and, perhaps, of overthrowing Napoleon. This de- 



The Douro — Talavera 83 

sign, insensate as it may seem, was not without real 
mischief; it was injurious, in the highest degree, to 
military subordination and trustworthy discipline. 1 
The army of the Marshal, disseminated and weak- 
ened in this way, was probably not more than 20,- 
000 strong; it was thus inferior in numbers to that 
of Wellesley. 

The British General was on the march for Oporto, 
by Coimbra, on the 9th of May ; he had detached 
Beresford, with some 6000 men, aided by irregular 
bodies of Portuguese, to turn the enemy's left wing 
on the Tamega, and, if possible, to intercept the line 
of his retreat. Wellesley had been in communica- 
tion with one of the traitors, and had ascertained the 
positions of the French army ; he advanced along 
the line of the coast to Vouga, taking advantage of 
a lake, which formed a ferry for part of his army. 
The right wing of the French was soon turned ; an 
indecisive engagement was fought at a place called 
Grijon, but the French General in command made 
good his retreat, and, having reached Oporto with- 
out much loss, destroyed the bridge of boats on the 
Douro, which formed the only means of communi- 
cation across the river. Meanwhile Soult had been 
informed of the treason around him, and of the 
approach of Wellesley 's army ; he instantly made 
preparations to break up from Oporto, and to make 
good his way into Spain, through the province of 
Trasos Montes, the line which he had taken when in- 



1 There seems to be little real authority for the statement made 
by Thiebault and other writers, that Soult was aspiring to the crown 
of Portugal, 



84 Wellington 

vading Portugal. His dispositions seemed to make 
him perfectly secure, and he probably would have 
been so, if he had not had to deal with an adversary 
of extraordinary skill and resource in the field. The 
Marshal took care to seize every boat and barge by 
which the passage of the Douro could be effected ; 
he collected these craft on the bank he held, and 
placed bodies of troops to guard it. The Douro 
was about three hundred yards wide ; how could 
Wellesley cross it, in the face of a brave army ? the 
obstacle might well have been deemed impossible 
to surmount. At the same time Soult made arrange- 
ments to secure the line of his retreat, which ap- 
peared to be ample and indeed ought to have been 
sufficient. His retrograde movement would be 
across the Tamega, at the bridge of Amarante, which 
afforded the only means of passage ; he directed 
his lieutenant, Loison, to occupy that point, and 
to keep any enemy away from it ; it was almost the 
only avenue of escape for the French army. A 
most disastrous incident, however, here occurred, 
for which the Marshal was in no sense responsible, 
but which nearly brought ruin down on him in the 
events which followed. Beresford, operating with 
his detachment, crossed the Tamega ; Loison fell 
back, making hardly any resistance; the bridge at 
Amarante was thus seized by Wellesley 's lieutenant, 
and the true line of retreat for Soult and his army 
was closed ! At the same time Soult had not, per- 
haps, taken all the precautions he ought to have 
taken against a bold and able enemy. The con- 
spiracy among his officers still existed, causing dan- 



The Douro — Talavera 85 

gerous slackness and neglect of duty : the Marshal 
did not guard his bank of the Douro with a suf- 
ficient force ; he was convinced that if the passage 
were attempted at all, it would be attempted lower 
down the river near its mouth ; he turned his atten- 
tion in that direction ; above all, thinking himself 
perfectly safe, he lingered at Oporto at least a day 
too long, and contented himself with sending part 
of his impedimenta out of the city. 

It was the 12th of May. Wellesley could not 
know that Beresford was closing on the French line 
of retreat ; but he had determined, if it were possible, 
to cross the Douro. On the nth, he had sent Colo- 
nel John Murray with a detachment of a few thou- 
sand men to try to effect a passage higher up the 
river; but how was he to cross it himself under the 
very beard of Soult? His dispositions, favoured by 
peculiarities of the ground, and seconded, in a most 
remarkable way, by an accident, were as admirable 
as have ever been made in an operation of the kind, 
and were attended with brilliant and complete suc- 
cess. A high eminence, on which a convent was 
built, rose on the bank, occupied by his outposts ; 
a large edifice, called the Seminary, which in its en- 
closures could form a shelter for some hundreds of 
men, spread along the French bank, opposite to the 
convent ; the British General chose this point as 
that in which he would make his venture. He had 
carefully reconnoitred the ground on which the con- 
vent stood ; he had perceived that the French bank 
was not well guarded ; but the principal difficulty 
still remained, — he was as yet without the means 



86 Wellington 

to ferry his army across the Douro. Propitious 
Fortune here came to his aid : a poor citizen of 
Oporto had, before daybreak, rowed a skiff unob- 
served to the British bank ; he recrossed the stream 
with a bold staff officer ; three or four barges were 
brought to the selected spot ; meanwhile some 
twenty guns were placed on the height around the 
convent, and troops were secretly posted behind the 
hill, the forlorn hope that was to make the first 
effort. The Seminary was soon seized, but only by 
a handful of men: it is a signal proof how ill the 
French outposts did their work, that three barges at 
least had got over the Douro, and had occupied the 
Seminary, with a not inconsiderable force, before 
the enemy had the least notion of what was taking 
place ; the surprise, in fact, was discreditable and 
complete. The French now fell on the troops, who 
had gathered within the kind of fortress marked out 
for them ; but they were ravaged by the fire of the 
guns from the hill and the convent ; the population 
of Oporto sent a number of barges to the help of 
Wellesley ; the British army was before long across 
the Douro. Meanwhile the columns of Murray were 
seen advancing ; they, too, had passed the river 
higher up ; this was the signal for a precipitate re- 
treat of the enemy; Soult's whole army hastened 
out of Oporto, leaving guns and stores behind, and 
losing many men ; it made for the roads leading to 
Amarante', where the Marshal expected to find Loi- 
son. Had Murray acted with vigour he must have 
destroyed a large part of the defeated host ; it ex- 
posed, in its flight, its flanks to him ; but he missed 




LORD WELLESLEY. 
(From the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence.) 



The Douro — Ta lav era 87 

his opportunity, whatever the cause ; he allowed the 
enemy to escape scot-free. 

The campaign on the Douro, above all, the passage 
of the great river under the very eyes of Souit, 
were signal instances of what^ Wellesley could 
achieve in war. He owed something, indeed, to 
treason in his adversary's camp, and something to 
the remissness shown by the French Marshal; an 
accident enabled him to find the means of sending a 
petty detachment across the stream ; but all this 
does not in the least detract from his merit. He 
gave proof of marked skill in sending Beresford to 
threaten the French line of retreat, though he could 
hardly have anticipated the success he gained; he 
took the right course in advancing from Coimbra 
upon Oporto. But the passage of the Douro was 
the great exploit ; it was a most conspicuous exhi- 
bition of resource in tactics. Wellesley properly de- 
tached John Murray to cross the river higher up : 
had his lieutenant acted with boldness and energy, 
the French army must have suffered enormous 
losses. The selection, however, of the true point 
where to make the passage was the finest specimen 
on this occasion of Wellesley 's powers; remarkable 
insight was shown in choosing the Seminary as a 
kind of place of arms, where the British troops on 
landing would be comparatively safe ; the hill and the 
convent formed excellent screens behind which the 
assailants could be formed, and good points of van- 
tage for artillery be obtained ; the surprise, in a 
word, was most admirably contrived. The dispo- 
sitions of Sou It, on the other hand, though the 



88 Wellington 

conspiracy in his army, of which he had no idea until 
the last moment, did him much harm, were hardly 
equal to the reputation of that distinguished soldier. 
He divided his forces on two rivers ; they were 
parted by the great stream of the Douro ; he did 
not sufficiently guard the bank he held at Oporto ; 
he may perhaps have left Loison too few troops to 
cover what was all but his sole line of retreat. 
Yet the conduct of the Marshal, after his first re- 
verse, was worthy of a general of no ordinary 
powers. When he found Amarante and its bridge 
seized, and his best avenue of escape closed, he 
might have been involved in another Baylen ; pusil- 
lanimous voices urged him to treat, like Junot at the 
Convention of Cintra. But the Marshal scorned 
these counsels of despair ; rising to meet a terrible 
crisis with a bold decision, he destroyed his impedi- 
menta, abandoned his guns, and led his army by 
mere mountainous tracks across a range of sierras 
from which a retreat might be yet possible though 
the difficulties were extreme. The toilsome march 
of the French was impeded by torrents and obstacles 
of many kinds; the heroism of individual soldiers 
was conspicuously displayed, and at last 12,000 or 
14,000 men, a disorganised wreck, for the moment 
worthless, made good their way to Orense beyond 
the Portuguese frontier. Wellesley did not at once 
pursue Soult, he only just reached the retiring 
enemy: for this he has incurred some censure. He 
certainly was not at his best in following a defeated 
enemy : but there were sound military reasons for 
the halt he made at Oporto for a single day. 



The Douro — Talavera 89 

After the passage of the Douro, Wellesley fell 
back on Abrantes, in order to watch the operations 
of Victor, and of the other forces that seemed to 
menace Portugal. A long pause in his movements 
followed : it was not until nearly the end of June 
that his army was on the march again. This delay 
has been made a charge against him, — and he was 
different from Turenne and Napoleon, when in a 
central position between divided enemies, — but it 
should be more justly ascribed to causes independ- 
ent of himself. His soldiers were exceedingly ill 
supplied, owing to the neglect of the men in power 
in Portugal : they lost a great number of comrades 
by disease : even their pay was very considerably 
in arrears, for the treasury at home was severely 
pressed. Under these adverse conditions they began 
to give proof of one of the characteristic defects of 
a British army, the tendency to break up, and to 
lose heart, when in the presence of continual hard- 
ship ; and they plundered the whole country around 
with audacious licence. Despite its commander's 
angry complaints, and the severe examples that he 
was forced to make, it was some time before the dis- 
cipline of his forces was restored ; meanwhile ar- 
rangements had been made for another effort to 
co-operate with the Spanish armies, and to assist the 
national insurrection of Spain. A plan of campaign 
was formed, the least well-conceived of Wellesley 's 
projects in war, and based on complete ignorance 
of facts of supreme importance. By this time Napo- 
leon, repairing the false steps taken by Berthier, had 
utterly defeated the Archduke Charles in operations 



90 Wellington 

as fine as any in his career; he had entered Vienna 
in triumph for the second time ; but he had met a 
serious rebuff at Aspern ; he appeared to be in grave 
peril upon the Danube ; the opinion that his fall was 
not distant had strengthened in England and else- 
where. His armies, too, in Spain, had been reduced ; 
the passage of the Douro was an augury of success ; 
the French had not ventured to invade Portugal ; 
it was in these circumstances that the design to which 
we have referred was formed. Wellesley's army had 
been reinforced and was perhaps 22,000 strong ; a 
Spanish army of about 40,000 men was in Estre- 
madura under Cuesta ; another Spanish army com- 
manded by Venegas was behind the Sierra Morena, 
perhaps 25,000 strong; it was agreed that Wellesley 
and Cuesta should unite their forces, and should 
march up the valley of the Tagus on Madrid, while 
Venegas, advancing through La Mancha, should 
second the movement. The combined forces, should 
they join hands, would thus be a host of nearly 
90,000 men ; but such a concentration was improb- 
able in the extreme; and the project did not make 
sufficient allowance for the miserable quality of the 
Spanish armies : for the risk of Wellesley's and 
Cuesta's march : for the strength of the French 
armies around Madrid : above all, for the hostile forces 
that might be arrayed behind the screen of the lofty 
sierras, overlooking the valley of the Tagus from the 
north, and might be directed with terrible effect on 
the flank and the rear of the enemy in his advance. 
Wellesley and Cuesta, advancing at wide dis- 
tances, moved up the valley of the Tagus, in the first 



The Douro — Talavera 91 

days of July, and were at Placencia and Almaraz by 
the 10th of the month. The British General trusted 
to Beresford, in Trasos Montes, and to some Portu- 
guese levies, to protect his march, and to cover his 
flank and rear, should any enemy descend through 
the Sierra passes, but these supports were far away 
and wholly inadequate ; he had no conception of the 
forces that might be combined against him. Mean- 
while Venegas had begun to move through La 
Mancha; but though his operations disconcerted 
King Joseph, and caused a dangerous division of 
trie French armies, the Spanish commander never 
approached Madrid, or came into line with the allies 
he was intended to join ; it has been said this was 
the fault of one of the Spanish juntas. For a time, 
however, the prospects of Wellesley and Cuesta 
seemed good : they advanced without any apparent 
sign of peril at hand ; on the 23rd of July an oppor- 
tunity arose to attack and to defeat Victor, who was 
isolated near Talavera, Joseph and Sebastiani hav- 
ing marched from the capital in order to observe 
the movement of Venegas : Wellesley urged his col- 
league to fall on the enemy, but Cuesta, an aged, 
obstinate, and ill-tempered man, lost precious time, 
and practically refused to move ; Victor fell back 
towards Toledo, and was for the moment safe. 
Cuesta, when apprised of Victor's retreat, recklessly 
pushed forward to attack the Marshal ; Wellesley 
sent him a reinforcement of a small body of troops, 
but would not follow his imprudent ally ; in fact, 
his army had been wretchedly supplied on its 
march, in consequence of Spanish carelessness and 



92 Wellington 

neglect, and was already suffering from many priva- 
tions. A transformation was soon seen on the 
theatre of events ; Joseph, assisted by Jourdan, the 
veteran chief of his staff, and Sebastiani ceasing to 
watch Venegas, — that General was many leagues 
distant, — united their forces with those of Victor ; 
the combined armies advanced to Talavera in the 
last days of July : Cuesta with difficulty made his 
escape. More than 50,000 excellent French soldiers 
were thus being concentrated against an enemy 
whose army was mainly composed of bad troops, 
and of men weakened by severe hardships ; mean- 
while another peril was already not far off, which 
might have proved simply fatal to the allies. Na- 
poleon, from the banks of the Danube, had perceived 
the risk Wellesley and Cuesta ran, in marching up 
the valley of the Tagus towards Madrid, when 
largely superior forces could be thrown on their flank 
and rear ; with characteristic insight and resource 
this greatest of strategists saw the favourable chance ; 
he directed Soult, whom he placed in supreme com- 
mand, to assemble a great force composed of his 
own corps, which had been quickly reorganised and 
restored, of the corps of Ney, and of the corps of 
Mortier ; and with these combined armies, to pass 
through the Sierras from the north, to join hands 
with all the armies under the command of Joseph, 
and then to fall in irresistible strength on the 
enemy, who, should he continue his march, could 
hardly be saved from complete destruction. 1 



1 Napier has misdescribed Napoleon's project, as his correspond- 
ence was not then published. It will be found in Corr., xix., p. 263, in 



The Douro — Talavera 93 

Partly, however, owing to the distances between 
the French marshals, but largely to dissensions be-' 
tween them, — the curse of the French in the Penin- 
sular War, — and to orders wrongly given by Joseph 
to Mortier, the march of Soult was considerably 
delayed ; the grand conception of Napoleon was not 
realised. Nevertheless, Soult, with the three corps 
of which he had been made the chief, was around 
Salamanca in the latter days of July; that is, he was 
now only four or five marches distant from the gap 
in the Sierras which would lead him into the Tagus 
valley, and would place him on the flank and rear 
of the enemy, with a veteran army fully 50,000 
strong. The Marshal wrote to King Joseph by a 
confidential officer, the General Foy of another day, 
entreating the King not to attempt " to fight a gen- 
eral action until all his forces were near Placencia," 
that is, had emerged from the passes in the Sierras, 
and were on the line of the allied retreat ; in that 
event, he insisted, " the most important results might 
be obtained : the enemy would be lost if he did not 
retrace his steps." This plan, if less perfect than 
that of the Emperor, for it involved an operation 



a letter written from Schoenbrunn, July 18, 1809: " Recommandez 
au Roi d' Espagne que, si les Anglais debouchaient en Espagne, il 
ne leur livre point de bataille qu'il ne soit reuni. II a le 4 e Corps, le 
garnison de Madrid, le i er Corps ; ce qui fait plus de 50,000 hommes. 
Les 2 e , 6 e , et 5 e Corps forment une soixantaine de mille hommes : il 
peut done donner bataille aux Anglais avec 110,000 hommes." The 
project is more fully developed in Corr., xix., p. 373. The Emperor 
disapproved of all the French operations that followed, and indicated 
the very means by which Wellesley actually escaped the net that 
seemed closing around him. See Corr., xix., pp. 315, 346, 379. 



94 Wellington 

conducted on double lines, — strategy, as a rule, not 
to be commended, — was, nevertheless, promising in 
the highest degree, if only Joseph would not make 
a premature attack, and Wellesley and Cuesta re- 
mained where they were ; and at this moment, it 
must be borne in mind, neither Wellesley nor Cuesta 
had an inkling of the approach of Soult. Two 
armies, therefore, each of 50,000 good troops, might 
not improbably be assembled to fall on a single 
army, not nearly half equal in real strength ; the 
overthrow of the allies would, in that event, be 
almost assured, especially as one of the armies would 
be on their flank and rear; their escape, indeed, 
would be difficult in the extreme. But Joseph, con- 
fident in the power of the forces of which he was 
nominally the head, and like Marmont on another 
occasion, eager to secure a victory for himself alone, 
resolved to attack Wellesley and Cuesta, before he 
could be joined by Soult, — presumptuous, reckless, 
and wrong conduct, which justly incensed the Em- 
peror when made aware of the facts. 

Wellesley and Cuesta were at Talavera by this 
time, a small town on the northern bank of the 
Tagus. The Spaniard gave the command to the 
Englishman, but with a bad grace ; Wellesley rightly 
determined to await the attack of the enemy ; re- 
treat, in truth, would have been fatal to his. com- 
posite and weakened army. His arrangements gave 
proof of the skill in tactics in which he had hardly 
an equal among the generals of his age. He arrayed 
the Spanish army, about 34,000 strong, but untrust- 
worthy troops in every sense of the word, from 



The Douro — Talavera 95 

Talavera on its extreme right, to an eminence 
crowned with a redoubt on its extreme left ; its front 
was protected by a convent, a breastwork, ditches, 
and stockades ; its rear was supported by its own 
and some British cavalry. Its position was thus 
very difficult to assail ; Wellesley's army extended 
from Cuesta's left to a hill which was the key of the 
whole battlefield ; the united forces held a front of 
about two miles. The Spanish army numbered, we 
have seen, some 34,000 men, the British 19,000 or 
20,000, the allies had perhaps 100 guns; in real 
strength they were far inferior to their foes. A 
prelude to the battle that followed took place; it 
was not of the best omen to the allied armies. 
The French crossed the Alberche near Talavera on 
the 27th of July ; they were at least 50,000 with 80 
guns : they were good soldiers, nearly all of one 
brave nation, the British soldiers alone were worthy 
of their steel. A sharp skirmish, that began with a 
surprise, was fought at a spot called the Casa de 
Salinas; Wellesley narrowly escaped being made a 
prisoner ; signs of confusion appeared in one or two 
British regiments ; a great mass of Spaniards left 
the field in precipitate flight. This brilliant effort 
had been conducted by Victor. The Marshal, elated 
with his first success, made a bold attempt to storm 
the height on Wellesley's left ; he very nearly 
attained his object, but his men were at last beaten 
off after a fierce struggle. It was now nightfall; 
both armies took their ground, and made prepara- 
tions for the fight of the morrow. 

The stern battle of Talavera was fought on the 



96 Wellington 

28th of July, 1809. Victor insisted on a trial of 
strength against Jourdan's counsels. The French 
chiefs were already at odds with each other; the 
ground was scarcely reconnoitred, an unpardonable 
fault. Victor, however, had perceived the true point 
of attack ; almost disregarding the Spanish army, 
he directed the divisions of Ruffin and Villatte, 
covered by a heavy fire of guns, against the decisive 
spot, the hill ; a bloody and well-contested fight was 
the result ; the French more than once almost reached 
the summit ; the losses were considerable on both 
sides, but Victor's men were again driven off in 
defeat. A long pause in the operations followed : 
Jourdan urged Joseph to run no further risk, and to 
wait until he should be joined by Soult ; Victor, im- 
petuous and thoughtless, exclaimed that " one might 
give up war if the hill could not be stormed." The 
attack was now conducted by the mass of the 
French army, and was somewhat better directed 
than it had been before. The Spaniards were again 
almost unassailed ; but the divisions of Sebastiani, 
Lapisse, and Ruffm were marshalled to fall on 
Wellesley's centre and left ; Villatte was ordered to 
reach the hill by a turning movement, through a valley 
that spread beyond the British left ; a small body of 
cavalry was to second the movement. The superior- 
ity in numbers of the French thus collected to attack 
the British was enormous, nearly two to one, but 
Wellesley had his arrangements made; he had ex- 
tended his left beyond the hill to cover the valley, 
when Villatte's movement was being developed ; he 
steadily awaited a most formidable attack. The 



The Douro — Talavera 97 

battle raged fiercely for several hours : Villatte's 
men were stopped in their advance by the British 
cavalry, and ultimately were compelled to fall back; 
but a British regiment of dragoons was well-nigh cut 
to pieces, having — a common fault — rushed forward 
and got out of hand. Meantime a furious on- 
slaught had been made on the hill, and the whole 
of Wellesley's line was searched by the enemy's 
guns, while the hostile columns boldly advanced 
and endeavoured to break it. The attack was all 
but crowned with success ; the British centre was 
forced at one point, the troops having got out of 
order on uneven ground, always a danger for a line 
in its movements ; but the battle was restored by a 
veteran regiment, the 48th ; the French gradually 
relaxed their efforts, and ultimately drew off from 
the blood-stained field. The losses on both sides 
were very large, from 6000 to 7000 men; but 17 
French guns were abandoned and taken ; Wellesley 
remained victorious on the position he had held. 
Owing probably to the disputes between Jourdan 
and Victor, the reserve of the French army, 12,000 
strong, was not engaged, and did not fire a shot, an 
exhibition of weakness succeeding rash confidence. 
After Talavera King Joseph fell back towards 
Madrid, leaving Victor on the Alberche to join 
hands with Soult, bat isolated for the moment, with 
Wellesley in his front. The British General, how- 
ever, did not venture to fall on ; he was always, per- 
haps, overcautious on occasions of this kind ; but his 
army had cruelly suffered, and was greatly weak- 
ened ; his Spanish allies were but of little worth. 



98 Wellington 

Meanwhile a storm was gathering on his flank and 
rear, the approach of which he had, very unaccount- 
ably, hardly considered possible. By the 4th of 
August Soult had traversed the passes through the 
Sierras; his whole army could be assembled in a few 
days ; he made ready to attack his enemy, though 
Talavera had baffled his excellent advice. Wellesley 
had not even yet been informed of the Marshal's ad- 
vance, he had marched to Oropesa, near the enemy's 
mouth, so to speak ; but gradually he ascertained a 
part, at least, of the truth; learning that Soult was at 
no great distance, he brushed Cuesta's idle entreaties 
aside, fell back on the Tagus, and crossed at the 
bridge of Arzopisbo, the very point Napoleon had 
foreseen he might select in the case of the operations 
conducted by Soult. The Marshal, however, did 
not abandon his quarry ; he directed Mortierto seize 
the bridge at Almaraz, lower down the river, and to 
intercept the enemy's retreat ; he endeavoured in per- 
son to press the pursuit ; he urged Joseph and his 
lieutenants to advance and join him. But Joseph 
set off again to observe Venegas, and had recalled 
Victor from the Alberche ; Wellesley safely effected 
his retreat on Merida and reached, unmolested, the 
Portuguese frontier, at Badajoz. 1 Yet the chances 
were that he would have been meshed in the toils 
Soult had carefully prepared, had Joseph not gone 
off in a false direction, and had he not been terrified 
by the movement of some of Wellesley's levies ; the 
" fate of the Peninsula hung for a few days on a 

1 Wellesley's account of his campaign of 1809 will be found in 
Selection, pp. 325-337. 



The Douro — Talavera 99 

thread which could not have borne the weight for 
even twenty-four hours." ' Soult, however, did not 
forego his purpose, though his first combination had 
been a failure; he proposed to assemble his army 
at Coria, near the borders of Portugal, and, sup- 
ported by Joseph in force, to invade that kingdom, 
perhaps even to descend on Lisbon. But Ney re- 
fused to obey his orders; the King was too timid to 
give his consent ; Napoleon always contended that 
even at the eleventh hour a grand opportunity had 
been thrown away. 

Wellesley was given a peerage for Talavera, in 
spite of querulous and shallow Opposition protests ; 
thenceforward he was to be known by the honoured 
name of Wellington. His skill and resource appear 
in this campaign on the Tagus ; he rightly accepted 
the challenge of Victor; he arranged his enfeebled 
army ably on the ground ; he plucked not safety, 
but victory, out of no doubtful danger. His retreat 
by the bridge of Arzopisbo was also an excellent 
movement, giving proof of quick resolution and 
firmness of purpose ; he extricated himself admirably 
from foes who seemed closing around him. But his 
strategy in the campaign was faulty ; it was not well 
designed, it was founded on false assumptions. The 
advance on double and distant lines was a hazardous 
scheme ; the quality of the Spanish armies was not 
sufficiently gauged : above all, the strength of the 
French behind the Sierras was not even guessed at ; 
it was deemed impossible that they could descend 
on the allied flank and rear. Wellesley, in a word, 

1 Napier, i., p. 384. 



L ofC 



ioo Wellington 

was in the air as he moved along the Tagus, and ex- 
posed to attacks that might well have been fatal ; 
had Napoleon directed the French armies he could 
hardly have avoided an immense disaster ; and but 
for the presumptuous recklessness of Victor and the 
weakness of Joseph, the chances were that he would 
have been beaten, perhaps surrounded, by Soult. 
The best proof that he knew he had made grave mis- 
takes was that he never ventured on such an enter- 
prise again ; the conditions had changed when he 
invaded Spain on two other occasions. As for the 
operations of his adversaries, if we except those of 
Soult, who proved his capacity as a real chief, they 
were badly conducted from first to last. Victor 
ought not to have fought at Talavera at all, until 
Soult had come into line with Joseph and himself ; 
this was a gross, nay, an inexcusable fault ; Joseph 
more than once allowed his enemy to escape through 
weakness, irresolution, and absolutely false move- 
ments. 1 The French commanders of a fine army 
also were found wanting at Talavera ; they did not 
really examine the ground ; they wasted their 
strength in premature attacks; above all, they left 
the field without engaging their reserve, irresolution 
that [incensed their master.' Owing to these many 



1 Napoleon was justly indignant at the results of the campaign, 
Corr., xix., 362: "Quelle belle occasion on a manque ; 30,000 Anglais 
a 150 lieues des cotes devant 100,000 hommes des meillieurs troupes 
du monde ! Mon dieu ! Qu'est-ce qu'une armee sans chef ! " 

2 The comments of the Emperor on Talavera were rightly severe. 
I have only space for a few words. Corr., xix., 379: " Cette position 
de l'ennemi exigeajt done des reconnaissances prealables, et qu'on a 
conduit mes troupes sans discernement, comme a la boucherie ; qu ' 



The Douro — Talavera 101 

faults and shortcomings, Wellesley eluded his foes, 
and even marred the operations of Soult ; the cam- 
paign ultimately was of advantage to him. It taught 
him not to trust Spanish levies ; it impressed Napo- 
leon with the false belief that he " was a rash, pre- 
sumptuous, and ignorant man, " a fixed idea that he 
held to even on the field of Waterloo. The British 
General now resolved to establish himself in Portugal, 
and, in pursuance of his original design, to defend the 
Peninsula from that strong point of vantage. He 
was soon to enter on a passage of arms, the real 
crown of his military career ; he was to make his 
position in Portugal secure, and, as it were, from 
this impregnable lair to defy his enemies ; he was to 
become a thorn in the side of the giant, which was 
to fester and produce the " Spanish ulcer," not the 
least of the manifold causes of the giant's collapse. 

enfin, etant resolu a la bataille, on l'a donnee mollement, puisque mes 
armes ont essaye un affront, et que 12,000 hommes de reserve sont 
cependant restes sans tirer. " 




CHAPTER V 

BUSACO, TORRES VEDRAS, FUENTES D'ONORO 

The supremacy of Napoleon on the Continent restored after Wag- 
ram — His efforts to extend the Continental System — Spain and 
Portugal threatened with subjugation — This might have hap- 
pened had Napoleon conducted the war in person — False opera- 
tions of the French armies — The invasion of Andalusia — 
Farsighted views of Wellington — His presence on the theatre of 
the Peninsular War of supreme importance — His preparations for 
thedefenceof Portugal — Increase and reorganisation of the Por- 
tuguese army — The lines of Torres Vedras — Grandeur of this con- 
ception and of the position of Wellington — Napoleon prepares 
to invade Portugal in complete ignorance of Wellington's 
arrangements — Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida — Advance 
of Massena — Battle of Busaco and defeat of the French — 
Further advance of Massena — He is permanently arrested by 
the lines — His position at Santarem — Soult at Badajoz — Retreat 
of Massena — Pursuit of Wellington — The French army forced 
back into Spain — Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro — The garrison of 
Almeida escapes — Disgrace of Massena. 

BY the close of 1809 and during the months that 
followed, Napoleon might have exclaimed 
with Richard, that the ''lowering clouds had 
been buried in the ocean's bosom." After the re- 
verse at Aspern, he had risen superior to fortune, 
had boldly maintained his hold on the Danube, and 

102 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes oTOnoro 103 

gathering his forces together with marvels of re- 
source and skill, had defeated the Archduke Charles 
in the hard-fought battle of Wagram. Austria had 
bowed once more to the will of her victorious 
enemy, had ceded territory, and had accepted an 
humiliating peace ; ere long she had thrown her 
Imperial daughter into the arms of her conqueror, 
as a pledge of submission to his all-powerful man- 
dates. The Continent hid again its diminished 
head : the Czar, who had been lukewarm in the 
campaign on the Danube, returned, in profession at 
least, to the policy of Tilsit and Erfurt ; the patri- 
otic movement in Germany ceased ; the supremacy 
of France seemed assured from the Rhine to the 
Vistula. In Italy Murat had been placed on the 
throne of Naples, and had been ordered to make a 
descent on Sicily. The Pope had been carried off 
from the Vatican, and had been thrown into gilded 
bondage ; a French army occupied Rome ; the 
spiritual power of many centuries seemed effaced 
by the material tyranny of the sword. England 
remained, no doubt, the mistress of the seas, and 
still, though unaided, maintained the contest ; but 
she had lost a fine army in the swamps of Walcheren ; 
the Douro and Talavera seemed fruitless triumphs. 
Her finances were subjected to a tremendous trial; 
and though her commerce and manufactures still 
bore the strain, and her real prosperity had not been 
decidedly checked, she was suffering much from the 
effects of the Continental System, and from the 
attempts to shut her out from trading with the civ- 
ilised world. The quarrel, too, between Castlereagh 



1 04 Wellington 

and Canning had weakened her Government, and 
distracted her councils; there was a prospect that 
the Opposition might acquire power : if so, the new 
Ministry would hardly continue the war. Mean- 
while, Napoleon, again the lord of the best part 
of Europe, was concentrating his strength against 
his one obstinate enemy : notwithstanding repeated 
defeats and failures, he was building fleets and fit- 
ting out expeditions at sea : he still looked forward 
to his great " battle of Actium." But his indom- 
itable will and commanding energies were chiefly 
directed, at this conjuncture, to the extension and 
the perfection of the Continental System, from which, 
blind to what experience was already proving, and 
ignorant of what the future was to bring forth, he 
drew a certain presage of the approaching ruin of 
England. Reckless that the prohibition of trade 
with his foe impoverished and exasperated every 
State on the Continent, and that his policy urged 
him on to universal conquest, he annexed Holland to 
his overgrown Empire ; he made the Hanse towns 
departments of France, and carried her frontier sea- 
wards far beyond the Elbe, in the fixed conviction 
that by these acts of unscrupulous force he would, in 
his own phrase, " subdue the sea by the land," and 
compel England to become one of his many vassals. 
The domination of Napoleon over the Continent 
seemed also about to be made complete, in the 
spring and the summer of 18 10, by the subjugation 
of the whole Iberian Peninsula. The results of 
the Campaign of 1809, especially the operations 
upon the Tagus, had filled the Emperor with indig- 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes oT Onoro 105 

nant wrath ; his arms in Spain and in Portugal were 
to be defied no longer. As had happened after 
Baylen, so after Wagram he moved enormous forces 
across the Pyrenees ; 100,000 soldiers at least were 
added to the legions that maintained the war ; his 
armies were fully 370,000 strong, and were largely 
composed of his best troops. For a time it appeared 
as if nothing could withstand the overwhelming tor- 
rent of French invasion that spread from beyond the 
Ebro to the Pillars of Hercules. In the East Suchet 
kept down Aragon, quenched the flame of insur- 
rection in Navarre, was preparing to attack Valen- 
cian fortresses. Catalonia had yielded to the arms 
of St. Cyr and Augereau ; Gerona had fallen after 
a memorable siege, worthy of the heroic defence 
of Saragossa. An army upheld the throne of the 
usurper at Madrid ; and occupied the valley of the 
upper Tagus; a great force had been assembled to 
avenge Baylen, to overrun Andalusia, and to com- 
plete its conquest. This host, directed by Soult, 
with Joseph at its head, swept easily through the 
Sierra Morena passes, spread over the fine adjoining 
regions until it approached the sea, took Cordova, 
Seville, and other important cities, and, carrying 
desolation and terror in its train, was stopped only 
before the lagoons of Cadiz, which seemed the last 
refuge of the independence of Spain. Meanwhile 
Napoleon had fixed his gaze on Portugal, and had 
resolved not only to annex that country, but to 
make it a theatre for a reverse to England and to 
the British army, which had appeared on its coasts. 
Another great force was being assembled on the 



106 Wellington 

frontiers of Leon ; it was amply sustained by power- 
ful reserves ; its mission was to crush every enemy 
in its path and to advance in triumph to the Portu- 
guese capital. Nor could even the most experienced 
soldier, nay, the conqueror himself — conducting the 
war from a distance, and far removed from the 
scene of events — understand how a real resistance 
could be made to this formidable display of the 
military force which had laid the Continent at the 
feet of its master. The Spanish rising, indeed, was 
perhaps fiercer than ever ; the Spanish levies had 
been formed into warlike bands known by the signif- 
icant name of Guerrillas, and had found skilful and 
patriotic leaders ; several of the Spanish towns had 
long kept the invaders at bay. But the Spanish 
armies were being routed over and over again; a 
pitched battle had been fought at Ocana, and had 
only lead to a frightful disaster, and though their 
shattered fragments invariably drew towards each 
other, and were animated by a really national spirit, 
it seemed impossible that they could keep the field. 
And what could a handful of British soldiers, even 
though backed by Portuguese levies, effect against 
the gigantic might of Napoleon employed to bring 
the Peninsula within his grasp ? It appeared to be 
no idle boast when the Emperor announced to his 
Senate that " the English Leopard would be driven 
into the sea," and that " the Tricolor would soon 
wave over Lisbon and Cadiz." 

Had Napoleon at this turning-point in his career 
seized the occasion when he bestrode the Continent, 
and had he directed the war in Portugal and Spain 



Bttsaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d'Onoro 107 

himself; had he followed the principles of his own 
strategy, and made the best use of his military 
power ; had he established a real Government at 
Madrid, and made his quarrelling lieutenants obey 
his commands, it is probable that in spite of all the 
obstacles he would have met, he would have con- 
quered the Iberian Peninsula, at least for a time. 
But the Continental System was at present his prin- 
cipal care, and this detained him at Paris, the centre 
of his affairs ; he could hardly leave his young con- 
sort, Marie Louise ; he had begun to dislike a 
national struggle in a most difficult country, which 
an Austerlitz or a Jena could not bring to a close 1 ; 
he kept away from what was now the main scene of 
events ; and yet, like Louis XIV. in another age, he 
controlled from his capital a war far beyond the 
Pyrenees, conduct certain to lead to defeats, nay, 
disasters. This was one of the principal mistakes of 
his life ; it was characteristic, not of a master of war, 
but of a mere despot; he acknowledged it, in exile, 
many years afterwards. How the colossal edifice of 
his tyranny in three-fourths of the Continent toppled 
down and fell in a tremendous ruin, belongs to the 
province of European History ; how it came to 
the same end in Portugal and Spain is largely con- 
nected w r ith the same subject ; and it was due to 
many and different causes. But of these not the 
least was the presence on the theatre of war of the 
great soldier who maintained the contest for England, 



1 Wellington was an admirable military critic. He has remarked 
over and over again, that impatience was a defect of Napoleon 
in war. 



108 Wellington 

and his commanding influence on the course of 
events ; it is unquestionable that the wisdom and 
the sword of Wellington threw a decisive weight in- 
to the scales of Fortune. By this time the British 
commander had, with a capacity and insight pecu- 
liar to himself, mastered the conditions of the 
struggle in the Peninsula hopeless as it appeared 
to the majority even of the ablest men ; he believed 
that, in certain circumstances, it could be carried on 
with success, even against the overwhelming power 
of Napoleon. He had never abandoned the idea he 
had from the first, that Portugal was the true point 
from which the Peninsula could be defended by 
England ; his deep-laid projects for such a defence 
had been formed ; they had been confirmed by his 
recent experiences in Spain, especially by what had 
happened after Talavera. At this conjuncture, he 
had grasped the real state of affairs, in Spain and 
Portugal, with unerring judgment ; being on the 
spot he understood it much better than the Emperor 
could do, hundreds of miles away in Paris. He had 
rightly deemed that Napoleon's principal effort in 
the Peninsula would be made against Portugal ' ; 
but having regard to the position of the French 
armies, he believed that that effort could be made 
a failure. He had properly condemned the invasion 
of Andalusia and the consequent dissemination of 
the enemy's forces as a distinct and momentous 
military mistake " ; this, he was convinced, would 
tell powerfully in the operations at hand. He put 
little or no trust in the Spanish armies, as was 

1 Selection, pp. 313-317. s Ibid., p. 434. 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d ' Onoro 109 

natural after the events of 1809; he possibly esti- 
mated them below their worth ; but he clearly per- 
ceived that the Spanish rising would prove an 
immense obstacle to the invaders ; would impede 
check, nay, perhaps paralyse their movements on 
the general theatre of the war. In these circum- 
stances Wellington contended that if the resources 
of Portugal were properly employed, and if England 
remained true to herself, that nook in the Peninsula 
could even now be made a stronghold from which 
the forces of Napoleon could be made to recoil. 1 

Wellington, after his retreat from Talavera, had 
kept his army around Badajoz for some time. His 
troops suffered from disease in unhealthy canton- 
ments, and for this he has been somewhat rudely 
blamed ; but his position on the Guadiana can be 
fully justified. The juntas, which had been the 
heads of the great rising of Spain, had been repre- 
sented by a Central Junta, which had been assem- 
bled at Aranjuez and Seville; the Central Junta had 
taken refuge at Cadiz, and had been replaced by a 
more regular government ; a project had been formed 
to convene the Cortes, the time-honoured Parliament 
of the Spanish monarchy. At the same time Cadiz 
was making a stubborn defence ; the place was ex- 
ceedingly difficult to attack; it had successfully 

1 Wellington wrote this in November 1809 : "I conceive that 
until Spain shall have been conquered and shall have submitted 
to the conqueror, the enemy will find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain possession of Portugal; if His Majesty should continue to 
employ an army in the defence of this country, and if the improve- 
ments in the Portuguese military service should be carried to the 
extent of which they are capable."- — Selection, pp. 313-314. 



1 10 Wellington 

defied the efforts of Victor ; it had the support of a 
British fleet ; a considerable force, composed partly of 
Spanish, partly of British troops, had been collected 
to oppose the besieging enemy. Wellington wished, 
when near Badajoz, to be within reach of the new 
Spanish Government, and to give it countenance as 
well as he could ; in this position, besides, he threat- 
ened the French invaders in the valley of the Tagus 
and in Andalusia,— these already greatly scattered 
and weakened, — and he protected the south-eastern 
frontier of Portugal. But during this period his 
powerful mind was bent on carrying out the profound 
designs he had made for the defence of that king- 
dom, and for resisting the attack he had clearly fore- 
seen ; his steadfast energies were directed to effect 
his purpose. He stipulated that he should have the 
command of a British army to be kept at a strength 
of thirty thousand men, and to be properly rein- 
forced from the sea ; this was, so to speak, to be his 
right arm in the field. But he had been placed at 
the head of all the Portuguese forces, under the 
honoured title of Marshal General ; the men in 
office in Lisbon, now called the Regency, who 
though often divided, factious, and jealous of his 
power, nevertheless bowed to his superior will, were 
persuaded or compelled to put the whole military 
resources of the State in his hands ; he had soon 
turned these to the very best advantage. The Por- 
tuguese army, which had already done good work, 
was largely increased and better organised, great 
additions were made to the Portuguese levies, and 
the whole male population was summoned to arms, 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Ftientes d 1 Onoro 1 1 1 

under the ancient feudal laws of the Portuguese 
monarchy. By these means Wellington's British 
force would have the support of a regular foreign 
army, and of a kind of militia as it may fitly be 
called ; both were probably not less than one hundred 
thousand strong; and there were, besides, large masses 
that could do much service. This combination of 
military arrays was to form, as it were, the human 
rampart which was to defend Portugal, and to offer 
the resistance which man could make to the enemy. 
The forces of nature, however, as well as those of 
man, were to be employed in the accomplishment of 
the British General's design. Napoleon's masterly 
offensive strategy largely depended on the facilities 
given by good roads, and on the products of agri- 
culture on the lines of march ; these enabled his 
armies to move rapidly, and to find the means of 
subsistence in the lands they traversed. His combi- 
nations had in a great measure failed when these 
conditions of success were absent ; this had been 
conspicuously seen in his winter campaign in Poland, 
and already in some of the French operations in 
Spain. The circumstance did not escape the pene- 
trating eye of Wellington ; he was alive to its signi- 
ficance for the defence of Portugal. He obtained 
from the Government at Lisbon a reluctant consent 
that the population should break up the main roads, 
should destroy the crops and harvests ; should lay 
the country waste along the whole front of the com- 
ing invasion ; this devastation, even if imperfectly 
carried out, would greatly embarrass and retard the 
enemy. But this was not the only natural obstacle 



112 Wellington 

which was to be thrown across the advance of the 
hostile army ; there was an obstacle which perhaps 
would be made impassable, if aided by the resources 
of the military art. Armed lines had become all 
but obsolete in war ; but they had repeatedly proved 
of supreme importance ; the lines of Villars, what- 
ever has been said, saved France in 1710-1711 ; the 
features of the region beyond Lisbon could make 
these defences play a most remarkable part. Two 
ranges of heights rose between the Tagus and the 
sea, twenty-nine and twenty-four miles in length, 
and considerably north of the Portuguese capital ; 
they formed a barrier to the approach of the enemy ; 
they enclosed a vast intervening space which could 
be held by a defending force, in fact, to be compared 
to a huge entrenched camp. These eminences were 
occupied by the British chief along their whole ex- 
tent, and fortified with admirable skill and care ; low 
uplands were scarped down and made precipitous ; 
valleys were inundated and turned into inaccessible 
swamps ; points of vantage were chosen for the com- 
manding fire of artillery ; hills, villages, streams, — in 
a word, every part of the ground, — were made to 
contribute to the great projected work. In this way 
two formidable defensive lines, each supporting the 
other, and of prodigious strength, were formed along 
the ranges in front of Lisbon ; they were protected 
by about a hundred and fifty redoubts, and armed 
by nearly seven hundred cannon ; they were to be 
held by a powerful army, and in constructing them 
care had been taken that the army should possess 
the means of a counter-attack, and should not be 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Ftientes d'Onoro 1 13 

confined to a mere passive resistance. But Welling-, 
ton's preparations did not stop here ; foreseeing that 
conceivably the lines could be forced, he formed a 
third line, behind the first two, on the verge of the 
sea near Lisbon, of narrow breadth, but well-nigh im- 
pregnable ; this would cover his army, if compelled 
to embark, and would make its retreat to its ship- 
ping secure. Tens of thousands of men were 
employed in making these gigantic works, rightly de- 
scribed as " a stupendous citadel, wherein to deposit 
the independence of the whole Peninsula"; and it is 
a most astonishing fact that these vast creations 
were planned and completed with such secrecy — this 
was a masterpiece of Wellington's art — that their 
very existence was unknown in Europe and even in 
England. 

The lines of Torres Vedras, the name they bear 
in history, and Wellington's other arrangements for 
the defence of Portugal, in conception and execu- 
tion were one of the most splendid specimens of 
the military art, in the great war between France 
and Europe. They were illustrations, on the very 
grandest scale, of sagacity, of forethought, of the 
adaptation of means to ends, in resisting the gi- 
gantic power of Napoleon ; and they were the first 
permanent check in his career of conquest. And it 
adds to our admiration of this magnificent design 
that it was carried out in spite of misgivings in Eng- 
land, in spite of fears openly avowed by the British 
Government ; in spite of alarm and scepticism in 
Wellington's camp. A Tory Ministry had retained 
office and the hopes of the Opposition had vanished ; 



1 1 4 Wellington 

but with the single exception of Lord Wellesley, 
the successor of Canning as Foreign Minister, the 
Cabinet of Percival had little faith in the possibility 
of a successful defence of Portugal ; and this was 
the opinion of most of the distinguished officers on 
the spot. From this point of view the attitude 
of the British commander was an exhibition of con- 
stancy, of resolution, of moral power, to which 
hardly a parallel can be found in war; he stood as 
it were, on a rock in Portugal, defying all that 
Napoleon could do against him, his countrymen 
and his lieutenants filled with forebodings, depend- 
ing on himself, and himself alone. Meanwhile his 
great adversary had his preparations made for re- 
invading Portugal, and for what, he was convinced, 
would prove an easy conquest. Had Napoleon had 
the slightest idea that the Portuguese auxiliaries 
now formed a real army, and that the lines of Torres 
Vedras were practically not to be assailed with 
success in front, he would doubtless have drawn 
together the mass of his forces in Spain, and moved 
them in overwhelming numbers upon Portugal ; and 
had he entered that kingdom from the south, as well 
as from the north, the lines might perhaps have been 
turned, and the defences of Wellington made to fall. 
Such a combination would not have been difficult, 
had not an army been almost thrown away in false 
operations in Andalusia ; but even now it was not 
impossible, had the Emperor thought the occasion 
had come. But Napoleon persisted in a belief that 
a small British army, of which, too, he much under- 
rated the strength, was the only enemy to be found 




MARSHAL SOULT. 
(After the painting by Rouillard.) 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes cT Onoro 1 1 5 

in Portugal ; he thought the Portuguese levies 
beneath contempt ; above all, he remained in com- 
plete ignorance of the formidable obstacle laid in his 
path, should a French army try to make a direct 
march on Lisbon. It will always be a mystery that 
this consummate master of war, who had spies and 
partisans in every part of Europe, was absolutely 
uninformed as to the most essential fact, when he 
formed his plans in 18 10 for a descent on Portugal. ' 
The preparations of Napoleon were, nevertheless, 
imposing, even if really insufficient for the intended 
enterprise. Armies, probably 120,000 strong, had 
been concentrated in Leon and Castile, to carry the 
war across the Portuguese frontier ; the first line 
was composed of some 650,00 men, largely veterans 
of the best quality ; the second was not much in- 
ferior in numbers and was, if necessary, to reinforce 
the first, and to guard the long line of communi- 
cations with France, always infested by the active 
Spanish guerrillas. These collective arrays had 
been placed under the command of Massena, con- 
fessedly the ablest of the Imperial marshals ; he had 
been directed, in the first instance, to take Ciudad 
Rodrigo, and Almeida, frontier fortresses on the 
northern verge of Portugal, — Ciudad, indeed, is just 
within Spain, — and then gathering together his fore- 
most line, the corps of Ney, of Junot, of Reynier — 
this last moving from the valley of the Tagus, to 
reach Wellington, to overthrow him, and to march 
straight on Lisbon. A word here may be said on 

1 The Correspondence of Napoleon at this time shows that he 
did not give the affairs of the Peninsula the attention they required. 



1 1 6 Wellington 

the renowned French chief who had been entrusted 
with a mission he could not fulfil, and of which, 
strange to say, he had had grave misgivings. Mas- 
sena was inferior, perhaps, as a strategist to Soult, 
inferior certainly as a tactician to Ney ; he was not 
a master of the great combinations of war; he was 
licentious, rapacious, not liked by his troops; but 
he was capable of splendid efforts in the field, as 
his great victory of Zurich proves; his tenacity and 
energy deserve the highest praise, as was seen in his 
heroic defence of Genoa ; we may accept Welling- 
ton's decisive judgment, that he was the best of all 
his Imperial opponents. The Marshal assumed his 
command in June; Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen on 
the nth of July, after a siege on which it is un- 
necessary to dwell ; Almeida surrendered, in the last 
days of August, in a great measure from the effects 
of an accident. Meanwhile, Wellington, who for 
some time, had concentrated the main part of his 
army in the valley of the Mondego, around Guarda, 
had, when made aware of the operations of the 
French, advanced cautiously beyond Celorico, not 
far from Almeida, in order to observe his antago- 
nists' movements ; but he properly refused to accept 
a trial of strength, to which Massena endeavoured 
to lure him, by feints, demonstrations, and an ap- 
parently careless attitude. This conduct was marked 
by his characteristic wisdom ; he had not more than 
24,000 men in hand, his best lieutenant, Hill, being 
still far away, another lieutenant, Leith, being many 
leagues distant ; a lost battle in his position would 
have been his ruin, and a lost battle would have 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes oT Onoro 1 1 7 

been well-nigh a certainty. Disregarding, therefore, 
the taunts of his enemy and angry recriminations 
from Spanish and Portuguese allies, nay, even mur- 
muring voices in his own camp, the British General 
allowed Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida to fall, with- 
out making an attempt at relief ; in this course he 
was unquestionably right. Rash movements, indeed, 
of a brilliant lieutenant, Crawford, which nearly led 
to a grave reverse, proved that Wellington's judg- 
ment was, as usual, correct. 

After the fall of Almeida, Massena made a rather 
long halt ; his army had not begun its advance until 
the 16th of September. This has been charged to 
the Marshal as a grave error ; it certainly gave Wel- 
lington what he needed, time ; but Reynier was late 
in joining the main army ; the French were already 
straitened for supplies. Massena's first object was 
to gain Coimbra, a large town which he may have 
wished to make a secondary base, and, if possible, to 
bring Wellington to bay. After making a series of 
dextrous feints, he marched, not down the valley of 
the Mondego, a comparatively fertile and prosper- 
ous tract, but just north of the river, through a 
barren and difficult country. This appears distinctly 
to have been an error ; but the Marshal relied on Por- 
tuguese nobles in his camp, who had traitorously 
taken the side of the French ; he knew nothing of 
the region he was passing through ; he took, too, the 
nearest route to Coimbra. His soldiers, however, 
had begun to murmur, and Ney and Junot already 
were complaining of their chief ; a train of his artil- 
lery had been nearly surprised and cut off ; he had 



1 1 8 Wellington 

hostile bands on his flank and rear ; he did not reach 
Viseu until the 23rd of September, a place three or 
four marches *at least from Coimbra. Wellington 
had fallen back through the valley of the Mondego, 
watching his enemy, but not molested by him ; but 
he had summoned Hill and Leith to come into line. 
These lieutenants were even now at hand ; he could 
dispose of not far from fifty thousand men. The 
British commander resolved to offer battle to his 
adversary in a strong position. This undoubtedly 
was running considerable risk, but military reasons 
did not determine his purpose. He was condemned 
by the men in power at Lisbon for what they 
deemed an ignominious retreat, as he had been con- 
demned for leaving Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida 
to their fate. His own officers and soldiers who 
were in ignorance of the lines, and thought that all 
before them was a long march to the sea, were 
vexed that they had not measured themselves with 
the enemy ; and though Massena's advance had been 
slow, the population had only partially wasted the 
country, and the Marshal had all the moral advan- 
tage of a bold offensive. Under these conditions 
Wellington crossed the Mondego, and standing be- 
tween Viseu and Coimbra drew up his army along 
the ridge of Busaco, a kind of spur of the Sierra 
Alcoba, itself an offshoot of the great Sierra Cara- 
mula. The position of the British General was ad- 
mirably chosen for the defensive battle he had 
decided to fight. The ridge afforded a formidable 
obstacle to the onset of the French, for they could 
only attack from a deep valley below, and they 






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Btisaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d'Onoro 119 

would have to ascend very difficult heights. Its 
crest afforded space for the first British line, but 
screened the reserves which were arrayed behind. 
It made Massena's powerful cavalry completely use- 
less, for they could not act on ground of the kind, and 
it greatly impeded the effective fire of the French ar- 
tillery. The front of the position extended about 
five miles ; it was to be occupied by nearly forty 
thousand men ; it was probably not to be stormed 
by a direct attack. But it might have been turned 
on the left by a pass of the name of Boyalva, and 
this had been left well-nigh unguarded, a mistake 
which might have cost Wellington dear. 

The advance guard of the French had reached 
the approaches to Busaco on the 25th of September ; 
the corps of Ney and Reynier were close to the 
ridge on the 26th ; they numbered more than thirty- 
five thousand men, for the most part veterans of the 
Imperial army. At this moment Leith and Hill 
were nearly half a march distant ; Wellington had 
not more than twenty-five thousand men in hand ; 
his position had not been completely occupied. 
Ney and Reynier were eager to fall on at once, but 
Massena was at Montagoa in the rear ; very prob- 
ably he had much to attend to, but there is reason to 
believe that he wasted time on the object of a dis- 
creditable amour. The Marshal, bringing with him 
the corps of Junot, did not join his lieutenants until 
the afternoon. The attack was postponed to the 
next day. Ney and Reynier, it is said, were now 
opposed to the attempt. 

Meanwhile Leith and Hill had come into line with 



1 20 Wellington 

their chief; the position was held by the mass of 
his forces ; his arrangements had been perfected for 
the impending conflict. It had been decided, in the 
enemy's camp, that the attack was to be conducted 
by Ney and Reynier, the corps of Junot being kept 
in reserve ; it was to be made by their troops at the 
same time ; but it was not so made, and this was 
a capital mistake. At daybreak on the 27th, Ney 
being still motionless, the columns of Reynier, 
throwing out their cloud of skirmishers, advanced 
against Wellington's right and right centre ; they 
had soon emerged from the valley below ; they 
scaled the difficult height before them with exult- 
ing cheers, and though but little supported by the 
fire of their guns, they had reached the summit in 
less than half an hour, " with astonishing power and 
resolution overthrowing everything that opposed 
their progress." The division of Picton and the 
Portuguese auxiliaries were driven back ; this part of 
the position had been nearly won, spite of a stern 
and fierce resistance ; it might perhaps have been 
won had the assailants had a reserve at hand. But 
if Wellington's line had been broken at one point, 
and his retreat on Coimbra had been threatened, his 
troops would not confess defeat ; the division of 
Leith restored the battle, plying the enemy with a 
murderous fire, and gradually forcing him from the 
crest of the height ; Hill, coming up from the ex- 
treme right, made victory secure. Meanwhile Ney, 
after a delay of some hours, had begun his attack 
against Wellington's left. This was more skilfully 
directed than that of Reynier, but the ground was 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d' Onoro 1 2 1 

more difficult, and it met the same fate. One of 
the Marshal's divisions, that of Loison, ascended the 
height before it, and nearly attained the top ; the 
men, who had retained their formation, though hardly 
pressed, made an effort to fall on the enemy in their 
front ; but as usual, the column was overcome by the 
line ; " the head was violently overturned and driven 
upon the rear ; both flanks were lapped over by the 
English wings, and three terrible discharges at five 
yards' distance completed the rout." The second of 
Ney's divisions — the third was held in reserve — en- 
deavoured to turn the right of Crawford, to whom 
the honour of Loison's defeat was due ; but it was 
kept completely in check, and it fell back, beaten. 

In this hard-fought engagement the French army 
was weakened by at least 4500 men, for the most 
part soldiers of the first quality, — many of the regi- 
ments had seen Jena and Austerlitz ; it had, in fact, 
suffered a terrible reverse. Massena had not con- 
ducted the battle well; his troops gave proof of 
heroic valour, but they were not sustained by a re- 
serve at any point ; their three arms could not act 
together ; the position ought not to have been assailed 
in front. And the blame the Marshal deserved was 
increased by this ; before he made an ill-conceived 
attack, he had been made aware that his enemy's 
left could be turned by the pass of Boyalva; but it 
has been said that he yielded to the first counsels of 
Ney and Reynier, with whom he was already at odds, 
through fear that the Emperor would be informed 
that an opportunity of success had been missed. 
The losses of Wellington were not 1500 men, his 



122 Wellington 

tactical dispositions had been as good as possible ; if 
his right centre was for a moment in peril, he gained 
a real victory along his whole line ; what was more 
important, the moral power of his army, which had 
been impaired, was restored ; the Portuguese auxil- 
iaries inspired daily increasing confidence. 

The defeat of Busaco had been such a weighty stroke 
that Massena's lieutenants were for an immediate re- 
treat ; this, too, was the judgment of the British chief ; 
he had written that the invaders ought not to have 
gone farther, unless they could be largely reinforced 
from Spain. 1 But tenacity was one of Massena's dis- 
tinctive qualities: he had been positively ordered to 
proceed to Lisbon, and he had no notion of what he 
would have to encounter ; he is hardly to be censured 
for continuing his onward march. The Marshal now 
did what he ought to have done before : leaving the 
corps of Junot to cover the movement, and aban- 
doning hundreds of his wounded men, he made, on 
the evening after the battle, for the pass of Boyalva ; 
he found no hostile force in the defile ; the excuse 
that a detachment of Portuguese had been employed 
to guard it and was not on the spot for some unex- 
plained reason, appears to be of little or no value. 
Within a few hours the whole French army had 
emerged from the pass ; but this was a flank march 
in the presence of a victorious enemy, at a distance 
of only eight or ten miles ; Wellington has been con- 
demned for not seizing an advantage that might have 
had immense results; in this, one of his few short- 
comings in a memorable campaign, we perhaps may 

1 Selection, pp. 399, 400. Wellington's language is emphatic. 




ANDRE MASSENA, DUKE DE RIVOLI. 
(After the painting by Maurice ) 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d ' Onoro 123 

see a defect in war characteristic of him, he very 
seldom made the most of success. The left of the 
British General had now been turned, but he crossed 
the Mondego safely, and made good his retreat ; his 
adversary made no attempt to molest him. Massena 
had entered Coimbra by the 1st of October ; he halted 
on the spot for three days — a delay for which he can 
hardly be blamed — to form a depot and to restore 
his army; leaving only a small detachment and his 
wounded behind, he boldly advanced with the mass 
of his forces. His pursuit, however, was feeble and 
slow ; the country on his line of march had been 
harried and wasted ; Wellington was chiefly harassed 
by the crowds of refugees from Coimbra who followed 
his columns. 

From the 8th to the 10th of October, the allied 
army had almost made its way within the celebrated 
lines. Hill lay along the heights of Alhandra to the 
right ; Crawford held the centre between Aruda and 
Sobral; Leith and Picton stood on the left beyond 
Torres Vedras toward the sea ; the first line of 
defence was fully occupied ; the second was guarded 
by a sufficient reserve. After a slight brush with 
the British General's rearguard, Massena had attained 
the lines by the I ith ; he had heard a few days before 
that some defensive works had been thrown up ; but 
he had not the slightest conception of the stu- 
pendous barrier which now rose before him, and was 
defended by the men who won Busaco. The veteran, 
however, would not flinch ; he searched the position 
from right to left, examining two or three of the 
most vulnerable points ; it has been said that he 



124 Wellington 

contemplated for a moment an attack pressed home. 
But such an effort, whatever French critics have urged, 
could only have led to a crushing defeat ; the army 
of Wellington was daily increasing by additions of 
Spanish and Portuguese troops ; the second line was 
even more formidable than the first ; it may safely be 
asserted that the twofold mighty obstacle could not 
have been overcome by an attack in front even though 
made by one hundred thousand men ; it could only 
have been turned by a movement from the other bank 
of the Tagus. In this position of affairs Massena 
rightly gave up any idea of a direct assault on the lines; 
he adopted a course not justified by the event, perhaps 
not strategically wise, but characteristic of the man, 
and from his point of view not without reason. Impos- 
ing silence on his discontented lieutenants, who in- 
sisted that a retreat had become a necessity, he re- 
solved to take a position before the lines from which he 
could hold Wellington in check, perhaps induce the 
British General to fight, and on which he could at once 
menace Lisbon, carry out as well as he could his 
master's orders, and, as might be expected, could 
obtain the large reinforcements from Spain, even 
from France, he had right to look for. Drawing off, 
therefore, skilfully from the front of his enemy, he es- 
tablished his army around Santarem and the adjoin- 
ning country, a tract only a few miles distant from 
the lines, comparatively fertile and not ravaged, af- 
fording points for a defensive battle, and commanding 
the routes that extend to Coimbra. At the same 
time he made preparations to bridge the Tagus, and 
its affluent the Zezere, in the hope that assistance 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d'Onoro 125 

might reach him from the South, and he sent that 
distinguished officer, Foy, to inform Napoleon of the 
events that had happened, and to demand the rein- 
forcements required if he was to fulfil his task. The 
arrangement was a masterly one if Massena's project 
could be accomplished. 

Napoleon has severely condemned the conduct 
of his lieutenant in thus standing before the lines. 
This view was strengthened by an unlucky accident : 
Coimbra had been seized by a levy of Portuguese ; 
Massena's detachment and his wounded had been 
captured or slain ; the French army had lost a depot 
and fully 4000 men. The Emperor has insisted that 
the Marshal, after Busaco, ought to have occupied 
Coimbra in force ; to have taken possession of the 
country around ; to have extended his right wing as 
far as Oporto ; and to have awaited the arrival of re- 
inforcements from Andalusia and the south.' Wel- 
lington, it is unnecessary to say, thought Massena 
completely in the wrong: as he ought to have fallen 
back from Busaco, he ought the more certainly to 
fall back now ; this was " the measure which it was 
the most expedient for the French to adopt." 2 
Nevertheless, despite these weighty opinions, much 
is to be said for what Massena did ; he kept his ad- 
versary confined within a nook of Portugal ; the mili- 
tary power of France in the Peninsula was immense ; 
it was practicable, at least from his point of view, to 
send him large aid from Andalusia and the Castiles ; 
in that case the lines might have been turned from 
the eastern bank of the Tagus, and Lisbon might 

1 Nap. Corr., pp. 31-362. 3 Selection, p. 344. 



126 Wellington 

have been reduced to submission ; it hardly lay in 
Napoleon's mouth to censure operations which real- 
ly conformed to his commands. Wellington, after 
Massena's movement on Santarem, was at the head 
of 60,000 or 70,000 men, to a considerable extent 
very good soldiers ; the French army was probably 
not more than 50,000 strong, and was suffering from 
all kinds of privations; the British General has 
been sharply criticised for not falling on his adversary 
under these conditions. We may, perhaps, see 
here his characteristic caution and his occasional 
neglect to appeal to Fortune ; but his seeming in- 
action was probably in all respects justified. Mas- 
sena's army, if weakened, was still powerful, and, 
what is more important, had not lost heart ; it would 
have been very formidable, had it been attacked in 
one of the excellent positions it might have taken ; 
in the event of a defeat of the British commander, 
" failure, " in his own words, " would be the loss of 
the whole cause." ' It should be added that Wel- 
lington probably believed that Massena's troops 
could not long find the means of subsistence in the 
country they held, and would soon be compelled to 
make a disastrous retreat ; he thus took a position 
not far from Santarem, hoping to assail his enemy 
when success would be certain. This expectation, 
however, was not fulfilled ; the hostile armies re- 
mained watching each other for months ; this was a 
striking instance of the resolution of the veteran 
Marshal, and also of the extraordinary skill with 
which an army of Napoleon could organise rapine 
1 ^election, p. 413. 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes oT Onoro 127 

and exist on scanty resources found on the spot. 
Meanwhile Massena threw a bridge across the 
Zezere, and hoped to be able to bridge the Tagus, 
ever looking forward to the assistance of his Imperial 
master. 

During these events Foy had safely arrived in 
Paris; had informed Napoleon of the position of 
affairs ; and had urged the necessity of reinforcing 
Massena in strength, with an army possibly as large 
as that which had invaded Portugal, and operating 
on both banks of the Tagus. He found the Emperor 
angry with his great lieutenant, who, he said, had 
made a series of mistakes, and deceived by the illu- 
sions to which he yet clung ; the Portuguese levies 
were completely worthless ; Wellington had not more 
than twenty-five thousand good troops ; the lines 
might have been stormed by a vigorous effort. Nev- 
ertheless, seeing that Massena was in a difficult plight, 
he gave directions that supports should be sent to the 
Marshal from Leon, the Castiles, and Andalusia ; the 
war must be brought to an end by the defeat of Wel- 
lington and the occupation of the Portuguese capi- 
tal. Orders were given that D'Erlon should advance 
from the north, and join hands with the army before 
the lines ; that Dorsenne should co-operate with the 
same purpose; that Joseph should send divisions 
from Madrid ; above all, that Soult should push for- 
ward from Andalusia and come into line with Mas- 
sena on the southern bank of the Tagus. By these 
means eighty thousand, even one hundred thousand 
men might be assembled to force and turn the de- 
fences of Wellington; the Emperor still believed that 



128 Wellington 

success was certain. In principle these directions 
were well conceived ; but the great warrior, still ig- 
norant of the real facts, had miscalculated his military 
resources in Spain and was once more conducting 
war from a distance. It was scarcely possible to 
array such a mass of forces to assail the lines, even 
had Napoleon taken the supreme command ; the 
communications with the North were in continual 
danger ; the army of Joseph was held in check at 
Madrid ; the siege of Cadiz paralysed Victor and was 
keeping the besiegers upon the spot ; Soult, though 
disposing of a still powerful force, was harassed in 
Andalusia by the guerrillas and by the wrecks of 
the beaten Spanish armies. Napoleon in truth had 
missed an occasion which he might have seized in 
the first months of 1810, and besides he had turned 
his attention from the Peninsula. His relations with 
the Czar had become unfriendly ; he had annexed 
the Duchy of Oldenburg, a state of one of the Czar's 
kinsmen ; he was impoverishing Russia by the Con- 
tinental System ; he had refused to declare that Po- 
land should not be restored ; his ally was jealous of 
his marriage with Marie Louise. In these circum- 
stances, the Imperial orders were ill obeyed ; Dor- 
senne never approached the Tagus ; D'Erlon only 
reached Massena with some ten thousand men ; Soult, 
moving from Andalusia with perhaps twenty thou- 
sand, was delayed for weeks in laying siege to Bada- 
joz, and remained far away from the decisive point, 
the Tagus. For this conduct the Marshal has been 
severely blamed, but it is difficult to say that he 
made a mistake : the enterprise would have been very 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Ftientes <£ Onoro 129 

dangerous, and Massena and Soult, even if united, 
would not have compelled Wellington to abandon 
the lines. 

It had become manifest, by the first days of March, 
181 1, that Massena could no longer maintain his po- 
sition. His army was not more than fifty thousand 
strong, even with the reinforcements that had been 
brought by D'Erlon ; it was isolated in a hostile 
country, which had been ravaged and turned into a 
waste ; it had only supplies for a few days ; the 
prospect of obtaining further support had vanished. 
The sound of artillery on the side of Badajoz had 
been heard, but it had ceased, or at least was at a 
great distance ; Massena had not been able to bridge 
the Tagus, a necessity if he was to be joined by 
Soult. The veteran made up his mind with pain to 
retreat ; in truth, no other conceivable course was 
open. The retrograde movement, if marked by 
more than one mistake, was conducted, on the whole, 
with admirable skill; but the French and the Portu- 
guese had become deadly foes ; it was disgraced by 
reckless barbarities and shameful excesses. 1 On the 
4th of March Massena drew off his sick and wounded 
men ; he contrived to screen this operation from the 
British chief ; on the 5th and 6th his army was in 
full march by the main roads that led to Coimbra. 
Massena had thus gained an advantage ; Wellington 
cautiously followed the retiring columns ; Ney fought 
a brilliant engagement at Redinha of the same char- 
acter as that of Rolica, in which the manoeuvring 
power of the French was very apparent. Massena 

1 Selection, p. 449. 
9 



1 30 Wellington 

resolved if possible to prolong the contest, and, eager 
to resume an offensive attitude, sought to cross the 
Mondego and to hold Coimbra; from that place he 
would be in a region which had not suffered much ; 
he still hoped that his master would reinforce his 
army. But the main bridge on the Mondego had 
been broken down ; Ney had not defended the pass 
of Condeixa, which covered the approaches to Coim- 
bra ; the French army was compelled to march to 
the frontier by the southern branch of the Mondego 
through a difficult country. A series of partial com- 
bats took place, to the advantage generally of the 
allied army; the French suffered a real defeat at Sa- 
bugal, not far from the borders of Spain ; in the last 
days of March Massena had crossed the Portuguese 
frontier ; his army was not more than forty thousand 
strong ; it was a shattered and disorganised wreck. 
Yet the Marshal would not forego his purpose ; he 
insisted, when his men had had time to recruit their 
strength, on making an effort to descend on Coria, 
and co-operating with Soult to advance to the Tagus, 
and to renew the campaign under better auspices. 
But his lieutenants had been quarrelling for months 
with him ; Ney, notably, refused to obey his orders ; 
he instantly deprived the Marshal of his command. 

Massena, after his calamitous retreat, spread his 
army in cantonments around Salamanca ; the move- 
ment on Coria, had to be given up ; it is impossible 
to suppose that it could have been successful. 
Meanwhile Wellington had invested Almeida, and, 
believing that he could not be attacked for a time, 
had gone in person into Estremadura, where his 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes oT Onoro 1 3 1 

presence on the spot would no doubt be of much ad- 
vantage. Events in Spain had taken an unfortunate 
turn for the French, while Massena was painfully- 
making his way out of Portugal. Soult had taken 
Badajoz after a protracted siege, and other places of 
little value ; but Wellington had sent Beresford and 
Hill, with a considerable force, to retake the fort- 
ress. The Marshal was being involved in a sea of 
troubles. The siege of Cadiz had become a great 
operation of war ; Victor still persisted in clinging to 
the spot; he had had enormous cannon made for 
bombarding the city ; he had placed a flotilla on the 
lagoons; but the resistance he encountered defied 
his efforts. Cadiz, rising from a peninsula, enclosed 
by the sea, was exceedingly difficult to attack from 
the land ; it had the support of a British squadron, 
and of an army weekly increasing in strength ; in 
fact, Victor was menaced in his own camp, and had 
become less a besieger than a besieged. A mixed 
British and Spanish force had been told off to fall on 
his lines, but the Marshal had advanced to give it 
battle ; he had been defeated with heavy loss at 
Barrossa, but he had averted a disaster that might 
have been fatal. Soult, in supreme command in 
Andalusia, found the affairs in that kingdom in a 
deplorable state ; the conquerors had nearly been 
imprisoned within their own conquest. Murat had 
failed to make a descent on Sicily ; a British detach- 
ment had been sent to take part in the defence of 
Cadiz; Murcia was stirring with a fast-spreading 
revolt ; the French armies in Andalusia, greatly 
reduced in numbers, were beset by guerrillas on 



132 Wellington 

every side, and by the remains of the Spanish armies ; 
they held only the wasted tracts that they occupied, 
and were disseminated oVer an immense region. 
Such had been the results of an invasion utterly 
ill conceived ; a fine army of eighty thousand men, 
which, if rightly directed, might have done great 
things, had been nearly reduced to impotence, and 
was now probably not sixty thousand strong. 1 Soult 
had only a small garrison to throw into Badajoz ; it 
seemed that the fortress would erelong fall ; it was 
this that had brought Wellington near the scene of 
events. 

The army of Massena had, meanwhile, been reor- 
ganised more rapidly than could have been supposed, 
and had been made again an efficient instrument of 
war. Napoleon, however, was now bent on con- 
ducting a mighty crusade of the West against the 
East, and on beginning the enterprise which was to 
lead to the retreat from Moscow. The Czar had 
resented the annexation of the domain of a kinsman, 
had refused to carry out to extremes the Continental 
System, and was making slight preparations for war. 
Napoleon was incensed at what he deemed a chal- 
lenge, and was making ready for a campaign far 
beyond the Niemen. Bodies of troops were being 
slowly moved from Italy and across Germany, every 



1 Wellington has clearly pointed out the mistake made by Napo- 
leon in sanctioning the invasion of Andalusia: "It was obvious 
that the French were in error when they entered Andalusia. They 
should have begun by turning their great force against the English 
in Portugal, holding in check the Spanish force in Andalusia."— 
Selection, p. 434. 



Busaco y Torres Vedras, Fuentes d ' Onoro 133 

precaution being taken to assure secrecy ; the French 
armies in Spain were being weakened by degrees; 
the reinforcements sent to Massena were small; 
they consisted of only a few thousand men added 
to D'Erlon's division, and of a detachment of the 
Imperial Guard under Bessieres, a good cavalry 
officer, but in no sense a general. Massena had 
soon collected about 50,000 men, but Bessieres was 
a jealous and unsympathetic colleague ; Loison, who 
had been given the command of Ney, was an unwill- 
ing lieutenant, disliked by his soldiers ; Junot and 
Reynier had never ceased to have disputes with 
their veteran chief. The Marshal, however, when 
made aware that Wellington was many leagues dis- 
tant, resolved to advance to the relief of Almeida, 
and if possible to fight a great battle, which might 
retrieve a reputation somewhat impaired, and recall 
victory once more to the Imperial standards. He 
had reached Ciudad Rodrigo in the last days of 
April, 181 1, and was soon on the way to Almeida, 
at the head of some 40,000 good troops, of whom 
5000 were very fine cavalry; he found the allies in a 
position before Almeida, which was still invested 
and seemed on the point of falling. Wellington had 
only resumed his command on the 28th ; it is not 
certain whether the dispositions made for his army 
were arranged by himself or by a subordinate, but 
they did not give proof of his remarkable tactical 
skill. His front was covered by the stream of the 
Dos Casas, by the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, and 
by a large ravine, but the position could be turned 
on the right, where the ravine ended in marshy flats, 



i 34 Wellington 

which were passable, however, even by cavalry. 
His army occupied a kind of tableland between the 
Dos Casas, and theTurones, a stream fordable indeed, 
but deep ; Almeida and the river Coa were in his 
immediate rear. Should his right, therefore, be 
forced and the position lost, he ran the risk of a 
very grave defeat. He was much inferior in num- 
bers to his opponent ; he had some 32,000 men and 
only 1200 cavalry; these last in by no means good 
condition for battle. 

Fuentes d'Onoro was attacked by a part of the 
French army on the 3rd of May. This seems to 
have been a distinct mistake ; the attack, as at 
Busaco, was made in front ; the position was for a 
time imperilled, but the allies ultimately beat back 
the enemy. Massena spent the 4th in carefully 
reconnoitring the ground ; he soon perceived the 
weak point of his adversary's line, he resolved to 
turn Wellington's right by a powerful force and si- 
multaneously to fall on the British General's front ; 
had his dispositions been properly carried out he 
probably would have gained a victory, considering the 
superiority in numbers of the French army. Wel- 
lington made arrangements to meet an effort of this 
kind ; but it can hardly be said that these were ade- 
quate ; he extended his right along the marsh, which 
possibly he may have thought impassable, but he 
placed only a body of partisans on the spot, and at 
first but a single division of British infantry. The 
attack of the French, intended to have been made 
at daybreak, was delayed for some unknown reason ; 
but in the early forenoon of the 5th of May a mass 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d'Onoro 135 

of cavalry, sustained by the corps of Junot, was seen 
advancing across the flat, menacing Poco Velio and 
Nava d'Aver on the British right. The detachment 
of partisans was driven off the field, and the single 
British division was placed in extreme danger; it 
has been said that had Loison seconded Junot, as 
he might have done, the British right might not 
only have been turned, but overwhelmed. The ar- 
rival, however, of two British divisions, and of 
the small and feeble body of British horse, to a cer- 
tain extent restored the battle ; but the superiority 
of the enemy, especially of his cavalry, was great ; 
Wellington had to make new dispositions for his 
defence. Withdrawing slowly his endangered right, 
he effected a change of front in retreat ; and took 
another position on rising ground between the Dos 
Casas and the Turones, falling back a distance of 
more than two miles. This was a most difficult and 
delicate movement ; the French horsemen showed 
astonishing boldness, and though their onset was 
checked by the retiring infantry, which halted when 
pressed, and formed squares, " in all the war there 
was not a more dangerous hour for England." In- 
deed had Bessieres, at a crisis perhaps decisive, sent 
a few squadrons of the Imperial Guard to support 
Montbrun, the all but victorious chief of the attack- 
ing cavalry, the British General could hardly have 
averted a defeat ; but this help was refused on a 
frivolous pretext ; the retrograde movement was 
maintained in order ; the new position was success- 
fully won. The French now opened a heavy can- 
nonade on the narrow front which had thus been 



136 Wellington 

formed ; this caused much loss, but was kept under 
by the opposing guns ; the efforts of the French cav- 
alry were made fruitless ; the assailants were brought 
completely to a stand. Meanwhile the original front 
of Wellington along Fuentes d'Onoro had been at- 
tacked ; but here, too, the attack was late; D'Erlon 
gave little proof of energy or resource. Reynier, on 
Massena's extreme right, remained almost motionless. 
It has been said that this remissness was caused by 
want of sufficient munitions, which Bessieres might 
have supplied, but refused ; it was at least as probably 
due in the main to thesupineness and faults of Mas- 
sena's lieutenants, suffering from the fatigues of the 
campaign, and discontented with their chief. The 
allied army remained master of the field, but Fuentes 
d'Onoro can hardly be called a British victory ; it 
was a fierce encounter in which a reverse was for a 
time imminent. If we bear in mind the defects of 
the British chief's position, a defeat might have had 
grave results. 1 

Massena retreated after the battle, gnashing his 
teeth at his lieutenants and notably at Bessieres, 
who seems to have been a very disloyal colleague. 
The surrender of Almeida now appeared certain ; 



1 Wellington was one of the most truthful of men. His remarks 
on the battle deserve notice. " Lord Liverpool was quite right not 
to move thanks for the battle of Fuentes, though it was the most 
difficult I was ever concerned in, and against the greatest odds. We 
had very nearly three to one against us engaged; above four to one 
of cavalry, and moreover our cavalry had not a gallop in them, while 
some of that of the enemy was fresh and in excellent order. If Bony 
had been there we should have been beaten." — Supp. Despatches, pp. 
7-176. 



Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuentes d'Onoro 137 

but the garrison escaped through a most skilful 
and brilliant feat of arms ; the fortress was partially 
blown up and was not taken. Massena was erelong 
superseded by Napoleon, an unjust, nay, a cruel 
sentence; Marmont, a very inferior man, was placed 
in his stead. The veteran was never at the head 
of an army again ; he was wanting to his master 
when the days of fatal disasters came ; but history 
has not forgotten Zurich and Genoa. In the cam- 
paign in Portugal he made a few mistakes ; his health 
was perhaps in some degree impaired, but he gave 
proof of his great qualities in war; his discomfiture 
was partly due to the misconduct of his colleagues, 
mainly to his having been committed to an enter- 
prise in utter ignorance of the most important facts 
of the case, and with wholly inadequate forces. Mis- 
takes, too, may be laid to Wellington's charge: he 
ought not to have neglected the pass of Boyalva ; he 
may have been rather slow in pressing his enemy's re- 
treat ; it is difficult to suppose that his position at 
Fuentes d'Onoro was chosen by himself. But these 
are only spots on the sun ; they disappear in the 
splendour of his designs for the defence of Portugal ; 
in the construction of the invincible lines ; in the ad- 
mirable arrangement of a magnificent campaign. He 
seized the true decisive points on the theatre of the 
war; made Portugal a fortress fronted by impregna- 
ble works and garrisoned by a powerful army, which 
defied the efforts of the best of the Imperial mar- 
shals ; he completely, above all secretly, carried out 
his purpose, in spite of misgiving at home and mur- 
murs in his own camp ; and, perceiving fully and 



138 



Wellington 



clearly the faults of his enemy, he never hesitated, 
but brought to a triumphant issue a defence which 
astounded soldiers and statesmen throughout the 
civilised world. A limit had now been placed on 
Napoleon's conquests; a French army never entered 
Portugal again ; Spain was thenceforward to be the 
theatre of the Peninsular War. No impartial mind 
can doubt but that in this contest the British General 
eclipsed and defeated Napoleon: not that he was the 
equal in war of the modern Hannibal, but that he 
conducted his operations with admirable skill and re- 
source on the spot while the Emperor, by directing 
them from an immense distance, made a whole series 
of palpable mistakes, which inevitably led to por- 
tentous failures ; in fact seemed to be, in more than 
one instance, like the blind leading the blind. Wel- 
lington, too, owed something to the disputes of the 
French commanders ; but this was not the main 
cause of what happened in the campaign of 1810- 
1811, decidedly the finest exhibition of his superi- 
ority in war. 




CHAPTER VI 

CIUDAD RODRIGO, BADAJOZ, SALAMANCA, 
BURGOS 



Wellington's defence of Portugal again stirs opinion on the Conti- 
nent against Napoleon — Discontent in France, especially with 
the Peninsular War — Policy of Napoleon — Weakness of the 
position of the French in Spain— Joseph resigns his crown — 
Napoleon, intent on war with Russia, menaces the Continent, 
and tries to restore the situation in the Peninsula, to little pur- 
pose — The Empire apparently at its height in the eyes of most 
men — Distress in England — Confidence of Wellington — State of 
the armies in the Peninsula — First siege of Badajoz — Battle of 
Albuera — Second siege of Badajoz — It is raised — Junction of 
Soult and Mannont — Wellington on the Caya — The marshals 
separate — Wellington purposes to take Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz — His preparations — He is in danger at El Bodon — 
Progress of the French army in the East — Siege and fall of 
Tarragona — Suchet at Valencia — Napoleon directs a large part 
of his forces to the East — Arroyo Molinos — Wellington takes 
Ciudad Rodrigo — Reduction of the French armies in Spain — 
Third siege of Badajoz — The place taken after a desperate 
resistance — Wellington invades Spain — Operations of Marmont 
— Wellington outmanoeuvred — Great victory of Wellington at 
Salamanca — Fine retreat of Clausel — Wellington occupies Mad- 
rid — He besieges Burgos and fails — Soult forced to evacuate 
Andalusia — Wellington retreats from Burgos — He is threatened 
by the united French armies, but makes good his way to Ciudad 
Rodrigo. 

THE successful defence of Portugal in 1810-n 
sent again a thrill through the submissive 
Continent. Massena had recoiled from the 
lines of Torres Vedras ; had been compelled to 
make a disastrous retreat ; had brought back to 

139 



140 Wellington 

Spain only the wreck of an army. The opera- 
tions of Wellington in war began to be studied, 
as the operations of Napoleon had been studied 
before; the importance of wasting a country, and 
of a great material obstacle in checking French 
invasion and conquest, had been fully perceived. 
The overthrow of Massena and the means by which 
it had been effected encouraged the Czar to take 
a bolder attitude ; he increased his preparations to 
resist his late ally, and moved part of his armies 
from the Danubian provinces ; Russia could assur- 
edly make as good a stand as Portugal. The Aus- 
trian Court, directed by Metternich and in some 
measure bound by the recent marriage alliance, 
remained openly on good terms with the French 
Emperor, though the Austrian aristocracy was, as 
always, hostile ; but Germany was stirred again with a 
patriotic movement, unchecked by vassals of the Con- 
federation of the Rhine, especially manifest in down- 
trodden Prussia. The regular army of that Power 
had, at Napoleon's bidding, been reduced to an in- 
significant force ; but a man of genius, Scharnhorst, 
had continued to increase its strength fourfold by 
passing recruits through its ranks in rapid succession; 
it was now burning to avenge Jena ; one of its chiefs, 
Blucher, though only a rude soldier, had, with insight 
quickened by hatred, seen, as Wellington with the 
eyes of wisdom had seen, that the stability of the 
French Empire — a defiance to European history — 
was not assured, and might not be permanent. 
Meantime, the excesses of the Continental System 
were provoking indignation, ever on the increase ; 






fit 'S'I'lH'l, 



'iHMlTTU 



iiittt ot*(i(ilatfi'bo. 



BLUCHER. 
(From an old engraving.) 



Ciudad Rodrigo 141 

this was much aggravated by devices of a fraudulent 
kind, employed to make it less onerous to France 
and to Napoleon's policy. The quarrel, too, with 
the Pope had been embittered ; Pius VII. had ex- 
communicated his Imperial tyrant, and had indi- 
rectly challenged his temporal power by refusing to 
institute French bishops ; the Emperor had hastily 
convened an episcopal council, and this had even 
openly sympathised with the imprisoned Pontiff. 
And in France herself there were signs of weakness 
and discontent which the most despotic of Gov- 
ernments could not conceal or suppress. England, 
supreme at sea, had destroyed French maritime 
commerce; grass grew in the streets of Bordeaux 
and Marseilles ; several industries of importance were 
in decay, and the Continental System had stimu- 
lated French production in some directions to such 
a dangerous extent that this had led to widespread 
bankruptcy and distress. France, too, was sick of 
war, and especially of the war with Spain, with its 
reverses and its devouring waste ; a cry had gone 
forth that " our youth were being sent to the sham- 
bles " ; at this very time fifty or sixty thousand 
conscripts had eluded the summons to the Imperial 
eagles, and were being hunted down, as malefactors, 
from Brittany to Provence. Napoleon had ceased 
to be the idol of a few years before ; it was signifi- 
cant that the birth of the young King of Rome made 
little or no impression on the national mind. 

Symptoms of decline that might ultimately lead to 
its fall were thus showing themselves in the colossal 
Empire, which was still dominant in three-fourths of 



142 Wellington 

the Continent. These were now strikingly apparent 
on the theatre of events, where Napoleon had hoped 
to find an easy conquest. It was not only that a 
comparatively small army, directed by a chief whose 
powers had become manifest, had repeatedly defeated 
the Imperial legions and had made the Iberian Pen- 
insula a kind of place of arms of the highest ad- 
vantage to England in her European contest. It 
was not only that the resources of the French Empire 
were heavily taxed to keep up the war in Portugal 
and Spain : more than 500,000 invaders had crossed 
the Pyrenees ; of these fully 1 50,000 had disappeared ; 
nearly 400,000 were required to keep up the struggle, 
and yet the prospects of success seemed every year 
darkening. Nor was it only that the Portuguese 
levies had been gradually formed into a real army 
growing in numbers and becoming very efficient in 
the field ; that the universal Spanish rising had 
proved impossible to put down, and was wasting 
away the hosts of the enemy; that the remains of 
the Spanish armies, still of little value in the field, 
were being reorganised in all parts of the country, 
and were becoming a force that could not be de- 
spised ; that Spain had acquired a kind of regular 
government which, though presumptuous, revolu- 
tionary, often unwise, and notably jealous of Eng- 
land, its true support, nevertheless represented the 
united Spanish people. The usurping authority 
Napoleon had set up in Spain had lost any influence 
it might have acquired, and seemed at this juncture 
ori the verge of extinction. The Emperor had pro- 
mised to make Joseph a national sovereign, ruling 



Chtdad Rodrigo 143 

Spain in independence of France ; but Spain had 
been treated as the mere spoil of conquest ; her ter- 
ritory had been parcelled out among French mar- 
shals, who preyed on it to support their armies, or 
wasted it to maintain licence and rapine ; her re- 
sources had been employed to pay for the war; it 
had openly been avowed that she was to be dismem- 
bered and to be deprived of her provinces north 
of the Ebro. The Government of Joseph had been 
completely set at naught ; he vegetated at Madrid 
with an empty treasury, surrounded by a mock 
Court in distress, often affronted by Napoleon's lieu- 
tenants, in fact, a scarecrow of royalty, not a king; 
all this had exposed him to general and profound 
contempt, while his brother's arbitrary and iniquitous 
conduct in Spain, his despotism, his exactions, above 
all, his threat to annex a great part of the mon- 
archy to France, had stimulated the national rising 
to the highest pitch, and had made all hopes of con- 
ciliation and peace vanish. Joseph declared his po- 
sition had become impossible to endure; he went to 
Paris and gave up the uneasy crown of Spain about 
the time when Fuentes d'Onoro had been fought. 
The new dynasty which Napoleon had set up beyond 
the Pyrenees had effaced itself ; the symbol of his 
power had suddenly disappeared, and this at the 
moment when his armies had suffered a terrible 
reverse ; when his lieutenants in Spain were ex- 
asperated by defeat, and were more than ever di- 
vided by jealousy and mutual ill-will. 1 

1 Long before this time Wellington had perceived the growing 
dissension between Napoleon and Joseph. He wrote thus in June, 



1 44 Wellington 

Napoleon, still confident in his genius and his 
sword, had little or no remedy but military force to 
apply to this threatening position of affairs. He was 
so indignant with Alexander that he thought for a 
moment of invading Russia before the Czar's prepar- 
ations had been made ; but he soon abandoned this 
premature design ; he spent the later months of 181 1 
and the months that followed in arranging for his 
attack on the Empire of the East, the difficulties of 
which he had completely fathomed. Nor did he 
neglect any means of assuring success ; he dangled 
the Illyrian provinces before Austria as a possible 
reward in the contest at hand ; he peremptorily 
warned Prussia that, should she prove false, she 
would be blotted out from the map of Europe ; he 
insisted on the contingents of the Confederation of 
the Rhine being ready ; he summoned a great army 
across the Alps from Naples and Italy. For the 
present he temporised with Pius VII., having wrung 
from him the chief concessions he wanted ; and 
though he imprisoned two or three recalcitrant bish- 
ops, he did not pit the Empire against the Church, 
always more afraid of moral than of material power, 
as was manifest in several passages of his career. As 
for France, he employed expedients, but to no great 
purpose, to mitigate her commercial distress ; but he 



1810: "I think there is something discordant in all the French 
arrangements in Spain. Joseph divides his kingdom into prefect- 
ures, while Napoleon parcels it out into governments ; Joseph makes 
a great military expedition into the south of Spain and undertakes 
the siege of Cadiz, while Napoleon places all the troops and half the 
kingdom under the command of Massena." — Selection, 367. 



Cindad Rodrigo 145 

would not in any sense relax the Continental System ; 
and, reckless of the murmurs heard far and near, 
he left nothing undone to pursue his " refractory 
conscripts," and he pushed the conscription to its 
extreme limits ; at this time there were one million 
men under the Imperial eagles, composed, however, 
of many races and tongues. At this juncture he 
once more devoted much attention to the Iberian 
Peninsula ; he did not wish to leave a destructive 
conflict in his rear, while he was about to lead the 
armed hosts of the West beyond the Niemen. It ap- 
pears certain that for some weeks he contemplated 
taking the field in person in Spain and Portugal ; this 
can be gathered from parts of his correspondence ; 
the rumour was so prevalent that Wellington 
strengthened the lines, and made ready again to de- 
fend Lisbon. But the Emperor gave up a half- 
formed purpose, which might have had momentous 
results, and, bent on his crusade against Russia, he 
treated the Peninsula as but a secondary object. He 
increased, however, at least for a time, the forces he 
had in Spain and on the Portuguese frontier; these 
were raised to nearly four hundred thousand men, 
but they were largely troops of not the best quality. 
As to the dispositions to be made of these vast 
arrays, the armies in Spain were to be kept to their 
strength, and the provinces they occupied were to be 
held ; but Portugal was not to be invaded again ; 
the fate of Massena had been a significant lesson. 
Napoleon, however, appears to have been convinced 
that the Peninsula could still be subdued when he 
had brought his enterprise in Russia to a triumphant 



1 46 Wellington 

close; meanwhile he believed that, even in 181 1, 
Suchet and Soult could crush all resistance in the 
South, and that Marmont and the army in the North 
had nothing to fear from Wellington. At the same 
time he persuaded Joseph to play the part of a pup- 
pet king again, and to return in idle state to Madrid ; 
he replenished, to a certain extent, his treasury ; he 
he gave him the nominal command of all the French 
armies in Spain. But he refused to say a word as 
to the threatened dismemberment, he did not really 
limit the power of his rapacious lieutenants ; he could 
not put a stop to their animosities and ruinous dis- 
cords. These half measures only filmed over the 
ulcerous part ; they left affairs in Spain hardly im- 
proved or changed. 

To ordinary observers, nevertheless, nay, to the 
great majority of soldiers and statesmen, the suprem- 
acy and the power of Napoleon seemed, at this junc- 
ture, as overwhelming as ever. He was master of the 
Continent, except in Spain and Portugal ; war with 
Russia had not yet been declared ; the belief was 
general that the Czar would not resist, or that re- 
sistance would end in another Friedland. It was as- 
sumed, too, as the event was to show, that Germany 
and Italy would bow to the will of their lord, and 
would march with his eagles beyond the Niemen ; 
and how could a half barbarian Empire cope with 
the armed strength of three-fourths of the European 
world ? England remained the only great Power at 
war with Napoleon ; and though she was still om- 
nipotent at sea, and had conducted a successful 
campaign in Portugal, it seemed in the highest de- 



Ciudad Rodrigo 147 

gree unlikely that she could permanently shake the 
structure of the French Empire. And England, at 
this time, had gravetroubles of herown ; shewasbeing 
drawn into a quarrel with the United States ; her in- 
ternal condition had become menacing ; millions of her 
poor population were suffering from distress, showing 
itself too often in riotous discontent ; the pressure of 
taxationonall classes was intense. Theglory of Torres 
Vedras no doubt had stirred the national mind: the 
Ministry maintained a bold attitude ; the cavillings 
of the Opposition had ceased ; the army in the Penin- 
sula was being strengthened ; things were very dif- 
ferent from what they had been when a descent on 
Portugal was deemed a forlorn hope. But very few 
of the leading men of England believed that the 
Peninsular War could be as ruinous to Napoleon as 
it was to be ; Wellington probably was the only real 
exception. His defence of Portugal had naturally 
increased his confidence; his profound calculations 
had been realised ; he was now convinced that the 
war could be carried on with good hope in Spain, 
and that it might be destructive of what he described 
as "the fraudulent tyranny" which kept down the 
Continent. The fears, too, of his subordinates 
had become things of the past ; his lieutenants and 
officers recognised the capacity of their chief; his 
army, though largely composed of Portuguese, had 
become a most formidable and efficient instrument 
of war. And yet the inequality of his forces ap- 
peared prodigious when compared to those which 
could be arrayed against him. English descents on 
the coast of Spain could, no doubt, assist him ; he 



1 48 Wellington 

expected that a British contingent from Sicily would 
come to his aid ; the guerrillas held in check thou- 
sands of the best troops of France, and made their 
communications everywhere insecure ; the Spanish 
armies were reappearing in the field ; the moral, even 
the material, power of the Spanish rising was great. 
But probably, under existing conditions, he could 
not oppose more than one hundred and sixty thou- 
sand men, including even his Spanish allies in the 
field, to nearly four hundred thousand of those of 
the enemy : the seeming disproportion of strength 
was thus enormous : it would have appalled every 
other commander who had tried to cope with Na- 
poleon. 

I may glance at the positions and the approximate 
strength of the belligerent armies at this conjuncture. 
Bessieres, soon to be replaced by Dorsenne, was 
in command of the French army of the North ; 
this was composed of 50,000 or 60,000 troops ; and, 
ever beset by bands of guerrillas, was guarding the 
communications between France and Madrid, a task 
of difficulty, that usually kept it on this part of the 
theatre of the war. Marmont was at Salamanca re- 
organising Massena's army ; he had probably 50,000 
soldiers, on paper, and many of these were of ex- 
cellent quality, but the army was still suffering from 
the effects of the campaign in Portugal. Joseph was 
the nominal chief of the Army of the Centre, as it 
was called; this was from 20,000 to 30,000 strong; 
it was spread around Madrid and in the valley of the 
upper Tagus. In the East, Suchet was in command 
in Aragon : he had been given the chief part of Mac- 



Ciudad Rodrigo 149 

donald's forces, which had been employed against 
the fierce Catalans ; he had administered his province 
with justice and care — in fact, he was the least rapa- 
cious of the French generals : he had taken Lerida, 
Tortosa, and other strongholds ; he had a fine army 
of perhaps 70,000 men, of whom some 50,000 could 
appear in the field ; he had been directed to be- 
siege and capture Tarragona, the greatest of the Cata- 
lonian fortresses, to advance southwards to subdue 
Valencia, and if possible to join hands with Soult. 
That Marshal was in Andalusia at the head of an 
army said to be 80,000 strong, but really hardly 
more than 60,000 ; part of these troops was em- 
ployed in the siege of Cadiz, which every week was 
proving to be all but hopeless; the remaining parts 
were scattered throughout the province, keeping the 
population and the conquered cities down, or were 
in Estremadura observing Badajoz, the only trophy 
of the Campaign of 18 10. The French armies were 
thus spread over the whole of Spain, everywhere as- 
sailed by the national rising, and here and there by 
the reviving Spanish armies; they were under chiefs 
who would seldom act cordially together ; thousands 
of the soldiers were mere recruits, and as the cam- 
paign at hand was to prove, they had lost much of 
their wonted confidence, and had learnt what was 
the power of the British infantry. On the opposite 
side Wellington probably disposed of some 80,000 
men along the Portuguese frontier; he had, too, a 
considerable reserve ; he held a central position be- 
tween divided and distant enemies, and he had a for- 
midable and victorious army, moved to a man by 



1 50 Wellington 

his single will. It is unnecessary to add that he de- 
rived enormous support from the guerrillas and the 
national rising, from the Spanish armies which, un- 
der Blake, Ballasteros, and other chiefs, were making 
their presence felt, especially in the South and the 
East, and from the descents of British squadrons on 
the coasts of Spain, and, as I have said, he hoped to 
see a British force from Sicily appear to give him 
aid. 

Hill and Beresford had, we have seen, been de- 
tached before Fuentes d'Onoro to lay siege to 
Badajoz. Hill had the covering army a few marches 
distant : the siege fell to the share of Beresford, who 
expected the support of one of the Spanish armies. 
The attack, however, had hardly begun, when Soult 
marched from Seville to the relief of the fortress at 
the head of about 24,000 good troops : the Marshal 
had his eyes always fixed on his late conquest. Well- 
ington, who, I have said, had left the main army 
for Estremadura, was not on the scene; Beresford 
raised the siege on the 12th and 13th of March, and 
advanced to Albuera, where he was joined by Blake 
and Castanos, with from 15,000 to 20,000 Spaniards, 
to offer battle to the enemy at hand. The allied 
army was perhaps 35,000 strong; but the British in- 
fantry did not exceed 7000 men ; the Portuguese were 
not more than 8000 ; the French army was very su- 
perior in really effective strength. These operations 
led to the battle of Albuera, in itself not of supreme 
importance, but perhaps the most desperately con- 

1 The figures I have above given are, of course, largely conjectural ; 
but I have taken pains to make them as accurate as possible. 



Badajoz 1 5 1 

tested of the Peninsular War. The French Marshal 
on the morning of the 16th of March, 181 1, flung his 
left wing against Beresford's right and endeavoured 
to seize an eminence which was the key of the whole 
position ; the Spaniards occupied this part of the 
line ; but though they made for a time a brave re- 
sistance, their ill-disciplined masses could not man- 
oeuvre ; when directed to make a change of front 
in retreat, they lost all order, and fell into utter con- 
fusion. The French were now masters of the de- 
cisive point: Soult collected his reserves to make 
victory certain, but Beresford called on his British 
infantry, and this nobly restored the conflict, though 
pressed by largely superior numbers. A disaster, 
however, soon occurred which would have been fatal 
to less stubborn and confident soldiers. Under the 
cover of a tempest of rain which darkened the air, a 
large body of French cavalry fell suddenly on the 
rear of the footmen ; two regiments were well-nigh 
cut to pieces. The heroic defenders still clung to 
the ground ; Beresford had sufficient time to bring up 
more reserves, especially a Portuguese contingent ; 
the battle raged furiously for some hours, each side 
fighting with unflinching courage, the murderous 
British musketry making havoc of the dense hostile 
columns. Fortune, nevertheless, seemed inclining to 
Soult, and Beresford, it is said, was about to retreat, 
when a final effort — the credit was mainly due to 
Hardinge, then a young colonel, afterwards a great 
chief in India — turned the balance in which victory 
had been trembling. A terrible onslaught of the 
last British reserve was directed on the flank of the 



152 Wellington 

advancing French: a great column was hurled down 
the height ; the Marshal gave up the fiery trial. 1 It 
has been said, however, — and this was one of his 
shortcomings in war, — that had he boldly fallen 
on, on the following day, Beresford could not have 
avoided a defeat. 

Villars fought Malplaquet to relieve Mons ; Soult 
fought Albuera to relieve Badajoz. Both generals 
retreated after these battles ; both, therefore, virtu- 
ally confessed defeat, if in both instances victory 
was all but doubtful ; indeed, Malplaquet was truly a 
Pyrrhic victory. The carnage at Albuera was pro- 
digious, about one in four of the troops engaged, a 
proportion to which very few parallels can be found. 
Soult fell back a few marches on Llerena, seeking 
an opportunity to strike again ; Wellington, hav- 
ing left Estremadura to fight Fuentes d'Onoro, re- 
turned to Badajoz in May and renewed the siege. 
The place was invested between the 25th and the 
29th ; the covering army was commanded' by Hill ; 
Wellington disposed of perhaps 43,000 men, but of 
these not 28,000 were British soldiers ; the besieging 
force was some 10,000 strong. I shall afterwards 
briefly describe Badajoz, when it became the scene of 



1 Napier's description of this famous charge is well known. This 
was Wellington's brief account of the battle : " The Spanish troops, 
I understand, behaved admirably . . . but they were quite im- 
movable ; and this is the great cause of our losses. After they had 
lost their position, . . . the British troops were the next and 
they were brought up, and must always be brought up in these 
cases : and they suffered accordingly . . . we should have 
gained a complete victory if the Spaniards could have manoeuvred, 
but unfortunately they cannot." — Selection, pp. 482-483. 



Badajoz 153 

one of the most terrible conflicts of which history has 
left a record ; enough here to say that the fortress rose 
from the southern bank of the Guadiana ; was sur- 
rounded by a wall, with its bastions, and by external 
works, and was defended by a garrison of some five 
thousand men, under Philippon, a most skilful and 
determined officer. The most vulnerable part of the 
place was the ancient castle, near the river, and on 
the north-eastern front ; but this was protected by the 
fortified work of Christoval, which was held to be 
the principal point for the attack. Fire opened on 
the fortress on the 2nd of June, and was maintained 
for three or four days ; but the siege guns of the 
assailants brought up from Elvas were old and bad, 
and without proper shot, — some of the guns were cast 
in the reign of Philip II., — the trenching and other 
tools were of inferior quality. Two breaches, how- 
ever, had been made in Christoval by the 6th, but 
the garrison had retrenched these ; two daring as- 
saults were successfully repulsed. Meantime a most 
formidable relieving force was being assembled to 
save the beleaguered fortress. Marmont had broken 
up from Salamanca, had crossed the Tagus, and was 
on the march to join hands with Soult ; Soult, sup- 
ported by D'Erlon, was on the way from Llerena; a 
great army would be before Badajoz in a few days. 
Wellington raised the siege on the 12th of June; 
the marshals had entered Badajoz on the 19th. 
Philippon and his brave garrison received the meed 
of praise they deserved. 

The British General now took a strong defensive 
position on the Caya, a feeder of the Guadiana, about 



154 Wellington 

midway between Badajoz and Elvas, and made ready- 
to accept battle. Everything seemed to portend 
a great trial of strength ; Wellington had hardly 
more than 42,000 men ; Marmont and Soult dis- 
posed of more than 60,000. The chances certainly 
were on the side of the marshals ; but, as had 
so often been the case before, the French com- 
manders disagreed with each other; Marmont thor- 
oughly disliked and distrusted Soult, 1 and, besides, 
the memory of a series of defeats hung heavily 
on the minds of the French soldiery. The hostile 
armies confronted each other for more than a fort- 
night ; the marshals drew off without firing a shot ; 
but it does not. follow, as French writers have urged, 
that they must have gained a decisive victory. Mar- 
mont now fell back into the valley of the Tagus, 
spreading his army over a vast space and connecting 
it with Salamanca, his headquarters ; but he repaired 
the bridge across the river at Almaraz, and fortified 
this with skill and care, in order to keep up his com- 
munications with Soult. On his side, Soult, leaving 
D'Erlon with a detachment not far from Badajoz, set 
off for Andalusia to maintain his hold on the pro- 
vinces; he was occupied for some time with the Span- 
ish armies, which caused him a great deal of trouble 
and loss ; he even stretched a hand towards Suchet in 
the East. Wellington, therefore, was unmolested and 
free to act ; he marched northwards with the mass of 
his forces, Hill being left in Estremadura to observe 
Marmont ; his object was, if possible, to capture 



1 See Marmont, Memoires, pp. 4, 46, 47. 



Badajoz 1 5 5 

Ciudad Rodrigo, taken by Massena the year before. 
The fortress, he had been informed, was without 
supplies ; he was deceived, however, by a false report. 
He confined himself to a blockade of Ciudad ; he 
placed his troops in cantonments in the adjoining 
lands between the Agueda and the Coa; they were 
suffering greatly from the fevers and the diseases of 
the tract around the Guadiana. Things apparently 
did not look well for the British chief ; Fuentes and 
Albuera had cost him dear ; the siege of Badajoz had 
been twice raised ; the hostile armies in Spain were 
in great strength ; the Spanish and Portuguese gov- 
ernments had been crossing him in many ways ; 
murmurs against his " inaction " were even heard in 
England. Yet Wellington retained his steadfast 
confidence ; he contemplated the situation with char- 
acteristic insight ; he was convinced, from the posi- 
tion of affairs before him, that he would not only be 
able to defend Portugal, but could carry the war be- 
yond the frontier. 1 

By this time it had become improbable in the 

1 Wellington wrote thus to Dumouriez in July, 1811, when his 
prospects did not appear bright: " Je crois que ni Buonaparte, ni le 
monde, n'ont compte sur les difhcultes a subjuguer la Peninsule, 
etant oppose par une bonne armee en Portugal. It a fait des efforts 
gigantesques, dignes de sa reputation, et des forces dont il a la dis- 
position; mais il n'en a pas fait assez encore; et je crois que l'ancien 
dictum de Henri Quatre que ' quand on fait la guerre in Espagne 
avec peu de monde on est battu, et avec beaucoup de monde, en 
meurt de faim,' se trouvera verifie de nos jours; et que Buonaparte 
ne pourra jamais nourrir, meme de la maniere Francaise moderne, 
une armee assez grande pour faire la conquete des Royaumes de la 
Peninsule, si les allies out seulement une armee assez forte pour 
arreter ses progres." — Selection, p. 501. 



1 56 Wellington 

extreme that Napoleon would appear in person in 
Spain ; he was engrossed with his preparations for 
the war with Russia. The French armies in the 
Peninsula, though still maintained at their full 
strength, would therefore sooner or later be more 
or less diminished, they were disseminated, besides, 
over a vast space ; for the present they were most 
powerful in the south and the east of Spain. In these 
circumstances Wellington believed that he might find 
an opportunity to pounce on Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz, the keys of the Spanish frontier to the 
west ; this would give him a favourable position 
to invade Leon and Castile, perhaps to strike the 
enemy's communications between Bayonne and 
Madrid. He had made arrangements to facilitate 
an attack on both fortresses ; he had caused a good 
road to be constructed, which opened a way into 
Estremadura, and thus brought him within easy reach 
of Badajoz, but Ciudad Rodrigo was his immediate 
object ; he was quietly preparing to make this 
siege. Taught probably by what had occurred at 
Badajoz, he resolved that his guns should be effi- 
cient ; he directed a siege train, which had arrived 
from England, to be sent from Lisbon, as if it 
was meant for Cadiz ; and then with admirable 
secrecy and skill he had had it landed at the mouth 
of the Douro and transported to Celorico, not far 
from Ciudad, where it remained concealed from the 
enemy until the proper moment had come. But 
in the meantime the British commander narrowly 
escaped a reverse which might have been most dis- 
astrous. His army, not more than thirty thousand 



Badajoz 157 

strong, — many of his troops were distant and smitten 
with disease, — was spread along the Agueda, on both 
its banks, its leading divisions near Ciudad Rod- 
rigo, its rearward miles away, at a place called St. 
Payo; he had no expectation that he could be 
attacked in force. Dorsenne, however, in the north, 
and Marmont along the Tagus, had learnt that 
Ciudad was about to succumb to famine; they 
rapidly assembled some sixty thousand men, acting 
well together, unlike most of their colleagues ; on 
the 23rd of September, 181 1, they had reached the 
fortress and successfully introduced a great convoy 
of supplies. Marmont, in supreme command, did 
not think of fighting a battle, but he wished to 
ascertain the positions of the enemy's forces. On 
the 24th his troops, greatly superior in numbers, 
attacked a single division of Wellington, standing 
isolated on the heights of El Bodon. The attack 
was repulsed, but the position was turned and lost; 
Wellington drew his army together in retreat on 
Guinaldo ; but he waited for hours for Crawford's 
division ; fourteen thousand men were for a time 
opposed to enemies who might have fallen on with 
at least, forty thousand! "Wellington, your star, 
too, is bright," Marmont bitterly exclaimed when 
he heard of the grand opportunity he had let slip; 
but the Marshal's operations had been tentative and 
weak. 1 

Wellington was taken by surprise in this instance, 
an accident that will sometimes happen in war ; he 

1 For Marmont's lame and impotent apology see M/moires, iv., 
67-68. 



158 Wellington 

had not reckoned on the speedy junction of Dorsenne 
and Marmont. Meanwhile the French arms had 
made remarkable progress in the theatre of the war, 
in Spain in the east. Suchet, leaving forces be- 
hind in Aragon and Catalonia to maintain a hold on 
the provinces he had so well governed, marched 
against Tarragona, as he had been ordered ; he was 
before the fortress in the first days of May, 181 1, 
with an army of about twenty-four thousand men. 
The place was one of very great importance ; it was 
a point of refuge for the Catalan rising, an arsenal 
and a depot of supplies; it had the support of a 
British squadron and of a British flotilla, which could 
assist the garrison if attacked. Its natural and arti- 
ficial strength was not doubtful ; it was divided into 
a lower town and an upper town, each defended by 
a bastioned enceinte ; it was unassailable on its sea- 
ward front, its northern and eastern points were cov- 
ered by Olivo, a fortified outwork, its western by a 
deep stream, the Francoli ; it contained an army of 
eighteen thousand Spaniards, always formidable when 
fighting behind walls. The siege was protracted for 
nearly two months, but French science and valour 
at last triumphed. Olivo was first taken after a 
stern resistance ; trenches were then opened beyond 
the Francoli ; the lower town was next successfully 
stormed ; the upper was carried by one of the most 
desperate efforts that were made in the whole Penin- 
sular War; the besieged were not far from equal to 
the besiegers in numbers. Tarragona was given up 
to pillage, as was the unhappy custom of those days. 
French writers, who have taken care to dwell on the 



Badajoz 159 

excesses of British troops in towns they had con- 
quered, must excuse us if we remark that in this in- 
stance, too, barbarity and licentiousness were not less 
manifest. Suchet justly received the staff of a mar- 
shal for this brilliant exploit. After placing his army 
in cantonments during the heats of summer, he 
advanced in September into the lands of Valencia, 
which Napoleon had marked down long before for 
conquest. The Marshal, making his way along the 
coast-line, was stopped before the walls of the ancient 
Saguntum, famous for the stand it made against 
Hannibal. Blake appeared with a considerable re- 
lieving force ; but he was completely defeated and 
the place fell. The way into Valencia was now 
open ; Suchet crossed the Guadalaviar, and by the 
end of November had invested the capital of the 
kingdom defended by Blake and a strong garrison. 

The Marshal had not more than twenty thousand 
men ; this force was not sufficient to take the fort- 
ress. Napoleon, hundreds of miles away from the 
scene of events, saw in Valencia the decisive point to 
be occupied at the existing moment. He directed 
parts of the armies of the North and the Centre to 
advance and to reinforce Suchet ; even Marmont was 
to despatch two divisions from the valley of the Ta- 
gus to support his colleague. These orders were 
obeyed more readily than was usually the case in 
Spain ; Valencia was surrounded by forces which 
could not be withstood ; the place fell in January, 
1812, after a mere semblance of a siege ; nearly 
twenty thousand Spaniards were made prisoners of 
war. This was a notable triumph for the invaders 



1 60 Wellington 



'& ' 



of Spain ; but the French armies had been moved 
from their positions to a considerable extent : Mar- 
mont's two divisions had overshot their mark, and 
had actually marched to Alicante, far south of Val- 
encia. This dislocation of the French armies gave 
Wellington his opportunity to fall on Ciudad Rod- 
rigo, though Napoleon's dispositions were correct in 
principle had they been carried out rapidly and with 
intelligence; possibly anticipating what the British 
chief might attempt, the Emperor had directed Mar- 
mont to move from the valley of the Tagus into that 
of the Douro, and thus to be nearer the threatened 
fortress. Wellington before this time had struck a 
weighty blow, of good omen for the operations at 
hand ; Hill had annihilated one of D'Erlon's divisions 
at a place called Arroyo Molinos, in Estremadura; 
Girard, though a good soldier, had been suddenly 
taken by surprise. The British chief, having brought 
up his siege train to the spot, appeared before 
Ciudad Rodrigo on the I2th of January, 1812; 
he disposed of more than seventy thousand men ; 
the garrison was not more than eighteen hundred, 
and was commanded by an inexperienced officer; 
there was no prospect of a relieving force ; this want 
of anything like adequate means of defence appears 
to have been mainly the fault of Dorsenne, at the 
head of the Imperial army of the North. The siege 
that followed may be briefly passed over, but in the 



1 Napier will not admit that Napoleon was in error in sending 
so large a force to Suchet when before Valencia. Thiers and other 
French writers take an opposite view. I do not think that the fall 
of Ciudad Rodrigo can be largely attributed to this cause. 



Badajoz 1 6 1 

result it was of very great importance. Ciudad was 
an old fortress upon the Agueda, surrounded by the 
usual bastions and walls ; but it was protected by 
two convents, which had been fortified, and by an 
outwork on rising ground called the Teson. The 
besiegers, who could spare almost any loss of men, 
had soon taken this work and stormed the convents; 
they easily made two breaches in the walls, which 
had been imperfectly repaired since Massena's siege ; 
and though they encountered a brave resistance, the 
place was assaulted by overwhelming numbers, and 
fell after a defence of but ten days. The only point 
in the siege that requires attention is that the Brit- 
ish engineers did not destroy the counterscarp, a mis- 
take that was soon to cost Wellington dear. In fact, 
though the lines of Torres Vedras were a model of 
art, the scientific arms in the British service had 
been but little versed in the attack of strong places. 1 
The losses of the assailants at Ciudad were great, 
not less than nearly one thousand men ; the brilliant 
and daring Crawford was among the fallen. Mean- 
while Marmont, who had waited for his divisions in 
the east, was on his way from the valley of the 
Tagus to that of the Douro, but the fortress had 
surrendered before he reached Salamanca. The ad- 
vance of the French Marshal had been slow ; but had 
Ciudad Rodrigo possessed a sufficient garrison, it 
might have held out for twenty days, and received 
the support of a relieving army; the speedy fall 
of the place must be mainly ascribed to Dorsenne. 

1 Marlborough noticed this defect at the great siege of Lille in 
1708. — Coxe, ii., p. 312. 



1 62 Wellington 

One of the keys of the Spanish frontier had thus 
been taken. Wellington was properly rewarded 
with an English earldom, and was made a duke in 
the peerage of Spain. 

A portentous change was now being made in the 
military power of the invaders of the Peninsula. 
The war with Alexander had become imminent. As 
Wellington had foreseen, Napoleon was compelled 
to make considerable drafts from his armies in Spain ; 
they were erelong reduced by fully sixty thousand 
men ; not more, probably, than two hundred thou- 
sand were actually present under arms to maintain 
the contest. The balance of force, therefore, which 
a few months before had seemed to preponderate so 
enormously against the British Chief — and yet was 
not so great as it appeared to be, if we bear in mind 
all the circumstances of the case — had now been in a 
great measure redressed ; even the Ministry in Eng- 
land — Lord Liverpool was soon to be its head, and 
Castlereagh was to return to office — was looking for- 
ward hopefully to a successful issue. Wellington 
now stretched his hand to seize the second key of 
the frontier ; he resolved to lay siege to Badajoz for 
the third time. Marmont, meanwhile, who after the 
fall of Ciudad was the most exposed of the French 
commanders, had done much to prepare himself 
against attack— he disposed of about forty thousand 
men ; he had hastily fortified Salamanca with skill ; 
it is to his credit that he anticipated Wellington's 
design ; he wrote to his master that he ought to be 
strongly reinforced, and to have the command of a 
great army, which would enable him to march to 



Badajoz 1 6 



o 



the relief of Badajoz. Napoleon, however, tartly re- 
plied that the defence of Badajoz was the affair of 
Soult, who, he declared, had not less than eighty 
thousand good soldiers ; should Wellington make 
the suggested movement, Marmont was to fall on his 
communications, and send him back into Portugal. 
These views were, in principle, strategically correct, 
but they were founded on assumptions completely 
false, — the fatal results of directing war from a dis- 
tance. Soult had not at this moment fifty thousand 
men around the eagles; he thought that D'Erlon 
near Badajoz could hold any enemy in check ; he 
was engrossed with the contest in Andalusia, with 
the siege of Cadiz not yet abandoned, with projects 
against British power in Portugal ; and though prob- 
ably he could have done more than he did, he could 
hardly have accomplished what the Emperor ex- 
pected from him. Napoleon's directions, therefore, 
were at odds with the facts ; and Marmont was not 
in sufficient strength to strike Wellington's commu- 
nications with effect, and to turn that General aside 
from his fixed purpose. 

While Marmont had been protesting in vain, Wel- 
lington had steadily completed his preparations. He 
remained in person near Ciudad as long as possible, 
had the breaches repaired and the defences improved 
in order to conceal his real purpose ; but he kept his 
eyes bent on his intended quarry, Badajoz. He had 
much of his siege train, and part of the material re- 
quired, brought up the Tagus to Abrantes from 
Lisbon ; all this was carried through Alemtejo to El- 
vas ; the enemy was still uncertain whether he would 



1 64 Wellington 

attack the fortress. Meantime he broke up from the 
Coa with the mass of his forces, marching along the 
main road he had taken care to construct ; he ap- 
peared before Badajoz on the 16th of March, 1812, 
at the head of more than 50,000 men, of whom 
30,000 were his best British soldiers. The place was 
invested on the following day, with a force perhaps 
15,000 strong, which, however, could be largely aug- 
mented. Hill was in command of the covering army, 
which extended on both sides of the fortress, on the 
lookout for either Marmont or Soult; The garrison 
was almost taken by surprise, but Philippon had made 
everything ready for a determined defence ; he nobly 
proved himself equal to a most arduous task. He had 
scoured the country around for supplies, and had 
sent the poorer population out of Badajoz : he 
had despatched many a messenger to Soult in the 
hope of obtaining aid from the Marshal ; he had left 
nothing undone to strengthen the place entrusted 
to his care. He had connected Christoval with the 
main fortress by a bridge and a bridge head on the 
Guadiana ; this outlying work could thus receive 
support if required. He had increased the artillery 
of the castle, and had flooded the approaches by 
damming up a little stream, the Rivillas ; this pro- 
tected the weakest point, the north-eastern front. 
He had also strengthened by different means the 
forts of Picurina and Pardaleras and the outlying 
work of St. Roque, external defences of the place ; 
he had deepened the fosse around the enceinte and 
spread inundations where this was possible ; and he 
had laid mines along the western front, the garrison 



Badajoz 1 65 

being too weak to cover every point. But Philippon 
had not sufficient munitions ; and he had hardly 
more than 5000 men to oppose to an enemy in im- 
mensely superior numbers. D'Erlon who, we have 
seen, had been detached to observe Badajoz would 
have done well to support the garrison with part of 
his troops ; but he fell back on the approach of Wel- 
lington, and took no part in the stirring events that 
followed. 

Ground was broken on the 18th of March before 
the Picurina and St. Roque, which protected the 
eastern front of the fortress ; a tempest of shot was 
rained on these outlying works, and on the bastions 
of Santa Maria and Trinidad in their rear. A bold 
sally of the garrison was repulsed with loss ; but guns 
were brought to bear on the trenches from across 
the river ; these raked them with destructive effect. 
The fire of the Picurina had slackened by the 25th, 
in fact, Philippon had to husband his powder; a 
furious assault was made on the fort, but the re- 
sistance was not less fierce and resolute ; it was not 
until half of the defenders had fallen that the assail- 
ants mastered their hard won prize ; and they were 
unable to retain it under the guns of the fortress. 
St. Roque still bravely maintained the struggle; but 
the threatened bastions were now exposed ; yawn- 
ing breaches were by degrees made in Santa Maria 
and Trinidad, and the adjoining curtains. The be- 
sieged, nevertheless, did not lose heart; they re- 
trenched the breaches and made a new line of 
defence ; they maintained a heavy fire from the ram- 
parts ; cleared the fosse which the enemy did not 



1 66 Wellington 



&' 



command, and as the counterscarp had not been even 
reached plied their dangerous task in comparative 
safety. Things were in this state when Wellington 
was informed that Soult was approaching with a re-' 
lieving army ; he resolved not to be baffled for the 
third time and to risk everything in a general assault 
on Badajoz, in which his immensely superior forces 
might give him success. His dispositions for the 
attack were made for the night of the 6th of April ; 
a combined effort was to be attempted in all direc- 
tions ; the fortress was to be surrounded by a circle 
of consuming fire. Picton's division was to escalade 
the castle, forcing its way over the hindrances in its 
path. The division of Leith was to make a feint 
against the Pardaleras and to assault part of the 
western front, which had been mined ; false attacks 
were to be tried on other points ; the divisions of 
Colville and that lately under Crawford, the flower 
of the British infantry, were to storm the breaches, 
whatever the cost. But Philippon had his prepara- 
tions made; hard pressed and straitened as he was, 
he was undismayed by enemies in overwhelming 
numbers; he called on his weakened garrison to hold 
out to the last man ; he did everything that was pos- 
sible to the art of the engineer. He was not suffi- 
ciently strong to defend all the points that could be 
assailed ; he properly concentrated his main force to 
cover the breaches ; he had here accumulated ex- 
traordinary means of resistance. Bodies of sharp- 
shooters, every man having three pieces were ranged 
along the imperilled ramparts ; a formidable stockade, 
constructed with the most ingenious skill, was laid 



Badajoz 167 

along the front of the breaches ; the bottom of the 
fosse was inundated and made a most grave obsta- 
cle ; and a long line of what may b ecalled infernal 
machines was placed at the foot of the counterscarp 
which, I have said, had been left intact. ' 

Wellington spared the garrison the form of a sum- 
mons; he knew what would be the indignant answer. 
The night of the 6th was dark, but still; it was a 
calm before a storm raised by the fury of man ; 
hardly a sound was heard in the trenches or along 
the ramparts save the voice of the sentry saying that 
all was well in Badajoz. Soon after ten the two di- 
visions charged to master the breaches, had reached 
the glacis, and were close to the place; bundles of 
hay were thrown into the fosse to fill it ; the forlorn 
hopes and the storming parties boldly fell on. The 
columns of the assailants had soon rushed forward 
"deep and broad, coming on like streams of lava"; 
an appalling spectacle suddenly was seen. The ram- 
parts were lit up with the blaze of rockets ; the mus- 
ketry of the sharpshooters made frightful havoc ; the 
train of the deadly engines laid along the counter- 
scarp, exploded, flinging out shells and other missiles ; 
the inundated fosse swallowed up many victims; 
hundreds of brave men perished before they at- 
tained the breaches, yet still the assaulting columns 

1 Wellington, after the result, complained bitterly of this: " I 
trust that future armies will be equipped for sieges with the 
people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be ; and that our 
engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the 
glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of placing them 
where the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers to get into 
and cross the ditch as they can." — Selection, p. 594. 



1 68 Wellington 



pressed on, maddened, shattered, yet determined to 
do or to die ; here they were met by fresh and ter- 
rific obstacles. The stockade along the breaches 
proved impossible to break down ; it presented a 
front of sword-blades fastened into beams, and of 
planks studded with sharp points of iron ; the assail- 
ants dashed themselves against it in vain ; they were 
crushed by the pressure of their comrades and rolled 
down into the fosse below, while the rattle of the 
musketry from the ramparts rang steadily out ; the 
troubled air was rent with the sound of bursting pro- 
jectiles ; the shouts and jeers of the garrison swelled 
loud and high as the enemy was called on to " come 
and take Badajoz," yet these desperate onslaughts 
were repeated over and over again, and continued 
for the space of two hours ; it was not until more 
than two thousand men had been slain, the fosse 
had been choked with the killed and the wounded, 
and the breaches had become a frightful scene of 
carnage, echoing with groans, execrations, and hor- 
rible sounds of passion, that a pause was made in 
the appalling struggle. But victory meanwhile had 
declared for Wellington at other points of the be- 
leaguered fortress. Picton's division had carried the 
castle after a brave resistance, though it has been 
said that the German troops who defended it hardly 
did their duty. The feint on Pardaleras was not 
pressed home; but though there was a panic about 
a mine which, proved, however, a false alarm, the 
part of the western front that was attacked was 
stormed ; in truth, the French were scarcely anywhere 
in sufficient force. The victors now took the garrison 



Badajoz 1 69 

at the breaches in reverse and exacted a fearful and 
bloody vengeance ; the assailants had soon swarmed 
into the town. Philippon and his chief officers made 
their escape into Christoval, but Badajoz was sur- 
rendered on the morning of the 7th of June. The 
losses of Wellington from first to last had not been 
less than 5000 men, out of an attacking force of some 
18,000; the losses of the garrison were 1500; there 
never has been a more fiercely contested siege. His- 
tory drops a veil on the hideous excesses that fol- 
lowed ; but in the case of towns taken under these 
conditions this was the evil custom of war in that 
age. 

The second key of the frontier had thus been taken, 
enormous as had been the cost of success. Spain 
now lay open to the attack of Wellington ; things had 
changed since he clung to the lines before Lisbon. 
Soult had meanwhile been approaching Badajoz 
from Seville, but his advance had been tentative and 
slow ; he appears to have had no communication with 
D'Erlon ; when apprised by Philippon of the fall of 
the fortress he retraced his steps, and was around 
Llerena for a few days ; he ultimately made his way 
into Andalusia. The Marshal's operations might 
have been more bold, — this was Napoleon's distinct 
judgment, — but he had not brought with him more 
than twenty-five thousand men, a force not sufficient 
to have compelled the raising of the siege ; he was 
hampered, besides, by the fruitless attack on Cadiz 
and by Ballasteros and a large Spanish army ; and 
he was contemplating a great movement which, with 
the support of Suchet, might force Wellington to 



1 yo Wellington 

retreat even to the Portuguese capital. The British 
General seems for a moment to have wished to pursue 
and attack Soult, and he would have been much su- 
perior in strength ; but he was recalled northwards 
by the operations of Marmont. That Marshal, com- 
plying with his master's orders, had fallen on the 
communications of Wellington, had passed Ciudad 
and Almeida, had reached Celorico, and had spread 
consternation as far as Coimbra; but he had not 
forced his adversary away from Badajoz, and before 
long he was in retreat into Leon. Wellington now 
placed his army between the Agueda and the Coa, 
and made preparations for the invasion of Spain. 
He disposed, including his reserve, of not far from 
100,000 men ; he could place in his first line some 
56,000, of whom 32,000 were British troops ; but his 
24,000 Portuguese had been made excellent soldiers; 
they were now known as " the fighting-cocks of the 
army." This force was still much inferior to that of 
the enemy as a whole ; but the French armies were at 
immense distances ; their chiefs notoriously would 
not act in concert ; their nominal head, Joseph, had 
no real authority ; they were everywhere harassed 
by the guerrillas and by Spanish armies, beaten in the 
field, but never subdued ; Wellington had thus a 
reasonable prospect of success, very different from 
what had been the case in 1809. The British chief, 
with characteristic insight, took careful precautions 
before he advanced, to make the movement as secure 
as was possible. He had left Hill in Estremadura 
with some fifteen thousand men ; that able lieuten- 
ant had destroyed the bridge at Almaraz, and the 



Salamanca 1 7 1 

fortified works which had been made to protect it ; 
he had thus severed the communications between 
Marmont and Soult by the Tagus. Hill, too, had 
repaired the great bridge at Alcantara, and this had 
much facilitated his junction with his chief; these 
two operations had been admirably designed. At 
the same time Wellington urged the Ministers at 
home to make frequent descents with squadrons on 
the coast, in order to assist the guerrillas in the north 
and to occupy the French army on the spot ; and he 
earnestly entreated that the British force, which had 
been expected from Sicily for some months, should 
be landed on the seaboard of Catalonia, to hold 
Suchet in check. This operation, he hoped, would 
indirectly give him the support of about twenty 
thousand men. 

The only army immediately confronting Welling- 
ton was that of Marmont, which, when concentrated, 
would be about forty-five thousand strong, but which 
at this juncture was much scattered, chiefly between 
Salamanca and the Douro. This army, the remnant 
of that of Massena, had been reorganised by its new 
commander ; it was for the most part composed of 
excellent troops ; but there was a certain admixture of 
new levies. The only armies that could be expected 
to reinforce Marmont were that of the North under 
Caffarelli, who had replaced Dorsenne, and that of 
the Centre, of which the nominal head was Joseph ; 
these could hardly be expected to send the Marshal 
more than twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand 
men. As for Suchet, he was bound to Valencia and 
was looking out for a hostile descent from Sicily ; 



172 Wellington 

Soult practically refused to leave Andalusia, or to 
weaken his army in that province, though Joseph 
had ordered him to send a detachment to Marmont, 
nay, to evacuate Andalusia if necessary, orders 
which, had they been obeyed at this time, might 
have changed the fortunes of the campaign at hand. 
Wellington was, therefore, not really overmatched ; 
he broke up from his cantonments in the first days 
of June and directed his movements on Salamanca, 
where he was received as a deliverer by the exulting 
citizens, like nearly all Spaniards, deadly enemies of 
the French. Marmont, I have said, had fortified 
Salamanca as well as he could, in order to make a 
barrier against the invasion he dreaded, after the 
loss of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo ; he had de- 
stroyed a number of religious houses and had cleared 
the town of buildings, which might be of use to the 
enemy ; but he had made three large convents strong 
points of defence, and one of these, San Vincente, 
was perched on a cliff overhanging the Tormes, an 
affluent of the Douro, flowing by the place. Wel- 
lington was compelled to lay siege to the convents, 
and this delayed him ten or twelve days ; San Vin- 
cente was not captured until the 27th of June. Dur- 
ing this time Marmont had approached the Tormes 
at the head of some twenty-five thousand men, who 
erelong were considerably reinforced ; the Marshal 
sought an opportunity to strike, but he found that he 
had been on a bootless errand. In a short time he 
had retreated behind the Douro, spreading his army, 
now assembled on a broad front, from Toro on the 
Douro, beyond Tordesillas and thence further to the 



Salamanca 1 73 

Pisuerga, holding the bridge of Tordesillas upon the 
Douro, which would enable him to cross over the 
river. In this position he was safe, it may be said, 
from attack ; he had drawn near Caffarelli and Joseph ; 
he commanded a very fine army of men of one race. 
But he sent messages to Caffarelli and Joseph very 
properly seeking assistance from both ; and both — a 
fact that deserves special notice — had held out hopes 
of support, if in very ambiguous language. 

In this position of affairs the obvious course for 
Marmont would have been to remain behind the 
Douro, and to await the reinforcements that might 
be on the way ; the Marshal knew that Wellington 
was at hand, and that Wellington had a superiority 
of force. But though Marmont was a brilliant sol- 
dier, an excellent tactician in the field, and possessed 
of no ordinary organising skill, he was a somewhat 
vain and presumptuous man ; the intelligent French 
soldiery had little trust in him; a phrase was current 
in their camps " Marmont fights, but fights to be 
beaten." The Marshal resolved to leave his point 
of vantage, and to try a game of manoeuvres with the 
British chief, which might perhaps compel his adver- 
sary to retreat, perhaps offer a chance of a successful 
battle. On the 15th and 16th of July he made a 
feint with his right and began to cross the Douro at 
Toro ; this movement had the effect of turning Wel- 
lington's left ; that General had his army at Canizal 
near a feeder of the main river. A trial of strength in 
this position would have been dangerous in the ex- 
treme; both armies would have stood on what tac- 
tically is called a front to a flank, that is, would have 



1 74 Wellington 

fought on a line not covering their communications 
and means of retreat ; Marmont had no intention of 
running such a risk. He countermarched, therefore, 
rapidly to his left, crossed the Douro at Tordesillas 
and another point ; and advanced to the upper 
Guarena, the feeder before mentioned ; his object 
now being to turn Wellington's right. A series of 
brilliant movements followed ; both armies marched 
in parallel lines, over an open country, each watch- 
ing an opportunity which did not come ; but the 
French distinctly outmarched their enemy ; Mar- 
mont, continually pressing Wellington's right, 
reached the Tormes and crossed the river at fords 
which Wellington believed were guarded by a Span- 
ish garrison in forts. The British commander, out- 
manoeuvred and outflanked, chiefly owing to the 
celerity of the French movements, now fell back and 
took a position on the heights covering Salamanca 
to the south; he reached this ground on the 2ist 
of July. The situation had become critical for him ; 
for his line of retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo was not 
firmly held, nay, was already in some degree men- 
aced, and should he abandon Salamanca he would 
give up a prize to Marmont. The Marshal was fully 
alive to the advantage he had won ; he advanced to 
a village called Calvarossa, the mass of his army, 
however, being somewhat in the rear ; his purpose 
was to threaten his adversary's communications with 
Ciudad ; to fall on them if a good chance offered, 
perhaps to fight if there was a real prospect of suc- 
cess. On the 22nd of July Marmont continued his 
movement; he began to press on Wellington's line 



Salamanca 1 75 

at least to approach it within a near distance ; one 
of his divisions seized a hill called the Great Ara- 
peiles, near an opposite height of the same name, 
which was occupied by a part of the allied army. 
But the Marshal's forces were not completely in 
hand ; there was a small interval of space between 
his centre and his left, though this was hardly of 
importance as yet, and his troops were rather en- 
tangled in the woodland that spread along the ground 
he held. 

Had Marmont at this moment kept to the vantage- 
ground he had won, and drawn together his some- 
what scattered troops, he could have compelled 
Wellington to leave Salamanca, and to seek his line 
of retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo ; he might even have 
harassed the retiring columns. But he continued to 
edge nearer and nearer to his adversary's right, 
whether to challenge him to a battle is still uncertain ; 
his left, under Thomieres, gradually extending itself 
increased the gap that separated it from the rather 
ill-formed centre, and became isolated at a distance 
from its supports. This false movement was in- 
stantly perceived by Wellington, — his exclamation, 
" Mon cJier A lava, Marmont est perdu'' is well 
known ; he seized the occasion as became a master 
of tactics, whose dispositions on the field have been 
seldom equalled. He directed the leaders of his 
centre, which was well in hand, to fall in full force 
on this part of the enemy's line ; at the same time 
he ordered his brother-in-law, Pakenham, to attack 
Thomieres's exposed wing, to overwhelm it, and to se- 
cure victory. The effect of these perfectly conceived 



1 76 Wellington 

strokes was extraordinary, sudden, and complete. 
The men of the allied centre rushed down from 
the Arapeiles where they stood, sweeping away 
the enemies who tried to arrest their onslaught ; 
"disregarding the storm of bullets discharged by the 
French artillery, which seemed to shear away the 
whole surface of the earth. " Erelong Pakenham 
had rolled up Thomieres's divisions in spite of a 
brave and stern resistance. The French were almost 
surrounded, and utterly routed ; a fine charge of 
cavalry scattered them into a horde of fugitives. 
Marmont from the Great Arapeiles beheld the disas- 
trous scene ; he sent messenger after messenger 
to try to restore the battle ; but his efforts would 
have been fruitless in any event, and he was struck 
down by a cannon-shot at a critical moment. The 
result of the day was now not really doubtful ; but 
justice should be done to a very able and skilful 
man, who still made a desperate attempt to bid for 
victory. Clausel, a young general of the highest 
promise, contrived to rally and strengthen the broken 
French centre ; he even ventured on a bold counter- 
stroke, "the result went nigh to shake the whole 
battle. " But victory, under these conditions, be- 
longs to the commander who has the last fresh re- 
serve ; this was launched by Wellington against the 
enemy ; " the allied host, righting itself like a gallant 
ship after a sudden gust, bore onward again in blood 
and gloom," and drove the French army in defeat 
from the field. Nevertheless Clausel admirably cov- 
ered the retreat ; with his colleagues he often stemmed 
the advancing tide of his foes ; but had not the fords 



Salamanca iJJ 

on the Tormes been left open, against Wellington's 
positive orders, the beaten host must have been all 
but destroyed. 1 

Besides eleven guns and two eagles, the French 
lost at Salamanca 6000 men killed and wounded, 
7000 prisoners were moreover taken, not more than 
20,000 men held together for some days ; the victory, 
in a word, was complete and decisive. The loss of 
the Allies was upwards of 5000 men, for the defeated 
army made a fine defence ; but Wellington was 
master of the situation for a time. Clausel conducted 
his retreat with conspicuous skill ; his rearward divi- 
sions were once or twice smitten, but he made nearly 
forty miles in less than twenty hours ; he rightly di- 
rected his movement on Aravelo, not on Tordesillas 
as the British General thought would be the case; 
he wished to draw near Madrid and King Joseph. 
The pursuit of Wellington, as was his wont, was 
slow ; in fact, as the historian of the Peninsular War 
has written, " the vigorous following of a beaten 
enemy was never a prominent characteristic of the 
British chief" 2 ; but Wellington did his young 



1 Wellington has thus briefly described the main features of the 
battle of Salamanca : " Marmont ought to have given me a pont d'or 
and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of 
that, after manoeuvring all the morning in the usual French style, 
nobody knew for what object, he at last pressed before my right in 
such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would 
have either carried our Arapeiles, or he would have confined us entirely 
to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, 
turning his left flank, and I never saw an army receive such a beat- 
ing." — Selection, p. 615. 

2 Napier, Peninsular War, iii., 67; edition published by Routledge. 



1 78 Wellington 

opponent justice; he has expressed high admiration of 
the operations of Clausel. Marmont from his couch 
of pain must have felt bitter anguish at the intelli- 
gence that* soon reached his successor ; Caffarelli 
sent a reinforcement to the defeated army ; Joseph 
had actually marched out of Madrid at the head of 
more than fourteen thousand men in order to sup- 
port Marmont upon the Douro. The King might 
have joined Clausel at Aravelo, and thus made a 
good stand against Wellington ; but he was appalled 
by the result of the late battle ; he fell back behind 
the Guadarrama and returned to his capital. The 
allied army continued to dog Clausel's footsteps ; 
but the French commander made good his way to 
Burgos, where, though he had been wounded at 
Salamanca, he rallied and reorganised his army with 
indefatigable care. Leaving a considerable detach- 
ment to observe Clausel, Wellington now turned 
against Joseph, but his movements once more were 
not rapid ; the King was given time to fly from Mad- 
rid, with his mock Court and a train of many thou- 
sand followers. The British General entered the 
capital of Spain on the 12th of August, 181 2 ; he was 
greeted with enthusiastic acclaim ; the moral results 
of his appearance were no doubt immense. But it 
has truly been remarked that he might have done 
more than he did had he been a chief of the type 
of Turenne or Napoleon. It was probably in his 
power, had he struck quickly home, to have annihil- 
ated Clausel and his shattered forces ; and he ought 
to have been able to have caught and routed Joseph 
before the fugitive had made his escape from Madrid 



Salamanca 1 79 

But strategy, in its grandest aspects, was never one 
of the strong points of Wellington ; this is manifest 
in several passages of his career. 

Wellington was raised a step in the British Peer- 
age for Salamanca, and was made commander-in- 
chief of the Spanish armies, honours nobly deserved 
and justly won. He remained in Madrid a few 
days only ; he seems rather to have offended jealous 
Spanish pride ; his stay was chiefly remarkable for 
the exasperation shown by the citizens to the hand- 
ful of politicians who had adhered to Joseph. Ere- 
long Clausel had again appeared in the field, having 
rallied his army with characteristic resource ; he was 
in command of some 30,000 men ; he threatened 
the detachment left behind to hold him in check ; 
this was from 15,000 to 18,000 strong. Wellington 
broke up from Madrid on the 1st of September; 
with his Portuguese, he had perhaps 35,000 men, for 
his army had suffered much from disease ; he was 
ultimately joined by some 11,000 Spaniards. The 
Allies had a great superiority of force, when the 
isolated detachment had come into line; the British 
General endeavoured to bring Clausel to bay ; but his 
enemy retarded his advance with consummate skill, 
defending position after position not without suc- 
cess 1 : he finally made good his way to Burgos, whence 
he effected his junction with the French army of the 
North. Wellington was before Burgos on the 8th 
and 9th of September, he was on the line of the 

1 Wellington gave this honourable testimony to Clausel : " He 
held every position till turned and then drew off in splendid order," 
■ — Sir H. Maxwell, History, i., 290, 



1 80 Wellington 

communications of the French with Madrid ; he 
may have believed that he could easily reduce the 
place and then strike a blow with effect, but his real 
purpose has hardly been made known. He had sate 
down before Burgos by the 10th, but his calculations 
were wholly frustrated ; the siege is a very remark- 
able instance of what the value of a weak fortress 
may be in war ; how it may baffle an enemy, nay, 
bring him into grave danger. Burgos was an ancient 
fortification of little strength ; but it was protected 
by entrenchments within the wall ; it was cov- 
ered on the northern front by a hornwork ; it had 
a very able commandant, Dubreton, and a brave 
garrison of some 2000 men. The hornwork was 
stormed on the 19th, but Wellington had no siege 
artillery ; his guns were comparatively few and weak ; 
he had to resort to mines to destroy the defences. 
Four assaults were made against narrow breaches; 
Dubreton and his men still clung to the entrench- 
ments they had admirably held. But meanwhile 
a formidable tempest of war had been gathering 
against the British commander. Massena had been 
sent to the southern borders of France ; but the 
veteran refused to take the field ; Clausel had been 
disabled by a festering wound ; Souham, rather an 
elderly man, was placed at the head of Marmont's late 
army, which had been reinforced to 40,000 men by 
the addition of a levy of conscripts. Caffarelli, too, 
was at hand with 10,000 or 12,000 men ; their united 
forces were much superior to those of Wellington, 
in the quality of the troops, nay, perhaps in numbers. 
The British General raised the siege on the 21st of 



Burgos 1 8 1 

October ; he had lost fully 2000 men ; he had cer- 
tainly delayed too long around the fortress. 

While Wellington had been laying siege to Burgos, 
great events had occurred in other parts of Spain. 
Joseph had reached Valencia on the 1st of Sep- 
tember, and with his motley following had been well 
received by Suchet, who — created by Napoleon 
Duke of Albufera — had, as usual, governed his 
province well, and had even been able to collect its 
revenue. The Marshal, however, had to provide 
against the expedition which had disembarked from 
Sicily, and which, though of less force than had been 
expected, was nevertheless sufficient to keep him on 
the spot. Joseph sent peremptory orders to Soult to 
quit Andalusia and to join the Army of the Centre 
with his own. Soult obeyed, but with a bad grace, 
after despatching a protest to the Emperor, which 
did not improve his relations with the King. 
The Marshal, I have said, had for some time been 
projecting operations which in his opinion would 
compel Wellington to return into Portugal ; he aimed 
at making Andalusia a great military base ; whence 
being reinforced to large extent, he might be able to 
turn the Lines, and to advance on Lisbon. Even 
after Salamanca he insisted that this was the true 
strategic course ; the Army of the Centre should 
unite with his own ; this would give a new, perhaps 
a fortunate turn to the war ; Andalusia in any event, 
should not be abandoned. But he was forced to 
forego these ambitious hopes, and to evacuate the 
province which he had occupied to little purpose, 
and which the invaders ought never to have entered 



1 8 2 Wellington 



s 



while Wellington had his army in Portugal. Soult, 
of course, withdrew from Cadiz, besieged in vain for 
months, the forces which the siege had greatly re- 
duced ; he gathered his outlying detachments to- 
gether ; he set off for Seville with a heavy heart, 
carrying away the spoil of a devastated land. 1 
He was harassed by Ballasteros and a Spanish 
army, while his lieutenant, D'Erlon, was pursued by 
Hill, but he reached the borders of Murcia in Sep- 
tember, and was in Valencia by the first days of 
October, not far from the historic field of Almanza. 
His junction with the King had now been effected ; 
the united French armies, not reckoning that of 
Suchet, were not far from 60,000 strong ; it was 
agreed, after some hot discussion, to march to and re- 
gain the Spanish capital, which Wellington, it was 
known, had left. Joseph re-entered Madrid on the 2nd 
day of November; Hill, who after pursuing D'Erlon, 
had held a position on the upper Tagus, with a com- 
posite army of some 25,000 men, having retreated 
through the Guadarrama to join his chief. Wel- 
lington, by this time falling back from Burgos, was 
now gravely threatened by two armies, that of Sou- 
ham and that of Joseph and Soult ; each of these 
was probably a match for his own, if for the present 
they were far apart ; such had been the result of 

1 Soult had taken away with him a number of important pic- 
tures, among others the magnificent Dona di Gloria of Murillo, 
and placed these in his mansion in Paris. Many years after- 
wards the Marshal showed the collection to Lord Cowley, nephew 
of Wellington, and remarked that "no doubt the Duke had a 
gallery of the same kind." The reply was excellent : " Non, M. 
le Marechal ; il vous a suivi." 




VISCOUNT ROWLAND HILL. 
(From the painting by H. W Pickersgill, R.A.) 



Burgos 183 

maintaining a fruitless siege. French writers, who 
have contended that in this position of affairs, the 
British General, like Napoleon in the campaign of 
Italy, could have fallen on and defeated his divided 
enemies, appear to be altogether in error. 

During these events Wellington in retreat from 
Burgos was followed by Souham with some 40,000 
men, Caffarelli having gone back with the Army of 
the North. The operations of Souham were cautious; 
some engagements of no importance took place ; but 
the British soldiery, as so often has been the case, 
when falling back a long distance before an enemy, 
began to show symptoms of insubordination and 
want of discipline. Meanwhile Joseph had marched 
out of Madrid in order to effect his junction with 
Souham, — a rapid and well-conceived movement ; 
he was accompanied by Soult and his Chief- of - 
Staff Jourdan ; the combined armies, about 90,000 
strong, were on the upper Douro by the 8th of 
November, advancing in full pursuit of Wellington. 
The British chief had crossed the Douro some days 
before ; he was joined by Hill, on the Tormes, on 
the 7th of November ; he had reached the scenes of 
his late victory ; he was now at the head of more 
than 60,000 men, a number, however, of these being 
Spanish levies. Wellington placed himself on a very 
extended line, from Alva, on the upper Tormes, on 
his right to Calvarossa occupied by Marmont on the 
2 1st of July, and thence to a point called San Chris- 
toval on his left ; the distance was nearly fifteen 
miles. He was ready, it has been said, to accept 
battle, to restore, as had been the case at Busaco, 



1 84 Wellington 

the confidence of an army that had been shaken ; but 
this appears to be, at the very least, uncertain. On 
the 14th of November the enemy had crossed the 
Tormes, and was even menacing Wellington's line 
of retreat ; an important council of war was held ; 
Jourdan's voice was for fighting a great battle, at 
least for attacking Hill, who was drawing back from 
Alba; the odds would certainly have been largely in 
favour of the French. But the memory of Sala- 
manca disturbed Soult, seldom ready to seize the 
occasion and to strike home ; he insisted that an at- 
tempt should be made to outflank Wellington, and 
to cut him off from Ciudad Rodrigo, in his retreat, 
very much as had been the object of Marmont before ; 
Joseph yielded to counsels that were perhaps unfor- 
tunate. The movement of the French was circuitous 
and slow ; it has been compared to the hovering of a 
wily kite ; Wellington, skilfully drawing his army 
together, reached Ciudad Rodrigo hardly molested. 
He had lost in the retreat nearly nine thousand men ; 
he vented his displeasure in an address to his troops, 
severely condemning their conduct since they had 
left Burgos. Many soldiers, even officers, had be- 
haved ill ; but this indiscriminate censure was hardly 
deserved ; it was characteristic of a stern and ob- 
durate nature which deemed military licence an 
unpardonable crime. 

To superficial observers the retreat from Burgos 
seemed to mark a turn in the tide of the war against 
Wellington. He had, after entering the capital of 
Spain in triumph, and striking the line of the com- 
munications of the French, been compelled to fall 



Burgos 185 

back an immense distance ; on the Tormes he had 
been exposed to no doubtful peril ; his army had 
been partly demoralised and much weakened ; he 
had been forced back almost to the Portuguese fron- 
tier. And his strategy after Salamanca does not 
commend itself to an impartial student of the mili- 
tary art. He ought not to have allowed the defeated 
army of Marmont to recover itself, and become 
formidable again, in order merely to appear in Mad- 
rid ; this was sacrificing the primary to the sec- 
ondary end. He might, perhaps, at this juncture 
have routed Joseph ; he ought not to have delayed 
before Burgos for weeks, and to have risked the issue 
of the campaign for an insignificant object. 

These mistakes, and certainly they were mistakes, 
enabled the French armies, scattered over Spain, to 
gather against him in greatly superior strength ; they 
obliged him to make a dangerous retrograde move- 
ment ; he ought to have been defeated near Sala- 
manca but for the hesitations of Soult. But if we 
examine the operations of Wellington as a whole, 
from Fuentes d'Onoro to the close of 1812, they bear 
witness to his great and characteristic merit in war. 
He was, no doubt, taken by surprise at El Boden ; it 
was fortunate when he stood on the Caya that Mar- 
mont and Soult would not agree to attack him. But 
when, in the summer of 181 1, the position of affairs 
seemed of evil omen, he maintained his undaunted 
and wise confidence ; in the dissemination of the hos- 
tile armies, in the disputes of their chiefs, in the 
preparations of the contest with Russia, he beheld the 
hopeful promise of final success. He made admirable 



1 86 Wellington 

arrangements for two great sieges; he seized the 
occasion with energy and skill ; he captured Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo and Badajoz under the beard, so to 
speak, of the enemy. When the keys of Spain had 
thus passed into his hands, he conducted the inva- 
sion that followed with fine judgment, at least at 
first ; and though he was outmanoeuvred by Mar- 
mont, his tactics at Salamanca were a masterpiece in 
the field. And the results of his achievements had 
been very great ; he had, with forces sometimes 
much inferior in strength, destroyed the renown and 
confidence of the French armies; he had made the 
invaders leave Andalusia, never to return ; he had 
practically upset the tottering throne of Joseph. 
The catastrophe which befell Napoleon in the north, 
and which shook his power on the Continent to its 
base, was to open a new career to Wellington in 
Spain ; he was erelong to overwhelm the enemies in 
his path, to strike them down in a decisive battle, 
and to carry the war into France itself, while the per- 
ishing Empire was crashing down in ruins. 





CHAPTER VII 

VITORIA 



The invasion of Russia in 1812 — The Retreat from Moscow — Great 
rising in Prussia after the disasters of the French — The Czar 
continues the war — Efforts of Napoleon to restore his military 
power — Lutzen and Bautzen — Negotiations — Policy of Metter- 
nich — The armistice of Pleisnitz — Events in Spain largely influ- 
ence the conduct of the Allies — Position of the French armies 
after the retreat from Burgos — They are considerably reduced 
— Directions of Napoleon for the Campaign of 1S13 in Spain — 
They reach Joseph late and are imperfectly carried out — Dis- 
semination of the French armies — Wellington disposes of a great 
military force — His plan for the Campaign of 1813 — He turns 
the position of the French on the Esla and the Douro — Joseph 
is surprised and compelled to fall back — Confused and ill-man- 
aged retreat of the French armies from Valladolid to Vitoria — 
Battle of Vitoria — Complete defeat of Joseph — Immense results 
of the victory. 

AFTER Salamanca and the conquest of Mad- 
drid, the retreat from Burgos caused much 
discontent in England ; murmurs were loudly 
heard that the Peninsular War could never come to 
an end. The nation, too, had been engaged in a 
contest with the United States, which markedly in- 
jured its renown on the seas, unchallenged since 
the great day of Trafalgar ; the Continental System 

187 



1 88 Wellington 

had continued to produce its disastrous effects, 
in bankruptcies, disorders, and the depreciation 
of a paper currency. These events, however, 
important as they were, were thrown into the 
shade by the awful catastrophe of the French in- 
vasion of Russia in 1812. Napoleon had steadily 
carried out the policy, in military as well as in 
civil affairs, of striking down the great Power of 
the North, to which he had for months turned his 
mighty energies. Concealing the movement by all 
kinds of feints, he had drawn together the armed 
strength of the West, supported by enormous re- 
serves, to assail and subdue the Czar in the East ; he 
had directed this from the Rhine and the Danube to 
the Vistula; in the spring of 1812 it was ready to 
march to the Niemen, drawing with it a huge ma- 
terial of war; the world had never yet beheld such a 
display of a conqueror's power. Austria and Prus- 
sia, with secret reluctance, but with apparent con- 
sent, had furnished contingents to the gigantic host ; 
France, Germany, and Italy had sent their youth to 
join in the great crusade. The Emperor left Paris in 
proud confidence, disregarding the entreaties of more 
than one wise counsellor; the alarm, nay, the dis- 
affection showing itself from the Seine to the Rhine, 
and the Spanish ulcer, malignant and growing. At 
Dresden the Continent bowed before its lord ; kings, 
princes, and potentates lavished their homage ; flat- 
tery described the enterprise as a triumphal march 
for the summer. Four hundred thousand men, 
sustained by two hundred thousand in the rear, 
crossed the Niemen in the last days of June; but 



Vitoria 1 89 

this immense host was composed of many races and 
tongues ; the forces of Austria and Prussia, foes at 
heart, formed the extremes of the wings. The ad- 
vance of the Grand Army — a time-honoured name — 
was impeded by many and grave obstacles, and its 
losses were great from the first moment ; but Napo- 
leon's earlier operations were admirably designed, 
and for some weeks were of the highest promise. 
The main army of Alexander was placed in im- 
minent danger, owing to the unwise advice of a 
pedantic theorist ; and though his secondary army 
made its escape, chiefly through the neglect of 
the young King of Westphalia, both were com- 
pelled, widely divided as yet, to retreat. Napoleon 
pursued, but the pursuit was checked by the im- 
pediments inherent to such an enterprise ; Barclay 
and Bagration ultimately combined their forces ; a 
bloody battle was fought at Smolensk, the portal, as 
its name was, of old Muscovy ; the two Russian 
commanders, imitating Wellington at last, fell back 
over an immense space, destroying the means of 
subsistence in a devastated and poor country. The 
Emperor advanced from Smolensk with the best 
part of his forces, about 160,000 strong, throwing 
out, however, powerful armies on both sides of the 
line of his march, in order to secure his communica- 
tions and his flanks ; Barclay and Bagration were re- 
placed by Kutusoff ; the terrible conflict at Borodino 
followed, not decisive, but one of appalling carnage; 
the Russian army continued its retreat. Napoleon 
entered Moscow on the 14th of September — the ex- 
treme limit of the march of the Tricolour ; he had 



1 90 Wellington 

lost fully fifty thousand men since he had broken up 
from Smolensk. 

The conflagration of Moscow, whatever the cause, 
might have warned the Emperor that with his di- 
minished forces he was isolated in the midst of a still 
unconquered country, and was already in a position 
that might become most critical. But Napoleon 
cherished the hope that the Czar would treat ; he 
was deceived by his wily foe, Kutusoff ; he lingered 
five weeks in the ruin of the half-effaced city ; boast- 
ing that a march on St. Petersburg was within his 
power ; ignorant of what was in the womb of the 
immediate future. On the 19th of October the 
memorable retreat began ; it is not probable that 
had Moscow remained intact it could have been 
used as quarter for the invaders through the winter, 
" whence they would have emerged like a ship from 
the ice of the North." The Emperor's intention was 
to make his way to Kalouga and to establish himself 
in a country unravaged and with a milder climate ; 
but he was repulsed by his adversary at Malo Iaro- 
slavetz. The Grand Army, laden with the spoils of 
Moscow, and already, too, like an undisciplined 
horde, though still perhaps ninety thousand strong, 
was forced to retreat through the devastated region 
in which it had advanced. Things looked compara- 
tively well for a few days ; but an Arctic winter, 
with its ice and its snows, fell suddenly on the rapidly 
dwindling host; supplies were not to be found on 
the wasted line of march ; the Russians, though 
timidly, hung on the enemy's flanks; when Smo- 
lensk was reached some forty thousand starving 



Vitoria 191 

fugitives, demoralised, and breaking even from their 
chief, were all that remained of the legions which 
had proved at Borodino what they were. Napoleon 
had hoped to find a safe haven at Smolensk ; but 
two large hostile armies, bearing back the lieuten- 
ants, who were to make the advance on Moscow 
secure, were menacing his rear on either side ; it had 
become necessary to continue the appalling retreat. 
The army, only slightly restored — the soldiery had 
recklessly pillaged the magazines — abandoned Smo- 
lensk between the 14th and the 16th of November, 
but it had separated into somewhat distant masses, 
perhaps in order to procure food ; Kutusoff, who had 
become bolder, attacked it with effect ; Ney, who 
covered the retreat with wonderful courage and 
energy, was nearly cut off, and with difficulty made 
his escape. The scenes on the march from Smolensk 
were even more terrible than those which had been 
witnessed before ; the army was quickly reduced to 
less than twenty-five thousand men ; as it drew near 
the Beresina the Emperor learned that his retreat 
was barred by the two armies, which had been con- 
verging to close on his rear. Napoleon had not been 
equal to himself since he had left Moscow; but two 
of his marshals had joined him at this crisis, with rein- 
forcements of considerable strength ; he effected the 
passage of the river with considerable skill, losing, 
however, many thousands of disbanded men ; he 
carried across perhaps 40,000 troops who held to- 
gether. He left the wrecks of his army at Smor- 
gone, conduct of at least a questionable kind, and 
gave the command to Murat, a bad choice ; the 



I g 2 Wellington 

retreat went on as before to Wilna ; but it was in 
vain that additions were made to the perishing host ; 
Murat lost his head and had only one idea, flight. 
About the middle of December some 20,000 spec- 
tres crossed the Niemen in little knots and bands ; 
these were the remains of the 400,000 men who had 
formed the first line of the Grand Army ; and the 
reserve of 200,000 had cruelly suffered. The catas- 
trophe was like that which befell the Assyrian tyrant ; 
it is doubtful if 80,000 of the 600,000 men were ever 
seen under the eagles again. 

This unparalleled disaster was quickly to prove 
how precarious was the structure of Napoleon's Em- 
pire. Schwartzenberg, the leader of the Austrian 
contingent, had allowed one of the hostile armies 
that had reached the Beresina to pass ; he had soon 
brought back his forces, almost unscathed, to the 
Vistula. York, a general of the Prussian contingent, 
abandoned Macdonald with his soldiers to a man ; 
he was welcomed as a hero by the whole Prussian 
nation. Germany, from the Niemen to the Elbe, 
rose up in patriotic passion ; the King of Prussia, 
hesitating and alarmed for a time, was swept into a 
mighty movement to avenge the humiliations and 
the wrongs of years ; Alexander, against Kutusoff's 
entreaties, crossed the Vistula and proclaimed him- 
self the deliverer of an enthralled continent. The 
survivors of the Grand Army, perhaps forty thousand 
strong, and now under the command of Eugene 
Beauharnais, were borne back by the universal rising 
to the Elbe ; they were islanded in a flood of enemies 
on all sides; the French garrisons shut up in the 



Vitoria 193 

Prussian fortresses were the only other signs of the 
domination of France in that kingdom. The Em- 
peror, however, though wrathful and troubled at the 
sight of a catastrophe surpassing his worst fears, and 
disturbed by the position of affairs at home, had no 
thought even of negotiating with his foes ; he was 
only intent on finding resources to continue the war. 
He had expected when he had left his army, to 
have two hundred thousand men on the Niemen ; 
he had now not more than a fifth part of that force 
on the Elbe. His throne, too, had been menaced 
by an obscure plotter, whose efforts, though fruitless, 
had startled Paris ; and it had been remarked that 
Paris had no real faith in his dynasty. Yet at this 
crisis he appealed, and with prodigious effect, to 
the pride and the martial spirit of France, bent on 
maintaining the supremacy on the Continent which 
she still possessed. Napoleon's efforts were gigantic, 
and his marvellous power of organisation was dis- 
played to the utmost ; but he was earnestly seconded 
by the will of a united people, as strongly expressed 
perhaps as in 1792-93. Discontent and murmuring 
for the present ceased ; the Emperor called out the 
conscripts of 18 13 and even of 18 14; the French 
youth gathered in thousands around the eagles. At 
the same time he restored the artillery he had lost ; 
he worked hard to form again a mighty force of 
cavalry ; he recalled the best of his officers and 
troops from Spain to strengthen and improve the 
newly raised levies. In less than three months he 
had 200,000 men in line ; and these were ultimately 
increased to more than 500,000. But though an 



1 94 Wellington 

extraordinary creation of genius and power, the new 
Grand Army was very different from that which had 
crossed the Niemen the year before, so far as this 
was composed of French elements. Its infantry was 
largely a multitude of boys ; its cavalry was compar- 
atively scanty and raw; its artillery, if imposing, was 
ill-organised ; it was in every sense a very imperfect 
instrument of war. 

Napoleon took the field in the end of April, 1813 ; 
he was soon joined by the troops of Eugene Beau- 
harnais, the remains of the immense host that had 
been assembled to invade Russia. The united Prus- 
sian and Russian armies had meanwhile advanced 
into the plains of Saxony, in order to encourage the 
mighty rising already stirring nearly all Germany; 
this was a dangerous movement in a military sense ; 
it exposed them to their great enemy when far from 
their base. The hostile forces encountered each other 
on the historic field of Lutzen ; the French levies 
fought with the valour of the race ; the Allies were 
compelled to retreat. Napoleon now entered Dres- 
den in triumph, though his want of cavalry had 
made his late success fruitless; another and a much 
greater battle took place at Bautzen, on the verge of 
Bohemia, along the heads of the Spree ; it was inde- 
cisive, but his enemies were again worsted. Things 
now looked badly for the cause of the Allies ; had the 
Emperor boldly followed up his victory he might 
have put down the German movement for a time, 
nay, have stood out again the lord of the Continent. 
But events were to take an extraordinary turn ; the 
great believer in the power of the sword was to 



Vitoria 195 

try to make assurance doubly sure, and to find 
his calculations completely baffled ; the way was to 
be prepared for his ultimate overthrow. Napoleon 
seems to have been convinced for some months that 
his marriage had made Austria a firm ally, to be 
reckoned upon in any case; when he felt himself 
strong enough to enter the lists in Germany he invited 
Austria to join him in attacking Prussia, and offered 
her the tempting bribe of Silesia, torn from her by 
Frederick the Great half a century before. The af- 
fairs of Austria were now in the hands of the far- 
sighted and calm-minded Metternich ; in the state of 
things created by the events of 18 12 he saw a pros- 
pect of restoring, to some extent, the power his coun- 
try had lost in a series of wars, and of relieving Ger- 
many, too, from the unnatural supremacy of France. 
He therefore eluded the offer of the bribe ; and gradu- 
ally with consummate skill, he assumed the attitude 
of a mediator between the belligerent powers, while he 
made military preparations to carry out his policy, 
and to throw the sword of his master into the bal- 
ance. His sympathies certainly were with the Allies, 
and probably he foresaw that Austria would be drawn 
into a conflict with Napoleon in the long run ; but it 
is fair to add that the peace he wished to establish 
would have left Napoleon by far the chief part of his 
Empire. The conduct of Metternich, dictated by 
profound statecraft, and savouring, no doubt, in some 
degree, of guile, exasperated, nay, incensed Napoleon; 
he resolved to avenge himself on Austria for what 
he called her gross breach of faith ; he even offered 
to treat with the Czar, in order to turn his arms 



1 96 Wellington 

against her. The Allies, however, held together; 
Metternich inclined more and more to their side ; 
Napoleon, suspecting part at least of the truth, 
determined to defy even their united forces, and 
to contend, if necessary, against embattled Europe. 
To accomplish this it was essential to increase his 
military power ; he believed that he would gain more 
by time than any coalition could ; he signed an ar- 
mistice at Pleisnitz in June, 1813 ; this has been 
called the greatest mistake of his life. Nevertheless 
his position was so commanding that all was hesita- 
tion and doubt for some weeks ; Metternich and no- 
tably his master were slow in making up their minds. 
Events in the distant theatre of the war in Spain did 
much to decide their halting purpose ; I pass on to 
direct attention to them. 

The situation in the Peninsula appeared to be not 
hopeless for the invaders after the retreat from Bur- 
gos. Salamanca had been a terrible defeat; the 
flight from Madrid had been a disaster for Joseph ; 
Andalusia had been permanently lost. But Welling- 
ton had been forced back to the verge of Portugal ; 
and though his resources for war were being largely 
increased, he had narrowly escaped very grave dan- 
gers. The French armies, at the close of 18 12, were 
extended upon an immense front, from Valencia, 
on the south-east, to the Biscayan seaboard ; they 
still numbered much more than two hundred and 
fifty thousand men on paper. But Napoleon, after 
the late catastrophe, was obliged, we have seen, 
greatly to reduce these forces when he was reorgan- 
ising the shattered power of France ; he drew nearly 



Vitoria 197 

30,000 men from Spain ; these, with their officers, 
were the flower of his troops in that kingdom. In 
the military operations of 1813 the French were prob- 
ably not more than 180,000 strong, perhaps not 
150,000 in arms around the eagles. This force, as 
before, was divided into five armies, that of Suchet, 
in Valencia and the provinces in the east ; that of 
the north, under the command of Clausel, pro- 
tecting the communications between Madrid and 
Bayonne ; that of the Centre, now in the hands 
of D'Erlon, spread for the most part around the 
capital ; that of Soult, who had been replaced by 
Gazan — the Marshal had been recalled from Spain 
— disseminated in the valley of the upper Tagus, 
and, finally, that of Marmont, still called the Army 
of Portugal, on the Tormes and in the valley of 
the upper Douro, with Reille, a capable officer, at 
its head. The first four armies, however, were be- 
set by enemies in almost every direction, and it was 
a weighty task for the Army of Portugal to match 
Wellington on the borders of Leon. The expedition 
from Sicily kept Suchet near the coast ; Aragon and 
Catalonia swarmed with guerrillas. The rising in the 
north, conducted by Mina and other skilful chiefs, 
had become more formidable than ever since the 
attack on Burgos ; it resembled, it was said, the war 
in La Vendee ; Clausel was not sufficiently strong to 
put it down anywhere. As for the army of D'Erlon 
and that of Gazan, they were threatened by two or 
three Spanish armies, not powerful indeed, but still 
a danger, and requiring to be held in check and ob- 
served. For the moment, however, the invaders 



1 98 Wellington 

were in comparative safety, at least until Wellington 
should appear, in force, on the scene. 

In this position of affairs, Napoleon gave his di- 
rections for the operations of the French armies 
in Spain, as usual, at a great distance, that is, from 
Paris. His real policy at this conjuncture was to 
endeavour to treat with England, and to restore Fer- 
dinand to his ancestral throne, taking, however, the 
provinces north of the Ebro as an indemnity for 
France, and perhaps offering Ferdinand the crown 
of Portugal in exchange. With these objects in 
view it was of supreme importance to him to have a 
powerful force in Biscay, Navarre, and the adjoining 
lands, and to keep his communications with France 
secure ; he did not wish to leave Joseph at Madrid ; 
he was at heart ready to abandon nearly all Spain, 
could Wellington be held in check on the Portuguese 
frontier. The Emperor accordingly, in the first 
days of 18 13, ordered that a great change should at 
once be made in the positions of the invaders in 
Spain, Suchet alone being left as before in the east. 
Joseph was to assemble the Army of the Centre 
around Valladolid, on the line of the communications 
with France ; he was to have only a few thousand 
men in the capital. The chief part of the Army of 
Portugal was to fall back from the country it now 
occupied, and to join hands with the army of 
Clausel ; these united forces were to crush the insur- 
rection in the north ; should this be accomplished - 
speedily, as was to be expected, Reille ought to 
have time enough to return to the upper Douro. 
Simultaneously the army of Gazan was to march 



Vitoria 1 99 

from the upper Tagus to the upper Douro, and 
to hold Wellington back on that line ; it was to main- 
tain an offensive attitude, especially if reinforced 
by the Army of Portugal. 1 These directions were 
right enough in principle, in order to give effect to 
Napoleon's views ; but issued as they were far from 
the theatre of the war, they reached Joseph several 
weeks late, and when they reached him they were 
very ill obeyed. The King moved to Valladolid, 
but too slowly ; he left half of the Army of the 
Centre behind at Segovia ; he placed a whole divi- 
sion of Gazan's army in Madrid : evidently he could 
not endure the thought of quitting the capital. At 
the same time more than three-fourths of the Army 
of Portugal were detached to the assistance of Clausel; 
a mere fraction only remained on the upper Douro, 
Reille and Clausel were kept employed for weeks in 
coping with the insurrection in the north ; and even 
in this they were far from successful. As for the 
army of Gazan, it reached the upper Douro, but in 
greatly diminished force ; and it had hardly any sup- 
port from the remnants of the Army of Portugal. 
When the season for military operations had come 
the French armies, scattered and largely directed 
northwards, were thus dangerously exposed in the 
highest degree, should they be attacked by Welling- 
ton in force from the western verge of Leon. 

The British commander, during these events, had 
been maturing his deep-laid designs ; after the ruin 
that had befallen the French in Russia, and the 



1 For Napoleon's instructions, see Corr., pp. 433-491, and especially 
pp. 506-507. 



200 Wellington 

faulty disposition of their armies in Spain, he had 
good hopes of decisive success in the campaign at 
hand. The national mind of England had been 
profoundly stirred by the catastrophe of 1812 and 
the German rising; the fall of Napoleon seemed im- 
minent ; the men of the militia flocked to the army 
in thousands ; Parliament was eager to do anything 
to further the contest in Spain. As commander-in- 
chief, too, of the Spanish armies Wellington had ob- 
tained additional elements of military strength ; he 
had repaired to Cadiz to meet the Cortes ; that 
Assembly had pledged itself to second his efforts. 
In the spring of 1813 he disposed of considerably 
more than 200,000 men ; half of this force was com- 
posed of Spanish troops, for the most part in the 
eastern provinces ; the other half comprised his Brit- 
ish and Portuguese army, from 70,000 to 80,000 fight- 
ing men, in the highest state of efficiency for war, 
and besides some 30,000 Spaniards, better soldiers 
than most of the levies of their race. Wellington 
had more than 100,000 men in his hands ; he had 
left nothing undone to make them ready to take 
the field and to march rapidly over long distances ; 
and he had the support of the bands of the omnipre- 
sent guerrillas, of British squadrons commanding the 
northern seaboard, and of the Sicilian expedition on 
the coast at the east. He was now distinctly su- 
perior to the enemy in force ; the plan of his in- 
tended operations was grand yet simple. He would 
fall on the French armies in his front, which certainly 
would not be as strong as his own ; he would turn 
their positions upon the Douro ; he would force 




LORD LYNEDOCH. 
(After the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence.) 



Vitoria 201 

them to retreat before they could unite ; he would 
threaten their communications, perhaps seize them, 
continually outflanking them on his left, and having, 
if possible, brought them to bay, he would, if success- 
ful, drive them across the Pyrenees. This fine con- 
ception was thoroughly carried out, if one or two 
shortcomings perhaps appear ; the possession of the 
northern seaboard, of which he was assured, would 
obviously facilitate the great outflanking move- 
ment. 

Wellington had his preparations made in the last 
days of April ; his operations had begun by the 
middle of May. He marched with some 90,000 
men ; his left wing, about 40,000 strong, under 
Graham, a lieutenant, who had distinguished him- 
self at Salamanca and on other fields, had advanced 
through the difficult country of the Trasos Montes; 
his task was to cross the Esla, in the first instance, 
and to join the main army on the upper Douro. 
Wellington's centre and right wing numbered some 
50,000 men ; his object was to effect the passage of 
the upper Douro, turning the defences of the French 
on the river, and attacking the enemy should he re- 
sist ; the British chief, besides, disposed of a motley 
force of guerrillas and of Spanish troops and levies, 
perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 strong, which, moving along 
the northern coast, was to co-operate, if required, 
in the outflanking movement. Wellington left his 
headquarters in the third week of May ; " Farewell, 
Portugal," it is said he exclaimed, so confident was 
he of decisive success in Spain. By the 26th of May 
he was at Salamanca with his centre ; Hill, with the 



202 Wellington 

right wing, was at Alba, upon the Tonnes ; a French 
division fell back after a mere show of resistance; 
the chief part of the army was thus approaching the 
Douro. But Graham, at the head of the left wing, 
had been delayed by accidents ; he was not over the 
Esla until the 1st of June ; Wellington had been 
compelled to pause for some days, and had even 
thought it necessary to see Graham. Such are the 
difficulties of widely divided movements, as a rule 
not to be commended in war, but perfectly to be 
justified in the present instance. The British com- 
mander crossed the Douro on the 3rd of June ; had 
Graham joined him, as had been arranged, in the last 
days of May, the weak forces of the French upon 
the Douro would have been completely surprised 
and in part destroyed, nay, Joseph might have been 
involved in an immense disaster. ' But the success 
already obtained had been great, the line of the 
upper Douro had been seized ; the positions which 
the enemy held on the river, and which had been 
fortified at different points, had been turned or forced 
almost without a shot being fired ; the detachment 
of the Army of Portugal and the army of Gazan, 
weakened as it had been, had no choice but to retreat 
before greatly superior forces ; writers seem to be in 
error who have maintained that the French could 
have made a stand on the Douro. Wellington made 
a halt at Toro on the river for two days ; we per- 
haps see here again his characteristic slowness in 
making the most of probable success ; he might, it 

'Napier is emphatic on this point. See History of the Peninsular 
War, iii., 194, Routledge Edition. 



Vitoria 203 

has been said, have come up with and routed the 
enemy. 1 His army, however, had marched a great 
distance, and it was necessary to have it well 
in hand; it has been justly remarked that "it was 
prudent to gather well to a head first, and the 
general combinations had been so profoundly made 
that the evil day for the French was only de- 
ferred." 2 

Meanwhile Joseph, possibly given a brief respite 
had been endeavouring to retrieve his mistakes, and 
to concentrate his forces around Valladolid. The 
division left at Madrid rejoined the army of Gazan ; 
the Army of the Centre was assembled at Valladolid ; 
the Army of Portugal, partly reinforced, fell back in 
order to draw near its supports. In the first days of 
June the three armies were around Valladolid, or 
near that city ; the army of Gazan beyond Tor- 
desillas ; the Army of the Centre at Valladolid; 
the Army of Portugal, that is, only a part of it, 
between Medina Rio Seco and Palencia north- 
wards. Joseph had now more than 50,000 men in 
hand ; but the greater part of the Army of Portugal 
and the whole army of Clausel were far away in the 
north ; in fact, Clausel had reached Pampeluna and 
the coast, making efforts to crush the guerrilla rising ; 
from 40,000 to 50,000 men were thus at a great dis- 
tance from the main army ; Wellington was ap- 
proaching in irresistible force ; Joseph is not to be 
blamed for deciding to retreat. But here two capital 
mistakes were made, most discreditable to Jourdan, 

1 Napier, History of the Peninsular War, iii., 194. 

2 Ibid. 



204 Wellington 

the chief of Joseph's staff, who at this conjuncture 
showed a want of capacity unworthy of the former vic- 
tor of Fleurus. The impedimenta of the French were 
enormous: siege guns, the material of the garrison of 
Madrid, all that belonged to a fugitive but once 
brilliant Court, and hundreds of non-combatant men 
and women ; these incumbrances should at once have 
been sent forward ; they were allowed to follow in 
the track of the retiring army. Again, there were 
numerous positions on the line of march, for the most 
part at the heads of the Douro, which could have 
been made excellent points of defence ; it was of su- 
preme importance to occupy these and to retard the 
advance of the enemy as much as possible, especially 
as time would thus be afforded to the largest part of 
the Army of Portugal and to the forces under Clausel 
to join Joseph ; a real general could certainly have 
taken advantage of these, perhaps even have found 
an opportunity to strike with effect. But no opera- 
tions of this kind were thought of; the only idea was 
to fall back on Burgos, on the line of the communi- 
cations with France ; this was pusillanimous, nay, 
contemptible strategy. 

The French armies, now forming a united mass, 
reached Burgos on the 9th and the 10th of June ; 
Joseph had sent messages to Clausel and Reille to 
come into line with him as quickly as possible ; this 
was apparently all that occupied the troubled mind 
of the King. Wellington pursued, but rather cau- 
tiously, as was his wont ; he had expected that the 
enemy would make a stand on the Carrion and the 
Pisuerga, affluents of the upper Douro ; he had pre- 



Vitoria 205 

pared himself for a trial of strength. But no use was 
made of these and other positions ; slight demonstra- 
tions of resistance were, indeed, attempted ; but these 
were fruitless displays and came to nothing. Reille 
and a part of the Army of Portugal had now joined 
the King; but a part was still at a distance under 
Foy, and Clausel was only advancing through Na- 
varre ; from 25,000 to 30,000 men were thus still far 
away from the principal army. Joseph evacuated 
Burgos on the 13th, but he was now at the head of 
more than 60,000 good troops elated by the news of 
Lutzen and Bautzen ; it is pitiable to reflect that he 
simply continued to retreat, dragging with him an 
immense and dangerous burden, and not venturing 
to defend a single point of vantage. The King, too, 
and Jourdan marched in a wrong direction: they fol- 
lowed the main line of the communications between 
Madrid and Bayonne ; this exposed them to attack 
from Wellington's left, and especially to the great 
outflanking movement which formed part of his origi- 
nal design and which might be extended even from 
the coast. And, at this crisis, a real commander 
might possibly have baffled the British General, cer- 
tainly have secured a large reinforcement to the re- 
treating army. Clausel was reaching Logrono, on 
Joseph's right; he commanded about fifteen thou- 
sand men ; there was nothing to prevent the King 
marching to join him ; and perhaps Foy, too, might 
have been brought into line. But the French leaders 
pursued their untoward course, passively clinging to 
their communications and making their way along 
the main roads to the heads of the Ebro. This was 



206 Wellington 

playing into the hands of Wellington ; continuing 
steadily the outflanking movement, and pressing the 
enemy's right as he fell back, he rapidly swung round 
his left wing, and advancing with the mass of his 
army, he forced his adversaries into Vitoria and the 
adjoining country where, being not far from the foot 
of the Pyrenees, it was impossible for them to avoid 
battle. This grand movement had been seconded 
by movements from the seaboard, on which the 
British General had always reckoned. 

By the evening of the 19th of June the three 
bodies of which the King's army was composed 
were assembled around Vitoria and the adjoining 
lands; they were huddled together in ill-united 
masses, disordered after the discreditable retreat. 
The town rises from a small plain encompassed by 
hills, which afford favourable positions for defence, 
the Zadorra, a feeder of the Ebro, runs before its 
front ; the main road to Bayonne and another 
road to Pampeluna, through the Pyrenees, formed 
avenues for retreat. The French army was about 
sixty thousand strong, and as Clausel and Foy were 
near at hand Joseph might accept a battle with 
some chances of success, — at least might make the 
British General pay dear for a victory. But the 
miserable arrangements which from first to last were 
made by the French commanders in this campaign 
were continued up to the latest moment. The ac- 
cumulation of impedimenta which, in the event of a 
reverse, would entangle and encumber a retiring 
army, were collected, for the most part, in and 
near Vitoria ; a fraction only was sent forward and 



Vitoria 207 

away ; and this required an escort of two thousand 
or three thousand men, to this extent weakening 
the principal force. It was imperative to summon 
Clausel and Foy to the field, and possibly they 
might have accomplished this had the orders been 
transmitted by armed bodies of men ; but the 
task was committed to guides and peasants, who 
ought never to have been entrusted with such a mis- 
sion. Above all it was, of course, essential to recon- 
noitre the ground and to place the army upon good 
positions ; the whole of the 20th might have been 
employed for this purpose, but nothing of the kind 
was done or even attempted. No doubt Jourdan 
was ill and could not mount a horse ; but there were 
excellent officers in the French army ; that they 
neglected this duty it is to be greatly feared was due 
to their characteristic disputes and jealousies. As 
the result, the morning of the 21st of June found 
the French army dispersed and scattered, in a word, 
unprepared to encounter a well-directed attack. 
The right wing, about half of the Army of Portugal, 
under Reille, was, so to speak, in the air ; it was be- 
yond the Zadorra and held two of its bridges. The 
centre and left, led by D'Erlon and Gazan, were at 
a distance of six or seven miles from Reille, and 
were separated by the Zadorra from that General; 
and of the seven bridges on the river, not one was 
broken, a mistake exceedingly difficult to explain. 
The position of the French army, in fact, was such 
that defeat at one point would lead to defeat in 
all. 

Joseph and his chief of the staff had hoped that they 



208 Wellington 

would be given the 21st of June to place their army 
in a position to fight, and to get ready for the battle 
now manifestly at hand. They reckoned, however, 
without their host ; Wellington was upon them on 
the morning of that day, a day of disgrace for the 
French commanders-in-chief, but not for their brave, 
if unfortunate, troops. The British General disposed 
of some 80,000 men, 20,000 of these perhaps being, 
however, Spaniards ; little more than 60,000 were 
actually engaged. The French must have been 
57,000 or 58,000 strong, all good soldiers of a single 
race ; had they been directed with ordinary fore- 
thought and care, they might possibly have kept Wel- 
lington at bay, certainly have rallied Clausel and Foy 
and made good their retreat. But everything went 
wrong with them on this fatal occasion : what ought 
to have been at least a hard-fought battle ended in a 
complete and shameful disaster. The attack began 
by a movement of the Spaniards against the French 
left; the assailants fell on their enemy advancing 
through the defiles of Puebla, but Gazan success- 
fully maintained his ground, though he is said to 
have been wanting in energy and resource. Ere- 
long, however, Hill, crossing the Zadorra on intact 
bridges, came to the aid of the Spaniards with a con- 
siderable force, and gradually bore back the divi- 
sions of Gazan ; and Wellington, in command of the 
British centre, having also easily got over the river, 
attacked D'Erlon with largely superior numbers. 
The two French generals endeavoured to make a 
stand on an eminence, which gave them a point of 
vantage, but they were slowly driven back towards 



Vitoria 209 

Vitoria, though their troops fought with the most 
determined courage. Reille, meanwhile, had been 
fiercely assailed by Graham ; but he defended his 
position with resolution and skill ; the bridges he 
held were taken and retaken ; the fight raged long 
and furiously, without any marked effect. But the 
defeat of Gazan and D'Erlon compelled Reille to 
retreat ; he was necessarily involved in the fate of 
his colleagues, and, isolated as he was, was exposed 
to a crushing disaster ; he drew his brave soldiers 
across the Zadorra, and kept the road to Pampeluna 
open, a movement that may have saved the French 
army from complete destruction. The Army of 
Portugal and its chief retrieved the honour of France 
on this calamitous day. 

While Reille had been playing this distinguished 
part, the rest of the French army was being forced 
back through the passes leading into the plain of 
Vitoria. The defence was for a time stubborn ; 
positions were held to the last moment ; clouds of 
skirmishers were thrown out to cover the retreat ; 
the fire of the artillery was well sustained and in- 
tense. But Gazan and D'Erlon were overmatched ; 
nothing could withstand the irresistible British on- 
set ; Wellington advanced upon a flood tide of vic- 
tory. The last stand was made on heights in front 
of Vitoria ; these were carried after a brave resist- 
ance ; the allied troops had soon taken possession of 
the town, driving before them enemies now com- 
pletely beaten. A terrible spectacle then was seen, 
a warning to military chiefs who neglect their duty. 
The immense incumbrances of the defeated army 



2 1 o Wellington 



a 



spread all round ; guns, trains, material of war of 
every kind retarded the flight of the disordered 
masses; the French were meshed, so to speak, in 
toils of their own making. Panic fell on the host 
already breaking up ; the terrified artillerymen aban- 
doned their pieces, the infantry and cavalry, mingled 
together, sped onwards in precipitate rout. The 
spoil taken by the victors was prodigious ; out of 
one hundred and fifty guns the French carried off 
but two; the treasure-chest of Joseph and the plun- 
der of a devastated kingdom were speedily captured. 
Jourdan lost his staff, and the King his papers. 
Vitoria and the surrounding plain was covered with 
swarms of non-combatants, fine ladies and gentle- 
men, camp-followers, and a multitude of the de- 
graded of their sex. The great road to Bayonne 
had been seized by Wellington ; Joseph, with the 
remains of his army, was very fortunate in escaping 
along the road to Pampeluna, from whence he got 
through the Pyrenees passes. Meanwhile, Foy and 
Clausel had not joined the King, and for some time 
were in the gravest danger. Foy, however, suc- 
ceeded in crossing the frontier ; Clausel was nearly 
caught by the enemy in pursuit, but ultimately made 
good his way into France through the pass of Jaca, 
having thought of marching on Saragossa and rally- 
ing Suchet. The French armies, which a few weeks 
before had been assembled around Madrid, and which, 
had they been rationally led, would have tasked 
Wellington's powers to the utmost, had been driven 
out of Spain in dishonourable rout. Of Vitoria, in- 
deed, Napier has truly written : " Never was an army 



Vitoria 2 1 1 

more hardly used by a commander, and never was a 
victory more complete." ' 

Napoleon was not unnaturally incensed at the ruin 
which had befallen his arms in Spain, and at the fla- 
grant misconduct which had led to Vitoria. " It is 
time to have done with imbeciles," he angrily wrote ; 
he deprived Joseph of his command, and made him a 
prisoner in all but the name ; he sent off Soult, " the 
only military head in Spain," to try to repair disas- 
ters beyond remedy. The Peninsula had now been 
set free from its French invaders, except where 
Suchet was isolated in the east, and a few garrisons 
held fortresses on the verge of the Pyrenees. The 
mighty efforts which the Emperor had made to 
achieve what he thought would be an easy conquest 
had failed after a struggle of five years ; the armies 
which had entered Lisbon, Madrid, and Seville had 
been defeated and at last disgraced ; Salamanca and 
Vitoria had followed Baylen ; the power of the Em- 
pire had been sapped and its renown marred ; the 
Peninsula had been well-nigh as fatal as Russia. 
This succession of reverses had been partly due to 
the energy of the ubiquitous Spanish rising, even to 
the efforts of the Spanish armies in the field ; it was 
largely due to the faulty operations of the French, 
and to the jealousy and the disputes of their chiefs, 
nay, to the mistakes made by Napoleon himself, in 
attempting to direct war from a distance, conduct cer- 
tain to lead to defeat and disaster, which strategic 
genius can in no sense justify. But beyond question 
a principal cause had been the capacity and the 

1 History of the Peninsular War, iii., 206, Routledge Edition. 



2 1 2 Wellington 

profound insight of the British commander, who had 
from the first seen how the invaders of the Peninsula 
could be withstood with success, and had marked the 
vulnerable heel of the Imperial Achilles; who, un- 
dismayed by the colossal forces of the Lord of the 
Continent, had resolutely stood on the verge of Por- 
tugal, and had stemmed the torrent of French con- 
quest ; who had gradually formed an invincible 
army, composed though it was of different races ; 
who in military and civil affairs had shown the great- 
est wisdom ; who with admirable perseverance and 
skill had defeated his adversaries over and over 
again; and who, finally, had in a magnificent passage 
of war driven an army hardly inferior in real strength 
to his own from the frontier of Portugal across the 
Pyrenees. Turning to the special events of 1813 in 
Spain, their most striking feature is the weakness 
and want of judgment seen in the conduct of the 
leaders of the French army; we are here reminded' 
of the Soubises and Cleymonts of the Seven Years' 
War. No doubt Napoleon may have been in fault 
in his direction of the Army of Portugal, in the first 
instance, though this is by no means certain ; but 
this cannot excuse the miserable retreat to Vitoria, 
and the enormous mistakes made before the battle. 
Yet these considerations do not in the slightest de- 
gree lessen the admiration that is justly due to the 
grand plan of operations formed by Wellington, and 
carried out to the end with complete success. If 
once or twice he possibly might have done more, if he 
was characteristically cautious rather than daring, the 
preparations he made for the campaign, his march to 



Vitoria 2 1 3 

the Esla and the Douro, and the movements by 
which he forced his enemy to fight at Vitoria, and 
struck him down in a decisive battle, rank high 
among the fine operations of war. 

Vitoria and the expulsion of the invaders from 
Spain confirmed the Allies in a purpose still not per- 
haps fixed ; the weight of Wellington in the balance 
of Fortune was great. The interview between Napo- 
leon and Metternich, in which the terms of Austria 
were treated with scorn, had been held before the in- 
telligence had arrived of the ruin in the Peninsula of 
the Emperor's power ; but Austria had soon openly 
thrown in her lot with Prussia and the Czar ; the Co- 
alition thenceforward had probably resolved on war ; 
it would hardly have made the peace which had been 
offered before. The Congress of Prague was a mere 
phantom. The Allies made preparations on a gigan- 
tic scale ; they had nearly 700,000 men under arms; 
the League was more formidable than any which 
France had encountered from the days of Louis 
XIV. to the existing time. The vassals, too, of the 
Confederation of the Rhine, though they sent their 
contingents to their still-dreaded lord, knew that 
their own subjects were rising against him ; new 
and strange enemies were crossing Napoleon's path : 
Moreau and Bernadotte had appeared in the allied 
camp ; Murat, infirm of purpose, was thinking, per- 
haps, of treason. And not only the material, but 
the moral forces, which tell with such potent effect in 
war, were being thrown into the scale against France 
and the Emperor. The resolve of great races, held 
down but not subdued, to throw off the detested 



2 1 4 Wellington 

yoke of a conqueror, the intense desire to avenge the 
wrongs of years, now stirring all the Teutonic peo- 
ples, sustained the cause of the League in Europe. 
On the opposite side was a great military genius, 
indeed, and the pride and the energy of a famous na- 
tion, but of a nation tired of despotic rule and well- 
nigh exhausted. The ultimate result of such a con- 
flict could be hardly doubtful ; but Napoleon cared 
little for these things ; he had greatly increased and 
strengthened his immature army; he was at the head 
of half a million of men; he held the fortresses of 
Germany from the Rhine to the Vistula. Astride on 
the Elbe from the Bohemian hills to Hamburg, as 
in former years he had been astride on the Adige, 
he was confident that he could defy his enemies. A 
gleam of victory was to shine on his arms ; but the 
contest of 1813 was to end at Leipzig. 




CHAPTER VIII 

FROM THE PYRENEES TO THE GARONNE 

Wellington made a Field Marshal and Duque di Vitoria — Soult reor- 
ganises the French army — Battles of the Pyrenees — Siege of 
San Sebastian — Fall of the place — The Campaign of 1813 in 
Germany — Complete defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig — The French 
armies driven across the Rhine — Wellington crosses the Bidas- 
soa — Soult fortifies his lines on the Nivelle — The lines forced— 
Soult had previously called on Suchet to support him — Soult at 
Bayonne — His formidable position — Wellington crosses the Nive 
— Danger of this operation — The allied army divided on the 
river — Soult concentrates his forces and attacks it — Indecisive 
battles of the 10th and 13th of December — Hostilities in the 
field resumed in February, 1814 — Difficulties of Soult and Wel- 
lington — Wellington attacks Soult — Passage of the Adour — 
Battle of Orthes — Retreat of Soult to Toulouse — Rising against 
Napoleon at Bordeaux — Pursuit of Wellington — Fall of Napo- 
leon — Battle of Toulouse — End of the War. 

FOR his triumph at Vitoria Wellington re- 
ceived the staff of a Field Marshal of Eng- 
land, an honour that had been in abeyance 
for nearly half a century. The Spanish Govern- 
ment, too, made him Duque di Vitoria ; the re- 
nown of his achievements had become so great 
that it was seriously proposed to place him at the 
head of the allied armies about to contend with 

215 



2 1 6 Wellington 

Napoleon on the Elbe. He had driven Joseph in 
rout out of Spain ; it has been said that he might 
have crossed the Pyrenees and destroyed the shat- 
tered wrecks of the French armies before they could 
be ready again to appear in the field. This view, 
however, is no doubt erroneous, even if, as a rule, he 
was slow in following up success. The allied army 
had lost more than 5000-men at Vitoria ; in fact, the 
loss of the enemy in killed and wounded had not 
been much greater ; and the country swarmed with 
thousands of disbanded troops, gorged with the plun- 
der strewn over the scene of the battle, and rioting in 
all kinds of excess. Wellington complained of this 
conduct in indignant language, exaggerated, perhaps, 
as after the retreat from Burgos 1 ; but time was re- 
quired to restore discipline ; the army was hardly 
able to move. Besides, he could not, at this junc- 
ture, have loosed his hold on Spain and begun what 
would have been a premature invasion of France. 
The fortress of San Sebastian on the coast, where the 
frontiers of France and Spain approach each other 
from the west, was still held by a French garrison ; 
it was absolutely necessary to reduce this before the 
Bidassoa, the river on the border, could be passed. 
The fortress, too, of Pampeluna, in Navarre, was still 
in the hands of the enemy ; it was connected with 

1 Selection, p. 706 : "I am quite convinced that we have now 
out of our ranks double the amount of our loss in battle, and that we 
have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have. . . . This 
is the consequence of the state of discipline of the British Army." 
Wellington doubtless was too severe; but a British army has perhaps 
always shown a tendency to get out of hand, whether in victory or 
in defeat. 



J 



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<Z 



I «< 



\ 



Cl, 



C/J 



£ 




,/ 







From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 2 1 7 

San Sebastian by a main road along the Spanish 
verge of the Pyrenees ; this could not be left as a 
menace on Wellington's flank, should he attempt 
to force the Pyrenean barrier. But the principal ob- 
stacle to the suggested movement was the presence 
of Suchet in the eastern provinces of Spain, dispos- 
ing of a well-organised and still powerful army. The 
Marshal, no doubt, had been held in check by the 
expedition which had landed from Sicily and by 
the guerrillas in Aragon and Catalonia ; but Murray, 
the officer who had failed on the Douro, had been 
forced to raise the siege of Tarragona, and was un- 
able to leave the line of the coast ; his operations had 
been of little use to the British arms. At this very 
time Suchet might, not improbably, have marched 
on Saragossa, nay, have attacked Wellington ' ; in 
any case, as long as he remained in the east of Spain 
he gravely threatened Wellington's right flank and 
rear. This circumstance alone forbade a march across 
the Pyrenees ; the British General clearly perceived 
this, and continued to fear what Suchet might do, 
though the Marshal, in the events that followed, 
never ventured to make an offensive movement. 

Meantime, Soult, invested with plenary powers, — 
"Lieutenant-General of the Emperor" was his im- 
posing title, — had been reorganising and restoring 
the French armies, which had fled through the Pyr- 
enees after Vitoria. He had been joined by Clausel 
and Foy ; he had obtained a small reinforcement of 



1 Napier disliked Suchet, for he would not co-operate with Napier's 
friend, Soult. But the historian is right, here. — History of the Pen- 
insular War, iii., 230. 



2 1 8 Wellington 

conscripts ; he had replaced from Bayonne the artil- 
lery lost in the battle ; he disposed erelong of nearly 
78,000 men ; he had united his forces into a single 
army under three subordinates, D'Erlon, Reille, and 
Clausel. In about a month he was ready to take the 
field ; he was to engage in a protracted contest with 
Wellington, of which the issue was long doubtful, 
and in which, though he was at last worsted, he gave 
proof of no ordinary powers. A few words must be 
said as regards this eminent soldier. Soult had a 
true eye to the great combinations of war ; as a 
strategist he was far-seeing and profound ; without 
the inspiration of Napoleon, he was one of the best 
of the master's disciples. He had also much te- 
nacity and firmness of purpose ; he could stubbornly 
play to the last a losing game in war ; he could pre- 
pare and array an army with remarkable skill. But 
he did not possess the divine gift of genius ; as a 
tactician in battle he does not rank high ; as a com- 
mander we see two distinct faults in him : in action 
he was often backward and remiss ; he was apt to fail 
in carrying out effectively well-conceived designs. 
Napoleon and Wellington concurred in their estimate 
of Soult : " he was excellent in council," the Em- 
peror said, "but in execution feeble" 1 ; "he knew 
how to place his troops in the field," was his adver- 
sary's remark, " but he did not know how to make 
the best use of them." The career of the Marshal in 
Spain had not been brilliant ; it had been marked by 
his characteristic faults ; but he had distinguished 
himself on many fields of fame ; his struggle with 
1 Gourgaud, ii., 424. 




SIR GEORGE MURRAY. 
(After the painting by H. W. Pickersgill.) 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 219 

Wellington was to add to his renown as a warrior, 
though he had not the tactical genius of the British 
commander, nor yet his admirable insight and readi- 
ness in the actual shock of battle. It must, how- 
ever, be said, in justice to Soult, that his antagonist 
was usually superior in force, and commanded an 
army excelling in every quality that makes a truly 
formidable instrument of war. The British soldiery 
— and the Portuguese were now nearly their equals — 
always terrible in a trial of strength for their murder- 
ous rire and their undaunted steadiness — this was 
the reason that the column could not stand before 
the line — had by this time got rid of most of the en- 
cumbrances of the past ; they were not inferior to 
their foes in manoeuvring skill ' ; they had a great 
leader and excellent lesser chiefs ; above all, a series 
of victories had given them that moral power, worth, 
it has been truly said, " three times more than mere 
physical force." " The Peninsular army," in Wel- 
lington's language, " could now go anywhere and do 
anything"; for its size it was unquestionably the 
best of European armies. The French soldiery, on 
the other hand, if brave as their race, and with its 
aptitude for war, were depressed by the memories of 
incessant defeats ; they were at heart afraid of their 
enemies, and spellbound by them ; they could still 
fight well, but seldom could make a resolute stand ; 
they had become to a certain extent demoralised, 
and this was especially the case with their officers. 

1 "L'armee anglais -portugaise," Napoleon has remarked {Com., 
xxxii., 369), " etait devenue aussi manoauvriere que l'armee fran- 
caise." 



2 20 Wellington 



'&' 



They were, in a word, no longer the men of Jena and 
Austerlitz, nay, of Busaco and Fuentes d'Onoro. 
It should be added that the army of Soult con- 
tained bad foreign elements in its ranks, and was, 
by degrees, crowded with comparatively worthless 
conscripts. 

Having made a spirited and stirring address to his 
troops, in which their late chiefs were severely con- 
demned, Soult resolved to assume a daring offensive. 
His position gave him a great strategic advantage. 
The French army extended along the northern 
verge of the Pyrenees ; it had the command of good 
lateral roads, connecting the passes into the range 
and facilitating movements in that direction ; it held 
the fortress of St. Jean Pied de Port, which screened 
its operations to a certain extent. The army of 
Wellington, on the other hand, though it controlled 
the main road from San Sebastian to Pampeluna, 
had very inferior lateral roads, spreading, as it was, 
on the southern edge of the mountains ; this made 
the communication between its separate parts dif- 
ficult, and exposed these to a concentrated attack 
in force. 1 Wellington, moreover, though superior 
to Soult in numbers — he was at the head of perhaps 
100,000 men — had blockaded Pampeluna, at one ex- 
tremity of his line, and was laying siege, on the other, 
to San Sebastian ; the double operation, which he 
acknowledged was a mistake, — he may have under- 
rated the organising power of his foe, — engaged a 
very considerable part of his army ; and his right 
wing was certainly too weak, and lay open to a bold 

1 See Selection, p. 720. 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 221 

and resolute stroke. Soult availed himself with re- 
markable skill of the favourable situation this pre- 
sented to him. Leaving only small detachments in 
his rear, he massed together the forces of Reille and 
Clausel, from 35,000 to 40,000 strong, and moving 
rapidly through the famous pass of Roncesvalles, 
he advanced against Wellington's feeble right, while 
D'Erlon, at the head of nearly 20,000 men, pushed 
onward through the pass of Maya against the allied 
centre. All went auspiciously with the Marshal at 
first; on the 25th of July he bore back with 30,000 
men the brigades opposed to him not 10,000 strong; 
D'Erlon thrust aside or defeated part of the forces of 
Hill, inflicting a loss that was severely felt. But at 
this point the shortcomings of Soult were seen; he 
halted on the 26th and made no use of his success ; 
he almost halted again on the 27th, awaiting, prob- 
ably, the approach of D'Erlon, whose movements 
had been unaccountably slow. 1 These hesitations 
gave Wellington just sufficient time to reinforce his 
gravely imperilled wing, though he remained consid- 
erably inferior in force ; he was attacked on the 28th 
by his adversary at Sorauren, almost within sight of 
Pampeluna; but the advantage gained by the Mar- 
shal had been well-nigh lost. The French fell on 
with determined valour, but they had to assail and 
carry a strong position ; the result was what had 

1 1 cannot credit the statement of Napier that Soult's inaction on 
the 27th was caused by his having heard shouts announcing the pre- 
sence of Wellington. In a conversation at St. Helena, related by 
Gourgaud, Napoleon declared that " Soult ought to have over- 
whelmed Wellington on the 25th." This criticism is exaggerated, 
but has some truth in it.— Gourgaud, ii., 416. 



222 Wellington 



a ■ 



been seen at Busaco ; after hours of " bludgeon 
work," as was Wellington's phrase, the army of 
Soult, practically beaten, gave up the contest. 

On the 29th of July not a shot was fired ; the hos- 
tile armies maintained the ground they held, but 
Wellington's right had been much strengthened ; 
D'Erlon, with eighteen thousand men, had at last 
come into line with his chief. Soult had still a su- 
periority of force ; but he had learned a lesson from 
the battle of the 28th, which his lieutenants had 
urged him not to fight ; he did not venture upon 
another engagement ; he formed a new combination 
worthy of a very able strategist. Hill, defeated on 
the 25th, was drawing near Wellington ; but he was 
isolated and still a long way off ; Soult resolved to 
fall on him, and to sweep him out of his path, while 
Wellington, still at Sorauren, was to be held in 
check. Should Hill be overwhelmed, as there was 
reason to expect, the Marshal might destroy some of 
his enemies along the hills and, above all, might be 
able to reach the main road from Pampeluna to San 
Sebastian, to advance by it and to raise the siege of 
that fortress. Taking, therefore, D'Erlon and some 
of his own troops with him, and leaving Reille and 
Clausel with the mass of the army, before Welling- 
ton, Soult attacked Hill on the 30th with very su- 
perior forces ; he succeeded in turning the British 
General's left, and all but reached his great object, 
the main road, which might become an avenue to 
no ordinary success. But Hill made a tenacious de- 
fence, disputing every inch of the ground ; he fell 
back to another position ; the progress of the Mar- 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 223 

shal was thus arrested ; meanwhile Wellington had 
struck a terrible stroke, which at once frustrated all 
his opponent's projects. Relying on his tactical 
power and on the ascendency his troops had gained, 
the British chief attacked Reille and Clausel on the 
30th ; he endeavoured to turn both their flanks, 
and at the same time he assailed their front ; a point 
of vantage was won on the extreme French right ; 
this was the prelude to complete success. In this 
second battle of Sorauren, as it has been called, 
Soulc's men did not give proof of their wonted cour- 
age ; they felt the effects of the reverse of two 
days before ; they gave way along the whole line ; 
the division of Foy was cut off from the beaten 
army. This sudden disaster placed the Marshal in 
the gravest danger ; he was exposed to a twofold 
attack by Wellington and Hill ; but he ably extri- 
cated himself, if with enormous loss. Rallying his 
shattered divisions as best he could, he threaded the 
pass of Dona Maria on his right, and thence he 
made good his retreat to the frontier, having only 
once attempted to run the risk of a stand. He had 
certainly been hardly treated by Fortune ; he had 
no reason to suppose that his lieutenants would be 
easily beaten ; they were in considerable force and 
held a strong position. But Soult's operations from 
first to last revealed his merits and defects in war; 
he could plan well, but in carrying out his plans was 
not good ; this was most perilous when in the pre- 
sence of such a man as Wellington. D'Erlon, too, 
was greatly to blame for his delays; had he pushed 
forward on the 26th and the 27th, the issue of the 



224 Wellington 

conflict might have been very different. As regards 
the British commander, he made a strategic mistake 
in attacking two fortresses at the same time, and in 
leaving his right well-nigh uncovered ; it was well he 
had not Napoleon before him ; as it was, his position 
was made difficult in the extreme. But his counter- 
stroke on the 30th was in his best manner, if un- 
doubtedly he owed much to his invincible troops. 
The losses of Soult in this interesting passage of 
arms was from twelve thousand to thirteen thou- 
sand men, those of Wellington less than eight 
thousand, and victory had once more abandoned the 
eagles. 

After the battles of the Pyrenees, as they have 
been named, Soult took a strong position in front of 
Bayonne, holding the range of hills along the Ni- 
velle, a stream parallel to the Nive and the Adour, 
but keeping possession of St. Jean Pied de Port. 
His adversary, taught by recent experience, en- 
trenched the passes leading into the mountain range 
and placed his army in a better situation for defence; 
there were no operations in the field for some weeks. 
The British commander now turned to the siege of 
San Sebastian, which had been for some time an ob- 
ject of attack ; as has been said, it was essential to 
master the place before the borders of France could 
be crossed. San Sebastian was not a great strong- 
hold in itself, but its position and the peculiarities 
of the ground made it very difficult to besiege and 
reduce ; and it was defended by an able command- 
ant and a devoted garrison. The fortress stands on 
an isthmus projecting into the Bay of Biscay ; it is 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne. 225 

covered to the north by a river called the Urumcea, 
and to the south by a creek, an inlet of the Bay ; on 
the west it is commanded by a steep hill, crowned 
at this time by an old castle ; the only easy approach 
to it is by a rising ground from the east. The for- 
tifications were not imposing ,• but they comprised a 
succession of outer and inner works which formed a 
kind of fourfold barrier ; the hill and the castle were 
points of vantage ; an enemy advancing to assault 
the place would be dangerously exposed to the gar- 
rison's efforts. Two of the outworks were carried on 
the 17th of July; but an assault on the breaches 
which had been made on the northern front was 
successfully repulsed on the 25th, the day when 
Soult forced the Pyrenean passes. The siege was 
now suspended for more than three weeks, for a 
sufficient battering train had not arrived from Eng- 
land ; Graham, who commanded the besieging force, 
though at the head of ten thousand men, not to 
refer to a covering army, was compelled to remain 
well-nigh wholly inactive. This respite gave the de- 
fenders — they were less than three thousand strong 
— an opportunity turned to the best advantage by 
their skilful chief, Rey ; some reinforcements came 
in from the Bay, not intercepted by the British 
cruisers ; the breaches were re-trenched and made 
difficult to force ; batteries were constructed at dif- 
ferent points ; works, where injured, were carefully 
repaired ; a great mine was laid along the spaces, 
where the besiegers, it was foreseen, would make 
the assault ; San Sebastian, in a word, was immensely 
strengthened. The battering train had reached its 



226 Wellingto7i 

destination on the 19th of August ; for twelve days 
a tempest of shot and shell, directed from sand-hills, 
called the Chofres, beyond the Urumcea, ravaged the 
place with its stern work of destruction. But the 
defences of San Sebastian were by no means ruined ; 
redoubts, a hornwork, and batteries remained in- 
tact ; a general assault was ordered for the 31st ; but 
the storming columns advanced between the river 
and the walls, exposing their flank to the fire of the 
enemy. They were struck down in hundreds before 
the breaches were attained : had not the great mine 
been exploded at the wrong moment the assault, it 
is believed, would have failed. The stormers, how- 
ever, were supported by a body of Portuguese, who 
crossed the Urumcea at the very nick of time ; the 
breaches were at last carried, after a desperate 
struggle ; the result was partly due to a mere acci- 
dent. The castle on the hill held out for some days; 
it was surrendered on the 9th of September ; San 
Sebastian had been defended for nearly ten weeks. 
As in the case of other assaulted places in that age, 
the excesses of the victors were, unhappily, great. 

Soult made an effort to relieve San Sebastian ; he 
crossed the Bidassoa, but not in force ; the attempt 
was tentative, and came to nothing. The belliger- 
ent armies returned to their former positions along 
either side of the Pyrenees to the west ; no import- 
ant movements were made for a month. Here Wel- 
lington's inaction has again been censured ; but 
sound military reasons explain his conduct. He had 
to form a new base before he invaded France, and to 
procure supplies on the seaboard of Biscay ; his ad- 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 227 

vance from Portugal had been unexpectedly rapid ; 
he was in need of requirements of all kinds for his 
troops. Besides, faction at Lisbon had raised its 
head against him ; the Spanish Government had 
been incensed by exaggerated reports as to the ex- 
cesses of his men ; it indulged in angry and noisy 
threats ; it was weakened by intestine discord. 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the issue of 
the contest in Germany was still doubtful ; Napoleon 
held his commanding position on the Elbe. Wel- 
lington well knew what the great warrior was ; he 
had little faith in the operations of his foes. Should 
the Emperor win a decisive battle on the plains of 
Saxony, he would be able to reinforce his Spanish 
armies; he retained many of the fortresses in the 
East ; Soult and Suchet, if largely strengthened, 
might make it go hard with the British commander. 
And even if no great additions were made to their 
forces, the position of Suchet in the east of Spain 
was a dangerous menace, and Pampeluna had not 
yet fallen. Lord William Bentinck had superseded 
Murray ; but his operations and those of the Spanish 
armies in Aragon and Catalonia, were of little use, 
he had been defeated at Ordal, beyond the lower 
Ebro. Suchet was superior in real strength in the 
eastern provinces ; he had advanced into Catalonia 
towards the frontier, leaving" garrisons in several fort- 
resses in his rear ; if he was now far distant from 
Wellington's flank, it was possible for him to join 
hands with Soult, — this very movement we shall 
see was proposed ; the united forces of -the two 
marshals would, in that event, be formidable in the 



228 Wellington 

extreme. Wellington, therefore, wished to dispose 
of Suchet before venturing into France : he even 
contemplated operations against the Marshal ; from 
a military point of view he was fully justified. 

While Wellington and Soult were thus watching 
each other, ruin was befalling Napoleon and his 
arms in Germany. When the Emperor rejected the 
terms of the Allies, which would have left him with 
hardly diminished power, he was confident that he 
would overwhelm his enemies, and be once more the 
undisputed Lord of the Continent. But he had 
wholly underrated the strength of the material and 
moral forces arrayed against him : he disposed, no 
doubt, of half a million of men ; but his army was 
filled with rude levies and discontented foreigners; 
the Allies had 700,000 men in their ranks ; the Prus- 
sian army was 150,000 strong, not 40,000, as he had 
supposed; all Germany from the Niemen to the Rhine 
was burning to rush to arms, and to avenge itself on 
its French oppressors. And if his position on the 
Elbe was imposing, it was weaker than his position 
on the Adige in 1796-7; the long line of the great 
river could be more easily turned, his communica- 
tions with France were insecure, regard being had to 
the German rising. Napoleon, too, from his centre 
on the Elbe, had thrown out secondary armies in 
many directions, in order partly to strike down 
Prussia, which he rightly judged was his bitterest 
enemy, and partly to stretch a hand to the large gar- 
risons he still had on the Oder and the Vistula : this 
greatly weakened his principal army and exposed 
his lieutenants to dangerous attack. He had, in a 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 229 

word, aimed at and grasped too much : scientific and 
grand as his strategy was, it had made the situation 
critical for him : had he fallen back to the Rhine in 
1813 he could have successfully defied the Coalition's 
efforts. Genius in war, nevertheless, for a time tri- 
umphed : the Emperor won a great battle at Dres- 
den ; and but for the disaster of Vandamme at 
Culm, the trembling scales of fortune might have in- 
clined towards France. But the Allies, acting on a 
preconcerted plan, the credit of which belongs to 
Moreau, and avoiding the strokes of the adversary 
they feared, fell on his secondary armies one after 
the other : Macdonald was defeated on the Katz- 
bach ; Oudinot met the same fate within sight of 
Berlin ; Ney was routed with terrible effect at Den- 
newitz ; the losses of the Emperor were enormous ; 
he was compelled to change the plan of his cam- 
paign. He marched down the Elbe hoping to seize 
Berlin, and to crush Prussia in a decisive trial of 
strength ; but Bliicher had successfully crossed the 
river ; Schwartzenberg was on the march to join 
Bliicher ; Bavaria suddenly declared for the Allies ; 
Jerome's kingdom of Westphalia disappeared ; 
Napoleon had no other choice but to abandon his 
design. He retreated on Leipzig, where the greatly 
superior forces of the League of Europe were clos- 
ing around him ; a great battle of two days followed : 
on the first the advantage remained with the French ; 
on the second they were distinctly worsted, partly 
owing to the defection of the Saxon contingent. 
The defeated army was now driven out of Leipzig ; 
the destruction of a bridge on the Elster caused the 



230 Wellington 

loss of many thousands of men ; the retreat was 
marked by scenes of horror and despair, like those 
which had attended the retreat from Moscow. A 
gleam shone on the Emperor's arms, as his fugitive 
host toiled onwards to the Main : the Bavarian, 
Wrede, was defeated at Hanau, but this was the 
flicker of the expiring lamp. The Grand Army which 
a few weeks before had seemed to defy attack on 
the Elbe had been destroyed as a military force ; a 
mere wreck only sought refuge behind the Rhine: 
the French garrisons in Germany had been lost to 
their country. 

At the instance of the Allies and of the British 
Ministry, Wellington had entered France a few days 
before Leipzig. His military object was to seize 
Fuentarabia, as a base of supplies ; he was still not 
inclined to invade the country, in face of the diffi- 
culties to which he remained exposed. His opera- 
tions were successful and brilliant : he deceived his 
adversary as to the true point of attack, as he had 
deceived him before upon the Douro ; he crossed the 
Bidassoa by fords near its mouth, and drove back 
Soult's right with largely superior numbers. Nearly 
at the same time he carried a height called the Great 
Rhune, just outside the main positions of the French ; 
the resistance was for some hours stern, but the 
British General turned the mountain by the left, and 
had erelong compelled the enemy to retreat. But 
as yet he had only reached the edge of the ground 
of vantage held by Soult, a range of eminences, 
we have seen, along the Nivelle, before the import- 
ant fortress of Bayonne. The Marshal had fortified 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 231 

this position with skill and care ; it bristled with re- 
doubts and entrenchments ; a double series of lines 
protected the heights ; these have been compared 
to the famous lines of Torres Vedras. But there 
was an essential distinction between the two cases: 
Soult's lines were hastily constructed in face of the 
enemy ; he commanded a brave, but a defeated 
army ; and Wellington, unlike Massena, was victori- 
ous and had a superiority of force. The Marshal 
endeavoured to find other means to defend the 
menaced territory of France, nay, to place his 
antagonist in real straits ; he formed a combination 
worthy of his strategic powers. Suchet was in Cata- 
lonia and could dispose of thirty thousand men, 
veteran soldiers of an excellent quality ; Soult en- 
treated him to cross the frontier, to advance through 
Roussillon, and to join hands with him around 
Tarbes and Pau ; the united armies, fully ninety 
thousand strong, would then break into Spain through 
the pass of Jaca, and fall on the flank and rear of 
Wellington ; should they defeat the British chief in 
a great battle, they would perhaps drive him back 
as far as the Douro. It was a fine project, and it 
proves how Wellington was right in being appre- 
hensive as to the position of Suchet, though it may 
be doubted if the two French armies could have 
made good their way, with their artillery, through the 
narrow pass of Jaca, especially as the winter was at 
hand. But as Suchet would not operate by himself 
against Wellington, he now refused to accede to 
Soult's counsels ; a real opportunity may have been 
lost ; the French commanders, as so often had been 



232 Wellington 

the case before, did not agree with each other and 
would not act in concert. 1 

Pampeluna had fallen on the 31st of October; a 
danger on Wellington's right flank had thus been 
removed. Leipzig had, by this time, closed the cam- 
paign in Germany ; the British chief was again urged 
to invade France. For the reasons, however, already 
given, he was still indisposed to an operation of this 
kind ; the weather, too, had been exceedingly bad, 
and the Spaniards in his camp had hardly any sup- 
plies. He resolved, in the first days of November, 
to storm Soult's fortified lines ; the result, if partly 
due to other not unimportant causes, was a fine 
example of his admirable coup d'ceil, and of his re- 
markable tactical power, but also of his adversary's 
defects on a field of battle. The lines to be assailed 
extended on a front from Ainhoue on the French 
left to the right on the sea ; they formed, we have 
seen, a strong twofold barrier ; they were held by 
D'Erlon, Clausel, and Reille, with probably 50,000 
men. But Foy stood, on the far left, with a large 
detachment, intended to threaten an offensive move- 
ment ; in the events that followed he was almost out 
of the conflict. Wellington's army was divided into 
three main bodies, Hill on the right, Beresford hold- 
ing the centre — that General had been called up from 
Portugal ; Sir John Hope was in command on the 

1 Soult, before this time, had urged Suchet to attack or to threaten 
Wellington's right flank. The plan of a combined operation is 
fully explained in Napier's Peninsular War, Hi. , 310-314. Napier, 
however, is always on the side of Soult when he refers to another 
French colleague. Good judges have thought Soult's plan very 
hazardous, nay, impracticable. 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 233 

left ; it numbered some 74,000 men. Soult, reckon- 
ing Foy, had perhaps 60,000. The attack began 
on the 10th of November; a hill, called the Lesser 
Rhune, and the intervening space to the bridge of 
Amotz, upon the Nivelle, formed the vulnerable 
point in the Marshal's lines ; Wellington perceived 
this with characteristic insight ; Hill and Beresford 
were directed to master the point ; their combined 
forces, more than 40,000 strong, bore back and de- 
feated D'Erlon, who had not more than 15,000 men. 
Clausel made an obstinate defence at the centre, 
but the weakest part of his front was held by a bri- 
gade only ; this was attacked by at least 8000 men ; 
he was erelong driven from the positions he held. 
Meanwhile Foy had been kept in check by a small 
body of men, and Reille, on Soult's right, with 
25,000 troops, was paralysed by Hope with a very 
inferior force. The masterly dispositions of the 
British chief had thus brought overwhelming num- 
bers against the French left and centre ; the lines 
were carried along this space ; the first line of the 
defence was untenable and was soon abandoned. 
Soult, on the contrary, had arrayed his army badly ; 
Foy, practically, was kept out of the battle ; Reille 
was unable to turn his divisions to account ; the 
Marshal made no real attempt to improve his posi- 
tion. On the second line of the defence little resist- 
ance was made; the twofold obstacle was carried 
with comparatively little loss. The issue was mainly 
due to the ability and the resource of Wellington. 
It is fair, nevertheless, to Soult to remark that his 
soldiery were disheartened by the rout of Leipzig, 



234 Wellington 

and did not make the stand that might have been 
expected from them. 1 

Notwithstanding the delays which had been laid 
to his charge, the British General had invaded France 
many months before the Allies. Soult was much 
disconcerted by the carrying of his lines ; he appears 
to have believed that they were impregnable ; but 
he was a tenacious and determined soldier; he fell 
back on the fortress of Bayonne, and entrenched 
himself again in a strong position. Bayonne was 
only a place of the third order, but its situation 
makes it a point of vantage for defence if a com- 
mander knows how to turn the adjoining ground 
to account. It is placed on the confluence of the 
Adour and the Nive, both large rivers, especially in 
the floods of winter ; the tract around it is divided 
by the Nive, which separates it into two parts ; the 
lands in its front are scarcely practicable for troops 
in a rainy season. Having strengthened his position 
by inundations and field works, Soult arrayed his 
army before Bayonne, extending it on both sides of 
the Nive ; D'Erlon was on the left, with Foy on the 
extreme left; Clausel held the centre, Reille the 
right. The Marshal had still nearly 60,000 men, but 
some of these were Germans, and there were a num- 
ber of conscripts. Wellington placed his army nearly 
in front of Soult, but occupied only one side of the 

1 Napier's comments on this battle, History of the Peninsular 
War, iii., 340, 341, are very discriminating and just. He clearly 
points out how Wellington brought largely superior forces to the de- 
cisive points, and how Soult failed to defend them. " Against such 
a thunderbolt of war," he remarks, "there was no defence in the 
French ranks." 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 235 

Nive', Hill was on the right, Beresford in the centre, 
Hope on the left; the troops were confined to the 
space between the Nive and the coast, and held a 
somewhat narrow and contracted front. The army, 
however, nearly 100,000 strong, was very superior to 
that of the enemy. The British General would have 
quickly fallen on Soult but for unexpected difficul- 
ties that crossed his purpose. The Spaniards in his 
camp, having entered France, gave a free rein to ex- 
cesses of all kinds. Wellington had no choice but to 
make severe examples ; he actually sent the great 
body of these troops across the frontier, retaining 
only one or two divisions, and necessarily weakening 
to some extent his forces. He also dreaded a rising 
of the population around him ; he rightly described 
it as a martial race. He issued a proclamation, 
pledging himself to respect persons and property, 
and to pay for supplies ; and this had an admirable 
effect on the neighbouring peasantry, who, as a rule, 
did not stir from their homes. These wise arrange- 
ments, characteristic of a chief intolerant of license 
and stern in discipline, but essentially humane, like 
most British officers, and having their ingrained re- 
spect for order and law, contributed largely to his 
ultimate success ; but some time passed before they 
were complete. It should be added that the low- 
lands in front of Bayonne were turned into swamps 
by incessant rains ; this circumstance alone retarded 
the intended attack. 

By the first week of December Wellington had 
his arrangements made ; he resolved to cross to the 
side of the Nive he had not yet occupied. His 



236 Wellington 

object was to hem in Soult in Bayonne ; to intercept 
the supplies of his enemy, and especially to cut him 
off from St. Jean Pied de Port, and to separate him 
from the Pyrenean passes. But the attempt was to 
be made in the face of an able chief, in possession of 
a fortress and a central position, which gave him 
shorter lines on the whole scene of action : even if 
successful it would make two parts of the allied 
army, with a broad river, not easy to cross, between 
them. The movement began on the 9th of Decem- 
ber : Hope made a demonstration against Soult's 
right, and held Reille, though superior in force, in 
check : meantime, Beresford and Hill, meeting but 
little resistance, crossed the Nive at the two points 
of Ustaritz and Cambo, and established themselves, 
in force, in the positions they had won. The Mar- 
shal had, in fact, been surprised by a bold, rapid, 
and well-conceived attack ; his adversary had seized 
the northern bank of the Nive : so far, he had com- 
pletely gained his object. But Wellington's army 
was now divided on a Avide stream ; the operation, 
skilfully carried out as it was, was in the abstract, at 
least, a strategic mistake, to be justified only by the 
ascendency his troops had attained ; Soult seized the 
opportunity presented to him. Availing himself of 
the screen which his entrenchments and Bayonne 
gave him, and holding the chord of the arc on which 
his enemy stood, the French chief assembled his 
whole army on the southern bank of the Nive: he 
concentrated nearly sixty thousand against thirty 
thousand men : he attacked Wellington on the 10th 
of December. The British General, as in July, was 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 237 

in no doubtful peril ; had Soult fallen in full strength 
on the allied centre, he would have found only a 
single division in his path : he must have gained, 
possibly, a signal victory. But the Marshal, from 
some unknown reason, sent Reille with all his forces 
against Hope, that is, against the left of his foe, — 
a badly conceived, almost an eccentric movement, — 
and Reille, after a fierce struggle at a place called 
Barrouilet, was repulsed. Meanwhile the division in 
the centre had held its ground, though attacked by 
Clausel with superior numbers : but it could hardly 
have maintained its position with success, had not 
Soult unexpectedly given up the attack. Welling- 
ton, from the opposite side of the Nive, had ferried 
large detachments across the river ; these, though 
still distant, threatened Soult's left flank : Clausel 
was directed by his superior to retreat from the 
heights of Bussussary, which he had nearly won. 
Once more the faults of the French commander 
appeared ; a demonstration, for it was little more, 
made him abandon a prospect of real success : be- 
sides, he had not chosen the true point of attack, 
and had not overwhelmed his enemy's centre ; 
Reille, too, had been moved in the wrong direction. 
The French army fell back on Bayonne: the fine 
project of its chief had, in its execution, failed. 

Two German regiments, after this hard-fought 
combat, followed the example of the Saxons at Leip- 
zig, and went over to Wellington's camp. But the 
French commander was not dismayed : he knew the 
advantage of his central position : he resolved to 
seize another opportunity to attack. On the nth 



238 Wellington 

and 1 2th of December skirmishes only took place; 
but on the night of the 12th a flood in the Nive 
swept away a bridge by which the Allies had crossed ; 
Hill remained isolated on the northern bank; he 
had not more than 14,000 men in hand. Soult 
had been defiling his army through Bayonne ; 
on the 13th he fell, with 35,000 men, on Hill: the 
odds were immensely in the Marshal's favour, if 
not so decisive as might be supposed. The ad- 
vance of the French was upon a narrow front, 
and by roads made almost impassable ; Soult was 
unable to bring more than 20,000 men into ac- 
tion. The assailants, nevertheless, had much the 
better of the fight for some hours : their artil- 
lery played from a height with deadly effect; Hill's 
centre at St. Pierre was very nearly broken : two 
English colonels, afterwards disgraced, abandoned 
their positions and drew their men out of fire. Vic- 
tory seemed at last in the Marshal's grasp : he pushed 
forward part of his reserve; he prepared himself 
for a final effort ; in this instance he tried to strike 
hard, and home. But three regiments, two British, 
one Portuguese, continued to make a fierce resist- 
ance : a sudden panic fell on the advancing enemy, 
caused, it has been said, by a mistaken order to re- 
treat ; at the very crisis of the fight Soult's columns 
came to a stand, 1 and failed to make use of the ad- 
vantage they had gained. Hill was gradually rein- 



1 Napier's History of the Peninsular War, iii., 354, significantly 
remarks : " Yet the battle seemed hopeless, for Ashworth was badly 
wounded, his line was shattered to atoms and Barnes, who had not 
quitted the field for his former hurt, was shot through the body." 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 239 

forced to a certain extent : and ultimately Soult 
gave up the contest. But Hill for a time was in the 
greatest danger '; it was conspicuously made appar- 
ent, how hazardous it is to have an army divided 
upon a wide river, in front of a concentrated enemy, 
especially if he commands a fortress. 

Soult retreated into Bayonne after this indecisive 
battle; he did not venture to make another attack; 
he devoted some time to restoring his weakened 
army and to strengthening his position around the 
fortress. Wellington remained in possession of both 
banks of the Nive; he continued to carry out his 
purpose, that is, to keep his adversary within Bay- 
onne, to isolate him, to cut off his supplies, and to 
separate him from Spain, and even from the plains 
of Gascony. The Marshal eluded these operations 
with skill and resource ; he left a considerable garri- 
son in Bayonne, but he succeeded in maintaining his 
communications with the adjoining country, and he 
held his army in readiness to march to the upper 
Garonne, where he still hoped to join hands with 
Suchet, who was about to abandon Catalonia and to 
cross the frontier. Hostilities, however, were nearly 
suspended for about two months ; a winter of ex- 
treme severity prevented operations in the field, and 
the movements of the British chief had rightly been 
made to depend on the general invasion of France 

1 Napier, History of the Peninsular War, iii., 355, points this out. 
" The Allies could not, unsuccoured, have sustained a fresh assault." 
Soult, except perhaps at Orthes, was never so near victory as on this 
occasion : of his operations as a whole Napier says, iii., 356, " The 
French general's plan was conceived with genius, but the execution 
offers a great contrast to the conception." 



240 Wellington 

by the League of Europe. Meanwhile the Empire 
of Napoleon was menaced on every side with ruin ; 
Murat had abandoned his benefactor and joined the 
Allies; Holland and even Belgium were in revolt; the 
hosts of the Coalition were upon the Rhine ; France, 
exhausted by her efforts in 1813, seemed utterly un- 
able to prolong the war; a movement against her 
ruler had begun ; discontent agitated the terrified 
bodies of the State. The situation appeared des- 
perate, but the great master of war did not give up 
hope ; he left nothing undone to restore his shat- 
tered military power, and though he listened, per- 
haps sincerely, to overtures for peace, he prepared 
to contend for Italy and the France of the natural 
boundaries. These events profoundly affected the 
position of Soult ; the Marshal was being cast on a 
stormy sea of troubles ; large drafts from his best 
troops were made by the Emperor ; his army was 
reduced to some 40,000 men ; increasing numbers 
of these were mere conscripts. But this was not 
all, or nearly all ; his soldiery, accustomed to li- 
cence in Spain, preyed on the country and stirred 
up the population against them ; he was short of 
requirements necessary to take the field ; parts of 
the south of France were breaking away from the 
Empire ; a rising in behalf of the fallen Bourbons 
was being planned at Bordeaux. But the diffi- 
culties, too, of Wellington were great, even at a 
conjuncture when the war seemed coming to an 
end. The admirable arrangements he had made 
to preserve discipline and to defray all the charges 
of his army had, no doubt, kept the French peas- 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 241 

antry quiet ; they were, indeed, better disposed 
to his troops than to those of their own country- 
men. But his Spanish auxiliaries were still given 
to excesses — a large number of these had been re- 
called ; the Regency, as it was named, of Portugal 
continued to refuse him the aid he required ; the 
Spanish Cortes had not ceased to be angry and jeal- 
ous. A most important incident, besides, had oc- 
curred, which the British commander regarded with 
just apprehensions. Napoleon had made a treaty 
with his captive, Ferdinand ; had acknowledged him 
as king, and had sent him back into Spain. Wel- 
lington feared that the Cortes might confirm this 
compact, and actually wrote to the Government 
at home that a war with Spain was by no means 
impossible. 

This danger, however, was soon dispelled ; the 
Cortes refused to have anything to do with Fer- 
dinand, and Wellington's position was in other re- 
spects improved. The campaign opened in the 
middle of February, 1814, the frost having con- 
gealed the roads and made operations practicable 
in a difficult country. The British chief was still at 
the head of about 100,000 men ; but of these 25,000 
perhaps were Spaniards, a part on the other side of 
the Pyrenees ; exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne, 
which seems to have been rather too large — this at 
least was the judgment of Napoleon. Soult, we 
have seen, was not more than 40,000 strong, and 
thousands of his troops were rude levies. The in- 
tention of Wellington was to attack Soult, whose 
army extended from the eastern verge of Bayonne, 



242 Wellington 

along the Bidouze, an affluent of the Adour, and 
also along the Gave of Oleron, the local name of a 
mountain torrent ; and at the same time to cross the 
Adour at its mouth, to invest it, and, if possible, to 
reduce Bayonne. Both operations were attended 
with success, if this was not as complete as Wel- 
lington could have wished. Soult's lieutenants were 
driven from their positions to the Gave of Pau, a 
stream parallel to the Gave of Oleron ; St. Jean 
Pied de Port was besieged by a Spanish division. 
The Marshal was finally cut off from the Pyrenean 
passes and forced farther into the interior of France ; 
his army, however, had suffered little loss; he made 
ready for another trial of strength before under- 
taking his march to the Garonne, which he had 
had in contemplation for some time. Meanwhile the 
allied army had effected the passage of the Adour ; 
the operation was conducted with daring and skill ; 
a bridge of boats was thrown across the river ; a flo- 
tilla seconded the crossing from the sea ; a kind of 
causeway was made of small coasting vessels. The 
garrison offered but little resistance ; the French, it 
has been said, were terrified by the British rockets, a 
missile as yet little known in the warfare of that age. 
The fortress was now besieged by Hope, but it held 
out until the close of the war; the siege, too, occu- 
pied a large part of Wellington's forces ; in fact, he 
failed here to attain his object; he had hoped to master 
Bayonne, to penetrate into France, and to find a 
better theatre on which to contend with his enemy. 

Meanwhile Soult, falling back behind the Gave 
of Pau, had assembled some forty thousand men, — 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 243 

seven thousand of these, however, were conscripts, — 
in a formidable position, round the little town of 
Orthes. His right, under Reille, was protected by 
marshy ground and held the hamlet of St. Boes and 
the adjoining heights, sloping down towards the vil- 
lage of Baights ; his centre, commanded by D'Erlon, 
was covered by an eminence, — the Marshal took 
his stand on this in the battle that followed, — by a 
ravine and by a swampy flat ; his left, with Clausel 
at its head, held Orthes and its fine bridge, the 
only one on the Gave that had been left un- 
broken. Both the flanks and the front of Soult 
were thus extremely strong and very difficult to 
reach and attack ; he was behind a river, be- 
sides, which the enemy must cross. Welling- 
ton had approached the position by the 25th of 
February ; having reconnoitred the ground with 
care, he made preparations rather, as he believed, to 
dislodge his adversary from his points of vantage 
than to fight a strongly contested pitched battle. 
The British General was not quite forty thousand 
strong : making every allowance for detachments and 
the siege of Bayonne, it appears strange that he had 
not assembled a more powerful force against his able 
opponent. His right, under Hill, was before Or- 
thes and Clausel ; his centre and left under Picton 
and Beresford, confronted D'Erlon and Reille, and 
Soult's centre and right. At daybreak on the 27th 
Picton and Beresford crossed the Gave ; the Marshal, 
it is said, thought of attacking them when in the act 
of passing ; but he preferred to maintain his attitude 
of defence, and to accept a battle, which gave him 



244 Wellington 

good hope of success. Hill remained on the other 
side of the river, and there was a wide space between 
his two colleagues ; Wellington's army was thus not 
favourably placed to fall on an enemy in a position 
of remarkable strength. The advanced posts of the 
French were soon driven in ; but the battle raged 
furiously for at least three hours around the village 
of St. Boes and its heights; the troops of the defence 
had long a distinct advantage. The men of Beres- 
ford and Picton, still rather far apart, endeavoured 
in vain to turn the enemy's right, and to force his 
centre ; they were repulsed over and over again, as 
they struggled through the obstacles in their way, 
and sought to close with the skilfully posted French ; 
they were ravaged by a destructive fire of guns and 
of musketry. Soult, it is said, as he beheld what 
seemed a certain defeat, smote his thigh and ex- 
claimed, " I have him at last " ; he marshalled his re- 
serves to make victory complete. But Wellington 
had watched the battle from a hill on his side ; his 
tactical inspiration turned the scales of fortune. 
Perceiving that St. Boes and the height could not be 
carried, he contrived by a movement of characteristic 
skill, to turn this part of the position to the left ; 
the result was before long developed : safety, nay, 
success, was admirably plucked from danger. The 
French army gave way by degrees : its commander 
had no choice but to retreat. Meanwhile Hill had 
effected the passage of the Gave ; Clausel fell back 
to join his discomfited chief. The retreat was con- 
ducted in good order ; but thousands of conscripts 
disbanded and threw away their arms. 



£lu§ f « 5 



cqo: 




From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 245 

Soult had ably fought a defensive battle ; he had 
only just missed a real victory; but probably he 
should have fallen on his antagonist when crossing 
the Gave : here, again, we see his shortcomings in the 
field. On the other hand, Wellington's strategy can 
hardly be admired ; but his genius in tactics shone 
out finely ; his movement to turn the hill at St. Boes 
was a master stroke. 1 The Marshal had lost four 
thousand men at Orthes ; besides, perhaps, half of his 
boyish conscripts ; but he rose superior to fortune, 
however adverse ; he made ready to march to the 
Garonne, where he still hoped to be joined by Suchet. 
The retrograde movement was across the heads 
of the streams which descend from the Pyrenees, 
through a difficult and intricate country ; it was 
effected with admirable skill and resource ; it was in 
no sense a mere passive retreat. Soult made a stand 
atTarbes on the upper Adour, and successfully held 
his adversary at bay : more than once he assumed a 
daring offensive ; meanwhile he reorganised his de- 
feated troops, restored their confidence in some de- 
gree, endeavoured to stir up a partisan warfare, and 
obtained reinforcements, though for the most part 
conscripts. And these fine operations were carried 
out at a time when the Empire was crashing down 
in ruin, and when a large part of the south of 
France was declaring against it ; this retreat of Soult, 
in fact, may be fitly compared to the remarkable 
retreat of Chanzy to Lemans, a striking episode 
in the great war of 1870. Wellington followed the 

1 Napier, History of the Peninsular War, iii., 419, has very clearly 
described the characteristics of the contending generals at Orthes. 



246 Wellington 

Marshal cautiously and at a distance ; he was appre- 
hensive of the strength of Suchet, who, he assumed, 
would come into line with Soult ; his army was being 
reduced by large detachments to guard his length- 
ened communications and his rear ; and he sent off 
Beresford, with twelve thousand men, to Bordeaux, 
where the Due D'Angouleme and many leading citi- 
zens had organised a rising against Napoleon, and 
had raised the white flag of the House of Bourbon. 
It may be doubted if this was a wise step in a mere 
military sense ; but it was of the first importance to 
second a movement, which was extending itself 
throughout Gascony : it should be added that Wel- 
lington gave proof of his characteristic prudence; he 
refused to recognise the Bourbons without the con- 
sent of his Government, though he did not conceal 
his sympathies with them. All this made his opera- 
tions slow, as was often the case with him when fol- 
lowing a retiring enemy, and he found it necessary 
to call up large reinforcements to his army as it ad- 
vanced eastwards. Meanwhile Soult had reached 
Toulouse, the chief town of Languedoc, in the last 
days of March ; he had gained a considerable start 
on his enemy ; he had reached his position on the 
Garonne. 1 

During the course of these events in the south of 
France, Napoleon's Empire was toppling down in 
ruin. By the first days of January, 1814, the armies 
of the embattled Continent had crossed the Rhine : 



1 For an excellent criticism of these operations of Wellington and 
Soult, see Napier's Peninsular War, iii., 435-436. The historian 
blames the slowness of Wellington's pursuit. 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 247 

they extended on a great arc from the confluence of 
the Moselle to the verge of Switzerland. The rapid- 
ity of the invasion had surprised the Emperor; he 
had not had time to restore his forces ; France, ex- 
hausted and discontented, gave him little support : 
he had not more than 80,000 or 100,000 beaten 
troops to oppose to 300,000 of the Allies. After La 
Rothiere his position appeared desperate; this would 
have been the case had his adversaries followed the 
principles of war. But Bliicher and Schwartzenberg, 
the chiefs of the hosts of the League, men of differ- 
ent natures and not disposed to agree, divided their 
armies on the Marne and the Seine ; Napoleon 
struck in between them, with marvellous power and 
skill, opposing a single front of defence to a double 
front of attack, he defeated them over and over 
again ; Vauchamps, Montmirail, and Montereau re- 
called the exploits of 1796-7. The Allies actually 
sued for an armistice ; had the Emperor at this 
juncture been satisfied with contending only for the 
France of the Rhine, the struggle perhaps would 
have turned in his favour. But he was still bent on 
retaining a great part of his Empire, especially Bel- 
gium and the prize of Antwerp ; he did not concen- 
trate all his forces and recall Eugene Beauharnais 
from across the Alps : this, in a military sense, was a 
real fault in his magnificent operations in 18 14. Nev- 
ertheless his genius shone grandly out for a time ; 
Bliicher advanced rashly again, as he had advanced 
before ; he was nearly caught and destroyed at 
Soissons ; but the old Prussian chief would not 
acknowledge defeat ; Napoleon met a reverse at 



248 Wellington 

Laon, followed by another at Arcis sur Aube, when 
he turned to manoeuvre against Schwartzenberg. 
Still, notwithstanding this partial success, the Allies, 
despite their overwhelming numbers, had really not 
accomplished much ; they had been outgeneralled 
in every respect ; Wellington, with a relatively small 
army, had been of more weight in the scales of for- 
tune. The British General has, in fact, maintained 
that their mighty enemy might have tired them out 
had he continued to operate as before ' : but the 
Emperor adopted a different course, grand in con- 
ception, but in the result fatal. He fell back to- 
wards the Rhine in order to rally his garrisons in 
Lorraine, to call up Eugene from Italy and Augereau 
from Lyons ; with their united forces — and they 
would be very great — he intended to strike the com- 
munications and the rear of his foes, to defeat them, 
and to drive them out of France. This movement, 
however, uncovered Paris ; opinion in the capital was 
turning against the war ; the Allies marched on 
and seized the seat of the Empire ; the effect was 
decisive and complete. After a short resistance 

1 These comments of Wellington on Napoleon's operations in 
1 8 14 are very interesting, especially as Waterloo was soon to be 
fought. They are in the Greville Memoirs, i., 73, ed. 1888. 
" Bonaparte's last campaign, before the capture of Paris, was very 
brilliant, probably the ablest of all his performances. . . . Had 
he possessed greater patience he would have succeeded in compelling 
the Allies to retreat. . . . The march upon Paris entirely dis- 
concerted him and finished the war. The Allies could not have 
maintained themselves much longer, and had he continued to keep 
his force concentrated and to carry it as occasion required against 
one or the other of the two armies . . . he must eventually have 
forced them to retreat." 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 249 

Paris opened her gates : the Monarchy of the Bour- 
bons was proclaimed restored : Napoleon, aban- 
doned by his companions in arms, but still idolised 
by his devoted soldiery, signed his abdication on 
the 6th of April, 18 14. 

Meanwhile Wellington and Soult had been gird- 
ing up their loins for a trial of strength around 
Toulouse. The Marshal had given orders to place 
the city in a state of defence, before he had ap- 
proached its walls ; his orders had been carefully 
obeyed. Suchet was still in Roussillon when his 
colleague reached Toulouse ; his army had been 
reduced to 12,000 men ; he continued to turn a deaf 
ear to Soult's counsels. That chief was thus prac- 
tically left to his own resources ; his arrangements 
were made with conspicuous ability and skill. He had 
still about 38,000 men, for he had been, we have said, 
reinforced on his march : his first care was to secure 
his communications with the adjoining country, — 
he hoped against hope to join Suchet ; his next 
was to take a formidable position for a defensive 
battle. Toulouse gave him most favourable 6ppor- 
tunities for this : he turned them to the very best 
advantage. The city is divided by the Garonne, a 
deep and broad river : on its southern bank the 
suburb of St. Cyprien stands ; this, surrounded by 
a loop of the Garonne, could be made well-nigh im- 
pregnable to attack. The canal of Languedoc cov- 
ers the place on the northern bank — not to speak 
of its ancient enceinte ; outside rises the eminence 
of Mont Rave, crowned by a tableland able to con- 
tain an army ; beyond, the Ers, an affluent of the 



250 Welfaigton 

Garonne, flows ; an enemy would have to cross this 
should he attack Mont Rave, the Ers being at 
hand, and directly in his rear. Soult chose his 
ground with remarkable skill ; his object was to com- 
pel the British chief to attack him on the tableland 
of Mont Rave ; in that case he would have to make 
a long flank march exposed to the onset of the 
French columns, and with a river behind him, im- 
perilling his retreat. The Marshal placed Reille and 
his troops in St. Cyprien, which had been made a 
post of very great strength ; he had a small detach- 
ment outside the city to observe the line of his re- 
treat, in the event of a reverse. But D'Erlon and 
Clausel had the mass of their forces accumulated 
along Mont Rave and thetableland, the point, Soult 
correctly judged, that his adversary would be obliged 
to attack. Wellington did not refuse a just meed of 
praise to his very able foe : " In the whole of my 
experience," he wrote many years afterwards, " I 
never saw an army so strongly posted as that of the 
French at the battle of Toulouse." ' 

The start gained upon Wellington by his oppo- 
nent had enabled the Marshal, not only to choose 
his position, but to strengthen Mont Rave and the 
tableland with redoubts and field works. The Brit- 
ish General was now in command of 52,000 men, 
9COO, however, being Spaniards ; he resolved to at- 
tack Soult and to drive him out of Toulouse. On the 
28th of March he tried to cross the Garonne above 
the city ; but the river was in flood and the materi- 
als for a bridge too scanty ; he was obliged to cross 

'Sir H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington, i., 371. 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 251 

lower down at a place called Grenade. The bridge 
was destroyed by the force of the current ; Beres- 
ford was isolated, without support, for two whole 
days ; Soult has been severely blamed for not at- 
tacking him when in these straits ; but Grenade is 
fifteen miles from Toulouse; it is difficult to say 
that an opportunity was missed. Wellington had 
his dispositions made by the 9th of April ; Hill was 
to threaten, and, if there was a chance, to attack St. 
Cyprien ; Picton, on the left, was to assist Hill; the 
main attack, directed by Wellington himself, with 
Beresford and the Spaniards, was to be on Mont 
Rave and the tableland. The assailants, therefore, 
were extended along a broad arc, of which the de- 
fenders held the chord, an advantage in itself of no 
little importance ; and the British General, as his ad- 
versary had foreseen, had been compelled to make 
his principal effort under conditions in the highest 
degree adverse. 

The battle began at an early hour on the 10th ; for 
a long time victory inclined to the French ; they 
might have won it had they had a more daring com- 
mander. Picton made a rash movement which cost 
him dear; Hill's attempt to storm St. Cyprien com- 
pletely failed ; Reille was able to detach largely to 
the assistance of his chief. Meanwhile Freyre and 
his Spaniards, and Beresford with his British troops, 
had crossed the Ers by the one bridge that had been 
left intact, and had begun making their perilous 
flank march, through miry, broken, and difficult 
ground, against Mont Rave and the tableland, ex- 
posed at all points to the destructive fire of the 



252 Wellington 

enemy. The Spaniards were unable to stand the 
ordeal ; their ranks gave way and became a horde of 
fugitives; Beresford's soldiery, though they toiled 
steadily on, were stricken down in hundreds by the 
French guns and musketry. As the formidable posi- 
tion of Soult was reached, the assailants were not 
more than 10,000 strong, blown, too, and exhausted 
by their most trying march. Soult might have fallen 
on them with nearly 20,000 fresh troops, strongly 
supported, and from a point of vantage. But the 
Marshal's defects in battle were once more made 
manifest; "he did not employ half the force he 
might have employed " ; he attacked Beresford with 
a single division only ; this was fairly repulsed after 
a brief struggle. The assailants now redoubled their 
efforts; nothing could withstand the British in- 
fantry's onset ; the Spaniards rallied at the spirit- 
stirring sight ; the French were by degrees driven 
back ; Mont Rave and the tableland were won. 
Soult retreated, but only a short distance ; he made 
ready to fight the next day ; his forces were much 
less than those of his enemy. The battle, however, 
if indecisive, was a defeat for the French ; they had 
been forced away from a position of extraordinary 
strength by assailants fighting with all the odds 
against them for hours. Once again Soult, admira- 
ble in conception, had been weak in execution ; but 
the result was largely due to the endurance and 
the valour of Beresford's men. " I could have done 
anything with that army," was a remark made by 
its chief. 

Soult retreated from Toulouse, still entreating 



From the Pyrenees to the Garonne 253 

Suchet to come into line with him at Carcassonne. 
The war, however, had now reached its end ; the 
Marshal, it has been said, fought his last great battle 
in the confidence of assured success, and knowing 
that peace had already been made. This is an un- 
just, nay, a shameful charge ; it is confuted by a 
simple comparison of dates. Napoleon's abdication 
was not ratified until the 1 ith of April ; the engage- 
ment took place upon the 10th ; Soult could not 
have heard that hostilities had ceased. 

The Peninsular War, in a strict sense, closed with 
Vitoria and the expulsion of the invaders from 
Spain. I have endeavoured to describe the great 
qualities of Wellington in that remarkable contest, 
to do justice to his antagonists, and to indicate the 
characteristics of the belligerent armies. I shall not 
repeat what I have already written. The war along 
the Pyrenees and in the south of France resolves 
itself into a duel between Soult and Wellington ; it 
has peculiar interest for a student of the art. The 
Marshal was a strategist of no mean excellence ; 
some of his combinations were exceedingly fine; he 
outgeneralled his adversary more than once ; he had 
great tenacity and firmness of purpose. But he was 
not equal to himself in the shock of battle ; his 
hand, so to speak, could not second his brain 1 ; he 
allowed victory to slip from his grasp ; he had not 

1 Napier is very partial to Soult, but these remarks on the Mar- 
shal's strategy before he fought at Toulouse are true (History of 
the Peninsular War, iii., 460): " Soult's combinations were now 
crowned with success. He had, by means of his fortresses, his bat- 
tles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his 
rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon 



254 Wellington 

the gifts of Conde or of Frederick in the field. In 
this contest Wellington made strategic mistakes : in 
fact, strategy was not his strong point in war ; but 
he was infinitely superior to his opponent in tactical 
power ; he directed an army on the ground much 
better ; in a word, he was a much greater com- 
mander. 1 It is unnecessary to dwell on the qualities 
of the contending armies. In 1813 and 18 14 the 
British soldiery — and the Portuguese were hardly 
inferior — trained for years under a great chief and 
flushed with repeated success, had acquired a com- 
plete ascendency over their disheartened foes, exhib- 
ited on almost every occasion. The main historical 
interest of this passage of arms is that it gives us a 
measure of what Wellington achieved in the final 
struggle between Napoleon and Europe. He kept 
Soult, and even Suchet, confined to a theatre of war 
outside the great theatre on the Marne and the 
Seine; had these Marshals been able to join their 
master, the Allies could never have reached Paris ; 
they would probably have been driven beyond the 
Rhine. 



Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his 
adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen 
days for preparation, had brought the Allies to deliver battle on 
ground naturally adapted for defence, and well fortified, where one- 
third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest." 

1 Napier (History of the Peninsular War, iii., 419), comparing 
Wellington with Soult, remarks : " Wellington possessed in a high 
degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration, 
. . . with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. 
It is this which especially constitutes military genius." 




Longitude West Longjttaae East o£ 3 Greenwich VII 



York 




GUPuttutnCs Sons, London ■' NcM York 




CHAPTER IX 

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA — QUATRE BRAS- 
WATERLOO 

Wellington made a Duke in 1814 — He is sent as Ambassador to 
France — His position at the Congress of Vienna — Napoleon's 
escape from Elba — He regains the throne — Conduct of the 
Allies — The Hundred Days — Weakness of the Emperor's Gov- 
ernment — His military preparations — The allied plan of cam- 
paign — Wellington proposes to invade France — Napoleon's plan 
of campaign — Concentration of the French army on the Belgian 
frontier — The operations of June 15, 1815 — Napoleon fails to 
attain fully his objects, but gains a distinct advantage — Blucher 
hastily advances to encounter Napoleon with only part of his 
forces — Delays of Wellington — The battle of Ligny — The 
D'Erlon incident — Blucher is defeated, but not destroyed — The 
Battle of Quatre Bras — Misconduct of Ney on the 16th of June 
— Tactics of Wellington — Napoleon and the French army on 
the 17th of June — Immense opportunity given the Emperor — 
Grouchy is detached with a restraining wing — The night of the 
17th of June — Operations of the 18th of June — The battle of 
Waterloo — Fine defence of Wellington — Rout of the French 
army — Grouchy the real cause of the disaster. 

WELL deserved honours were showered on 
Wellington when he sheathed his victori- 
ous sword in 18 14. He was raised to 
the highest rank in the Peerage, and, as in the case 
of Marlborough, was made a Duke ; he was led in 

255 



256 Wellington 

state into the House of Commons, and received 
its thanks, which he acknowledged in brief, but dig- 
nified words ; half a million was voted as a reward 
for his services ; he was the most striking figure at 
a solemn thanksgiving at St. Paul's ; peerages were 
bestowed on three of his best companions in arms. 
The troubled state of the Continent erelong required 
his presence on the scene of events, in differents 
countries. He endeavoured to compose disputes be- 
tween the Spanish Cortes and Ferdinand, who, hav- 
ing regained the throne, was reviving absolutism and 
the abuses of the past ; his remonstrances and even 
threats prevailed for the moment. A more difficult 
mission was then entrusted to him ; he was sent 
as the envoy of England to France, where Louis 
XVIII., restored by the right of conquest, was al- 
ready wearing an uneasy crown. With character- 
istic insight he was not slow in perceiving the 
mistakes and the vices of the Bourbon regime ; his 
Correspondence abounds in dry comments on these, 
especially on the weakness of an ill-united Govern- 
ment— "they are ministers," he bitterly said, — 
" not a ministry" ; he predicted before many months 
had passed that the existing order of things could 
not endure in France. His position in Paris, how- 
ever, became dangerous : he stood, indeed, well with 
the King, and the noblesse of the Court; but the 
disbanded soldiery and the populace looked askance 
at him ; his life was exposed to the plots of assassins; 
Lord Liverpool insisted upon his recall to England. 
Before this time, it may be observed, he had turned 
his attention to the defence of the Netherlands ; he 



The Congress of Vienna 257 

had surveyed the fortresses on the Belgian frontier ; 
he had marked out " the entrance of the Forest of 
Soignies" as a favourable position for a great defen- 
sive battle, an augury of what was to be seen at 
Waterloo. Wellington replaced Castlereagh during 
the later scenes of the memorable Assembly which 
met at Vienna to dispose of the spoils of Napoleon's 
Empire, and to remodel the map of a transformed 
Continent. But though his Correspondence clearly 
shows that he had opinions of his own on the mo- 
mentous questions which were agitating the Euro- 
pean world, he confined himself to carrying out the 
policy of his chief ; he made little or no mark on 
what took place at Vienna, at least until the very 
last moment. His sympathies were, on the whole, 
with a settlement of the Continent which curbed the 
ambition of France ; but he approved of the pro- 
posed alliance between Austria, England, and France, 
to check the pretensions of Prussia and the Czar. 
Like all the soldiers and statesmen of the Coalition, 
he had no inkling beforehand of the portentous 
events which were about to convulse the world 
again and to lead to the conflict of which the end 
was Waterloo. 

The Congress of Vienna was about to dissolve 
when it received the intelligence of Napoleon's es- 
cape from Elba. This is not the place to examine 
the reasons that led the fallen Emperor to attempt 
to recover his throne in defiance of Europe, still 
armed against him. That he broke faith with the 
Allies is true, and probably he would have made his 
wonderful venture in any event : but the Bourbons 

17 



258 Wellington 

and the Allies had broken faith with him : History 
justly condemns a great deal of their conduct. We 
may accept Wellington's statement that St. Helena 
had not been chosen as a place for his banishment ; 
but his forcible deportation had been discussed at 
Vienna ; Marie Louise and his son had been taken 
from him, by shameful intrigues that cannot bear 
the light ; funds promised him by treaty were 
wrongfully withheld ; plotters, known to Talleyrand, 
seemed to have aimed at his life. His march from 
Grenoble to Paris was a triumphal progress ; it 
proved how an immense majority of the French 
people detested and despised the rule of the Bour- 
bons ; the Royal authority disappeared on his way; 
his advance was that of a mighty influence that 
nothing could resist. He was at theTuileries on the 
20th of March, 181 5 ; within four weeks he had put 
petty risings down, without shedding, it may be 
said, a drop of blood ; he had accomplished a Revo- 
lution to which no parallel can be found ; he was 
acknowledged from the Atlantic to the Mediter- 
ranean as the Sovereign of France. When he first 
landed on the shores of Provence even his old com- 
panions in arms denounced him as an adventurer 
engaged in a mad enterprise ; this, too, was Welling- 
ton's decided view ; " The King of France," he 
wrote, " will destroy him without difficulty, and in 
a short time." As to the leading personages at 
Vienna, they turned a deaf ear to what they were 
told for some days ; in the phrase of the Corsican 
Pozzo di Borgo, Napoleon " was a bandit soon to be 
strung up on a tree." But when it had become 



The Congress of Vienna 259 

too evident that the great body of the French nation, 
and that the army, to a man, had rallied around 
him, they adopted measures without example in 
the annals of the diplomatic world. Napoleon was 
proclaimed the outlaw of Europe ; it is idle to attempt 
to qualify the phrase ; the overtures he made for 
peace received no answer ; war, deadly and universal, 
was declared against him. This frantic violence no 
doubt may be partly excused, if we bear in mind 
what had been the Emperor's career ; but it was 
mainly due to the animosities and the fears of a 
League apprehensive of having to disgorge what it 
had gained ; it is significant that even such a man as 
Wellington fully concurred in what was being done 
at Vienna. He even signed a treaty which pledged 
England to join in the crusade against the ruler of 
France before he had obtained the consent of the 
Ministry. 

The brief and tragical period of the Hundred 
Days was meanwhile running its momentous course. 
The Second Empire of Napoleon, from the nature 
of the case, could not be the absolute and uncon- 
trolled despotism of the First. France had wel- 
comed him with general acclaim as her chief, but 
the prospect of a tremendous struggle with Europe 
made large parts of the nation fall away from 
him, and separated it into discordant factions. The 
Royalists lifted again their heads ; the great Liberal 
middle class, though it had thrown off the Bour- 
bons, began to regard the Emperor with distrust ; 
the mass of the peasantry had hailed him as a Deliv- 
erer, but it dreaded the conscription and the return 



260 Wellington 

of years of fatal war. The stern unanimity of Rome 
when she confronted Hannibal at a crisis of her 
fortunes was not seen ; the Assembly of the Cham- 
bers and the " Acte additionnel," concessions to the 
prevailing ideas of the hour, showed how France 
was a house divided against itself, and impaired the 
authority of the Head of the State. Disappoint- 
ment, too, had followed illusions ; Napoleon, in his 
advance to the capital, had appealed to revolution- 
ary passions and hopes, but he had no real intention 
of satisfying these ; he would not be, he exclaimed, 
" the king of a Jacquerie " ; besides, for many and 
obvious reasons, his new-made Government was un- 
stable and essentially weak. He was thrown, in a 
word, on a sea of troubles, in which the vessel of 
the State could hardly be steered ; nevertheless, his 
genius of organisation and his administrative powers 
were never, perhaps, more grandly displayed. He 
was too clear-sighted not to perceive, from the first, 
that the League of Europe was bent on war to the 
death, though he endeavoured for some weeks to 
obtain peace, and he offered to accept the settle- 
ment of the Continent made at Vienna. But when 
it became manifest that these attempts were hope- 
less, he addressed himself to the herculean task of 
contending against a world in arms. His efforts to 
recreate the military power of France, and to place 
the nation in a position of defence, were, consider- 
ing the circumstances of the time, astonishing. The 
army, which on his return from Elba could not 
send 50,000 soldiers in the field, was raised by him, 
within two months, into an active army, nearly 200,- 



The Congress of Vienna 261 

000 strong, by the middle of June, 181 5, and into an 
auxiliary army of greater numbers ; by the autumn 
the armed strength of the Empire would have ap- 
proached the enormous total of 800,000 men. At 
the same time, he contrived to find the means to 
arm, to equip, and to supply these masses, to a very 
considerable extent at least. He had begun to for- 
tify Paris and Lyons ; he restored the organisation 
of his field army, distributing it into its old divi- 
sions, and giving it again its revered eagles. Napo- 
leon, no doubt, had, at this crisis, vast elements of 
military force in his hands, in thousands of dis- 
banded soldiers and their trained officers ; and the 
nation, exasperated by the threats of its enemies, at 
last seconded his exertions with patriotic ardour, 
and shook off the apathy and the weakness of the 
year before. But what Napoleon accomplished was 
not the less wonderful ; it even surpassed his achieve- 
ments of 1813. 1 

While the great warrior was making these gigan- 
tic efforts, the Allies were preparing to overwhelm 
their enemy. Their forces were being assembled 
from all parts of Europe ; 700,000 men were con- 
centrated, in June, 18 15, to carry the war from the 
Scheldt, the Elbe, and the Po, to the Seine. Well- 
ington, the only one of the chiefs of the League who 
had not felt the terrible hand of Napoleon, had 
wished to invade France in April with 300,000 men ; 



1 It is impossible, in a mere sketch like this, to describe Napo- 
leon's preparations for war in 1815. An admirable and exhaus- 
tive account will be found in the "7^/5" of H. Houssaye, ii., 

1-83. 



2 6 2 Wellingto n 



S' 



his colleagues resolved to follow the general plan of 
their operations in 1814. Four great armies, ad- 
vancing from Belgium, from the Rhine, from the 
Var, and forming a huge semicircle of attack, were 
to bear down all resistance and to converge on Paris. 
They could not be arrested by partial defeats; they 
would stifle the disturber of the world in the capi- 
tal, and speedily bring the contest to a triumphant 
close. The situation, as it was thus presented, of- 
fered two plans of campaign to Napoleon. The en- 
emies could not reach Paris until the end of July, 
and then with not more than 450,000 men, for 150,- 
000 would be required to mask the fortresses on 
their way ; they could not reach Lyons until about 
the same time, and they would not be more than 
70,000 strong. In the first case, they would have to 
deal with Napoleon, at the head of at least 200,000 
men, in possession of both banks of the Marne and 
the Seine, and supported by a fortified city with a 
powerful garrison ; in the second, they would be op- 
posed to Suchet, who, with 30,000 men and the re- 
sources of the second town of France, ought to be 
quite able to hold them in check. This scheme of 
operation had real promise ; if we bear in mind what 
the Emperor achieved in his wonderful struggle of 
1 8 14, it afforded reasonable hopes of ultimate suc- 
cess. But the plan exposed France to a second in- 
vasion, and this the nation would not endure ; it 
was certain to quicken the intrigues of faction, to 
strengthen the Bourbon cause, and to play into the 
hands of the League. The second plan was, no 
doubt, more hazardous ; but it was in accord with 



The Congress of Vienna 263 

the true principle of the art of war ; it gave scope to 
Napoleon's strategic genius. 

The forces of the Coalition formed a huge front 
of invasion, extending from the North Sea to the 
Mediterranean ; at the edge of this lay the armies 
of Bliicher and Wellington, spreading over Belgium 
and near the borders of France. The northern col- 
umn of the enemies, as it might be called, was thus 
widely separated from its supports ; it was possible 
suddenly to spring on this, and, when isolated, to 
defeat it in detail ; it would then be practicable to 
turn against the eastern and southern columns, and 
to confront them, with many chances of success. 
Napoleon resolved to adopt this plan, in principle 
the same as that which led to Marengo and Ulm. 
The position of the hostile armies in Belgium was 
most favourable, it should be added, to his auda- 
cious venture. They were disseminated on a great 
space of country ; their concentration would neces- 
sarily take time ; the headquarters of their chiefs 
were far apart ; they were dangerously exposed to 
an ably directed attack. 1 

The united armies of Bliicher and Wellington 
were about 220,000 men. Napoleon had hoped to 
fall on them with 150,000; a sudden rising in La 
Vendee, however, deprived him of from 15,000 to 



1 These operations have been admired by all commentators. Well- 
ington said to Greville {Memoirs, i., 40): "Bonaparte's march 
upon Belgium was the finest thing ever done." Napoleon {Com- 
ment., v., 198) has remarked: "II trouva ainsi dans les secrets 
de l'art des moyens supplementaires, qui lui tinrent lieu de 100,000 
hommes, qui lui manquaient ; ce plan fut concu et execute avec 
audace et sagesse." 



264 Wellington 

20,000 good troops ; he was only able to assemble 
128,000, including 3500 non-combatants ; this largely- 
lessened the chances of an advantageous issue. His 
object was to strike the allied centre at the points 
where its inner flanks met, and where it would 
naturally be most weak ; to force it, and to com- 
pel his antagonists to separate, and to diverge 
from each other, giving him an opportunity to at- 
tack them when apart. The Emperor's first opera- 
tions were as admirably designed and conducted 
as any in his extraordinary career. Four corps 
d'arme'e, their movement skilfully masked, were 
marched along the edge of the Belgian frontier to 
the point of junction of the army as a whole; a 
fifth corps advanced from the Aisne ; the Imperial 
Guard was pushed forward from Paris ; on the night 
of the 14th of June, 1815, 124,000 fighting men 
were assembled within a few miles of Charleroy 
under the beard, so to speak, of a hardly suspecting 
enemy, and directly before a great main road lead- 
ing from Charleroy to the chief town of Belgium, 
and traversing the allied centre, the object of at- 
tack. Operations began in the early morning of the 
15th. 1 The purpose of the Emperor for this day was 
to catch and destroy the corps of Zieten, one of 
the four which composed the army of Blucher, and 
which lay near the Sambre on either side of Char- 
leroy ; to hold, as far as possible, the main road in 
force, and to seize the two strategic points of Quatre 
Bras and Sombreffe, on the line of the communica- 

1 For the objects of Napoleon on the 15th of June, see the authori- 
ties collected in my Campaign of 1815, pp. 76, 77. 



Quatre Bras 265 

tion of the hostile armies, the occupation of these 
manifestly being of the very first importance. 

The project was one of the finest ever conceived 
in war, but the accomplishment of it was far from 
perfect. Napoleon expected to have crossed the 
Sambre, and to have been master of Charleroy by 
noon ; in that event Zieten could have hardly es- 
caped ; the main road would have been occupied for 
miles ; Quatre Bras and Sombreffe would have been 
in the hands of the French by the afternoon. But 
hesitations and delays occurred, partly owing to ac- 
cidents common in war, largely to the timidity and 
indecision of commanders, who, terrified at the pros- 
pect of a contest with Europe, did not second as 
they ought to have done their great chief. D'Erlon, 
on the left, a laggard, we have seen in Spain, was 
very late in reaching the Sambre, and did not ad- 
vance on the 15th as far as was expected from him. 
Vandamme, in the centre, was retarded by a mis- 
chance. • The march of the chief part of the army 
was checked for some hours. Gerard, too, on the 
right, had not assembled his whole corps by day- 
break ; the shameful desertion of the vile traitor 
Bourmont impeded, to some extent, his advance. 
Charleroy was thus not attained until the afternoon ; 
even by nightfall a fourth part of the French army 
still lay on the southern bank of the Sambre. The 
corps of Zieten, accordingly, escaped with but little 
loss; one of the objects of Napoleon had not been 
realised. The invaders, however, had possession of 
the main road for some distance beyond Charle- 
roy, and Quatre Bras and Sombreffe might, without 



266 Wellington 

difficulty, have been seized. But Ney, who had only 
received the command of the left of the army at the 
last moment, would not employ a sufficient force to 
take Quatre Bras ; the point was successfully held 
by the enemy, through a mere chance. A dispute 
between Grouchy and Vandamme, in Napoleon's ab- 
sence, prevented the occupation of Sombreffe. 

Napoleon had already gained a great strategic ad- 
vantage, if his operations on the 15th had been in- 
complete. He had occupied the main road and 
gathered near the enemy's centre, as he had cal- 
culated, the weakest part of their line; he was within 
easy reach of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe; he might 
hope to divide his adversaries, and to beat them in 
detail. The dispositions of Bliicher and Wellington 
were singularly favourable to this daring offensive 
movement. The Prussian chief had learned that the 
French army was near the frontier on the 14th of 
June; he directed his forces to concentrate on Som- 
breffe ; but only three of his corps could be at that 
place on the i6th,the corps of Bulow being far away 
around Liege. Bliicher was thus exposing himself 
to the strokes of Napoleon with no more than apart 
of a not united army ; and he had no certainty of 
support from Wellington, whose headquarters at 
Brussels were far from his own at Namur. The con- 
duct of the British commander gave signal proof 
that he did not excel in strategy, especially when he 
had to cope with the greatest of strategists. He had 
been informed, as early as the 10th, that an attack 
on his positions was, perhaps, imminent ; but he left 
his army as dispersed as it had been before ; he 



Qttatre Bras 267 

would not believe that the allied centre would be 
assailed ; he left the mass of his forces far on his 
right, thinking that this was his most vulnerable 
point, an assumption very difficult to understand. 
He remained motionless until the 1 5th ; by the after- 
noon of that day, perhaps at an earlier hour, he was 
apprised that the allied centre was being threatened; 
but practically he did nothing to ward off this 
attack. Towards nightfall he assembled his army ; 
his right was moved in the direction of his left ; his 
reserve was made ready to march from Brussels ; but 
not a regiment was sent to the main road, which was 
already partly held by Napoleon and would bring 
the enemy in full force on the allied centre. A wide 
gap thus divided him from his Prussian colleague ; 
but happily one of his subordinates, perceiving this, 
moved a single small division to Quatre Bras, which 
closed the gap to a certain extent, — the distance 
was not less than fourteen miles, — and so far might 
retard the advance of the Emperor. Late in the 
night Wellington gave orders that a large part of 
his army should march towards Quatre Bras ; but 
these dispositions were hours too late; no great force 
could reach Quatre Bras on the 16th; the one weak 
division which held that point could not possibly re- 
sist a powerful attack. 1 

1 For the dispositions of Blucher and Wellington on the 15th of 
June, acknowledged by all commentators to have been very faulty, 
see the admirable chapter of Mr. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 
pp. 70-115. I may refer to my own Campaign of 1S15, pp. 88-102, 
and the authorities there cited. The operations of the day on both 
sides are excellently narrated by H. Houssaye, " fS/j," ii., 109- 
149. 



268 Wellington 

We may glance at the positions of the belligerent 
armies on the morning of the 16th of June. Ney, 
in command of the French left, was at Frasnes, a 
little village near Quatre Bras, but with a few hun- 
dred men only; the other divisions of his army, 
under Reille and D'Erlon, extended backwards to 
Gosselies and Jumet,a distance, at the farthest point, 
of eleven miles. Grouchy, who had received the 
command of the French right, was, with part of his 
army, near Fleurus, that is only a short way from 
Sombreffe ; Napoleon, with part of the centre, was 
around Charleroy ; Lobau, Kellermann, and Milhaud 
were about to cross the Sambre, in all, about 17,000 
strong ; Gerard, now under Grouchy, had half of his 
corps still south of the river. On the other side of 
the field of manoeuvre, Blucher was approaching 
Sombreffe, but with only three-fourths of his army; 
Wellington was moving on Quatre Bras, but with a 
force comparatively small. In these circumstances 
the Emperor has been charged with undue delays ; 
he ought to have advanced against Blucher at once ; 
in that event he could have annihilated the corps of 
Zieten, not yet supported by the corps of Pirch and 
Thielmann, and isolated between Fleurus and Som- 
breffe.' If not wholly without foundation, this criti- 
cism is far fetched 2 ; Napoleon was bound to assem- 

1 The authorities on this subject will be found cited in my Cam- 
paign of 18 15, p. 104. 

i Napoleon returned to Charleroy on the night of the 15th of June; 
he was already suffering from the physical decline which affected 
him in 1815. According to Gourgaud, AMmoires, i., 502, the Em- 
peror said he ought to have slept at Fleurus ; this may indicate 
that he thought he should have fallen on Zieten early on the 16th. 



Quatre Bras 269 

ble his army north of the Sambre before encounter- 
ing enemies nearly double in numbers; anything 
like a premature movement might have been dis- 
astrous. The Emperor, too, from the point of view 
he took, — and this conformed to true strategic prin- 
ciples, — did not expect that his adversaries would 
meet him in force on the 16th ; close as he now was 
to the allied centre, he did not suppose that Bliicher 
and Wellington would attempt to approach each 
other at Sombreffe and Quatre Bras with only a part 
of their armies ; he assumed that they would fall 
back, as would have been their most prudent course. 
It is plain from his despatches and those of Soult — 
the Marshal had been made chief of the French 
Staff, an unfortunate choice — that he did not think 
he would be seriously engaged on this day ; he be- 
lieved that he would reach Brussels on the 17th; 
there was no necessity, therefore, to hasten the ad- 
vance of his army. 1 These anticipations were, no 
doubt, false in the event ; but what really deserves 
notice is, that Napoleon's dispositions for the 16th 
were masterly, and ought to have secured him de- 
cisive success. Ney was ordered to march with his 
army to and beyond Quatre Bras, — a single division 
was being detached, — and to send another division 
to a point called Marbais, where it would be on the 
flank and rear of the Prussians, should Bliicher be 
moving upon Sombreffe. Ney would thus hold 
Wellington in check and probably beat him, for the 
Marshal would dispose of more than 40,000 men ; 

1 All these considerations are admirably explained by H. Hous- 
saye, " rSij," ii., 131-134* 



2 70 Wellington 

and he would be admirably placed to fall on Bliicher, 
should Bliicher attempt to give Napoleon battle. 
At the same time Grouchy and the main army of the 
Emperor were to march to Sombreffe, and even as 
far as Gembloux, and to attack Bliicher should the 
opportunity arise. 

Had Ney carried out his orders as he might have 
done, the army of Bliicher would have been de- 
stroyed ; Wellington could hardly have averted a 
severe defeat ; the campaign in Belgium would prob- 
ably have come to an end. But the Marshal " was 
not the same man," in Napoleon's phrase; his de- 
fection from the Bourbons preyed on his mind ; he 
was distrusted by his master and by the army ; he 
was fighting with a halter around his neck. It is 
impossible to account otherwise for the timidity, 
followed by recklessness, of which the ill-fated chief 
gave such decisive proof in the conflict of 1815. He 
had been directed, on the 15th of June, to seize 
Quatre Bras ; he had failed to do this through his 
own fault ; but the directions of Napoleon remained 
unchanged. Ney, therefore, ought to have had his 
army ready to advance by the early morning of the 
1 6th ; but he allowed Reille and D'Erlon to be 
motionless for hours. He received the Emperor's 
orders for the 16th in the forenoon ; yet he did very 
little to conform to them ; he indeed summoned 
Reille to Quatre Bras, but very late : he did not send 
a message to D'Erlon for a considerable time. No 
doubt Reille hesitated and paused, which he should 
not have done ; but Napoleon was indignant at the 
Marshal's conduct ; he peremptorily ordered him 



Quatre Bras 271 

again to advance to Quatre Bras, and to drive off any 
enemies he might find in his path. This second order 
was rather late ; but it might have been carried into 
effect, with consequences of the most momentous 
kind, had Ney been the daring and energetic warrior 
of old. The result of this inaction, nay, of disregard 
of positive commands, was unfortunate for the Em- 
peror in the very highest degree ; it frustrated to a 
great extent his consummate strategy. It was not 
until two in the afternoon of the 16th that Ney was 
within reach of Quatre Bras ; he had as yet only 
some 11,000 men in hand ; he was confronted by the 
single division, nearly 8000 strong, which had been 
sent to Quatre Bras the night before ; this sufficed 
for the moment to arrest the Marshal's advance. 
His false operations had saved the allies from dis- 
aster : and yet even this was not the measure of his 
errors on the 16th. 1 

Meanwhile Napoleon and the greater part of the 
main French army had reached Fleurus by noon on 
the 16th, a short distance from Bliicher's point of 
assembly, Sombreffe. But half of Gerard's corps 
had not yet come into line and Lobau was only 
breaking up from Charleroy, that is, was still seven 
or eight miles away. The Emperor reconnoitred 
the ground from the roof of a mill ; he seems at 

1 The misconduct of Ney in the first part of the 16th of June has 
been admirably pointed out by Mr. Ropes, Campaign of Waterloo, 
pp. 176-188. I can only quote one sentence : " The whole manage- 
ment of Marshal Ney shows distrust of the Emperor's judgment, un- 
willingness to take the most obvious steps, finally disobedience of 
orders." See also H. Houssaye, " fS/J," ii., 185-192, and my 
Campaign of iS/j, pp. 109-11 o. 



272 Wellington 

first to have only descried the corps of Zieten ; but 
he soon recognised that a real army was at hand ; 
Pirch and Thielmann were advancing in force. His 
forecast for the day had thus turned out false ; he 
could not reach Sombreffe, and still less Gembloux, 
without fighting a great battle ; this had been rather 
unexpectedly offered by Bliicher. Napoleon in- 
stantly seized the occasion ; Gerard had reached the 
scene of action a little after one; Lobau was ordered 
to quicken his march ; the Emperor resolved, when 
ready, to attack. Bliicher had now arrayed his three 
corps on the ground : they formed a most danger- 
ously extended front, from Wagnelee on the extreme 
right, to the centre, Ligny, and thence to Sombreffe, 
and to Tougreienes and Balatre on the extreme left; 
for Bliicher sought to join hands with Wellington, 
and to guard his communications with Namur; and 
though his position was in parts very strong, it was 
vulnerable at some points, and was much too widely 
held. But this was not all, or even nearly all ; the 
Prussian army would be on the rear of Ney, should 
the Marshal, as was to be assumed, be in possession 
of Quatre Bras ; it would be almost under the guns 
of the division to be detached to Marbais ; it was 
open to attack in front, flank, and rear ; it might be 
nearly surrounded and destroyed. Napoleon felt 
assured of a decisive triumph at hand ; he said ' to 
Gerard, in whom he placed great trust : " The cam- 
paign may be brought to a close in three hours. If 
Ney executes his orders properly not a gun of the 
Prussian army will escape : it is entrapped in a fatal 

1 Napoleon, Comment., v., pp. 140-141. 



Quatre Bras 273 

position." From another point of view Wellington 
augured very ill of the fortunes of his colleague in 
the battle at hand. The British General had has- 
tened from Quatre Bras to meet Blucher; he pro- 
mised to assist him if this was in his power ; but it 
is not true, as German writers have alleged, that 
Blucher was about to fight with the certainty of his 
ally's support ; his own correspondence proves the 
exact contrary. With his fine tactical insight, Wel- 
lington had perceived a bad mistake in the disposi- 
tion of the Prussian army ; the reserves, arrayed on 
high uplands, were most wrongly exposed. He re- 
monstrated in vain with the stubborn old chief ; as 
he rode from the field he drily said to his staff : " If 
they fight here they will be damnably mauled." 

The battle of Ligny began at about three in the 
afternoon. The Prussian army was some 87,000 
strong; the French, including the corps of Lobau, 
some 78,000 ; but the French had a superiority in 
cavalry and guns. The plan of Napoleon's attack 
was perfectly designed ' ; Vandamme, supported by 
a division of Reille, detached for some time, was to 
fall on Bliicher's right, which was greatly exposed ; 
Gerard, with the chief part of his corps, was to storm 
Ligny ; Grouchy was to hold Bliicher's far-extended 
left in check. These attacks might be expected to 
break the enemy's front, badly placed on the ground, 
and stretching much too far; but they were to be 
combined with the decisive onslaught, to be exe- 
cuted by Ney, on Bliicher's flank and rear. This 

1 Napoleon at St. Helena triumphantly demolished the petty criti- 
cisms made on this project {Comment., vi., 146-147). 

18 



2 74 Wellington 

last was to be the mortal stroke ; had it been struck 
there would have been an end of the Prussian army. 
Napoleon spared no pains to make its delivery as- 
sured ; at two he had sent off a message to Ney 
directing him to attack " a Prussian corps " on his 
right ; at a quarter after three he despatched an- 
other message, telling the Marshal " to envelop the 
flank and the rear of the Prussian army." ' Soon 
after this he was informed by Lobau that Ney was 
fighting a battle with Wellington ; the roar of can- 
non at Quatre Bras was, indeed, proof of this. The 
Emperor accordingly summoned D'Erlon to his own 
field — D'Erlon was still at a distance from Quatre 
Bras, in the rear — ordering that general to march 
on " St. Amand, near Ligny " ; that is, to strike 
Bliicher's flank with his corps, 20,000 strong. A staff 
officer was the bearer of this order ; a duplicate was 
sent to Ney by a second staff officer. 8 

The conflict at Ligny raged for two or three 
hours, without leading to decisive results, though 
the Prussian army was, on the whole, worsted. 
Vandamme mastered St. Amand, and drew near 
Wagnel£e, on Bliicher's extreme right ; the veteran 

1 The expression " Prussian corps " instead of " army," has puz- 
zled commentators. The word was probably a mistake of Soult, 
a bad chief of the staff in the campaign. 

2 The D'Erlon incident, as it has been called, has been the sub- 
ject of much controversy, for it had a most important bearing on the 
results of the campaign. I have never doubted that Napoleon gave 
the order as above mentioned. See my Great Commanders of Mod- 
ern Times, p. 329, and Disputed Passages of the Campaign of iS/j 
{English Historical Review, January, 1895, p. 68). H. Houssaye 
has set the question at rest ("18/3," ii., 162-163) ; but I do not think 
the text of Napoleon's order is genuine (Hid., ii., 201). 



Quatre Bras 275 

warrior was all but turned and outflanked. Gerard 
attacked Ligny, which had been partly fortified ; 
the position was one of considerable strength; it 
was taken and retaken after furious efforts ; no 
quarter was asked for or given by troops animated 
by savage national hatred. Meanwhile Grouchy 
successfully engaged Thielmann, and was able to 
paralyse a superior force by demonstrations which 
held his enemy fast to the spot. The fight was 
desperately contested along three-fourths of the 
line, but the losses of the Prussians were much 
greater than those of the French ; as Wellington 
had foreseen, their reserves were cruelly stricken ' ; 
and Bliicher was compelled to employ a consid- 
erable part of his reserve against an army much 
more skilfully arrayed on the field. It was now 
about half-past five o'clock. Vandamme sent a 
report to Napoleon that a large hostile column 
was advancing against his flank and rear towards 
Fleurus, and that he would be driven from his po- 
sition if he was not reinforced. The Emperor de- 
spatched an aide-de-camp to find out how the matter 
stood ; this officer returned, in rather more than an 
hour, announcing that the apparition was that of the 
corps of D'Erlon, which, we have seen, had been 
summoned to the field of Ligny. Erelong the great 
mass of this force was seen to disappear. This most 
untoward accident saved Bliicher. Had D'Erlon 
marched to St. Amand, as he had been directed, 
the Prussian army must have been overwhelmed. 
It is now tolerably certain how this did not happen. 

1 Napoleon also noticed this. Comment. , v. , 144. 



2 j6 Wellington 

D'Erlon received the order sent by the staff officer ; 
he turned aside from the roads to Quatre Bras to- 
wards Ligny ; but the order was not sufficiently pre- 
cise. 1 He marched on Fleurus, not on St. Amand ; 
that is, he seemed to be threatening the French, not 
the Prussian army. Napoleon, trusting to the mes- 
sage from Vandamme, appears to have accepted a 
mistake as a fact ; but it remains a mystery why 
he did not bring up D'Erlon to the field, when the 
aide-de-camp had ascertained that D'Erlon was at 
hand. Many surmises have been made to account 
for this ; but it seems most probable that the Em- 
peror, losing his presence of mind in the confusion 
of a great battle, unaccountably missed the occa- 
sion. All that is certain is, that the message to 
D'Erlon was badly worded, and that Napoleon's ac- 
count of this incident is very obscure ; he seems to 
have felt that a great mistake had been made. 5 

The march of D'Erlon, announced to be that of an 
enemy, had caused great disorder in Vandamme's 
columns ; they lost much of the vantage ground they 
had gained. By this time Blucher had learned that 

1 This was another instance of the negligence of Soult, as chief of 
the French staff, repeatedly seen in the campaign. Soult was natur- 
ally indolent, and had little or no experience of this most important 
office. 

2 Napoleon's narrative of the D'Erlon incident will be found in 
Comment., v., 142. In Gourgaud's Me'moires, i., 174, the Em- 
peror is made to say: " Le mouvement D'Erlon m'a fait bien 
du tort ; on croyait autour de moi que c' etait l'ennemi." In my 
Great Commanders and Disputed Passages I have come to the con- 
clusion that a mistake was made by Napoleon, and this is the view 
of H. Houssaye ("/S/j," ii., 203; see also my Campaign of/S/j, 
p. 145). 



Quatre Bras 277 

he could expect no help from Wellington, engaged 
for hours with Ney at Quatre Bras ; but the old 
chief thought his opportunity had come. He made 
a desperate onslaught on Vandamme, collecting all 
the available troops at hand ; his object was to out- 
flank the French left, perhaps to drive it into the 
defiles of the Sambre. The attack, supported by a 
great part of the Marshal's reserve, was formidable, 
and not far from successful ; Napoleon was obliged 
to send part of the Imperial Guard to the aid of 
Vandamme : this reinforcement brought the attack 
to a stand. The Emperor now made ready for a 
decisive counter-stroke ; he could no longer hope to 
annihilate Blucher ; but he had the means at hand 
of winning the battle. The Imperial Guard and the 
horsemen of Milhaud, sustained by the divisions of 
Gerard, were launched against the Prussian centre at 
Ligny ; this was now held by a small force only, for 
the Prussian reserves had been wasted and greatly 
weakened, and large detachments had been made to 
join in the attack on Vandamme. The result, in 
the expressive language of Soult, was " like a trans- 
formation scene at a theatre." Ligny was carried, 
after a short resistance ; the Prussian army was rent 
asunder; Blucher was unhorsed in a cavalry mel6e ; 
he owed his life to a devoted aide-de-camp. The 
exulting French had soon taken possession of the 
ground held by their defeated enemies; but these 
fought fiercely to the last moment, and fell back a 
short distance only. The Emperor, in a word, had 
gained a victory ; but this was not the complete and 
absolute triumph which unquestionably would have 



278 Wellington 

been seen had D'Erlon fallen on Bliicher's flank or 
rear; in that event, Soult wrote, without exagger- 
ating the facts, that " 30,000 Prussians would have 
been made prisoners." The losses of the French 
were about 11,000 men; those of the enemy 18,000 
killed and wounded ; and from 8000 to 12,000 flying 
troops disbanded. 1 

Meanwhile Quatre Bras had been the scene of a 
combat, fierce and well contested, but unlike Ligny. 
It was a little after two on the 16th of June, when Ney 
began his attack on this important point, which he 
ought to have occupied and passed many hours be- 
fore. Perponcher, the general who had so happily 
sent his division to Quatre Bras on the 15th, had with 
his chief, the young Prince of Orange, made their 
preparations to resist the enemy. The ground tra- 
versed by the great main road from Charleroy to 
Brussels, but protected by woodland and two or three 
large farms, was favourable to the defensive as a 
whole, and Perponcher and the Prince had skilfully 
arrayed their men ; but these were unable to with- 
stand the onset of the French ; by three Quatre Bras 
was almost in the grasp of Ney. The Marshal, 
nevertheless, had been held in check for an hour, 
and this had been a godsend for the Allies ; Per- 
poncher's division may have been a forlorn hope, 
but it had been a forlorn hope of the very 
greatest value. About half-past three, Welling- 

1 The account of the battle of Ligny, by Clausewitz, is very able 
and brilliant, but very disingenuous. The historian conceals the 
truth as to what must have been the result had D'Erlon fallen on 
BlUcher ; see, too, the admirable remarks of Mr. Ropes, The Cam- 
paign of Waterloo, pp. 163-175. 



Quatre Bras 279 

ton, returning from Ligny, had most fortunately 
reached Quatre Bras ; Picton's division and other 
detachments had reached the field by this time; but 
Ney had been joined by the mass of Reille's corps : 
he disposed of from 18,000 to 19,000 men, and was 
very superior in cavalry and guns ; the situation 
had become " most critical " for the British com- 
mander. Wellington, however, an eye-witness has 
said, was " as cool as ice " ; his dispositions for 
the defence were, as always, excellent. Picton 
and his soldiers successfully held their ground 
on the left ; but the Dutch, Belgian, and Ger- 
man auxiliaries, who formed a large part of the 
Duke's army, were distinctly beaten at the cen- 
tre and on the right ; and though Wellington was 
again reinforced, the tide of battle was still turn- 
ing against him ; he must have been overwhelmed 
had Ney concentrated his forces, as he might have 
done, by the early afternoon of the 16th at latest. 
It was now about half-past five o'clock ; the Mar- 
shal had just received the message sent by Napoleon 
at a quarter after three, directing him to " envelope 
Bliicher's flank and rear" ; how he had failed to sec- 
ond his great master's designs ! Ney could not now 
hope to do the Emperor's bidding; he was held in 
check at Quatre Bras by Wellington ; D'Erlon and 
his corps were far from the scene ; only a part of 
Kellermann's cavalry, which had been placed in his 
hands, was on the spot. Ney acted with precipitate 
haste ; he launched a single brigade of Kellermann 
against the enemy, a useless and ill-conceived effort; 
the steel-clad horsemen made a very fine charge ; 



280 Wellington 

but their onset was fruitless, and they were erelong 
repulsed. 

During this episode in the conflict, or about that 
time, a superior officer, sent off by D'Erlon, had in- 
formed the Marshal that his chief had been sum- 
moned to join Napoleon. Ney flamed out into 
indignant wrath ; he forgot that D'Erlon had re- 
ceived the Emperor's orders, and that D'Erlon was 
too far off to be of any use at Quatre Bras ; he per- 
emptorily enjoined his lieutenant to come to his aid. 
D'Erlon very injudiciously obeyed this command ; 
clearly he ought to have done what Napoleon had 
told him to do ; he could have made Ligny a decisive 
victory for France ; he was too late to reach the 
Marshal in time. Despite the angry protests of his 
own soldiery, he drew off three-fourths of his corps 
from where it stood, and marched towards Quatre 
Bras ; he left a single division to observe the Prus- 
sians, a bad half-measure that effected nothing. 
Twenty thousand excellent troops, therefore, who 
could have crushed Bliicher had they fallen on his 
flank, in conformity with Napoleon's orders, or who 
would have struck Wellington down, had they been 
brought up by Ney to Quatre Bras in time, were 
idly moved to and fro between two battlefields, and 
did not fire a shot on the 16th of June; Napoleon 
probably made a mistake ; but the blame must lie 
mainly on Ney, and in part on D'Erlon. The Mar- 
shall meanwhile had continued to fight at Quatre 
Bras ; the staff officer who had carried the despatch 
in duplicate, directing D'Erlon to march on St. 
Amand, had entreated Ney in vain to countermand 



Quatre Bras 281 

his order : he had persisted in recalling his subordinate 
to his side. The evening by this time had far 
advanced ; considerable reinforcements flowed into 
Wellington, who had conducted the defence with 
characteristic skill : Ney was compelled to retreat 
to Frasnes ; the losses of the French were about 
4300 men ; those of the allies rather a larger num- 
ber. As we look back at the operations of the day, 
Ney, it may be admitted, did one good service ; he 
prevented Wellington from stretching a hand to 
Bliicher But if we recollect that he was at the 
head of an army of more than 40,000 men, and how 
great his opportunities were, his conduct must be in 
no doubtful sense censured. Had he assembled his 
forces in sufficient time, he ought to have been able 
to overthrow Wellington, and to detach a force that 
would have destroyed Bliicher : nay, had he not im- 
properly recalled D'Erlon, disobeying flagrantly his 
master's orders, Ligny would have been a second 
Jena for Prussia. Napoleon has written, without 
exaggerating the truth, that he would have " crushed 
his enemies on the 16th, had Ney done his duty on 
the left." In that event Waterloo would not have 
been fought , superior strategy would have pro- 
duced its natural results. 1 

The operations of the French on the 16th of 
June had been " incomplete," as had been the 
case on the 15th. It is simply ignoring plain facts 

1 For an admirable resume of what Ney might have accomplished 
on the 16th of June, see Napoleon, Comment., v., 199, 200. Consult 
also the judicious remarks of Mr. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 
pp. 186, 187. 



282 Wellington 

to deny that, had the Emperor's arrangements been 
properly carried out, Bliicher would have been 
crushed on the field of Ligny, and that Wellington 
would have been severely beaten ; a magnificent con- 
ception of war would have been realised. But if 
these decisive results had not been obtained, the 
strategic advantage gained by Napoleon, from the 
outset of the campaign, had been largely increased ; 
and the prospect before him was of the most splen- 
did promise. He was master of the main road from 
Charleroy to Brussels, up to the line of the communi- 
cation of his foes ; he had broken in the weak allied 
centre : Wellington would have to leave Quatre 
Bras, as Bliicher had been driven from Sombreffe. 
The hostile armies would be compelled to retreat 
into an intricate country of woodland and marsh, 
where it would be very difficult to effect their junc- 
ture, and where this could be made impossible, they 
could probably be kept separated and defeated in 
detail. But this was only a part of the results ; it 
was in the power of Napoleon to achieve a signal 
triumph for France on the 17th of June. The Prus- 
sian army had been badly worsted, and its chief dis- 
abled : it could not fight a battle for many hours, 
and was in retreat ; Wellington could not assemble 
45,000 men at Quatre Bras, and was far from his 
colleague "in the air"; Napoleon was at the head 
of more than 100,000 men ; and of these 60,000 were 
fine fresh troops. In these circumstances, the Em- 
peror had the choice of three courses ; all were in 
the very highest degree auspicious. 1 He might 

1 All commentators are now agreed as to what Napoleon might 



Quah' e Bras 28 







send only a few thousand men to observe Bliicher, 
and might fall on Wellington, a short way off at 
Quatre Bras, with his own army and that of Ney ; a 
disaster must have befallen the British commander. 
Or, leaving a small detachment to observe Welling- 
ton, he might pursue Bliicher, with the mass of his 
forces ; in that event nothing could have saved 
Bliicher. Or, finally, in conformity with more 
scientific strategy, and with grand examples set by 
Turenne and himself, Napoleon might attack Welling- 
ton with from 70,000 to 80,000 men, an army that 
ought to make victory certain ; at the same time he 
might send some 30,000 against Bliicher ; the Prus- 
sian army, we must bear in mind, had not been de- 
stroyed, and it might be reinforced by the whole 
corps of Bulow. In any of these cases, it seemed 
hardly possible but that decisive success would be 
obtained. 

The events of the 17th of June, however, turned 
out otherwise ; it is essential to examine how this 
happened. To secure the splendid results he might 
have secured, Napoleon should have been equal to 
himself, and should have shown his characteristic 

have achieved on the 17th of June. Reference may be made to the 
authorities cited in my Campaign of 181 5, p. 156; and see Ropes's Cam- 
paign of Waterloo, pp. 197-200, an excellent resume. Of the three 
alternative operations Soult, who knew what British soldiers were, pre- 
ferred the first ; he wished every available man to be directed against 
Wellington. H. Houssaye, " i8ij," ii., 240. According to Gour- 
gaud, M/moires, i., 197, Napoleon accepted this view after Waterloo. 
Clausewitz has written that the second alternative would have been 
the best, but this is more than doubtful. The third alternative was 
the most correct in pure strategy ; it was adopted by Napoleon, but 
too late ; and the execution of it was utterly mismanaged. 



284 Welling ton 

energy and resource, usually seen in following up 
victory. He ought to have had reports from his 
lieutenants at Ligny and Quatre Bras as to the state 
of his army before retiring to rest ; he ought to 
have had his troops ready to march against Bliicher 
or Wellington by the early morning of the 17th; 
this was only what was to be expected of him. Un- 
fortunately, at this juncture he lost many hours; he 
was in a state of inaction for a not inconsiderable 
time ; this is acknowledged by his friendly as well as 
his hostile critics. He went back to Fleurus after 
the defeat of Bliicher, completely exhausted by the 
work of two days ; and though he gave general di- 
rections for the pursuit of the Prussians, he saw no 
one until six or seven in the morning of the 17th. 
This conduct was so utterly different from the ex- 
traordinary activity of other campaigns that there 
must have been a real cause for it ; this, I believe, 
was the state of Napoleon's health, which had been 
in decline for many months, especially since his re- 
turn from Elba. Not that his genius did not often 
shine out in full force, or that he was not still ca- 
pable of great exertion ; but he was subject to two 
distressing ailments and to a kind of lethargy which 
occasionally made him good for nothing." There is 
cogent proof that this was the case with him on the 
night of the 16th ' ; this accounts, and can alone ac- 
count, for his seeming remissness. Meanwhile, the 
Prussians after Ligny were not even observed ; it 



' For the state of Napoleon's health in 1815 see the authorities 
in my Campaign of 1815, pp. 164-166. 

2 Dorsey Gardner, Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo. 



Quatre Bras 285 

was assumed that they were utterly routed ; care- 
lessness and negligence ran riot in the camp of the 
victors ; worse than all, Ney and Soult did not com- 
municate with each other, as was their obvious duty. 
The Achilles of war, whatever the cause, was thus 
slumbering in his tent ; his whole army and its 
chiefs were reposing in thoughtless confidence. It 
is unnecessary to say how dangerous this was in the 
presence of two such men as Bliicher and Welling- 
ton ; the first always indomitable in adverse fortune, 
the second prompt, skilful, and daring, when his ad- 
versary was before him. 

A letter from Soult to Ney — dictated, no doubt, 
by the Emperor between seven and eight in the 
morning — was the first sign of life shown by the 
French army on the 17th of June. This important 
despatch announced that " the Prussian army was 
routed " ; it added, among many other things, that 
the French army was to make a halt for the day ; 
unquestionably it had suffered a great deal. 1 Mean- 
while the Emperor had sent two of his cavalry chiefs 
after Bliicher ; he reached the field of Ligny be- 
tween nine and ten ; he was received with enthusi- 
astic acclaim by his troops ; but he was obliged to 
await for a time the report of his horsemen. These 
informed him that the Prussians were falling back 
towards Namur and Liege, that is, on the line of 
their communications with the Rhine ; but that a 
large body of the enemy had assembled around 
Gembloux, that is, near a village some eighteen 

1 This despatch will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, Water- 
loo, pp. 211-213. It is, I think, conclusive as to the D'Erlon incident. 



286 Wellington 

miles from Brussels, but almost parallel with Quatre 
Bras; this would show that Bliicher may have di- 
vided his forces, but that he was, perhaps, thinking 
of drawing near Wellington. The lame and impo- 
tent conclusion of a halt was abandoned ; Napoleon 
instantly resolved to attack Wellington, taking with 
him every man he could spare from Ligny ; a mes- 
sage was sent to Ney to join in the attack. At the 
same time, that is, before noon, Grouchy was to be 
detached, with a considerable restraining wing, to 
pursue Bliicher and to hold him in check, and, as a 
matter of course, to keep him away from Welling- 
ton. These operations were in accordance with true 
strategy, especially having regard to the probable 
strength of Bliicher ; but they were undertaken late ; 
precious hours had been lost ; success, which ought 
to have been made certain, had been rendered doubt- 
ful ; nay, there were chances that Fortune might be- 
come adverse. The orders given to Grouchy were 
of supreme importance ; they have been angrily dis- 
cussed, but their import is plain. In an interview 
with the Marshal, the Emperor told him that his 
mission was to reach and to attack Bliicher ; that he 
was to communicate with headquarters by the road 
from Namur to Quatre Bras ; the Emperor all but 
certainly added that Grouchy was to hold a position 
intermediate between the Prussian army and his 
own, which, if possible, was to attack Wellington in 
front of the forest of Soignies. In a despatch sent 
a little later Napoleon ordered Grouchy " to march 
to Gembloux with the mass of his forces" 1 ; he 



1 The orders given to Grouchy on the 17th of June have been the 



Quatre Bras 287 

added significantly that Wellington and Bliicher 
might be trying to unite, and to endeavour to fight 
another battle. 1 

The French army was now divided into two 
groups; the first, some 72,000 strong, with the Em- 
peror at its head, was to attack Wellington ; the sec- 
ond, not quite 34,000 men, under Grouchy, was to 
pursue Bliicher. Napoleon reached Quatre Bras at 
about two in the afternoon; Ney had not stirred from 
his camp at Frasnes ; his master was incensed that 
he had made no movement ; he had again set posi- 
tive orders at nought. But Napoleon and Ney 
could not, for many hours, have made any real im- 
pression on Wellington's army. The Duke — here 
different from his great antagonist — had been in the 
saddle from the early dawn of the 17th; he had been 
informed of the defeat of Ligny, and of the line of 
the Prussian army's retreat ; he resolved to fall 
back on a parallel line ; but told the aide-de-camp, 
sent by the chief of Bliicher's staff, that he would 
accept battle at Waterloo, on the 18th of June, if 
he had the support of one or two Prussian corps 
d'armce. Wellington's retreat was begun at ten in 
the morning; it was admirably conducted, and with 
perfect steadiness ; the Emperor was a great deal 
too late. A body of British cavalry, however, had 

subject of endless controversy by commentators. See H. Houssaye, 
" 1 8 15" ii., 225 ; Thiers, vi., 470 ; my own Campaign of i&ij, pp. 
168-170. Jomini, Precis de la Campagne de i8rj, pp. 188, 189, has 
no doubt as to Napoleon's meaning. 

1 As to this most important order reference may be made to the 
admirable remarks of Mr. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, pp. 
209-2 1 1 . 



288 Wellington 

screened the movement, and still continued at Quatre 
Bras ; Napoleon pushed his own cavalry forward, 
and vehemently directed the pursuit in person. But 
only insignificant skirmishes took place ; the pur- 
suit, in fact, was to no purpose ; and, besides, a tem- 
pest of rain which flooded the country had made 
military operations well-nigh useless. By seven in the 
evening the French squadrons had reached the up- 
lands of La Belle Alliance, in front of the position 
chosen by Wellington ; Napoleon ordered a charge 
to be made ; the thunder of many batteries made 
him aware that he had a considerable army before 
him ; in fact, Wellington had assembled the greatest 
part of his forces. " What would I have given," 
the Emperor exclaimed, " to have had the power of 
Joshua, and to have stayed the march of the sun ! " ' 
But the march of the sun had not been turned to 
account in the morning ; a great opportunity had 
passed away. 

Meanwhile Grouchy, with nearly 34,000 men, had 
been on the march to pursue Blucher. His move- 
ments, however, had been extremely slow ; his mas- 
ter had advanced not far from twenty miles on the 
17th ; he had not advanced more than nine or ten ; 
it deserves special notice that part of his cavalry had 
come up with the corps of Thielmann, falling back 
from Ligny, and yet did not hang on its retreat, un- 
pardonable negligence, which may have had great 
results. Grouchy had his army around Gembloux by 
nine on the night of the 17th, some of his squadrons 
being at Sauveniere, northwards ; during the night 

1 Comment., v., 200. 



Waterloo 289 

he received several reports to the effect that Bliicher 
all but certainly was at Wavre, a town some fifteen 
miles from Gembloux, and about ten or eleven from 
Waterloo, on a line parallel to Wellington's army. 
We have reached, perhaps, the most important pas- 
sage of the campaign, for it led to the memorable 
events that followed. Grouchy wrote twice to the 
Emperor, between ten at night and three in the morn- 
ing, that he was on the track of the Prussian army, 
and that Bliicher had assembled it around Wavre ; he 
added that should this prove to be the case, he 
would follow Bliicher and march on Wavre, " in 
order to keep him apart from Wellington" ' ; sig- 
nificant words, which show that he understood his 
mission, and knew what his restraining wing was to 
do ; had he intelligently carried out this purpose, 
Waterloo would have been a French, not an allied 
victory. While Napoleon was thus before Waterloo 
and Grouchy was at Gembloux, even now backward, 
the Prussian army, beaten as it had been at Ligny, 
had effected its retreat in complete safety. As we 
have seen, it had not even been observed by its 
enemy ; Zieten and Pirch marched northwards by 
Tillyand Sauveniere ; Thielmann, though reached by 
the French horsemen, was not molested; Bulow, with 
29,000 fresh troops, joined the main army by Wal- 
hain and Corry. The whole army, still some 90,000 
strong, and with from 270 to 280 guns, had assembled 



1 These despatches will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, Water- 
loo, pp. 230, 231, and 318. Grouchy shamefully garbled the first 
afterwards, to excuse his own conduct. His works on the campaign 
are a tissue of falsehoods. 



290 Wellington 

round Wavre on the night of the 17th, on both 
banks of the stream of the Dyle, its divisions, how- 
ever, being rather far apart ; that is, it held posi- 
tions parallel to the field of Waterloo ; but it was at 
a considerable distance from the British commander. 
This movement was directed by Gneisenau, the chief 
of Bliicher's staff ; it has been extolled by the won 
shippers of success ; but it was really a very imper- 
fect half-measure. Bliicher was now separated from 
Wellington by a long march, through a most difficult 
and broken country; he was not near his colleague 
as he had been at Sombreffe ; Grouchy had been de- 
tached to prevent their junction ; had he been a true 
soldier he would have made this impossible. 1 

We turn to Napoleon on the night of the 17th of 
June. The great warrior showed no signs of the 
lethargy which had disabled him the night before: 
he carefully observed his own position, and that of 
the enemy, lit up by a succession of bivouac fires. 
His chief thought was how to bring Wellington to 
bay : he was afraid that this would be almost im- 
possible, for rain had continued to fall in torrents ; 
but he had resolved to risk a night attack should the 
British General decamp. He had been informed 
that a Prussian column was not far from Wavre; but 
he gave little attention to this report ; he believed 
that Bliicher, severely stricken at Ligny, would not 
venture to march on Waterloo; in any case, Grouchy 
would hold him in check, and this was to be ex- 
pected from Grouchy's letters. At the same time 

1 See, on this subject, the conclusive observations of Napoleon, Com- 
ment., v., 205. 



Waterloo 291 

he did not neglect Grouchy ; it may be affirmed that 
he ordered the Marshal to send a detachment, on the 
1 8th, to the main French army, falling on the flank 
or the rear of Wellington ; this would be the coun- 
terpart of the movement that ought to have been 
made by Neyon the 16th. 1 Passing on to the Allies 
Wellington had made up his mind to encounter 
Napoleon on the 18th. Bliicher, though still suffer- 
ing from the shock of his fall, had nobly written that 
he would join his colleague with his whole army. 
Should Wellington and Bliicher once unite, they 
would be largely superior to Napoleon in numbers ; 
but were there reasonable grounds for supposing that 
they could effect their junction in time to baffle the 
attack of the Imperial army ? Bliicher would have to 
make a long and hazardous march from Wavre ; was it 
not certain, having regard to the Emperor's strategy, 
illustrated in many splendid campaigns, that there 
would be a restraining wing on his way to stop him ? 
It should be observed, too, that the allied chiefs 
thought that Napoleon had 100,000 men before 
Waterloo, and that Grouchy was far away with 
15,000 only ; but Wellington had only assembled 
70,000, — bad auxiliaries to a large extent, — what 
would be his chances in the battle at hand, should 
the French attack in the early forenoon, as would 
have happened but for a mere accident? The allied 
dispositions for the 18th were, therefore, faulty ; 



1 As regards this order, which was exactly in Napoleon's manner, 
see Comment., v., 154, 155, and the authorities cited in my Cam- 
paign of 1813, pp. 190-236. I am convinced the order was given ; 
but it never reached Grouchy. 



292 Wellington 

Napoleon has proved with irresistible logic ' that his 
adversaries should not have run the risk of fighting 
a great battle before Waterloo ; both should have 
fallen back and joined hands near Brussels. This 
whole strategy was essentially false ; it may com- 
mend itself to the courtiers of success ; it cannot 
blind the real student of war. 

Napoleon's army was nearly 72,000 strong, in- 
cluding 15,000 cavalry and 240 guns. The Emperor 
had intended to attack at nine in the forenoon; but a 
large part of his troops was still in the rear ; he had 
no notion of making an attack piecemeal. The at- 
tack, however, migl\t have begun at about ten 2 ; but 
the state of the ground, sodden with incessant rain, 
made the manoeuvring of cannon and horsemen 
very difficult ; at the instance of Drouot, one of his 
best officers, Napoleon postponed his onset for a 
time. Opinions have differed whether this was not 
a grave mistake ; the delay was an advantage in 
a certain sense, but it favoured a Prussian march 
from Wavre ; all that can be said, with certainty, is 
that, on the 18th of June, the sun in its course 
fought against Napoleon ; Wellington must have 
been defeated had the attack been made at about 
ten, on reasonably solid ground. Wellington's army, 
we have seen, was composed of about 70,000 men, 



' For Napoleon's conclusive reasoning on this subject reference 
may be made to Comment., v., 2 10-21 1. The passage is unan- 
swerable and avoided by English and German critics. See also my 
Campaign 0/1815, pp. 193-194. 

2 The order for the attack at nine is in La Tour d'Auvergne, 
Waterloo, p. 251. Charras most improperly suppressed it. 



Waterloo 293 

comprising 13,500 cavalry and 159 guns 1 ; but it 
was crowded with very inferior levies ; it did not 
contain 50,000 really good troops ; it was not nearly 
so powerful as the army it opposed ; all the more 
reason that its chief should not have accepted battle. 
The Duke had made his arrangements for the de- 
fence at an early hour; with one great exception 
they were, on the whole, masterly ; they fully re- 
vealed the consummate tactician. Ever apprehen- 
sive for his right, he left 17,000 men near Hal and 
had thus greatly weakened his main army ; unques- 
tionably this was a strategic error 2 ; even in the 
dispositions he made at Waterloo his right was, per- 
haps, too strongly occupied. But, as a rule, the 
choice of this position had been admirably made, 
and the means he adopted to hold it were, in the 
highest degree, excellent. The front of his main 
battle was covered by a crossroad, leading from 
Ohain to Braine le Leud, and forming in itself a very 
strong obstacle ; the slopes before it gave free play 
to the fire of artillery. Before the position stood 
a kind of succession of outworks ; the chateau of 
Hougoumont, with its walled enclosures ; the large 
farm of La Haye Sainte with its buildings, and the 
little hamlets of Papelotte and La Haye ; these were 
calculated to break the first fury of the enemy's 

1 I have taken the figures as to the numbers of Napoleon's and 
Wellington's forces from Charras, who has studied the subject with 
great care. The English estimate for Wellington, rather more than 
67,000 men, omits commissioned and non-commissioned officers and 
bandsmen. 

2 All commentators are agreed as to this. See especially Charr,as, 
ii., 72-73- 



294 Wellington 

attack. But the most distinctive feature of the posi- 
tion was this: the reserves were kept behind the ridge 
of Mont St. Jean, screened to a great extent from the 
fire of the French guns ; this was exactly the oppo- 
site of what had been seen at Ligny. Wellington 
knew what his antagonist had done with this arm, 
and had provided most skilfully against its effects. 
The ground, too, gave facilities for counter-attacks 
always essential in the case of a well- designed 
defence. 

While Napoleon and Wellington were thus con- 
fronting each other, we may glance at the operations 
of Grouchy, the evil genius of France on the great 
day of Waterloo. He had learned on the night of 
the 17th that Bliicher was at Wavre, that is, ten or 
eleven miles from his colleague ; he knew that his 
mission was to interpose between Bliicher and Wel- 
lington: he has acknowledged this in his own des- 
patches. To effect this object was by no means 
difficult ; he should cross the Dyle by the bridges of 
Moustier and Ottignies, about nine or ten miles from 
Gembloux ; this movement would place him on the 
western bank of the Dyle and could be accomplished 
before noon, 1 if reasonable activity were employed ; 
the restraining wing would thus be near Wavre, and 
on the flank of Bliicher, were the old Prussian chief 
drawing near Wellington, and would be in direct 
communication with the main French army; Napo- 
leon's orders would have been carried out in their 
true spirit. Had this been done, Grouchy would 

'This is admitted even by Charras, a libeller of Napoleon, ii., 
"5- 



Waterloo 295 

probably have defeated a part of the Prussian army 
and certainly would have prevented it reaching 
Waterloo; France would not have had to mourn for 
a frightful disaster. 1 Unhappily the Marshal, a mere 
cavalry chief, adopted an exactly opposite course ; 
he advanced along the eastern bank of the Dyle, 
making for Wavre, but not interfering with Bliicher 2 ; 
his march, too, was extremely slow ; he was really 
playing into the enemy's hands. Meanwhile Bliicher, 
not molested or disturbed, was moving on Waterloo 
to join his colleague. The movement, however, was 
too late, and was retarded by accidents that need 
not have happened. Gneisenau distrusted and dis- 
liked Wellington ; he charged him with misconduct 
on the 15th of June; he disapproved of an advance 
on Waterloo until he was assured that Wellington 
was determined to make a stand. He was ignorant, 
too, of the whereabouts of Grouchy ; he thought 
that the Marshal had a small force only ; had he 
known that Grouchy had nearly 34,000 men he prob- 
ably would not have sanctioned the march from 
Wavre ; and he was the mentor of his aged chief. 
The Prussian army, however, was at last on the 
march ; but it was greatly and very unnecessarily 
delayed. Bulowwas moved first, because his troops 



1 For what Grouchy should have done and what he could have ac- 
complished in that event, see the authorities collected in my Campaign 
of iSij, p. 326. Charras is the only writer who takes a contrary 
view. I am the only English writer who has seriously gone into 
the subject. — Campaign of 181 f, pp. 314-328. 

2 Grouchy had never had an independent command. Pasquier, 
M/moires, iii., 232, relates that Soult and other generals warned 
Napoleon not to give him one. 



296 Wellington 

had not fought at Ligny ; but Bulow was on the 
eastern bank of the Dyle, that is, farther than any 
of his colleagues from Wellington's lines ; Pirch 
marched next, and was followed by Zieten ; but 
these generals were slow and timid ; they had not 
forgotten the defeat of the 16th ; Thielmann was 
left behind to defend Wavre. The Prussian army 
was thus divided into masses far apart and exposing 
their flanks for miles to their foes ; had Grouchy 
fallen on these, as he might have done, he could 
have stricken Bulow, at least, with effect ; and he 
could have kept Bliicher far away from Welling- 
ton. 

The French army had taken its ground at about 
eleven on the 18th ; the masses of infantry and 
cavalry on a front of rather more than two miles, 
on either side of the great main road from Charleroy 
to Brussels, presented a most imposing spectacle. 
Wellington's army, on a more extended front, had 
only its foremost line displayed : the reserves were 
carefully withheld from view ; it stood motionless 
and silent, while the enthusiastic shouts of its enemy 
rang out up to the ridge of Mont St. Jean. The 
plan of Napoleon's attack was grandly designed, ' 
but, as we shall see, it was more than once changed ; 
and it was badly carried out on this eventful day. 
The centre of Wellington at La Haye Sainte was to 
be stormed ; this would open to Napoleon the way 
to Brussels ; at the same time Wellington's left was 
to be turned and forced ; this was the weakest part 

1 Compare Jomini, Prdcis de la Campagne de /SiJ, p. 198 ; Char- 
ras, ii., 88. 



Waterloo 297 

of the British chief's position. The attack began at 
about half-past eleven ; the soldiery of Reille ad- 
vanced against Hougoumont ; the 'movement was 
intended to be only a feint, to withdraw the attention 
of the enemy from the decisive onslaught. But 
owing to the passionate ardour of the French chiefs 
and their men — conspicuously seen throughout the 
day, for the victory at Ligny had turned their 
heads — the feint was turned into a real attack ; 
no marked impression was made on Hougoumont; 
the Duke reinforced the defenders from time to 
time; the assailants perished in hundreds, and were 
held completely in check. At about one the Em- 
peror's grand attack opened ; the fire of a great 
battery of eighty guns, so directed as partly to rake 
the enemy, searched the centre and the left of the 
Allies ; Wellington's front was in some degree 
shaken ; the Belgian auxiliaries, too much exposed, 
gave way. The corps of D'Erlon, eager to avenge 
the 16th, and a division of Reille were pushed for- 
ward ; the French soldiery swarmed around La Haye 
Sainte ; they reached the crest of the Duke's po- 
sition ; the battle seemed to be almost won. But 
three of D' Erlon's divisions had been arrayed in 
dense and clumsily formed columns 1 ; they had not, 
besides, the support of cavalry ; the superiority of 
the line over the column was seen, as so often had 
been the case in the Peninsular War. D' Erlon's 
men were furiously charged by Picton and by British 
and Scotch infantry ; the staggering masses were 
forced back by degrees ; their defeat was completed 
1 See Ropes's Campaign of Waterloo, p. 305, and Charras, ii.,,25. 



298 Wellington 

by a magnificent charge of horsemen. At the same 
time Reille's division was driven from La Haye 
Sainte ; and a body of cuirassiers, sent by Napoleon 
to the spot, was beaten by another body of British 
cavalry. D' Erlon's fourth division was also com- 
pelled to retreat ; the first great effort of the Em- 
peror had failed. But Wellington, too, had cruelly 
suffered ; Picton and hundreds of his best troops 
had fallen ; his cavalry, carried too far in their 
triumph, had been half cut to pieces ; his inferior 
auxiliaries had shown signs of flinching; the vulner- 
able points in his position had been searched and 
discovered. 

A short time before the great attack of D' Erlon, 
Napoleon had cast his eyes over the whole scene of 
action ; he saw what appeared to be a kind of cloud 
three or four miles away on his right. His practised 
sight perceived that this was a body of troops. 
Soult expressed an opinion that this was a detach- 
ment from Grouchy — significant words of extreme 
importance ; the truth was in a short time as- 
certained. A Prussian officer had been made pris- 
oner ; he reported to the Emperor that the appar- 
ition was a part of the corps of Bulow, stationed 
around the hamlet of St. Lambert ; that Bulow was 
on his way to join Wellington ; and that no tidings 
had been heard of Grouchy, who, it was assumed, 
was moving towards the main French army. This 
intelligence, of course, was extremely grave ; Na- 
poleon despatched Lobau with ten thousand men 
to observe Bulow, and to hold him in check ; he 
was to take position between St. Lambert and the 



Waterloo 299 

Emperor's right flank. It appears certain, however, 
that, at this moment, Napoleon had little or no fear 
for himself ; he was rather apprehensive that Bulow 
might intercept Grouchy, supposed to be on the 
march to the French lines at Plancenoit. He cer- 
tainly expected Grouchy to be not far off, if the 
Marshal was not keeping Blucher away from Wel- 
lington ; this would be in conformity with his own 
orders ; and all but certainly he had directed 
Grouchy, on the night of the 17th, to send a detach- 
ment to his aid. Besides, Napoleon had, on the 
morning of the 18th, despatched a body of horse- 
men and a special messenger, towards the bridges of 
Moustier and Ottignies, in the assurance that Grou- 
chy was crossing the Dyle at these points ; he told 
the special messenger that the Marshal was already 
at hand. Nor is there anything in an ambiguous des- 
patch from Soult to make an impartial critic reject 
this inference. In reply to the letter from Grouchy, 
written at three in the morning of the 18th, Soult 
said that his master approved " of the march on 
Wavre " ; but he ordered the Marshal to " manoeuvre 
in our direction " ; and he positively commanded 
him to advance to the battlefield of Waterloo. 
The meaning, badly expressed as it was, was 
obviously that Grouchy was to move on Wavre, but 
by the western bank of the Dyle, so as to keep 
Blucher apart from Wellington ; in any case he was 
to make his way to the Emperor. Soult added in a 
postscript written after the prisoner's report, that 
Bulow was threatening Napoleon's right flank, and 
that Grouchy was " to attack and crush Bulow," a 



300 Wellington 

clear proof that Grouchy, it was believed, was 
near. 1 

The attack of D'Erlon had been repulsed at about 
three; before that time Napoleon had received in- 
telligence from Grouchy of the most ominous kind. 
The Marshal wrote from Walhain, a village some 
eight miles from Wavre : he was advancing by the 
eastern bank of the Dyle, that is, far away from the 
Imperial army; he did not exactly know what had 
become of Blucher. Napoleon, therefore, could ex- 
pect no support from Grouchy ; he would have to 
meet the attack of Bulow on his right flank ; he 
would have to continue the great fight with Welling- 
ton. He immediately changed the plan of his battle: 
he could not now hope to turn the Duke's left, for 
this would imperil his own right; he ordered Ney, 
who had the chief charge of all the attacks, to storm 
La Haye Sainte at any cost, that is, to effect a lodg- 
ment in the enemy's centre, but to maintain him- 
self in that point of vantage until he, the Emperor, 
should dispose of Bulow. 2 Under the cover of an in- 
tense cannonade, which greatly ravaged Wellington's 
troops, Ney succeeded in mastering La Haye Sainte, 3 
but, as had been the case on the 16th, he again dis- 



1 I have endeavoured to reconcile the very conflicting evidence and 
judgments on this most important passage of the battle of Waterloo. 
The authorities will be found collected in my Campaign of 1815, pp. 
232, 236, and see the text. 

2 Gourgaud's Campagne de 1815. Jerome's Jlf/moires, vii., 22. 

3 As to the capture of La Haye Sainte, see the authorities collected 
in my Campaign of i£/J, p. 256. It is very important, if possible, 
to fix the time, but the evidence is conflicting. From the course of 
the battle I believe it was four or half-past four. 



Waterloo 301 

obeyed his orders. The Marshal thought he per- 
ceived signs of retreat on the part of the enemy ; 
no doubt many of the weak auxiliaries were in full 
flight ; in a reckless moment he launched some 5000 
horsemen, despite the entreaties of their own chiefs, 
against Wellington's right centre, still quite un- 
broken. The onset of these brave troops was very 
fine ; but it was not supported by infantry or guns ; 
the Duke was fully prepared to resist the attack ; it 
failed against the British and German Legionary 
squares. Meanwhile Napoleon had been fiercely 
engaged with Bulow ; Bliicher, fearing for the re- 
sults of the day, 1 fell on Lobau with 29,000 men. 
Napoleon was obliged to detach the Young Guard 
against the advancing enemy, already menacing his 
right and even his rear at Plancenoit. This attack 
was for the moment beaten back ; the Emperor has- 
tened to the main field of battle, and was indignant 
at seeing what Ney had done. " The' madman ! " he 
exclaimed, "he is ruining France for the second 
time" ; but he decided that Ney's movement must 
now be sustained. 2 He allowed the Marshal to en- 
gage nearly his whole cavalry; but he asserted, 
to the last hour of his life, that he directed a con- 
siderable reserve to be kept intact. 3 The charges of 

1 See the Prussian official account of Waterloo, Campaign of 181J, 
p. 265. 

5 As to Ney's premature and most unwise cavalry attacks, see the 
authorities in my Campaign of 1815, pp. 258-259. They were un- 
questionably made against Napoleon's orders. 

3 See Comment., v., 177; vi., 150, and H. Houssaye, " 1815," ii., 
364. As to keeping a reserve intact, see the above and Gourgaud, 
Memoir es, Passim, 



302 Wellington 

these masses of horsemen, from 11,000 to 12,000 
strong, were magnificent and repeatedly pressed 
home ; but again they were very ill supported '; the 
Duke strengthened his right centre with character- 
istic skill; the proud squadrons were again beaten 
off by squares, which a brave enemy has written 
seemed rooted " in the earth" ; but thousands of the 
auxiliaries were fugitives along the main road to 
Brussels. During this time Bulow had again fallen 
on Napoleon's right; the Emperor sent a part of the 
Old Guard to withstand the attack ; this effort was 
for the present successful ; the Prussian columns 
recoiled, and even disappeared. But the attacks 
made by Ney had once more failed ; the flag of 
England still waved along the ridge of Mont St. 
Jean, though Wellington's centre at La Haye Sainte 
was in the gravest peril. 2 

It was now about seven in the evening ; the result 
of the battle still hung in suspense. Napoleon had 
hopes that he could yet gain a victory, but he must 
have felt for hours that this could be only a victory 
in name. The attack of Bulow seemed to be spent; 
the cannon of Grouchy were heard at Wavre ; the 
Marshal surely could keep Bliicher back ; the centre 
of Wellington had been well-nigh broken ; fugitives 
were choking the great main road in thousands. 
The Emperor resolved to make a last effort with the 
Imperial Guard ; but he could not dispose of more 
than half of that noble force ; the other half was 



1 See on this point the judicious remarks of Mr. Ropes, The Cam-, 
paign of Waterloo, pp. 272, 273. 

2 Shaw Kennedy, an eye-witness, Battle J Waterloo, p. 124. 



Waterloo 303 

protecting his right flank from the Prussians. But 
Wellington had a better prospect of success ; his 
British and German Legionary soldiers had held 
their ground ; he had a considerable reserve con- 
cealed from his enemy ; above all, he knew that 
Zieten and Pirch were at hand to support Bulow. 
Six battalions of the Guard were told off for the final 
attack ; these were placed under the command of 
Ney, but they were directed against the Duke's 
right centre, his strongest point, not against his 
gravely endangered centre ; four battalions were to 
second the movement ; these were to be led by 
Napoleon in person. The Guard did all that brave 
men could do ; they even gained some trifling suc- 
cess ; but they had not much infantry and no cavalry 
on their flanks ; they were overwhelmed by Welling- 
ton's admirably husbanded reserve and part of his 
fire and line. The whole French army suddenly 
gave way ; the Duke, seeing that the battle had been 
won, advanced his shattered army a few hundred 
yards ; La Haye Sainte was retaken ; fresh British 
cavalry was let loose on the blood-stained field. 
Just at this moment Zieten appeared on the scene ; 
from 10,000 to 12,000 Prussians broke the extreme 
right of Napoleon ; Pirch seconded Bulow in another 
attack; fully 35,000 Prussians fell on Napoleon's 
right flank and rear. An appalling spectacle of ruin 
was seen ; the beaten army broke up in multitud- 
inous rout ; the four battalions of the Guard, which 
had not been engaged, perished almost to a man, 
but refused to surrender. The fugitive host, now a 
mere chaos, relentlessly pursued by the triumphant 



304 Wellington 

Prussians, made its way to Charleroy and crossed the 
Sambre; as an effective force it was practically de- 
stroyed. The losses of the victors were about 23,000 
men, those of the vanquished upwards of 40,000. 

Wellington proved himself to be, in the highest 
sense, a great master of tactics on the field of Water- 
loo. With trifling exceptions he arrayed his army 
on the fine position of his choice with conspicuous 
skill, especially in concealing his reserves; he con- 
ducted the battle with admirable activity and re- 
source ; he was the soul of a magnificent defence. 
But his chief excellences were his stern constancy 
and invincible endurance in a most fiery trial, and 
here no general of the Coalition can be compared to 
him ; the Archduke Charles, we may affirm, would 
have retreated after the fall of La Haye Sainte. 
Justice, too, should be done to the British troops. 
Napoleon had had little experience of them ; after 
Waterloo he recognised their sterling worth ; a 
prouder testimonial has never been given to sol- 
diers. 1 The tactics of the French in the battle were 
faulty : the attack of Hougoumont was a reckless 
waste of life ; Ney disobeyed the Emperor's orders, 
and " massacred his cavalry," as his master wrote ; 
the Imperial Guard was wrongly directed ; the three 
arms failed to support each other over and over 
again throughout the day. Napoleon was, of course, 
in a sense, responsible for all this ; he gave little 
proof of the energy of his antagonist ; this may 

1 " Les Francais, quoique si inferieurs en nombre, auraient rem- 
porte la victoire, et ce ne fut que labravoure obstinee et indomptable 
des troupes anglaises seules qui les empecha." 



Waterloo 305 

have been partly owing to the state of his health ; 
he was dozing for a time during the attack on 
Hougoumont. But we must recollect, that in the 
later part of the 18th, he was fighting two battles 
and could not direct the operations as a whole, and 
his lieutenants must bear the chief share of the 
blame ; he invariably left a great deal to them, espe- 
cially when they had been engaged in action. Never- 
theless, in spite of the great qualities displayed by 
Wellington, and the steadfastness and valour of part 
of his army, and in spite of the tactical mistakes of 
the French, Napoleon would have won the battle of 
Waterloo, had he been able to employ his whole 
forces against the Duke, but his victory, I believe, 
could not have been decisive. 1 The allied army 
was very inferior in strength to its enemy : it had 
fairly defeated the attack of D'Erlon ; but it could 
not have withstood a combined effort made not only 
by the Emperor's first line, but by Lobau, the Im- 
perial Guard, and the powerful French cavalry. The 
intervention of Bulow prevented this ; Zieten and 
Pirch turned a defeat into an appalling rout. But 
Grouchy ought to have made these results impos- 
sible ; he is mainly responsible for what occurred at 
Waterloo. I have already indicated what the Mar- 
shal ought to have done : had he crossed the Dyle 
on the forenoon of the 18th, and made his way on 
the western bank, France would have been spared an 
immense disaster, very probably would have secured 
a victory ; nay, had he not rejected the counsels of 

1 See the admirable remarks of Mr. Ropes, Campaign of Water- 
loo, p. 327. 



306 Wellington 

Gerard, who, when the thunder of Waterloo was 
heard at Walhain, entreated his chief to hasten to 
the field, he would have at least averted the catas- 
trophe that took place. But he persisted in march- 
ing on the eastern bank of the Dyle, thus permitting 
Bliicher to join Wellington, and not even lending a 
hand to his master; he reached Wavre only to find 
Bliicher gone ; he merely fought an indecisive com- 
bat with Thielmann. Grouchy stands before the bar 
of impartial history as the true author of the fright- 
ful ruin of Waterloo. 1 

A well-informed survey of Wellington's career 
proves that, like Frederick, he did not excel in 
strategy. This was strikingly apparent in 1815, 
when the greatest of strategists met him in the field. 
He was outmanoeuvred at the outset of the cam- 
paign ; he ought to have been defeated on the 16th 
of June; he was in the gravest peril on the 17th ; he 
risked too much in making a stand at Waterloo ; 
he ought not to have weakened his army by leaving 
a large detachment at Hal. Yet he should not be 
judged as a strategist by his conduct in 181 5 ; his 
veteran colleague forced his hand, especially by his 
advance to Sombreffe: had he been the commander 
of the two allied armies, he would probably have 
united them at Waterloo on the 17th of June ; and 
Napoleon would have been defeated had he at- 
tacked. His real merit in this passage of arms 
was that of a consummate leader of men in battle ; 



1 I have already noticed the best authorities on the operations of 
Grouchy. I would especially refer the reader to Ropes, The Cam- 
paign of Waterloo, pp. 245-288, and to H. Houssaye, l, /Sij," 
ii., 485-494- 



Waterloo 307 

this largely atones for undoubted strategic errors. 
Justice, too, is due to his aged ally ; Bliicher made 
many and grave mistakes ; but no other general of 
that age, not Wellington himself, would have so 
heroically risen superior to defeat, and would have 
made the most hazardous march from Wavre to 
Waterloo. With respect to Napoleon, the plan of 
his campaign was one of the finest ever thought out 
in war, and it was over and over again well-nigh suc- 
cessful, though his enemies were not far from two- 
fold in numbers. No doubt the Emperor made a 
few mistakes; but in his operations in 1815 the extra- 
vagance of the Peninsular War and of 1812 and 1813 
does not appear ; the grandeur of the conception, 
and the scientific method characteristic of the first 
master of modern war, are manifest in their full com- 
pleteness. Yet Napoleon met his ruin at Waterloo: 
nor is it difficult to ascertain the causes. Two or 
three times victory was within his grasp ; but the 
lieutenants in whom he trusted failed him ; Ney and 
Grouchy were instruments that broke in his hands ; 
he was unequal to himself on the night of the 16th ; 
his army, too, was not sufficiently strong : due 
allowance could not be made for mischances. The 
French army, besides, if it gave proof of heroic 
valour, on many occasions was an ill-organised and 
ill-disciplined army ; the soldiery had little trust in 
their chiefs ; the chiefs themselves were to a great 
extent demoralised. Nevertheless the splendour of 
Napoleon's genius in war shines out conspicuously 
in the campaign ; nor has his renown, as he foretold 
would be the case, suffered. 




CHAPTER X 

THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION — ENTRANCE INTO 
POLITICAL LIFE 

Wellington and Bliicher invade France — Intrigues of Fouche to 
effect the restoration of Louis XVIII. — Napoleon practically 
deposed by the Chambers — Duplicity of Fouche — He paralyses 
the defence of Paris — Envoys sent to Wellington and Bliicher — 
Hazardous advance of Bliicher — Wisdom and moderation of 
Wellington — The capitulation of Paris — Great position of Wel- 
lington — He saves France from dismemberment, and does her 
other services — He commands the Army of Occupation — He 
enters political life in 1818, and is made Master of the Ordnance 
and Commander-in-Chief — The period from 1818 to 1827 — 
Conduct of Wellington — His attitude to the Irish Catholic and 
other questions — His dispute with Canning. 

WELLINGTON and Bliicher at once invaded 
France, the victory of Waterloo had been 
so complete, though the other armies of 
the Coalition were still distant. The British Gen- 
eral called in the detachment, which he had left at 
Hal, and advanced by the fortresses of the Somme ; 
the Prussian Marshal, pressing more boldly forward, 
marched along the western bank of the Oise, leaving 
the corps of Pirch behind to conduct sieges. The 
object of the two chiefs was to make for Paris, and 

308 



The A rmy of Occupation 309 

to cut off the now isolated force of Grouchy, which 
had effected its retreat from Wavre to Givet, and 
was trying to reach the capital by the Aisne ; the 
movement of its commander, if unduly extolled, 
was intelligent, energetic, and rapid, very different 
from his movements on the 17th and 18th of June. 
Meanwhile a revolution had broken out in the seat 
of power in France which had brought the Hundred 
Days to a close, and was attended with portentous 
results. Napoleon, at the instance of his chief offi- 
cers, who had too truly told him that he had no 
army in his hands, had hastened to Paris to make an 
effort to obtain means to continue the war, and 
to defend the nation against an invasion now threat- 
ening its very existence as a State. He rightly said 
to his Council that the only chance of safety lay 
in the patriotic union of all Frenchmen, under the 
sovereign they had welcomed a few months before ; 
and he wished to have a dictatorship, which would 
have given him unfettered power for a time. But 
France was enervated, divided, appalled by the late 
disaster; the Chambers, which he had just convened, 
regarded the Emperor with profound distrust, and 
were inspired by the revolutionary liberalism of the 
day : and at this crisis, they fell under the influ- 
ence of one of the ablest and most unscrupulous in- 
triguers of that age. Fouche had long been one of 
Napoleon's ministers ; but he was convinced that his 
second reign could not last : he had plotted traitor- 
ously against him during the Hundred Days ; after 
Waterloo he saw that a Bourbon restoration was 
at hand, and he aspired to be one of its principal 



3 1 o Wellington 

leaders. Under his guidance and that of Lafayette, 
an ideologist of 1789, the Chambers turned a deaf 
ear to Napoleon's requests ; they practically deposed 
him by a sudden coup d' dtat ; they extorted an 
abdication, nominally in favour of his son, which, he 
bitterly exclaimed, was a sorry delusion. 

In a few days a kind of provisional government of 
France was set up ; Fouche contrived artfully to be 
made its head ; the one chance, and it was an almost 
hopeless chance, of resisting the armed League of Eu- 
rope disappeared. Napoleon was relegated to hardly 
veiled captivity : he was abandoned as he had been 
in 18 14 ; ere long he was on his way to St. Helena, 
the last scene of a strange, eventful history, unparal- 
leled in the annals of mankind. The Provisional 
Government was largely composed of regicides ; the 
Chambers were distinctly opposed to the Bourbons. 
They despatched envoys to Blucher and Wellington 
who, in the first instance, curtly refused the over- 
tures that were made for an armistice ; they issued 
proclamations calling on Frenchmen to rise up in 
arms, and to repeat -the national efforts of 1792-94; 
as if the circumstances were not wholly different, 
and as if the shadow of a government sitting in 
Paris could be a second convention reviving the 
Reign of Terror. But Fouche judged the position 
of affairs correctly; he knew the Assembly, and the 
men he had to deal with ; he allowed noisy patriot- 
ism to vent itself in clamour, indeed seemed to pro- 
mote it in different ways; but with great tact and 
adroitness, and with duplicity skilfully concealed, 
he took care to paralyse every attempt to resist the 




NAPOLEON BY A DYING CAMP FIRE. 
(From a drawing by Charlet.) 



The Army of Occtipatzon 3 1 1 

invaders, and steadily plotted to restore Louis 
XVIII. to the throne ; his real object was, in 181 5, 
to play the part played by Talleyrand the year 
before. He refused to give arms to the population 
of Paris, already beginning to menace traitors ; the 
old Jacobin terrified the Chambers with reports of a 
Jacobin rising ; he did nothing to strengthen the for- 
tified works begun around the capital. He placed 
Massena at the head of the National Guard of 
Paris, thus giving this force the sanction of an illus- 
trious name ; but Massena was no friend of the 
fallen Emperor ; he had no thought but that of an 
inglorious repose, and of preserving the wealth he 
had amassed by rapine ; the National Guard, com- 
posed of the timid bourgeoisie, was soon persuaded 
that its real and only mission was to maintain order. 
At the same time the astute and base intriguer con- 
vened a great council of marshals and generals, to 
whom he put questions as to the capacity of Paris to 
withstand an attack, and as to the favourable chances 
of a great national defence ; such a council prover- 
bially never fights ; and though Davout, Napoleon's 
late Minister of War, showed hesitation and made 
some ambiguous protests, the council reported in 
the negative to both questions, and by implication 
declared for the restoration of the King. Mean- 
while Fouch6 had continued to send negotiators to 
the allied camp, — one, Vitrolles, a notorious parti- 
san of the Bourbons, who had tried to raise armed 
levies against Napoleon in the South and was now 
released from Vincennes to do Fouche's bidding. 
Bliicher and Wellington still rejected an armistice, 



3 1 2 Wellington 

though some of Bliicher's officers dropped pacific 
hints ; the British commander, with characteristic 
wisdom, perceived that it might be possible to treat 
on conditions that would bring the war to an end. 
Louis XVIII. had joined his victorious army; his 
authority with the King was immense ; he saw, and 
rightly saw, that the only hope for France was to 
restore the Bourbon dynasty to the throne, though 
he declared that there was no wish to force on the 
nation a government against its will. He indicated 
his thoughts to Fouche's envoys: these fell in with 
the arch-intriguer's views ; but he also laid down the 
conditions which, in a military sense, must be com- 
plied with, before he could sheathe his sword. 

It was strange that one of the greatest and one 
of the worst men of that time had accidentally 
agreed, though from different motives, in giving 
effect to the same policy at this grave conjuncture. 
Events singularly concurred to favour the object at 
which Wellington and Fouche aimed. Bliicher had 
pressed forward far in advance of his colleague : 
their two armies had been many leagues apart ; 
Napoleon, from his retreat at Malmaison, had in 
vain implored the Provisional Government to allow 
him to fall on the divided enemies ; he might have 
gained a passing triumph, but it could have come to 
nothing; at all events Fouche had ideas of a very 
different kind. But nothing could stop the im- 
petuous veteran; he marched on to Paris and 
crossed the Seine, to the southern bank, where the 
defences of the capital were quite unfinished; he 
gave out that he would shoot Napoleon, should he 



The Army of Occupation 3 1 3 

have the chance; he threatened the Jacobin Cham- 
bers and the infidel city. This sent a thrill of indig- 
nation through the mass of the citizens, and even 
stirred the Chambers to wrath; they had the means 
of making the old Marshal feel their vengeance. 
Grouchy had reached Paris with most of his forces ; 
the remains of the Waterloo army had been brought 
together and numbered perhaps twenty thousand 
men; large bodies of troops had been drawn from 
depots; volunteers had been suddenly enrolled; in 
short the capital was a very formidable object to at- 
tack. And though Wellington had ere long come 
into line with his ally, he only held the northern 
bank of the Seine ; their armies were not one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand strong, and were dis- 
persed over an immense space ; their enemies stood 
between them with ninety thousand men, supported 
by a kind of great entrenched camp ; the Prussians 
had been routed in a bloody combat ; there was real 
danger of a conflict that might have the worst re- 
sults. The wisdom, the moderation, the statesman- 
like sense of Wellington were now conspicuously 
seen, and, happily for the estate of man, triumphed. 
He warned his colleague that the fate of Napoleon 
did not depend on generals in the field, but on their 
masters ; he quietly deprecated acts of violence and 
revenge ; he even informed Blucher that it was by 
no means certain that their united efforts would 
make Paris fall ; at all events it was common pru- 
dence to wait for the support of the other allied 
armies. The passionate veteran yielded to these 
sagacious counsels; he felt the superior influence of 



3 1 4 Wellington 

a calm but overmastering mind. In a very short 
time the conditions of Wellington were agreed to ; 
the French armies were to retire behind the Loire : 
the Allies were to occupy Paris, but the National 
Guard was to act as the police of the city. It was 
understood that Louis XVIII. was to be restored; 
the King, in fact, entered the capital three weeks 
after Waterloo. Fouche, of course, gladly accepted 
these terms ; he had played a hazardous game, and 
had won the stake ; but his life had been in no 
doubtful peril ; he had been loudly denounced as a 
false-hearted traitor. 

The position of Wellington, at this juncture, was 
one of almost unexampled grandeur ; he certainly 
was the foremost man in Europe. He was compara- 
tively unknown, during the Peninsular War, though 
his operations had been watched and studied ; he 
did not march to Paris in 1814; even at the Con- 
gress of Vienna he held a secondary place. But he 
had forestalled the Coalition in 171 5 ; he had struck 
down Napoleon in a decisive battle ; the glory of 
this was mainly and rightly ascribed to him. He 
had also practically restored the Bourbons, and had 
saved France from perhaps an internecine struggle ; 
the Allies and Louis XVIII. owed everything to 
him. This was the splendid climax of his renowned 
career; no English subject, not Marlborough him- 
self, has ever stood so high in the councils of 
Europe. During the three years that followed, he 
gave signal proof, in a situation glorious indeed but 
difficult, and which taxed his great powers to the 
utmost, of the far-seeing wisdom, the well-balanced 



The Army of Occupation 3 r 5 

judgment, the moderation and the profound sa- 
gacity which were the distinctive features of his 
character on its intellectual side, but also of his 
sterling integrity and strong sense of duty, the most 
striking, perhaps, of his moral qualities ; it was well 
for the world that it possessed such a man. The 
most important of his achievements, at this time, 
was that he prevented the dismemberment of France, 
and thus averted revolution for many years, and 
secured for the Continent a season of comparative 
repose. Every member of the Coalition in 1815 
was eager for vengeance on a people which, since 
1791, had disturbed and threatened the civilised 
world, and had carrried its victorious arms from 
Madrid to Moscow ; ambition and prudence seemed 
alike to require that the territory of France should 
be largely diminished. Austria demanded the resti- 
tution of Alsace and Lorraine ; Prussia declared 
that the Continent would not be safe until France 
had been cut up into separate kingdoms ; the sover- 
eign of Belgium and Holland, just made one state, 
insisted on having a new barrier, which would in- 
clude the fortresses of Burgundian Artois : even 
Lord Liverpool, a timid and pacific statesman, 
thought that France should be reduced nearly 
within her limits before the Peace of Westphalia. 
Wellington steadily rejected these dangerous coun- 
sels; in a masterly correspondence he pointed out 
that peace was the great need of the Continent, and 
that this would be impossible were whole provinces 
torn from France ; he laid stress also on the injust- 
ice of a policy of this kind ; and he significantly 



3 1 6 Wellington 

added that France still possessed more elements 
of military power than any state in Europe. His 
arguments were attended with success : no doubt 
other and potent reasons concurred : but it was 
chiefly due to the victor of Waterloo that France 
was not dismembered in i8i5,a result very different 
from what was seen in 1870-71. 

This, however, was not the only service done by 
Wellington to France in this eventful period. He 
prevented Bliicher from destroying the bridge on the 
Seine, which commemorates the Prussian disaster of 
Jena. With Castlereagh and, in a lesser degree, 
with Nesselrode, he succeeded in cutting down the 
enormous charges made by the Coalition for its opera- 
tions in 181 5, when seven hundred thousand armed 
men were quartered on provinces of France. Another 
circumstance did him peculiar honour ; his capacity 
in civil affairs had been recognised ; he was placed at 
the head of a commission appointed to adjust the 
compensation due to the allied Powers for their 
losses caused by the Revolutionary wars and those 
of Napoleon. He acquitted himself of an Her- 
culean task, involving inquiries difficult alike and 
delicate, with characteristic industry and tact ; he re- 
duced the compensation to a moderate sum ; he 
negotiated a loan to enable France to discharge it. 
The great qualities he had shown in council, not less 
than his renown in the field, induced the Allies to 
give him the command of the Army of Occupation, 
as it was called, which, composed of not less than 
150,000 men, of different nationalities and tongues, 
was charged with keeping the Revolution down in 



The Army of Occupation 3 1 7 

France, and with propping up the throne of Louis 
XVIII. In this high office he won the respect of 
his subordinates, in every servfee, including our 
own ; he maintained order and enforced discipline; 
but he was remarkably considerate and humane in 
the exercise of his immense authority. It is un- 
necessary to say that he refused the pay and emolu- 
ments offered him by foreign Powers ; his ideas on 
this subject were strict and severe, and were formed 
on the noblest standards of duty ; here he presents 
a striking contrast to Marlborough, unhappily not 
superior to evil corruption. France, it might have 
been thought, would have felt what she owed to 
Wellington, and now that the animosities of the day 
are dead her best historians have honourably avowed 
her debt. But he was unpopular with all classes 
from 181 5 to 1818; the reasons are not difficult to 
seek. The King and the Court were under obliga- 
tions too great to have a really friendly feeling for 
him ; his antagonists in the field were sore and angry; 
indeed, he treated them more than once with a kind 
of dry discourtesy. Allowance, too, must be made 
for the wounded pride and susceptibilities of a great 
nation, which rightly saw in Wellington one of its 
chief conquerors ; Waterloo was a humiliation not to 
be soon forgotten. Plots were again formed against 
the life of the Duke ; whatever excuses may be 
made for it, Napoleon's legacy to Cantillon was an 
unworthy act, even though it was done in the agony 
of death. Wellington's conduct to Ney has been 
severely censured : perhaps he ought to have laid 
stress on the capitulation of Paris, the only real 



3 1 8 Wellington 

defence for the ill-fated Marshal. But, technically, 
Ney's guilt could not be questioned, and justice was 
more akin to meity in the nature of the great Eng- 
lishman, a personality essentially stern and hard, and 
seldom swayed by emotions of any kind. 

The Army of Occupation was disbanded in 1818 ; 
Wellington returned to England to receive new 
honours, and to hold a high place in the national 
councils. His great military reputation, the remark- 
able powers he had shown in the administration of 
civil affairs in India, in Portugal, in Spain, and in 
France, marked him out for distinction in the service 
of the State; the men in power were only too glad to 
secure such an ally. He entered the Cabinet of Lord 
Liverpool, and, as Master of the Ordnance and Com- 
mander-in-Chief, was in office until 1827. During 
this period England passed through immense changes 
in government, in administration, in public opinion, 
and in the conditions of public life; these present 
two marked and very striking phases. When Wel- 
lington joined the Ministry, Toryism of a peculiar 
kind was in the ascendent in our foreign and domes- 
tic policy ; there was no immediate prospect that its 
long reign was coming to an end. The Tories had 
brought the great war to a triumphant close ; the 
Whigs were discredited for their French sympathies. 
Tory statesmen, too, had had a part in effecting the 
settlement of the Continent made at Vienna ; and if 
they gave no countenance to the Holy Alliance, and 
to Alexander's fantastic dreams, they had been asso- 
ciated with Metternich and other pillars of absolute 
monarchies. In affairs at home hardly any reforms 



Entrance into Political Life 3 1 9 

had been made, for the national mind had been en- 
grossed by the war ; the aristocracy of the land was 
supreme, and it was an exclusive and illiberal aris- 
tocracy of class ; the House of Commons did not re- 
present the nation ; enormous abuses were allowed 
to flourish ; legislation was far behind the require- 
ments of the age ; the criminal law was a disgrace to 
a civilised State; taxation was oppressive and unjust ; 
the life of the ruling classes was selfish and frivolous ; 
it had its image in the " First Gentleman of Europe," 
as George IV. was called with unconscious irony. 
At the same time vast and important interests had 
grown up within a recent period, and yet were of no 
account in the State ; Birmingham and Manchester 
sent no members to Westminster ; our colossal manu- 
factures had been established, and with these the 
factory system ; a teeming population had come 
into being, and this was often in extreme poverty. 
Things however, went on tolerably well until the 
close of the war turned the attention of thinkers to 
this position of affairs, and, above all, until a sudden 
and great fall of prices, reducing whole classes to 
sheer want, provoked general and widespread dis- 
content. But the Tory Government had not under- 
stood the signs of the times : they applied coercion 
when they should have found remedies ; they mis- 
took disorganisation for sedition ; they had recourse 
for years to measures of harsh severity to put down 
the rebellious spirit, as they called it, of evil-minded 
demagogues. The results were seen in suspen- 
sions of the Habeas Corpus Act, in Peterloo riots, in 
Cato Street conspiracies, in criminal prosecutions 



3 2 o Wellington 

which disgraced their authors, and in the continu- 
ance of heavy and unfair taxation. The trial of 
Queen Caroline clearly brought out how fiercely 
popular feeling ran against the aristocracy and the 
monarch on the throne. England and Scotland, in 
fact, were in a critical state ; many believed a revolu- 
tion to be at hand. 

The second phase of this period marks the begin- 
ning of a more auspicious era in the affairs of Great 
Britain. Not, indeed, that the changes of supreme 
importance which took place in the next generation 
had as yet been more than partly foreshadowed. 
England had not associated herself with Liberalism 
in foreign politics, nor had she made a close alliance 
with the France of Louis Philippe. The House of 
Commons remained unreformed ; it was still the as- 
sembly of an oligarchy, and of a privileged class. 
The landed aristocracy as yet was dominant in the 
State ; the interests of manufacture and commerce 
were comparatively without their legitimate influ- 
ence, the institutions of the country still rested on 
too narrow a basis. Trade, too, was subject to most 
injurious restraints ; the mass of the population was 
largely sunk in poverty ; the tone of society in high 
places was hardly improved. But a better, a more 
enlightened, a more philanthropic spirit was animat- 
ing the minds of most of our statesmen, and this had 
a powerful effect on the national life. Canning did 
not exactly break with Castlereagh's foreign policy ; 
but, as Metternich clearly perceived, he gradually 
transformed it in a liberal sense, as was seen when 
his mantle fell on Palmerston. The Whigs slowly 



Entrance into Political Life 32 1 

regained their authority in the State ; their leaders 
raised the cry of parliamentary reform erelong to 
swell into a national demand ; they exposed the 
abuses of nomination and rotten boroughs, and de- 
nounced the corruption and scandals too often seen 
in the administration of affairs. The Ministry, too, 
became greatly improved ; mediocrities were re- 
placed by men like Peel and Huskisson ; these per- 
ceived and to some extent carried out reforms 
absolutely essential to the national welfare, espe- 
cially in relaxing the fetters on trade, and thus 
indirectly bettering the condition of the humbler 
classes ; in mitigating the atrocity of the criminal 
law ; in making justice more humane and popular. 
The distress besides, universal and acute, which had 
followed the collapse of the war prices, was dimin- 
ished in a great measure by degrees ; there were no 
doubtful signs of growing material progress. And 
with this improvement the hatreds and discords of 
class, which had separated by a wide gulf the rich 
from the poor, became much less than they had 
lately been, though too many signs of this great 
social evil remained. If the England and Scotland 
of 1826-27 were very different from the England and 
Sotland of the present day, they were not the dis- 
contented England and Scotland of 1816-20. 

The changes of this period were also distinctly 
apparent in what Macaulay has aptly called " the 
withered and distorted limb of the Empire." The 
state of Ireland in 181 8 and up to 182 1 had, on 
the whole, not improved since the Union ; in many 
respects it had become worse. Five-sixths of the 



322 Wellington 

people were as disaffected as ever ; they had the 
French sympathies of 1798 ; it was impossible to 
govern them without repressive measures. Pro- 
testant ascendency was supreme in the Church, in 
the State, in the Land ; its evils had been aggra- 
vated by the Toryism of the time, and by the favour 
shown to the Orange societies, the embodiment of 
the extreme domination of race and sect. The ad- 
ministration of the Castle was not only exclusively 
Protestant, — it was harsh, narrow-minded, severe, 
bigoted ; it was worse than it had been under the 
extinct Parliament in College Green. Nor had the 
representation of Ireland improved; it was, with few 
exceptions, selfish and corrupt, and confined to an 
oligarchy of creed ; it had but little authority in the 
Imperial Parliament. As for the Irish Catholics, 
that is, the mass of the people, they remained all 
but outside the pale of the State ; O'Connell, no 
doubt, had made his influence felt ; but the cause 
of Catholic Emancipation, as it was called, though 
advocated by Grattan with great eloquence and 
power, seemed to have gone back, owing to Catholic 
disputes. The social condition, too, of the coun- 
try made no progress ; absenteeism had increased 
since the Union ; landed relations formed on the 
ascendency of the Protestant gentry, and on the 
subjection of the Catholic peasantry, were essenti- 
ally bad, and had perhaps become worse ; disord- 
ers and outrages were widely prevalent ; coercion 
was resisted, often successfully, by organised crime. 
The decline in prices, besides, at the close of 
the war had made the poverty of Ireland more 



Entrance into Political Life 323 

general and severe ; teeming millions were on the 
brink of starvation; there were seasons of dearth 
and approaching famine. After 1821-22 there were 
signs of a change for the better in this sad state of 
things ; Catholic Emancipation became the leading 
question of the day ; it was advocated ably by the 
Whig party, it was supported in Parliament by suf- 
frages steadily on the increase. The Catholic Asso- 
ciation, too, was formed ; O'Connell became the 
tribune of a people demanding justice ; in fact, as 
early as 1825 Catholic Emancipation would have be- 
come law, under liberal and well-conceived condi- 
tions, but for the perverse bigotry of the Duke 
of York. And Protestant ascendency received a 
weighty blow ; the Protestant Junta at the Castle 
was replaced by enlightened men of a very different 
type ; Orangeism was made to feel that it was not 
above the law. Inquiry, too, was made into the 
social state of Ireland ; the report of a committee 
that sat in 1824-25 has thrown a flood of light on this 
important subject. Much in the affairs of Ireland 
certainly remained very bad, especially in a vicious 
land system, and there was a great deal of social dis- 
order, but the future seemed to be not without real 
promise. 

I shall glance afterwards at Wellington's work in 
the army, during the long peace that followed the 
great war ; for the present I shall notice his position 
in the State throughout the period I have briefly 
described. His antecedents, his character, his pro- 
fessional career, naturally identified him with the 
Tory party ; he must always be regarded as a Tory 



324 Wellington 

statesman. He was a scion of the Irish Protestant 
noblesse, an exclusive class of extreme Tory views, — 
divided from a subject people in race and faith ; he 
had been a fast friend of Castlereagh, a thorough 
Tory : he had been associated in the most brilliant 
period of his life with the leading men of the 
Continental monarchies, of whom Metternich was 
the master spirit. His nature was unsympathetic 
and stern ; far-seeing and sagacious as he was, he 
disliked and sometimes misunderstood popular de- 
mands and movements ; his experiences in the 
Peninsula and in France made him an enemy of 
Revolutionary Democracy wherever it appeared. As 
a great soldier, too, he was fashioned to the habit of 
command ; being almost unversed in parliamentary 
life, he thought that the State should be ruled like 
an army; he believed that a government should be 
essentially strong : he occasionally failed to perceive 
the power of the forces political, social, and eco- 
nomic, which may affect a nation under a constitu- 
tional regime, and even to interpret the signs of 
the time. Yet he was never a bigoted and narrow- 
minded Tory of the bad school of the successors of 
Pitt ; his wisdom, his prudence, his saving common- 
sense, usually taught him when the course of the 
vessel of the State required to be changed and 
adapted to the exigencies of the hour ; and he pos- 
sessed in a very high degree the capacity of true 
Conservatism in the best sense of the word ; he was 
never Quixotic, he was, as a rule, enlightened. And 
thus it was that he continued in office supporting 
the Government with an authority on the increase 



Entrance into Political Life 325 

during the two phases of the period to which I have 
referred. He held that the Six Acts and drastic 
legislation of the kind were unavoidable in the exist- 
ing condition of England ; he repeatedly condemned 
the violent agitators of the day. He also insisted 
on the maintenance of order, whatever the cost ; 
turned a deaf ear to clamouronthis subject; laid down 
excellent regulations for the preservation of the pub- 
lic peace ; defended functionaries who had fearlessly 
done their duty, despite parliamentary and popu- 
lar protests. He voted, too, with his party during 
the trial of the Queen, and even exposed himself to 
some special odium ; but it is tolerably certain that 
he disapproved of the conduct of the King, and that 
he thought the whole proceedings unwise. Never- 
theless, even in those days of Toryism well-nigh un- 
controlled, he did not always sanction his colleagues' 
acts and measures ; and it is very remarkable that 
he strongly urged that Canning should be recalled 
to office, and should give a more liberal tone to our 
foreign policy. 

Two tendencies may be clearly seen in the Liver- 
pool Cabinet after 1822, that is, during the second 
part of this important period. There was a real 
Tory and a real Liberal party, and though these re- 
mained united until the disappearance of their chief, 
they were divided on many of the questions of the 
day. Wellington remained a Tory, but became a 
moderate Tory; he gradually inclined to the more 
enlightened policy of the rising generation of states- 
men. Thus in foreign affairs he did not like the re- 
cognition of the insurgent Spanish Colonies : he had 



326 Wellington 

no sympathy with the struggle of the Greeks for inde- 
pendence. But, on the whole, he co-operated loyally 
with Canning for years : he carried out the Minis- 
ter's views at Verona, and did excellent service at 
that Congress ; he endeavoured to prevent the Bour- 
bon invasion of Spain, undertaken to maintain the 
sinister power of Ferdinand ; he averted for a time 
a war between Nicholas and the Turk. In domestic 
affairs he upheld the existing Corn laws, supposed to 
be a mainstay of the aristocracy of the land; he 
steadily set his face against reform in Parliament. 
But he advocated most of Huskisson's fiscal and 
commercial measures, all tending to the expansion 
of trade, and to the prosperity of the nation as a 
whole ; he cordially supported the mitigation of the 
bad criminal law and the establishment of a police 
force in England and Ireland, one of the best 
achievements of Peel in those days. His attitude 
towards Ireland and Irish affairs was characteristic 
of his sagacious wisdom. He was a member of the 
dominant Protestant caste ; but as Chief Secretary, 
many years before, he had seen that Protestant as- 
cendency was a dangerous state of things, and he 
gave his full sanction to the important change which 
removed the extreme Protestant Junta from the 
Castle, and checked the arrogance of Orangeism and 
its sectarian tyranny. His brother, Lord Wellesley, 
indeed, had, as Lord Lieutenant, inaugurated this 
most salutary reform ; it became the precursor of a 
new era in the consideration and treatment of Irish 
affairs. As to the Catholic question, now in the 
forefront of politics, Wellington had no thought of 



Entrance into Political Life 327 

heroic remedies : he wished to preserve what was 
called the Protestant Settlement in the Church, the 
State, and landed relations ; he was opposed to 
Catholic Emancipation as a somewhat hazardous 
policy, and as placing the Irish Catholics in a posi- 
tion that might become dangerous to the institu- 
tions under which they lived. But he had no 
objection to Catholics on the ground of their faith ; 
he was wholly free from the ideas of Eldon and Per- 
cival; he had the good sense to perceive when coercion 
must give place to concession in the government 
and administration of Catholic Ireland. The Catho- 
lic Association, founded by O'Connell in 1823-24, had 
soon practically superseded the authority of the law 
and of the men in office in Dublin in three-fourths 
of Ireland ; in Canning's words it had formed a State 
within the State : it was far more powerful than the 
Land or the National Leagues of a much later day. 
Wellington, able in council as he had been in the 
field, knew when a position had become untenable: 
he took a prominent part in advocating the Compro- 
mise of 1825, largely founded on the Irish policy of 
Pitt : it was most unfortunate that this measure never 
became law. 

A very striking feature in Wellington's career in 
this period was the authority he acquired over lead- 
ing public men. This, indeed, was largely due to 
his military renown : but it was also caused by a 
conviction that he was a servant of the State of ex- 
traordinary merit and worth, and a politician of no 
mean order: we must bear in mind that he owed 
his eminence to himself; he did not belong to one 



328 Wellington 

of the great ruling families. This influence was per- 
haps most clearly seen, and not without a comical 
touch, in the ascendency he exercised over George 
IV. ; he disliked the King and was disliked by him, 
but he treated him as a kind of royal puppet, 
and he kept him out of a great deal of mischief. 
Peel was the statesman to whom he was most nearly 
allied, though he was, perhaps, never one of Peel's 
intimate friends ; this alliance had memorable results 
in a troubled period now close at hand. In 1827 he 
unfortunately broke with Canning, when Canning had 
been unexpectedly made head of the State ; this was 
one of the most remarkable mistakes of his political 
life. He distrusted a great deal of Canning's policy; 
but the real reason that he would not hear of being 
his colleague was not mere envy and jealousy, as has 
been said, but that he believed Canning to be false 
and insincere, and that he detested his somewhat 
questionable parleys with the Whigs. Yet certainly 
he gave proofs of faults of temper ; he ought not to 
have thrown up the great office of Commander-in- 
Chief on grounds that cannot be fairly justified ; 
this office did not depend on the fate of a Ministry. 
But in truth Canning and Wellington were men of 
opposite natures ; the brilliant orator, emotional, en- 
thusiastic, optimistic, vain, was a striking contrast to 
the sound-headed, calm-minded, stout-hearted sol- 
dier, seldom swayed by sympathies of any kind. 



CHAPTER XI 

PRIME MINISTER OF ENGLAND 

The Administration of Canning — Hopes formed as regards his pol- 
icy — Death of Canning — The Goderich Ministry a mere stop- 
gap — Wellington becomes Prime Minister — General belief that 
his Government would be permanent — Hill made Commander- 
in-Chief of the army — Repeal of the Test and Corporation 
Acts — Huskisson and the followers of Canning leave the Min- 
istry — Vesey Fitzgerald — O'Connell stands for Clare — The 
Clare election— Great results — Catholic Emancipation a neces- 
sity of State — Policy of Peel and of Wellington — Great difficul- 
ties in their way — The Emancipation Bill carried — Political 
consequences — Indignation of the high Tory party and of Pro- 
testant England — The question of Reform pressed to the front 
— Distress — Revolutions in France and in Belgium — The Re- 
form movement adopted by the Whig party — Unwise speech of 
Wellington — Fall of his Government — Lord Grey and the Whigs 
in office. 

THE conflict between the old and the new ideas, 
which had been apparent in the Liverpool 
Cabinet, broke out at once when Canning be- 
came Prime Minister. The quarrel with Welling- 
ton, partly due to personal dislike, was followed by 
the resignations of the leading Tories, of whom 
Peel was the most conspicuous. Peel, though in no 
sense an extreme Tory, had always opposed the 

329 



330 Wellington 

Catholic cause, of which Canning had been the most 
distinguished advocate, at least since the death of 
the illustrious Grattan. Canning was forced to look 
for support to the Whig party ; he placed several 
of its chiefs in office ; and though he was sustained 
by the mass of the Tories in the House of Com- 
mons, these did not fully confide in him ; his Gov- 
ernment had the inherent weakness of a Coalition 
Government. Great hopes were formed that the 
brilliant and enlightened statesman would inaugu- 
rate a new order of things in England ; but these 
were dissipated by his sudden and untimely death ; 
had he lived they would probably not have been 
fulfilled. The great Tory aristocracy distrusted 
Canning ; they looked down on him as a plebeian 
upstart ; the majority were averse to him on the 
Catholic question. He had incurred the special dis- 
like of Lord Grey, the champion of the High Whig 
noblesse ; and though he had for the moment the 
support of the Whigs, he had always denounced 
Parliamentary reform, soon to be the rallying cry of 
the whole Whig party. He had not besides much 
personal hold in the nation ; and his foreign policy 
was detested by Continental statesmen, who had 
still much influence on the Tories in England. He. 
was succeeded by an obscure member of the Liver- 
pool Ministry, who held office for a few months 
only, and was universally felt to be a mere stop-gap. 
The Government of Lord Goderich was also a Coa- 
lition Government composed partly of Tories and 
partly of Whigs ; it did little or nothing during its 
brief existence. Wellington returned to the com- 



Prime Minister of England 331 

mand of the army, a tolerably clear proof that he 
left that post on account of the feelings he enter- 
tained towards Canning; but he stood aloof from 
the Goderich Ministry ; he truly remarked that 
it had neither power nor principle. The Whigs 
also fell away from their nominal leader ; after some 
hesitation, George IV. had recourse to Wellington, 
the most famous of living Englishmen, who natur- 
ally was placed at the head of the State, but prob- 
ably against the secret wishes of the King, who 
dreaded the authority of a domineering mentor. 

Wellington was now on the verge of his sixtieth 
year ; he was in the fulness of his ripe experience, 
and of his powerful faculties. The opinion pre- 
vailed abroad and at home, that after a succession 
of weak Governments, his administration would be 
as lasting as that of the second Pitt, that is from 
1784 to 1 801. He had no rival in military fame: 
he was the only surviving British statesman who 
had taken anything like a conspicuous part in the 
settlement of the Continent in i8i4and 1815. He 
had been the colleague and the fast friend of Castle- 
reagh ; and though he had backed Canning in parts 
of that Minister's policy, he had separated himself 
from Canning in 1827. He had been cordially re- 
ceived at the Russian Court by Nicholas, now becom- 
ing the first of Continental rulers ; he stood well with 
Charles X. of France : he was still recognised as one 
of the chiefs of the old League of Europe. His in- 
fluence on the Continent, in a word, was immense; 
his position in domestic politics seemed completely 
secure. He was at the head of the great Tory 



332 Wellington 

following, still in possession of scarcely interrupted 
power; but he had associated himself with the pru- 
dent Tories, who were not hostile to the spirit of 
the age ; the ablest certainly of these was Peel, who 
under him, had become the leader of the House of 
Commons. His tenure of office, besides, seemed 
not to be threatened by any of the immediate ques- 
tions of the day, or by the prospect of impending 
social troubles. He was now opposed to the Catho- 
lic claims, because he believed they could not be 
settled in the existing condition of English parties ; 
but he had never resisted them on grounds of 
principle; and he had tried to effect the compro- 
mise of 1825. He was an adversary of Parlia- 
mentary reform, but this great question, if plainly 
making its way, had not yet reached the first place 
in politics; indeed it was not deemed of much real, 
practical moment. The country, too, was in the 
main progressing; agriculture and commerce were 
not unprosperous; there were few signs of wide- 
spread discontent; and Wellington, now universally 
known as " the Duke," if not popular, was justly 
esteemed by the nation. His Government therefore 
promised to be of long duration; it had the appear- 
ance of complete stability. But it fell on extraor- 
dinarily difficult times; it was destined to lead to 
a great constitutional change, and to cause the 
break-up of the dominant Tory party; to encounter 
a revolutionary movement at home, made worse by 
general and acute distress, and a violent revolu- 
tionary movement abroad; to make the long-dis- 
credited Whigs the depositories of power, and to 




SIR ROBERT PEEL. 
(From the painting by John Linnell, in the National Portrait Gallery.) 



Prime Minister of England 333 

transfer it practically, for a time, to the middle 
classes in the State : and finally to succumb, after a 
few months, amidst indignation not wholly unde- 
served, and a tempest of popular passion, which 
shook the institutions of England to their base. 

The Government of Wellington was not origin- 
ally a purely Tory Government ; it comprised four 
of Canning's distinguished followers, men of liberal 
and enlightened views, for liberal ideas were steadily 
increasing in strength. The command of the army 
was conferred on Hill, perhaps the ablest companion 
in arms of the Duke ; all seemed full of certain pro- 
mise for a time. The Test and Corporation Acts, 
bad legacies of the seventeenth century, which im- 
posed galling restrictions on Nonconformists, were re. 
pealed ; it deserves notice that Wellington refused 
to sanction an indirect attempt to subject Catholics 
to further disabilities in the State. A rift, however, 
soon appeared in the lute ; a compromise was ef- 
fected in the exclusive Corn Law, but dissensions 
broke out on a greater subject. The Tories in the 
Cabinet desired to transfer the seats of two corrupt 
boroughs, that had been forfeited, to parts of the 
adjoining counties : Huskisson voted for giving 
them to the great towns of Birmingham and Manches- 
ter, still unrepresented in the House of Commons; 
his resignation of his office was somewhat curtly ac- 
cepted by his chief. The three other disciples of 
Canning — of these Palmerston was the most emin- 
ent — thinking their colleague wronged, went out of 
office with him ; the Administration became wholly 
of a Tory complexion : one of the ministerial 



334 Wellington 

changes that ensued had memorable results. Mr. 
Vesey Fitzgerald was appointed to the Board of 
Trade, his re-election to his native county of Clare 
was considered to be a foregone conclusion : his 
father had been a friend of Grattan : he was a 
staunch advocate of the Catholic cause ; the landed 
gentry of his county were on his side, to a man ; and 
hitherto, as in other parts of Ireland, they had been 
masters of the votes of the peasant masses, enfran- 
chised by the measure of 1793. But great events, 
ill understood in Downing Street, had been for some 
time taking place in Ireland : a movement of extra- 
ordinary force had been let loose which was sweep- 
ing away the old political landmarks. The failure 
of the arrangement of 1825 had incensed O'Connell; 
the agitation he had set on foot acquired sudden and 
enormously increased power ; at the general election 
of 1826, Protestant ascendency received another 
weighty blow. The Catholic Association, already a 
danger to the State, already subverting the law of 
the land, became absolutely supreme throughout the 
South of Ireland : it was backed by the immense 
authority of the Catholic Church ; it formed a kind 
of government which made its mandates obeyed. 
O'Connell conceived the bold design of opposing 
Fitzgerald at the Clare election, though, as a Catho- 
lic, he could not sit in the House of Commons ; the 
power of the Association was concentrated in his 
hands; the result was never for a moment doubtful. 
At the instigation of local leaders, in every district, 
and at the bidding of their clergy, who from their 
altars called on them to rise on behalf of freedom 



Prime Minister of England 335 

and their faith, the Clare peasantry broke away from 
their landlords : the feudal ties which had bound 
them snapped in a moment ; O'Connell was re- 
turned by an immense majority of votes ; the tri- 
umph of the Association and of the great tribune 
was complete. 

A violent revolution now appeared imminent 
throughout Ireland, and in all her provinces. The 
Clare election had a portentous influence ; in Lein- 
ster, Munster, and Connaught the peasantry joined 
in the revolt ; in many places they refused to pay 
rents or tithes, as had happened before the rising of 
1798. Catholic Ireland, in a word, was in an insur- 
rectionary state ; and though the Association and 
O'Connell denounced crime and outrage, there was 
widespread disorder that seemed impossible to re- 
press. At the same time Orangeism lifted up its 
head in frenzy, and threatened to have its revenge 
on its foes : and though the great body of the Pro- 
testant landed gentry declared that concessions 
must be made, Protestant Ulster wore a dangerous 
aspect. There were incessant rumours of a bloody 
civil war : and if the Catholic leaders preached peace, 
they had the fortunes of Ireland in their hands ; a 
word from O'Connell might have inaugurated a 
Reign of Terror. In these circumstances Peel, at 
the head of the Home Office, and largely responsible 
for Irish affairs, perceived that the settlement of the 
Catholic question had become necessary for the 
safety of the State, and did not hesitate to avow 
this belief to his leader. Peel had for many years 
opposed the Catholic claims on the ground that they 



336 Wellington 

were incompatible with the political and social sys- 
tem that prevailed in Ireland ; he properly offered 
to retire from his post, but when he had 'convinced 
Wellington that his views were correct, he patrioti- 
cally agreed to act with him, and to give Catholic 
Emancipation effect. By adopting this course he 
was no doubt throwing political consistency to the 
winds, and so in a certain degree was the Duke ; 
but the welfare of the Commonwealth was at stake ; 
and — a fact that should be carefully borne in mind 
— Wellington and Peel were the only statesmen who 
could have carried a concession of this kind through 
Parliament ; the Whig party would not have had a 
chance of success. The difficulties, however, in 
their way, were prodigious; George IV. and his 
brother, the Duke of Cumberland, were furious in 
their anti-Catholic zeal ; the Tory majority in the 
House of Commons, and three-fourths probably of 
the aristocracy of the land, resented a policy they 
deemed truckling and unwise ; the House of Lords 
and the Church were distinctly adverse. The na- 
tion, besides, was indignant at what O'Connell had 
achieved ; it despised the Irish Catholics as an inferior 
race ; Protestant feeling ran high against the Irish 
priesthood ; the Nonconformists especially were ve- 
hement in their bigoted language. Had an appeal 
to the country been made at this crisis, Catholic 
Emancipation would never have been granted by an 
unreformed Parliament. 

Peel and Wellington had soon agreed to their 
project ; the Duke had more enlightened views than 
his colleague ; as had been the case with Pitt at the 



Prime Minister of England t>37 

Union, he wished to make a provision for the Irish 
priesthood, a salutary and far-sighted policy. But 
how to give effect to the measure was the great 
question, having regard to the formidable obstacles 
in the way. The Duke acted as he had acted more 
than once in the field, he carefully masked the large 
change of front he was making ; he gave no open 
countenance to the Catholic claims ; he even re- 
moved from office one of their leading advocates. 
He has been angrily blamed for concealing his pur- 
pose, and for not making it known to the heads of 
his party, but it is more than doubtful whether his 
position would have been improved by such a dis- 
closure. He had soon thrust the Duke of Cumber- 
land aside ; but when the Emancipation Bill was 
explained to the King, George IV. refused his assent 
in passionate phrases ; it was not until the Ministers 
had resigned that he yielded to an ascendency of 
which he stood in awe, and sullenly agreed to acqui- 
esce in the measure. The bill was brought into the 
House of Commons in the session of 1829, and was 
supported by Peel in a masterly speech ; but it was 
not so conciliatory or comprehensive a scheme as 
might have been expected. The Catholic claims 
were indeed satisfied, if with somewhat unwise ex- 
ceptions ; it can hardly be denied that as affairs 
stood, the Catholic Association was rightly sup- 
pressed, and the Irish peasant masses were rightly 
deprived of the franchise. But there was no pro- 
vision for the commutation of the tithe in Ireland, 
a reform in the minds of our best statesmen for 
years; the Irish Catholic priests were left out in the 



338 Wellington 

cold ; O'Connell was not permitted to take his seat 
for Clare, an instance of want of tact for which Peel 
was responsible. The measure, in a word, fell 
short of the proposals of 1825, but it passed the 
House of Commons, partly owing to the assistance 
of the Whigs, and partly to a majority still pos- 
sessed by the Government : it was forced through 
the House of Lords by Wellington's overpowering 
influence. The nation, however, was deeply stirred ; 
a furious outcry against the Ministry arose, increas- 
ing day after day in volume. The extreme Tories 
declared they had been deceived and betrayed : the 
oligarchy, so potent in the House of Commons, 
pronounced in many instances against the Govern- 
ment ; the Tory party seemed rapidly falling to 
pieces. The signs of the times revealed themselves 
in the rejection of Peel, her favourite son, by Ox- 
ford, and in the ludicrous passage of arms between 
the Duke and Lord Winchelsea. The prejudices 
and the pride of Englishmen were also enlisted 
against the men in office ; they had tamely surren- 
dered to Irish Papists, and to a noisy and obscure 
Irish demagogue ; they had humiliated and dis- 
graced England ; was this to have been expected 
from the victor of Waterloo ? 

Catholic Emancipation was the greatest achieve- 
ment of Wellington in the sphere of politics. He 
saw that a great change in Ireland could not be 
avoided ; he seized the occasion with characteristic 
judgment ; he overcame difficulties from which 
weaker men would have shrunk ; he gave con- 
spicuous proof of his indomitable will ; he prevented 



Prime Minister of England 339 

a revolution that must have endangered the State. 
Nevertheless the measure Parliament enacted had 
faults and defects ; it has had consequences that 
have left their mark on our history. The conces- 
sion of the Catholic claims was the triumph of 
agitation organised with marvellous skill ; agitation, 
before without much strength in England, became 
thenceforward a mighty force in her politics; the 
Catholic Association was the parent of the Birming- 
ham Union, of the Anti-Corn-Law League, of 
the Chartist movement : it gave an immense im- 
pulse to Democracy in many of its forms. Catholic 
Emancipation too, accomplished without the proper 
safeguards contained in the scheme of 1825, and ef- 
fected in a tumult of popular passion, all but 
destroyed the influence of the Irish landed gentry, 
and deeply affected the settlement of the Irish land: 
it introduced, besides, into the national councils 
a faction which has had a great deal too much 
power, which ought to have been kept within closer 
limits, and which has played a sinister part in the 
affairs of the Empire. The measure, moreover, 
fathered by Wellington and Peel, greatly shook 
confidence in public men ; it not only shattered the 
ties of party, it seemed a gross violation of 
the most solemn pledges ; it had results akin to 
those caused by the coalition of Fox and North. 
But its most immediate, if not its most lasting 
effect, was that it gave a sudden and powerful im- 
pulse to a movement hitherto almost in the back- 
ground, but now rapidly and portentously brought 
to the front. It has often been remarked that 



34-0 Wellington 

Englishmen do not like to deal with two im- 
portant questions in politics at the same time ; 
when Catholic Emancipation had been put out 
of the way, Parliamentary reform began to engross 
the national mind. And the animosities, the pas. 
sions, the divisions, the distrust, engendered in 
1828-29, from the highest down to the lowest 
classes, did not conduce to an easy, even to a wise 
settlement of Parliamentary reform. 

Having successfully carried the Emancipation 
Bill through Parliament, in a great measure through 
his personal influence, Wellington endeavoured to 
strengthen his forces in both Houses, which, he must 
have felt, had been much weakened. He was con- 
fident in his own position, and in that of his Govern- 
ment: it should be remembered that he was less an 
object of party and popular odium than Peel, who 
had been more deeply pledged against the Catholic 
claims, and whose cold, cautious, and reserved man- 
ner contrasted unfavourably with his superior's bold, 
frank, and soldierlike bearing. The Duke, however, 
seems hardly to have gauged the power of the for- 
midable combination arrayed against him, composed 
as it was of many diverse but most potent elements. 
A large minority of the Tories denounced his Gov- 
ernment ; the Whigs, though they had supported 
him on the Catholic question, regarded him with 
growing envy and dislike, and were irritated that 
they had been kept out of office ; Protestant Eng- 
land largely condemned him for his late conduct. 
Besides, some of his appointments to high places in 
the State were bad ; and the dictatorial attitude he 



Prime Minister of England 341 

had been almost compelled to assume provoked 
a good deal of discontent in Parliament. Neverthe- 
less he went steadily to work to improve his position: 
he made overtures to the Whigs, which, if coldly- 
received for the moment, might in other circum- 
stances not have been fruitless ; he endeavoured to 
rally to his side many wavering and recalcitrant 
Tories. This balanced strategy, as it has aptly been 
called, might have succeeded had its author had 
time, and had not a series of conditions become 
suddenly adverse. As has repeatedly been seen in 
the affairs of Ireland, the immense concessions just 
made to the Catholics did not bring peace or allay 
trouble ; sedition and agitation were more than ever 
rampant; disorder and crime distinctly multiplied; 
Catholic Emancipation, it was loudly asserted, had 
proved a failure ; this told with no little effect on 
the Ministry. Simultaneously there were at least 
two bad harvests ; in the three kingdoms every 
interest connected with the land suffered ; this re- 
acted on manufactures and commerce, more depend- 
ent then upon agriculture than in the present age. In 
several counties it became impossible to pay rent; 
the poor-rates ate up the produce of the soil ; the 
wages of labour fell to starvation point ; factories 
were shut up and furnaces blown out in many 
towns, lately thriving centres of industry and trade. 
Widespread and severe distress followed : the re- 
sults appeared in dangerous movements in parts of 
the country, in angry popular risings, in incendiary 
fires, in savage deeds of violence, in organised out- 
rages. All this increased and exasperated political 



342 Wellington 

discontent, and produced a general feeling in favour 
of a great change in the State ; even in Parliament 
the Government was fiercely denounced, when it 
was declared in the Speech from the Throne in 1830, 
that practically little or nothing could be done 
to remove or even to lessen the many ills which 
afflicted the nation. 

The cry for Parliamentary reform already loudly 
heard and greatly increased by the prevailing dis- 
tress, now became passionate, intense, general : the 
existing Parliament, it was proclaimed, would not 
do its duty or attempt to improve the' state of the 
country ; many of the Tories renounced the opinions 
they had held, and became reformers even in an 
extreme sense, partly in order to harass and vex 
the Government. The movement was immensely 
strengthened by movements abroad, which, turned 
to account by popular leaders, made a profound im- 
pression on the national mind in England. A re- 
actionary minister of Charles X. issued ordinances 
which suspended the constitution in France, and 
practically destroyed the liberty of the press ; Paris 
rose up in indignant wrath ; the army took the side 
of the multitude ; the Bourbon dynasty was driven 
from the throne ; the Duke of Orleans was made 
King; democracy gained a decisive triumph. At 
the same time, Belgium, linked to Holland by an un- 
natural tie, threw off an allegiance detested by 
nearly all classes ; part of the settlement made at 
Vienna was undone ; a democratic revolution again 
triumphed. These events told powerfully against 
the Duke and his Ministry ; he was identified by 



Prime Minister of England 343 

his political foes, by demagogues, and by the Rad- 
ical press with the policy of Metternich, and of 
Castlereagh ; he was a champion of absolutism on 
the Continent ; he was a dangerous man to be at 
the head of affairs in England. Just at this time 
too, George IV. died ; his successor, William IV., 
was known to have liberal views ; and though he 
made no change in Wellington's Government, it 
was loudly announced that he favoured reform in 
Parliament. At the general election which fol- 
lowed the demise of the Crown, seat after seat was 
lost to the Ministry; in fact, England pronounced 
against it ; the abuses prevalent under the existing 
order of things, the anomalies, the iniquities, the in- 
tolerable state of representation, which did not ex- 
press the will of the nation, and was the monopoly 
of an oligarchy, selfish and corrupt, were subjects 
of invective at every husting ; country and town 
echoed with a universal demand for a thorough re- 
form of a bad Parliament ; this was urged by forces 
evidently of extraordinary strength. The Whigs 
who had for years made this policy their own, but 
who had hitherto failed to give it effect, perceived 
their opportunity and cleverly seized it; they placed 
themselves at the head of the popular movement : 
Parliamentary reform was made their principal 
watchword. Their success was seen in the trium- 
phant return of Brougham for York : and the 
country was organised to promote the cause. In 
Birmingham, in Manchester, in other important 
towns, nay, even in several rural districts, associa- 
tions were formed to bring the mighty change 



344 Wellington 

about which was to inaugurate a new era in 
England. 

A violent revolution appeared at hand ; some of 
the leading Whigs, essentially an aristocratic class, 
afraid of the ominous signs of the times, made over- 
tures to Wellington in order to join his Government, 
and to effect a compromise on the question of Re- 
form. These parleys, however, proved useless ; 
events were precipitated by a very untoward inci- 
dent. When Parliament had met after the late 
election, Lord Grey, the recognised head of the 
Whigs, brought forward the subject in a temperate 
speech. " You see," he said, " the danger around 
you ; the storm is on the horizon, but the hurricane 
approaches. Begin, then, at once to strengthen 
your houses, to secure your windows, and to make 
fast your doors. The mode by which this must be 
done, my lords, is by securing the affections of your 
fellow-subjects, and I pronounce the word — by re- 
forming Parliament." The earnest appeal was wise 
and statesmanlike: the reply of Wellington, peremp- 
tory, curt, nay, offensive, was an emphatic protest 
against any measure of reform. " I have never read 
or heard," he declared, " of any measure up to the 
present moment, which can in any degree satisfy 
my mind that the state of the representation can be 
improved, or be rendered more satisfactory than it 
is at present. ... I am fully convinced that 
the country already possesses a legislature which 
answers all the purposes of a good legislature. . . 
. I will go further and say that the legislature and 
the present system of representation possess the 



Prime Minister of England 345 

full and entire confidence of the country. ... I 
will go still further and say that if at the present 
moment I had imposed on me the duty of forming 
a legislature for my country, and particularly for a 
country like this, in possession of great property of 
many descriptions, I do not mean to assert that I 
should form such a legislature as you possess now, 
for the nature of man is incapable of reaching such 
excellence at once, but my great endeavour would be 
to form some description of legislature which would 
produce the same results. ... I am not only 
not piepared to bring in any measure of the 
description alluded to by the noble lord, but I 
will at once declare, that as far as I am concerned, 
so long as I hold any station in the government of 
the country, I shall always feel it my duty to resist 
such measures when proposed by others." 

The nation had distinctly pronounced for reform : 
the new House of Commons had been elected to dis- 
pose of the question. England was incensed with 
the minister, who had crossed her will, and with an 
audacity alien to his real character had, without 
hesitation, defied her opinions. A sudden tempest 
of indignation swept over the country, one of those 
outbursts of popular passion often seen in its history, 
like the frenzy of the Popish Plot and of the Ex- 
clusion Bill, like the wrath aroused by revolution- 
ary and regicide France. Disorders and outrages 
rapidly increased ; attacks on property were made 
in many places ; Reform became an insurrectionary 
cry ; the institutions of the kingdom were held up to 
odium ; the landed aristocracy and all that pertained 



346 Wellington 

to it were savagely decried at angry public meetings. 
" London," it is said, " became like the capital of a 
country devastated by cruel war or foreign invasion." 
The Duke boldly confronted the crisis ; he took 
strong measures to enforce the public peace, he bar- 
ricaded his mansion of Apsley House ; he called on 
the landed gentry in every county to uphold order. 
But nothing could stem the universal torrent ; his 
Government was swept away on a minor question ; 
Lord Grey and the Whigs came into office on the 
crest of a revolutionary wave, pledged to carry a 
great measure of Parliamentary reform. Welling- 
ton left his post censured and decried even by mod- 
erate men ; for a time he was the most unpopular 
man in these kingdoms. A singularly well-informed 
and calm-minded observer has placed on record in 
these words, how his late conduct had alienated men 
of all parties, and even the great majority of the 
people of England : " With his Government falling 
every day in public opinion, and his enemies grow- 
ing more numerous and confident, with questions of 
vast importance rising up with a vigour and celerity 
of growth which astonished the world, he met a new 
Parliament (constituted more unfavourably than the 
last, which he had found himself unable to manage), 
without any support, but in his own confidence and 
the encouraging adulation of a little knot of de- 
votees. There still lingered around him some of 
that popularity which had once been so great, and 
which the recollection of his victories would not 
suffer to be altogether extinguished. . . . But it 
was decreed that he should fall. He appeared bereft 



Prime Minister of England 347 

of all judgment and discretion, and after a King's 
speech which gave great, and I think unnecessary, 
offence, he delivered the famous philippic against Re- 
form which sealed his fate. From that moment it 
was not doubtful, and he was hurled from the seat of 
power amid universal acclamations." ' 

To this generation it may appear ^ amazing that 
Parliament had not been reformed long before this 
period ; its defects had been perceived by Cromwell 
and Chatham. The old House of Commons did not 
represent the nation, save in a very indirect and im- 
perfect way ; the landed aristocracy had far too 
much power in it; there was no representation of 
most important towns ; nomination, rotten, and 
close boroughs secured for privileged classes a bad 
influence ; the anomalies and vices of the system 
were prodigious and glaring. Yet Burke and Can- 
ning had always defended this order of things ; the 
statesmen who had beheld the French Revolution, 
nay, many of their successors, dreaded organic change 
in a Constitution, even as it was, very much the best 
in Europe. The antipathy of Wellington to Parlia- 
mentary reform was due partly to his political faith 
and partly to the peculiar circumstances of the time. 
If not a mere Tory bigot, he was not less a Tory ; he 
wished to see the aristocracy of the land the chief 
power in the State ; that " the King's Government 
should be strong" seemed to him essential; these 
great objects he thought practically secure under our 
old Parliamentary regime. Nor had he any real 



' Greville, Memoirs, ii., 84-85. 



348 Wellington 

knowledge of the Great Britain of manufacture and 
commerce, and of the great interests which had been 
growing up for years and yet had very little weight 
in public affairs ; he failed to understand the changed 
conditions of the national life ; he did not correctly 
discern the signs of the time. He was rather a mar- 
tinet than a thinker in the political sphere, and re- 
form seemed to him especially dangerous, when 
democracy was gaining triumphs abroad, and was 
making rapid and threatening progress at home ; he 
was not wholly in error when, in 1829-30, he believed 
the season was unpropitious for making an immense 
experiment in all that related to the institutions of 
the State. These considerations partly excuse the 
attitude he took at this important juncture; never- 
theless his speech in reply to Lord Grey was intem- 
perate, unwise, unworthy of him, — it was one of the 
few great mistakes of his career. 




CHAPTER XII 

FROM 183O TO 1841 

The Grey Government — It introduces the Reform Bill — Progress of 
the measures brought in — Wellington called upon to form an 
administration — He fails — The Reform Bill becomes law — 
Characteristics of the measure — Wellington steadily opposes it 
all through — Agitated and critical state of England — The 
Duke's life exposed to danger — The first Reformed Parliament 
— Fall of the Government of Lord Grey — Lord Melbourne 
Prime Minister — William IV. changes his Ministry and places 
Wellington at the head of affairs — His patriotic conduct — Peel 
Prime Minister — His first short administration — The Melbourne 
Government restored to office — Wise and moderate attitude of 
Wellington in opposition — Death of William IV. — Accession of 
Queen Victoria — Soult in England — Feebleness of the Mel- 
bourne Government — Wellington and Peel, who had been es- 
tranged, are completely reconciled — Fall of the Melbourne 
Government — Peel Prime Minister. 

THE Government of Lord Grey, which succeeded 
that of the Duke, was composed partly of aris- 
tocratic Whigs and partly of late adherents of 
Canning ; it was well for England that, at a grave 
crisis, she did not fall into the hands of demagogues. 
This is not the place to examine at length the memor- 
able events which, continuing for many months, 
wrought a complete change in the unreformed Parlia- 

349 



350 Wellington 

ment, and transformed the old political system of 
these realms amidst shocks and troubles that seemed 
to imperil the State. The first Reform Bill, introduced 
by Lord John Russell, passed the second reading in 
the House of Commons by a majority of one ; but the 
Ministers were beaten in committee, and appealed 
to the country. The new House of Commons pro- 
nounced decisively for a second bill ; but this was 
summarily rejected by the House of Lords, which 
denounced the measure as fatal to the Constitution 
and the national welfare. The people of Great Bri- 
tain, already with difficulty restrained, and incensed 
at seeing its will thwarted, rose in several districts in 
angry outbreaks; ominous signs of social disorder 
appeared ; many thinking and moderate men be- 
lieved that England was going the way of France in 
1789-91. The Ministers, however, persisted in their 
course ; they brought forward a third Reform Bill, 
to which the House of Commons, of course, gave its 
sanction : a party called " the Waverers " had been 
formed in the House of Lords, which dreaded the 
aspect of the time, and wished for a compromise ; in 
a great degree owing to this influence the second 
reading passed the House of Lords by a small ma- 
jority. But the measure was defeated in committee 
again ; Lord Grey and his colleagues resigned office ; 
William IV., who had become terrified at the condi- 
tion of affairs, called on Wellington to form a new 
Government. This attempt, however, completely 
failed ; the Grey Ministry returned to power : the 
House of Lords sullenly assented to the third Re- 
form Bill, largely from dread of a great creation of 



From 1 8 jo to 1841 351 

peers, to which, it was said, the King had agreed. 
Parliamentary reform became at last the law of the 
land ; a real danger to the State had been averted. 
It is impossible in this brief sketch to describe the 
organic change in the Constitution which had been 
thus effected, or even to dwell on its momentous re- 
sults. The three Reform Bills were substantially 
the same ; they were not without grave and palpable 
defects. They swept away popular franchises in 
some boroughs ; they made the franchise they 
created too uniform ; they confined it too much to 
a single class : the farmers in the counties were en- 
franchised by a mere accident. But, to a very con- 
siderable extent at least, they removed the abuses 
which had made the House of Commons the instru- 
ment of an oligarchic caste ; they got rid of a num- 
ber of nomination, close, and rotten boroughs ; they 
gave Manchester, Birmingham, and other great 
towns the representation to which they had a right ; 
and while they deprived the aristocracy of illegiti- 
mate power, they left most of its indirect authority 
unimpaired. On the whole, they added greatly to 
the influence of the trading and middle classes in the 
State, but this the facts of the situation required ; 
and that influence was not to become excessive, as 
time was before long to prove. And though essen- 
tially democratic in their tendencies, they did not let 
democracy run riot ; they left the most vital parts of 
the Constitution intact. 

Wellington resisted reform with the steady per- 
severance he" had exhibited on many a hard-fought 
field. His perfect sincerity cannot be doubted ; the 



352 Wellington 

measure, he was convinced, would prove the ruin of 
the State ; it would make the stable administration 
of affairs impossible ; it would destroy the aristoc- 
racy, perhaps overthrow the monarchy. In these 
views he was certainly wrong ; yet they were quite 
as conscientiously held by Peel, the leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Commons, and by many 
of the eminent men of the time, astonishing as this 
may appear to the generation in which we live. 
The Duke had no patience with the " Waverers " ; 
he regarded them as deserters in the face of the 
enemy ; he turned a deaf ear to any thought of com- 
promise. Undoubtedly he made an earnest attempt 
to form a Ministry when Lord Grey resigned ; but 
Peel, very properly, would not consent to introduce 
a Reform Bill similar to that which he had steadily 
condemned. Catholic Emancipation, he insisted, was 
quite a different case. This caused a temporary es- 
trangement between the two men ; but Peel cer- 
tainly took the right course ; the Duke's argument 
that a Government should be formed "to save the 
King," even at the heavy price of reform, cannot 
bear examination and was self-deception. It de- 
serves notice that in opposing reform, the Duke 
rallied again all the Tories around him ; the events 
of 1829 were forgotten; but this was by no means 
the case with Peel ; he was still regarded with a good 
deal of distrust. During these agitated months 
Wellington's unpopularity passed all bounds ; he was 
held up to execration by demagogues and an in- 
cendiary press ; more than once his life was in danger 
from the savage mob of London. Yet he pursued 



From iSjo to 184.1 353 

his course with the tenacity characteristic of him ; 
he set an example to Englishmen which it is impos- 
sible not to admire. Much as he disliked the Min- 
istry of Lord Grey, he co-operated loyally with it in 
maintaining order wherever it was disturbed ; he 
repeatedly warned his party that its first duty was 
to support the " King's Government," and never to 
try to gain a factious triumph. This truly patriotic 
conduct had an immense effect ; Whigs and Tories 
united in defence of the State and the laws ; it dis- 
tinctly checked much that was most dangerous in 
the Reform movement. It should be added that, 
except in a few instances, the Ministry acted as be- 
came statesmen, and kept anarchy effectually down : 
that the aristocracy when attacked showed courage 
and spirit, and that the nation gradually returned to 
the ways of moderation and common sense. Never- 
theless it must be acknowledged that when the first 
Reformed Parliament met, in the beginning of 1833, 
the balance of the Constitution seemed perilously 
disturbed and Parliamentary Government brought 
well-nigh to a deadlock. The Ministry had such an 
immense majority, that it appeared to possess irre- 
sistible power; the Tory party in the House of 
Commons was a mere forlorn hope; the House of 
Lords, humiliated and defeated, was held of little 
account in the State. And for a short time innova- 
tion rushed onwards in full flood : extravagant pro- 
jects of change were proposed : the Opposition in the 
House of Commons was treated by Radical faction 
with contempt. But the Ministers set their faces 
against extreme measures ; their legislation was, in 
23 



354 Wellington 

the main, well conceived : and under the able and 
skilful leading of Peel, the Tories, thenceforward 
to be called Conservatives, regained confidence, and 
even increased in numbers. Omnipotent, too, as the 
Government was deemed to be, a variety of causes im- 
paired its strength and gradually made it essentially 
weak. There was a frightful agrarian outbreak in 
Ireland, stained with detestable deeds of blood ; the 
Ministry was compelled to have recourse to severe 
coercion ; this incensed O'Connell and his " Tail," as 
it was called ; he broke away from the " base, bloody, 
and brutal Whigs " with his submissive followers. 
Measures, too, introduced to reform the Established 
Church in Ireland, produced a schism among the 
men in office : four Ministers resigned, as they would 
not sanction the application of part of the property 
of the Church to secular uses. Nor had the Govern- 
ment a master mind in the House of Commons ; 
Lord Althorp, if an amiable even an able man, was 
no match for his opponent, Peel ; Lord John Rus- 
sell was, as yet, a subordinate only. The majority, 
moreover, of the Ministry was so great that it be- 
came unmanageable and split into groups ; and as 
disenchantment follows illusion, the wild hopes en- 
gendered by the Reform Bill had soon proved im- 
possible to fulfil ; and this disappointment told on 
the Government. In these circumstances a Conser- 
vative reaction quickly set in ; within a few months 
Conservatism was distinctly gaining strength in the 
country. A kind of conspiracy, too, even now ill 
explained, was formed against the veteran Prime 
Minister, in which, perhaps, one or two of his col- 



From 1 8 jo to 1841 355 

leagues took part ; and the violent harangues of 
Brougham, who had been made Lord Chancellor, in 
order " to muzzle him," as was generally said, dis- 
gusted hundreds of moderate and right-minded men. 
The Grey Government, which, in 1833, seemed to be 
as absolute as the Long Parliament was in 1641-42, 
within eighteen months was almost reduced to im- 
potence ; Lord Grey suddenly resigned in the sum- 
mer of 1834. 

The Government of Lord Grey was not broken up. 
Lord Melbourne, one of his colleagues, became 
Prime Minister. He was in no sense a statesman 
of a high order, but he was a cautious, astute, and 
amiable man, an epicurean and a courtier, and he was 
for a long time at the head of the State. But his first 
administration did not last. William IV. had long 
resolved to get rid of the Whigs ; the death of Lord 
Spencer, the father of Lord Althorp, gave the King 
the opportunity he sought. Melbourne and his 
colleagues were induced to resign ; and as Peel, 
recognised by the Conservatives as their coming 
Minister, was for the moment abroad in Rome, Wel- 
lington was practically made a Dictator for a time, 
the Treasury and the seals of three Secretaries of 
State having been placed in his hands. It might 
have been supposed that a coup d^tat of this kind, 
which elevated to supreme power a soldier lately the 
mark of popular hatred, would have raised an outcry 
throughout the nation ; but England had returned 
to her rational mind. She acknowledged the great 
qualities of the Duke ; it was felt that the best 
selection had been made. Wellington advised the 



356 Wellington 

King to make Peel Prime Minister, and meanwhile 
discharged his multifarious duties with characteristic 
zeal and attention. Peel, on his return home, formed 
his first Government, and appealed to the country to 
give him its support. The strength of the Conserva- 
tives was greatly increased at the election that fol- 
lowed, but it did not secure Peel a majority in the 
House of Commons ; he had to confront the Whigs, 
infuriated at their late removal, and the whole body 
of the Liberal and the Radical parties. The conduct of 
Peel, however, was judicious and able in the extreme, 
and Wellington co-operated with loyal zeal, if their 
personal relations were still rather strained. In the 
Tamworth Manifesto, as it has been called, Peel 
accepted reform as an accomplished fact, and indi- 
cated that he was prepared to carry out an essentially 
liberal policy. But he could not expect fair play 
from an Opposition eager to turn him out ; a coalition 
between the Whigs and O'Connell was made, on the 
principle of appropriating part of the revenues of the 
Established Church of Ireland to education and other 
purposes ; Peel was placed in a minority on this 
question. He was also defeated with respect to other 
measures. He resigned in the spring of 1835. Never- 
theless, the conduct of the Duke and the Minister 
had generally been approved by Englishmen ; they 
had made an effectual stand in behalf of Conserva- 
tive principles ; the appeal to the electorate had, 
in a great measure, restored the natural balance of 
parties; they had been beaten by a far from credit- 
able intrigue. 

The Melbourne Government was forced upon 



From iSjo to 1841 357 

William IV. when Peel had resigned after this brave 
struggle. Though never really strong, and declining 
as time rolled on, it continued in office for nearly six 
years ; its existence was prolonged by more than one 
accident. The state of political affairs during this 
period was very remarkable if we bear in mind that 
a revolution had lately appeared imminent. The 
Conservative reaction which had set in, soon after 
1832, went on with steadily augmented force; in 
England at least, it became dominant. The move- 
ment gradually drew into it what was best in English 
opinion ; there was an English majority in the House 
of Commons in 1839-40. Peel promoted this turn in 
affairs with consummate skill ; he completely broke 
away from the Toryism of the past ; he announced 
his policy to be that of moderate progress, and 
though he acted as a powerful check on the Ministry, 
and successfully resisted some of their measures, 
he usually contented himself with modifying what 
was most open to objection in them. By these 
means he welded together the Opposition he led into 
a most formidable power, which in practice largely 
controlled the Government ; and though the extreme 
Tories among his followers murmured complaints, 
his authority over his party was supreme. It should 
be added that his position and his attainments were 
perfectly adapted to a Reformed House of Commons 
after the frenzy of 1831-32 had subsided. He was 
himself a member of the great middle class of 
England ; he was cautious, sagacious, able in the 
extreme ; he was Conservative and Liberal alike ; 
all this fell in with the prevalent ideas of the time. 



358 Wellington 

The Ministry, on the other hand, if they retained 
their places, were never popular. The King 
was on the watch to trip them up, nor was his 
influence to be despised ; the great body of 
the aristocracy was opposed to them ; they had 
comparatively little hold on the nation, which 
regarded them with mingled contempt and dis- 
trust. And though several of their measures were 
well conceived, their policy was, in some respects, 
unfortunate ; they were far from successful in foreign 
affairs and in finance ; and if Palmerston and Lord 
John Russell were very able men, they did not 
possess the authority of Peel. These various circum- 
stances told with effect on the Government ; but 
what injured it most was, beyond question, its alli- 
ance with O'Connell and his " Tail," an alliance that 
ultimately became dependence. Englishmen were 
incensed that their rulers often bowed to the will of 
an Irish demagogue they hated and feared, and of an 
alien and disloyal faction, and that they accepted 
their insolent dictation on many questions. It should 
be remarked, too, that O'Connell's attitude in the 
House of Commons and in the country was rude and 
offensive, and that he was held up to public odium 
by the powerful press of England. 

The estrangement between Wellington and Peel, 
which had long been marked, continued during a 
part of this period. It was rather increased by the 
circumstance that Peel was annoyed that Oxford 
had made the Duke her Chancellor: the prize, he 
thought, should have been bestowed on himself, 
the most distinguished of her scholars in the service 



From iSjo to 1841 359 

of the State. The two men, in fact, were of dif- 
ferent natures, as in the somewhat analogous case of 
Canning ; they were not yet intimate in social con- 
verse, though Peel felt and professed the sincerest 
regard for Wellington. But they worked loyally 
together in the interests of the State ; the Duke as 
leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords 
played a very conspicuous and patriotic part. Ever 
true to his maxim that the " King's Government " 
must be steadily upheld against mere faction, he 
supported the Ministry against discontented Tories, 
who endeavoured to wreck it over and over again. 
He especially censured the invectives of Brougham, 
who, furious that he had lost the Great Seal, held up 
Melbourne and his colleagues to execration and 
scorn. The Conservative Opposition in the House 
of Lords was thus kept in harmony with the Opposi- 
tion in the House of Commons ; the Conservative 
cause was greatly strengthened ; its ultimate tri- 
umph was rendered certain. The Duke, too, suc- 
ceeded admirably in modifying the legislation of 
the Ministry where this seemed to require improve- 
ment, and in carrying it through the House of 
Lords when it was in the national interest. He 
supported the great measure of Corporate Reform, 
which passed into law at this period, though, with 
Peel, he changed some of its essential features. He 
refused to echo the outcry against the new Poor Law, 
in which many of the Tories joined ; the result was 
fortunate for the aristocracy of the land. As re- 
gards Ireland and Irish affairs, which were very 
prominent at this time, he showed that he had no 



360 Wellington 

sympathy with Orangeism and its pernicious doc- 
trines ; he assisted in effecting the commutation of 
the tithe of the Established Church, one of the 
most salutary reforms of these years ; he gave his 
sanction to a compromise on Irish Corporate Re- 
form. As regards foreign affairs he generally gave a 
cordial and honourable support to the Government. 
He approved of the suppression of the rebellion in 
Canada : he made no attack on the war with China 
in 1840. As a rule he supported the policy of 
Palmerston abroad, especially as regards the alliance 
with France, and the events that took place in 
Portugal and Spain, though all this was opposed to 
the ideas of 18 14-15. But it deserves notice that 
he objected to the return of Napoleon's ashes from 
St. Helena ; this has been called an unfeeling and a 
hard act, and it was in accordance with his unsym- 
pathetic nature. But it is by no means certain that 
Wellington was not in the right: the funeral of Na- 
poleon revived the Napoleonic legend and shook the 
throne of Louis Philippe. 

William IV. died rather suddenly in 1837 ; his 
niece, the Princess Victoria, became sovereign of 
these realms. She had been brought up in the 
traditions of the Whigs ; her favourite attendants 
were all Whigs ; Melbourne was her excellent and 
trusted mentor. This change strengthened the 
Melbourne Government ; at the election which fol- 
lowed the demise of the Crown it gained a few 
seats in the House of Commons ; but even the 
charm of the presence of the young Queen, and the 
influence she exercised on behalf of her friends, 



From 1 8 jo to 1S41 361 

only retarded for a time the Conservative triumph. 
The coronation took place in the last days of June, 
1838 ; it was a magnificent, nay, an astonishing spec- 
tacle. Though the railway system was as yet in its 
infancy, the world of London seemed trebled in 
numbers; the royal procession passed through enor- 
mous crowds from the Palace to the Abbey of 
Westminster ; the streets were decked out with 
banners and flags extending for miles. The cere- 
mony within the abbey was imposing and touching; 
the crown was placed on the head of a girl of nine- 
teen, who bore herself as became the daughter of 
a long line of kings, in the presence of the envoys 
of the allied Powers of Europe and the West and of 
all that was most noble and beautiful in the land ; the 
pomp of ancient chivalry, the splendour of modern 
wealth, the solemn ritual of the Church handed 
down through the ages, gave a grandeur and an 
impressiveness all their own to the superb spectacle. 
The figure of Soult was conspicuous among the am- 
bassadors of foreign Powers ; the veteran soldier 
had just landed in England ; he received every- 
where an enthusiastic welcome. Wellington treated 
his old adversary as a favoured companion in arms; 
shouting crowds followed the aged warriors as they 
were seen riding or walking together ; the brother- 
hood-in-arms, often formed between antagonists in 
the field, as we see in the cases of Turenne and 
Conde, of Eugene and Villars, has seldom been more 
strikingly displayed. The Duke took care that 
Soult should be shown everything that London, 
Woolwich, and Greenwich could show ; with delicate 



362 Wellington 

courtesy he tried to stop the publication of a paper 
from the pen of the malevolent Croker, which re- 
flected on the Marshal's conduct at Toulouse ; he 
even delayed with equal good feeling the appear- 
ance of a volume of his own Despatches. The Brit- 
ish aristocracy, it is unnecessary to say, received the 
veteran as a most honoured guest ; he was greeted 
with friendliness and respect in the great London 
houses ; all kinds of attentions were lavished on him. 
Yet there was one awkward scene amidst these fes- 
tive gatherings: the Lord Mayor proposed, at a 
great city banquet, that the Duke should speak 
to the toast of the " French Army " ; he growled 
out, " Damn them, I '11 have nothing to do with 
them but to beat them ! " 

In 1839 the Melbourne Government resigned, 
having had a majority of five only, on a West 
Indian question. The Queen sent for Wellington, 
who advised her to make Peel Minister. Peel was 
actually installed in office. But her Majesty clung 
to her old friends, and was too glad to find an oppor- 
tunity not to give them up ; she refused to make a 
change in the Ladies of her Bedchamber, all, with- 
out exception, devoted Whigs ; Peel declined to be 
Minister on these terms. In this singular intrigue, 
if not a party to it, the Queen gave proof of a resolu- 
tion hardly becoming her youth ; and as Englishmen 
have no taste for such schemes of the Palace, she 
continued to be unpopular for many months, a cir- 
cumstance that appears strange to those who did not 
live in those days. The Melbourne Administration 
resumed their places, but they were overshadowed 



From 1 8 jo to 1841 363 

by an opposition that had the substance of power, 
and a series of events proved adverse in the extreme. 
The policy of Palmerston in the East was, indeed, suc- 
cessful and gave his colleagues and himself a passing 
triumph ; but an expedition into Afghanistan was 
fitted out which led to a great disaster to the British 
arms; the tragedy of the Khyber Pass has not yet been 
forgotten. Meanwhile a succession of bad harvests 
had occurred ; the condition of agriculture became 
very bad ; trade and manufactures suffered even 
more severely. In this position of affairs, Chartism, 
the forerunner of the Socialism of these days, lifted 
its head menacingly and became formidable in many 
of the large towns ; thousands of the artisan popula- 
tion were deprived of work ; mills were closed ; fur- 
naces were extinguished ; industry was well-nigh 
paralysed in several districts. There were dangerous 
riots in some places, which the Government did not 
suppress with vigour ; the state of England seemed 
like that which it had been in 1829-30. The finances, 
too, were badly administered ; there was a series of 
deficits, ominous and increasing ; the cry for the 
repeal of the Corn Laws had arisen ; it was felt that 
public affairs should be placed in abler hands. 

The marriage of the Queen with Prince Albert 
revived her popularity to some extent, and was not 
without effect on the Government. Trade, too, had 
become somewhat better in 1841 ; a few of the 
measures of the Administration — the penny postage 
was the best of these — were liberal, and were gener- 
ally approved. But nothing could arrest the decline 
of the Whigs ; the Opposition, they knew, were their 



364 Wellington 

masters ; they only nominally held the reins of Gov- 
ernment. Peel and Wellington steadily pursued their 
course; the pear was ripening; power was passing 
into their hands. By this time they had been fully 
reconciled ; but it is more than doubtful if they were 
ever intimate friends, in the sense of complete and 
genuine friendship ; the idem sentire de republica re- 
mained the bond between them. In this position of 
affairs, the Ministry made a desperate effort, unwise 
and unstatesmanlike, to retrieve their fortunes, but, 
as it deserved, it became worse than fruitless. Believ- 
ing that they read correctly the signs of the times, 
they brought forward a series of Free-Trade meas- 
ures, but Parliament refused to accept these ; they 
had little or no effect on public opinion. At last, in 
May, 1 841, Peel brought matters to a decisive test ; 
he proposed a vote of no confidence in the Minis- 
try, this was carried in the House of Commons by a 
majority of one. The Government, however, would 
not even now resign : they appealed to the Electorate 
on a Free-Trade cry ; they were completely defeated 
and at last left office. Peel became Prime Minister 
for the second time ; but he was now in command of 
a great majority in both Houses; the nation had 
clearly pronounced in his favor. The Conservative 
party which, in 1832, had been reduced to a handful 
of men, was now for the time supreme in the State ; 
the result must be largely ascribed to the joint efforts 
of Peel and Wellington, in conducting an opposition 
with consummate prudence and skill. 



CHAPTER XIII 

DECLINING YEARS — DEATH — CHARACTER 

Wellington in the Cabinet of Peel, but without office — He returns to 
the command of the army after the retirement of Hill — State 
of England when Peel became Minister in 1841 — His great 
fiscal and economical reforms — Policy of Free Trade — The 
Income Tax — Peel's administration gradually undermined — The 
failure of the potato in Ireland — Discussions in the Cabinet — 
Attitude of Wellington — Resignation of Peel and return to 
office — The ultimate repeal of the Corn Laws carried through 
Parliament — Wellington succeeds in passing the measure through 
the House of Lords — Fall of Peel's Ministry — The Administra- 
tion of Lord John Russell — Wellington often consulted — His 
conduct as Commander-in-Chief in his later years — Universal 
reverence felt for him — His death and funeral — His character 
as a general, as a military administrator, as a statesman, and in 
public and private life. 

WELLINGTON had a seat in the Cabinet 
of Peel, but without office ; he charac- 
teristically said that he wished to give 
place to a younger generation of men. But 
on the retirement of Hill, in 1842, he returned 
to the command of the army, which he had exer- 
cised many years before ; he retained this high post 
until he disappeared from the scene. Peel, when 
he became Minister for the second time, found 

365 



366 Wellington 

England in a sea of troubles ; disasters threatening in 
the East, discontent and distress at home, financial 
embarrassments on the increase, a violent agitation 
for the Repeal of the Corn Laws, a depression in 
most branches of trade and commerce, a state of 
public opinion deeply diseased. This is not the 
place to examine by what means the great Minister 
encountered the difficulties of the time, and in what 
degree he relieved or removed them. The peril in 
Afghanistan was averted, partly owing to the renown 
of the British arms and to the proved valour of the 
British soldier, partly to the dissensions of races 
which have never made use of success. A series of 
good harvests improved the state of the country, and 
quickened industry with fruitful results ; the rapid 
development of the railway system, if attended by 
speculation which did much mischief, added enor- 
mously to the national wealth, and gave employment 
to a huge mass of surplus labour. These happy 
accidents, however, as they may rightly be called, 
were perhaps not more effectual in raising England 
from the critical situation into which she had fallen, 
and in launching her again on the path of progress, 
than the bold, wise, and masterly policy inaugurated 
by Peel in her domestic affairs. His Corn Law, 
indeed, was a mere compromise ; it did not disarm 
the Anti-Corn-Law League, or silence its powerful 
champion, Cobden ; it irritated many of the old 
Tory party, who thought the interests of agriculture 
betrayed and looked back at the surrender of 1829; 
it gave little or no impetus to our foreign commerce. 
But Peel revived, though on a grander scale, the eco^ 



Declining Years— Death— Character 367 

nomic reforms of Pitt and Huskisson ; he may fairly 
be said to have been the great apostle of Free 
Trade for England. He broke down an exclusive 
tariff, ruinous to the national industry ; in hundreds 
of cases he abolished or reduced duties on imports 
required by our manufactures and trade ; he thus 
liberated commerce from most injurious restraints 
encouraging industry to an immense extent, and 
giving an extraordinary impetus to the general wel- 
fare. And he had the courage — and this was very 
great — to carry out these reforms, to defray the 
charge, and to restore the equilibrium in the finances 
of the State, by subjecting the wealthier classes to 
the income tax, imposed hitherto only in time of 
war, an experiment deemed astonishing in those 
days. 

The administration of Peel still appeared of un- 
broken strength, when Parliament adjourned after 
the session of 1845. The prosperity of the country 
was great ; social discontent had all but completely 
ceased ; the state of agriculture and commerce was 
full of promise. The Chartist movement seemed a 
phantom of the past ; if the Anti-Corn-Law League 
retained life, its influence had been perceptibly 
weakened ; England seemed to be advancing tran- 
quilly on the path of progress. But a series of events 
had undermined the Government ; the Conservative 
party had for some time been complaining of its 
chief. The Repeal movement of 1843 had assumed 
gigantic proportions under O'Connell ; it had not 
been suppressed until very late ; this alienated many 
of the high Tories. Peel, too, had introduced more 



368 Wellington 

than one measure of reform for Ireland, which 
aroused the suspicions of Protestant England ; one, 
a bill for the increased endowment of Maynooth, the 
seminary of the Irish Catholic priesthood, aroused a 
tempest of fierce sectarian passion. Our relations 
with America and France had, besides, been more 
than once strained ; the pacific attitude of Lord 
Aberdeen, Peel's Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, rather irritated and vexed the national 
pride, contrasting as it did with the pugnacity, the 
boldness, the meddling, of Palmerston. All this had 
an effect on the Ministry ; but the ascendency of 
Peel was most weakened among his followers by his 
Free-Trade policy. He had enormously reduced the 
duties on foreign imports, with admirable results 
that could not be denied ; how could high duties on 
foreign corn continue? was Protection to British 
agriculture to fetter our commerce abroad, and to 
impose a tax on the necessaries of life ? The mind 
of the Minister was evidently turning by degrees to 
a relaxation of the Corn Laws, in a Free-Trade sense, 
probably to their abolition in a not distant future : in 
truth their maintenance was every year becoming 
more difficult, largely owing to the conclusive logic 
of Cobden. The Conservative party was stirred to 
its depths, especially the great aristocracy of the 
land ; it was whispered that the Minister would be- 
tray them again, as he had betrayed them on the 
Irish Catholic question ; a young man of genius 
gave great force to the sentiment. Disraeli, amidst 
the plaudits of scores of the followers of Peel, had 
announced that Protection was going the way of 



Dec lifting Years — Death — Character 369 

Protestantism in 1828-29; and that the Government 
was an " organised hypocrisy," with a traitor at its 
head. If Peel's majority in the House of Commons 
had hardly declined, its fidelity to its leader was no 
longer assured. 

Wellington took no part, as may be supposed, in 
the fiscal and economic reforms at this period ; these 
were the work of Peel and his rising lieutenant, 
Gladstone. The Duke, however, came prominently 
forward during the events which ultimately led to 
the fall of Peel's second Ministry. In the early 
autumn of 1845, the precarious root which formed al- 
most the only support of teeming millions in Ireland 
always in want, suddenly failed in many parts of 
the country ; there was a certainty of dearth which 
might end in famine. Peel, who had been Chief 
Secretary for Ireland from 1812 to 181 8, and knew 
the condition of the mass of the people, summoned 
a Cabinet and proposed to suspend the Corn Laws, 
in order to let cereals free into the ports; he added 
that, if suspended, they could hardly be revived ; 
but only three of his colleagues concurred in this 
view. Erelong Lord John Russell announced, in a 
famous letter, that the time for the repeal of the 
Corn Laws had come, and that free trade in corn 
could not be deferred ; this necessarily forced the 
hand of Peel ; he submitted a measure to the Cab- 
inet by which the Corn Laws would have been 
abolished in a few years. The Duke, though op- 
posed to a free trade in corn, accepted the project on 
the characteristic plea that it was of paramount im- 
portance to sustain the Government, and not to hand 



3 jo Wellington 

it over to the Whigs and Cobden ; but a leading mem- 
ber of the administration refused to follow his chief ; 
Peel resigned, seeing that his colleagues were divided 
in mind. The Queen called on Lord John Russell 
to form a Government ; but owing to dissensions 
with Palmerston Lord John proved unable to carry 
out his purpose; Peel returned to office with his 
late Cabinet ; the only exception being the dissen- 
tient member. Peel, in the beginning of 1846, 
brought forward his famous measure for the gradual 
repeal of the Corn Laws, and the ultimate establish- 
ment of free trade in corn ; it is unnecessary to 
dwell on the memorable events that followed. A 
tempest of party fury broke against the Minister ; 
the mass of the Conservatives fell away from him, 
declaring that he had been pledged to Protection 
and that he had again shamefully betrayed his trust; 
Disraeli made himself conspicuous for his brilliant 
invectives ; he concentrated against Peel a body of 
angry opinion in the House of Commons. The 
measure passed the House by a large majority, hav- 
ing the support of the Opposition, and of adherents 
who still clung to Peel ; but this success was for a 
moment only. Peel had introduced a Coercion Bill 
for Ireland in the early part of the session ; but the 
progress of this had been delayed ; the Whigs and 
the Protectionists had voted for it ; but they seized 
the opportunity to pronounce against it ; this " black- 
guard combination," as it was bluntly called by the 
Duke, — and faction seldom has played a more dis- 
creditable game, — placed Peel in a minority, and he 
at once resigned. Wellington carried the Corn Law 



Declining Years — Death — Character 371 

Bill through the House of Lords, insisting, as was 
his wont, that the Government must be upheld ; the 
Peers, though detesting it, did not attempt to resist 
it ; times had changed since 1831-32. It is very re- 
markable that the outcry raised against Peel by the 
Protectionists did not affect the Duke ; it was felt 
that, from their point of view, he was hardly to 
blame ; the veneration which his age and his charac- 
ter inspired throughout the nation was more than a 
sufficient safeguard. 

The administration of Lord John Russell fol- 
lowed that of Peel ; it was practically kept in office 
by the late Minister, who opposed the Protectionists 
by all the means in his power ; it adopted and ex- 
tended his Free-Trade policy. But essentially it was 
a feeble Government ; it had to cope with difficult 
crises, notably with the great Irish famine of 1846-47, 
and with revolutionary events abroad and even at 
home ; Palmerston, an object of dislike to the Queen 
and her Consort, was a thorn in its side. The Duke 
was consulted more than once, on occasions when it 
seemed about to fall ; he had become his sovereign's 
most trusted servant, especially since the untimely 
death of Peel. But, as a rule, he confined himself to 
his post at the head of the army ; the aged veteran 
greatly distinguished himself; the setting sun still 
shed many a bright ray of glory. I shall notice 
afterwards the influence Wellington had on our 
military system, during the long period when vir- 
tually it had passed into his hands ; I shall here only 
refer to what he achieved in the last years of his 
life.. By this time he had exceeded the allotted span 



p 



372 Wellington 

of threescore and ten ; but though he was not free 
from the infirmities of old age his martial spirit re- 
mained unbroken ; he still professed himself able to 
defend the State in the field ; he was still animated 
by his enduring sense of duty. As far back as 
1839-40, when a rupture between Prussia and France 
appeared probable, he had declared that, with the con- 
sent of his sovereign, he was willing to take com- 
mand of a Prussian army against the enemies he 
had encountered in another age ; this offer, it is be- 
lieved, was repeated many years afterwards. Wel- 
lington observed with profound and intelligent 
interest the events of the first great Sikh war after 
the disappearance of our old ally, Runjeet Singh ; 
he fully appreciated the desperate battles that were 
then fought ; the Harding of Albuera, one of his 
Peninsular officers, who almost saved India at a 
terrible crisis, was rightly singled out for the praise 
he deserved. In 1849, when Gough, a dashing but 
imprudent soldier, and, perhaps, too harshly con- 
demned at the time, was defeated at Chillianwalla, 
with heavy loss, the Duke insisted that Napier 
should be sent out to retrieve the disaster; other- 
wise he declared he would embark for India himself ; 
the veteran had then passed his eightieth year. One 
of his best services at this period was his admirable 
plan of defending London against a Chartist out- 
break, threatened in the year of revolutions, 1848; 
his arrangements were masterly and skilfully con- 
cealed ; Chartism sank in ignominious collapse. He 
was also desirous, about this time, to transfer the 
command of the army to Prince Albert ; but the 




SIR HENRY HARDING. 
(After the painting by E. Eddis.) 



Dec I in ing Yea rs — Dea th — Character 373 

Prince for weighty reasons declined ; the veteran 
remained at his glorious post until his death. 

As Wellington's declining years rolled on, he be- 
came an object of national veneration perhaps un- 
equalled in England. The renown of his military 
exploits remained undimmed ; a new generation re- 
cognised his great services in the field ; it was felt 
that he was a principal author of the long peace 
which followed the French Revolutionary War ; as 
Napier wrote, the Empire reposed under the Glory 
of Waterloo. He was still distinctly the first soldier 
of the time ; Soult, Paskievitch, Radetsky, were 
illustrious names, but they could not be compared 
to him in the opinion of Europe. The unpopularity 
of 1831-32 had passed away ; the voice of faction 
had been hushed ; his sagacity, his wisdom, above 
all, his single-minded and patriotic sense of duty, 
had sunk deep into the hearts of his revering coun- 
trymen. He had become a kind of Mentor of the 
Palace for his still youthful sovereign, who looked 
up to him with almost a daughter's affection ; when 
he made his appearance in the House of Lords, its 
members hung on the words he uttered ; he was al- 
ways welcomed with a more than respectful greeting 
as he passed through the busiest streets of London. 
It was a touching sight to behold the veteran riding 
quietly to do his work at the Horse Guards, or tak- 
ing his customary exercise in the Park ; every hat 
was doffed as he responded to the universal salute. 
In this respect his last days and those of Marl- 
borough were very different ; the victor of Blenheim 
and Ramillies died unlamented ; but the judgment of 



3 74 Wellington 

England fell in with the truth ; there are " damned 
spots" on Marlborough's name; as the poet has 
said, no record can cast shame on Wellington. The 
end of this history of glory in arms and of faith- 
ful service to the State came rather suddenly 
on the 14th of September, 1852. The Duke, as 
Warden of the Cinque Ports, had been staying at- 
Walmer ; he had intended to meet one of his nieces 
at Dover ; he fell ill, and expired in a few hours. 
The news was rapidly spread far and near ; it was 
received on the Continent not without emotion ; 
as was eloquently said, " a Pillar of the old order 
has been removed from an edifice tottering under 
the Revolutionary storm." From the Sovereign to 
the most humble citizen, the great soldier and states- 
man was universally mourned ; a Master in Israel, 
men felt, had died and had left no successor. 
The body lay in state for some weeks ; reverent 
spectators flocked to see it, day after day, at Aps- 
ley House, the London residence of the Duke ; the 
staffs of a marshal of all the great armies of Europe 
were exhibited, and formed a most interesting sight. 
A public funeral was solemnly announced ; Queen 
Victoria expressed a wish that Parliament should 
associate itself with it, and with " the memory of 
one whom no Englishman can name without pride 
and sorrow." The ceremony took place on the 
1 8th of November; Wellington was borne through 
the mourning streets of the capital to the cathedral, 
which holds the ashes of Nelson. The military 
pageant was not very imposing, though it was at- 
tended by representatives of nearly all the great 



Declining Years — Death — Character 375 

Powers, nor was the procession formed by the chief 
officers of the State remarkable. What was most 
touching and most significant was the enormous 
multitude, not only of the London citizens, but of 
visitors from all parts of the country, who filled the 
streets and ways of the city for miles, and wore the 
solemn look of a people in grief. 

Wellington was of the middle height and rather 
slightly formed ; he had been delicate in youth, but 
in mature age was strong — the epithet of the " Iron 
Duke" is well know*! ; his health began to fail after 
he had passed seventy ; but he retained his faculties 
almost unimpaired ; he was in his eighty-fourth year 
when he died. The extant portraits of him are not 
very good ; they are somewhat tame, and hardly re- 
produce features which were evidently those of a 
very remarkable man. I only beheld him when in 
advanced old age ; his figure was bent, his stature 
was shrunk ; but it was impossible not to understand 
the character of that wise countenance, and espe- 
cially the look of that keen, piercing eye, which always 
reminded me of that of a raven. It was no associa- 
tion of ideas that made you feel that you were in 
the presence of a superior nature when you saw 
Wellington ; for the rest, he had the simple and 
somewhat reserved bearing distinctive of the born 
English gentleman ; there was nothing showy or 
ostentatious about him. The ground plan, so to 
speak, of his character is evident to those who have 
studied hrs career. He never rose to the topmost 
heights of genius ; he was deficient in imaginative 
force ; he was less remarkable for originality than 



376 Wellington 

for strong common sense. Sagacity was his chief 
intellectual gift ; he was admirable whether in esti- 
mating the prospects of a campaign, or in laying 
down a plan of operations in war, or, usually, in per- 
ceiving what ought to be done in politics ; his judg- 
ment in any given situation was of the very 
highest value. '• He had, also, remarkable quickness 
and clearness of insight ; he confounded his adver- 
saries by his ready skill in the field ; he knew in 
affairs of State when to stand firm or to retreat, at 
least in the great body of instances. It is unneces- 
sary to add that his professional knowledge was 
great ; he had mastered the details of the service in 
youth ; he was perfectly able to direct an army 
before he had a command ; his moral excellences 
were, perhaps, even more striking ; he had extra- 
ordinary strength of character, he was animated 
throughout his long career by a steadfast and un- 
erring sense of duty ; this was the principle of his 
conduct, from which he never swerved ; loyalty and 
patriotism were his guiding motives ; he was sin- 
gularly devoid of ambition and personal selfishness. 
His perfect integrity, too, was one of his finest 
qualities ; in positions in which he might have made 
immense wealth, and that without a stain on his 
character, he thought only of the public service ; the 
slightest taint of corruption was odious to him ; in 
this respect he had much in common with the Patri- 
cians of the best ages of Rome. For the rest, his 
nature was cold, hard, and stern ; he had little sym- 
pathy with the social life around him ; he was never 
happy in the circle of home. Of the blemishes in 



Declining Years — Death — Character $77 

his domestic relations it is needless to speak ; they 
were not grave and hardly require notice. 

More than half a century has elapsed since the death 
of Wellington ; eighty-eight years since he fought his 
last battle at Waterloo. His figure stands out in the 
light of history ; an impartial estimate of his career 
has become possible. It was the fashion of his day, 
in England, to compare him with Napoleon ; but no 
masters of war were more completely different ; 
Wellington was not a military genius of the first 
order. The Peninsular War was his great achieve- 
ment ; in this long passage of arms his powers were 
made grandly manifest. With characteristic sagac- 
ity he perceived how Portugal could be defended 
against the French armies, notwithstanding their 
immense numerical strength ; how Spain, in that 
event, could hardly be subdued ; this was a military 
conception of the very highest merit. In conduct- 
ing the contest, too, he gave proof of most remark- 
able gifts ; his plans were usually profound and well 
laid ; no general of the Coalition understood, even 
nearly as well, what were the inherent defects of the 
French army, and how it could be encountered and 
beaten in the field. And his project of defending 
Portugal at Torres Vedras was a masterpiece ; if not 
wholly original, it was magnificently worked out; firm- 
ness of purpose and force of character in war have 
never been more conspicuously seen than when he 
stood on this rock before Lisbon confronting the co- 
lossal might of Napoleon. Wellington's operations 
that led to Vitoria are the best examples of his combin- 
ations on a great scale in the field ; they were most 



K 






378 Wellington 

ably designed ; they were the prelude to a decisive 
victory. And as we look back at the Peninsular 
War, and at the vicissitudes of that protracted con- 
test, it is impossible to deny that the British com- 
mander was the principal author of the ultimate 
issue, if he owed much to the discords and jealousies 
of his antagonists, and to the extravagance to be 
laid to the charge of Napoleon in directing opera- 
tions in Spain from a desk in Paris. Justice, too, 
should be done to the skill and resource shown by 
Wellington in making his Peninsular army the ad- 
mirable instrument of war it became, and in fashion- 
ing his Portuguese and Spanish levies into disciplined 
and, usually, effective soldiers. On the whole, it 
may be said that the British General was superior _-. 
to every other chief of the League of Europe in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars ; this, I am 
convinced, will be his place in history. Neverthe- 
less Wellington cannot rank high as a strategist ; — 
here he is not even to be named with Napoleon ; he 
was hardly the equal of the Archduke Charles. An 
attentive examination of his Peninsular campaigns 
proves that he made many grave strategic mistakes ; 
this was conspicuously seen in the Campaign of 1 809 ; 
he ought not to have fought at Busaco ; he narrowly 
escaped discomfiture before Salamanca. Strategic- 
ally, too, he was more than once outmanoeuvred in 
his long duel with Soult along the Pyrenean fron- 
tier ; the success he achieved was partly due to his 
marked superiority in the shock of battle, and to the 
qualities of his Peninsular army, and partly to 
defects in the qualities of his opponents. And it 



Declining Years — Death — Character 379 

is simply disregarding palpable truths to say that, 
when he encountered the greatest of strategists, he 
was not outgeneralled -almost from first to last, 
though his hand was certainly forced by Bliicher, 
and he would have probably acted quite differently 
but for his impetuous colleague. 

It is to the field of battle that we have to repair to X. 
see the best qualities of Wellington in the conduct 
of war. He was hardly as great a tactician as Marl- 
borough ; he did not achieve anything equal to 
Blenheim and Ramillies. Nor did he ever show the 
genius of Frederick the Great at Leuthen ; but he 
was a much safer and more prudent commander ; he 
made no such mistakes as were made at Kolin and 
Torgau. But whether on the offensive or the de- 
fensive, and especially when he had a position to 
hold, he proved himself to be a great master of 
tactics. He was not superior at Assaye to Clive at 
Plassy ; but in boldly attacking he took the right 
course ; his movements in battle were very fine ; 
he plucked safety and victory from great appar- 
ent danger. His passage of the Douro, under 
the beard of Soult, was an operation of admirable 
skill and resource : had he been properly seconded 
the distinguished Marshal would, not improbably, 
have met the fate of Dupont at Baylen. At Tal- 
avera he rightly made a resolute stand ; he might 
otherwise have lost his army ; and he inflicted a 
severe defeat on Joseph and Victor. Fuentes 
d'Onoro is the one of his battles in which his powers 
are least distinctly manifest ; he acknowledged him- 
self, that he ought to have been beaten ; but probably 



380 Wellington 

he did not make the arrangements before the 
fight, and he executed admirably a most difficult 
change of front. The keenness of his insight, and 
his remarkable gift of turning to account a mistake 
made by an adversary on the field, were grandly 
conspicuous at Salamanca ; he gained a great victory 
by a tactical stroke ; this, Napier has written, was 
the most brilliant of his offensive efforts. Few pas- 
sages of war are of more striking interest than the 
prolonged struggle between Wellington and Soult 
on the Pyrenees, before Bayonne, at Orthes, at 
Toulouse; the fine combinations of the French Mar- 
shal were baffled, over and over again, by the ac- 
tivity, the cotip tVoeil, the brilliant movements of the 
British commander in the actual stress of battle. 
And, not to speak of his stern constancy, perhaps 
never more magnificently displayed, Wellington 
gave proof of the very highest capacity and military 
skill on the great day of Waterloo ; he showed that, 
as a tactician, he was a master of his art, in the gen- 
eral arrangement of his army on the ground ; in 
husbanding his reserves to the latest moment ; in 
screening his troops from the destructive fire of the 
artillery which gave Napoleon so many triumphs ; 
and, finally, in attacking when he saw that the day 
was won. His conduct of Waterloo is his real title 
to eulogy in the Campaign of 181 5 ; it is a legiti- 
mate set-off to no doubtful strategic errors. 

Wellington, to a very considerable extent at least, 
made his Peninsular army what it became, the best 
army in Europe for its size. His military adminis- 
tration, during the many years when he held the 




THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 
(From a steel engraving. ^ 



Declining Years — Death — Character 381 

post of Commander-in-Chief, is hardly entitled to 
high praise. There is something in the system of 
war established in England which makes her forces 
inefficient in time of peace ; this has been seen from 
the Peace of Utrecht to the South African War. 
Wellington did not attempt to make reforms in the 
army, of which he was the head ; he allowed it to 
exist in the routine of the past ; he did not try to 
improve its quality. He had the highest opinion of 
the British officer ; but he did not lay stress on his 
professional knowledge ; his idea was that he should 
be able to lead his men and to fight. He thought 
the non-commissioned officers the backbone of the 
army ; but he hardly sought to improve their 
condition ; he regarded the great body of the Brit- 
ish soldiers as excellent troops when under severe 
discipline, but prone to drunkenness and degrading 
vices ; he protested against the abolition or the 
mitigation of the barbarities of the lash. But where 
he was most deficient in chief command was that 
he would not recognise the manifold changes 
which the progress of the age and material inven- 
tions were making in all that relates to war ; and 
that he would not adapt the British army to the re- 
quirements of the time. He would not hear of a 
short-service system, or of the formation of a re- 
serve ; Brown Bess, in his eyes, was a perfect weapon; 
he thought rifled guns and field shells of very little 
value. But in this conservatism, it may fairly be 
said, he trod in the footsteps of the chiefs of the 
Continental armies ; Soult and Paskievitch clung to 
the traditions of the past, in which they had been 



382 Wellington 

trained and had learned war ; Moltke alone — then an 
unknown subaltern — had perceived what the future 
could effect for the military art. Yet it would be a 
mistake to suppose that, as Commander-in-Chief, 
Wellington did not do England great and patri- 
otic service. From an early period he saw how, as 
has always happened, British statesmen, under the 
influence of a prolonged peace, were allowing the 
army to be dangerously reduced in strength, and 
how the defences of the country were being ne- 
glected. When in the Cabinet of Peel he entreated 
that the subject should be considered with care, and 
that the military power of the nation should be in- 
creased. But the time was one of economic reform 
and retrenchment; the warnings of the great veteran 
were but little heeded. His celebrated letter to Sir 
John Burgoyne, written just before the tornado of 
1848, showed how insecure was the position of Eng- 
land, and how exposed to foreign invasion ; it had 
a decisive effect on the national mind ; despite too 
long intervals of thoughtlessness and neglect, the 
country has never since been so completely unpre- 
pared for war. It should be added that Wellington 
lived to see an increase of the militia force, a re- 
form he had always had at heart, made by the first 
administration of Lord Derby, in 1852. 

Apart from his brief apprenticeship in the Irish 
Parliament, the political life of Wellington extended 
over a third of a century. He can hardly be called 
a great statesman ; but no eminent English soldier 
has ever given proof of such statesmanlike qualities ; 
here he was by many degrees superior to Marl^ 



Declining Years — Death — Character 383 

borough, consummate in diplomacy, but not in poli- 
tics. If we recollect that he belonged to the 
Protestant noblesse of Ireland, an exclusive oligarchy 
of race and creed ; that he did not enter the Cabinet 
until he was nearly fifty ; that he had been in com- 
mand abroad for a series of years, and that his 
knowledge of England was comparatively small, it 
appears surprising that his political distinction was 
what it was, and that he did so much as a civil serv- 
ant of the State. The secret is to be found in his 
wisdom and well-balanced judgment, and in his noble 
sense of public duty ; it must be borne in mind, 
besides, that in India, in the Peninsula, even in 
France, he had to play a remarkable part in political 
affairs. His antecedents and the associations of his 
career connected him with the Tory party ; but he 
was usually a moderate and fair-minded Tory; he 
had nothing in common with the school of the ex- 
treme followers of Pitt. And hence it was that, as 
a general rule, he adapted himself to the circum- 
stances of the time ; seldom resisted measures he 
foresaw were required ; was, like Peel, a Conservative 
in the truest sense of the word. His two greatest 
achievements in the sphere of politics were the 
emancipation of the Irish Catholics in 1829, and his 
conduct in opposition from 1833 to 1841 ; he 
accomplished a great reform most unjustly delayed, 
and no one else could have carried it out at the 
time; he gradually restored the balance of parties in 
the State, with the skilful and admirable assistance 
of Peel, and secured for a great Conservative states- 
man a decisive triumph. Wellington, no doubt, 



384 Wellington 

made grave political mistakes ; he rather discredited 
himself when he broke with Canning; he was too 
much of a dictator when Prime Minister ; he did not 
rightly interpret the signs of the time ; his stubborn 
resistance to the Reform Bill cannot be justified. 
But he sincerely believed that Parliamentary reform 
was incompatible with the ideal he had ever be- 
fore him, " that the King's Government must be a 
strong government"; and with many of the ablest 
men in the country he was convinced that reform 
would be fatal to the State. For the rest, Welling- 
ton in politics, as in all his public conduct, was 
animated by a patriotism always, in the long run, 
acknowledged ; it was this that gave him such weight 
in the national councils. 

Wellington was not an orator or a graceful public 
speaker, but, like men of powerful and clear intellect, 
he always managed to convey his meaning to an 
audience he addressed ; not a few of his sayings 
were epigrammatic, and made a strong impression. 
The enormous mass of his despatches on military and 
civil affairs give us a striking idea of his great 
capacity ; they are very superior to those of Marl- 
borough ; they are written in a simple and admirable 
style, which perfectly express the writer's thoughts ; 
occasionally they contain terse and happy phrases. 
The Duke was an excellent country gentleman ; as a 
landlord he was just and considerate ; he was, more- 
over, a diligent man of business ; his estate of 
Strathfieldsaye, one of the gifts of the nation, 
would, he used to say, have been ruinous to any 
other owner ; yet he contrived to make it pay, and 



Declining Years — Death — Character 385 

he greatly improved it. He was fond of the chase 
and other rural pursuits ; men still living remember 
the spare figure in scarlet crossing steadily, but hardly 
skilfully, a somewhat difficult country. The Duke 
was seen at his best in the social hour, at festive 
gatherings in great country houses ; he had real en- 
joyment in these; he was occasionally induced to 
talk of his campaigns ; his anecdotes and remarks, 
as we know from Greville, were always interesting, 
sometimes of the greatest value. He necessarily 
filled a conspicuous place in the world of London ; 
for many years his surviving companions in arms 
assembled at his board at the Waterloo banquets; 
he was a constant and most favoured guest of his 
sovereign ; the aristocracy of all parties vied to do 
him honour. Yet he appears to have been less at 
home in London than among his friends in the 
country ; in truth, he had so much official work to do 
that he had but little time for what is called society. 
As I have said, he was not happy in his domestic 
life ; his wife was hardly a fitting helpmeet ; he stood 
rather aloof from his immediate family ; his home 
was not blessed by devoted affection. Though he 
was really attached to a few friends, he was lonely, 
honoured and revered as he was ; he never attracted 
profound human sympathy ; this was one of his 
defects as a chief; he was respected by his officers 
and soldiers, never loved. His correspondence, as 
may be supposed, was immense ; he was punctual 
and precise in attending to it ; his replies to imperti- 
nent and frivolous letters, which came in in thousands, 
were to the point and often very amusing. As we 
25 



386 Wellington 

look back at that long and glorious career of renown 
in arms and civic virtue, we feel that the poet has 
written the truth of Wellington : 

" Rich in saving common sense 
And as the greatest only are, 
In his simplicity sublime. 
O good gray head which all men knew, 
O voice from which their omens all men drew, 
O iron nerve to true occasion true, 
O fall'n at length that tower of strength 
Which stood four square to all the winds that blew! " 




INDEX 



Aberdeen, Lord, contrasted 
with Palmerston, 368 

Altmera, battle of, 151 

Alexander, Czar, conduct of, 
during Napoleon 's inva- 
sion of Russia, 189, 192 

Almeida, taken by Massena, 
117; besieged by Welling- 
ton, 130, 133, 136 

Aspern, reverse of Napoleon 
at, 90 

Assaye, battle of, 36-38 

Austria, attitude of, toward 
France after Portuguese 
Campaign, 140 



B 



Badajoz, besieged and taken 
by Soult, 128, 131; siege 
of, abandoned by Beres- 
ford, 150; siege of, re- 
newed by Wellington 152; 
description of, 153; meet- 
ing of Soult and Marmont 
at, 153; Soult and Mar- 
mont decline battle with 
Wellington at, 154; be- 
sieged for the third time 
and taken by Wellington, 
164-169 

Baird, General, supplanted 
by Wellington in com- 



mand of the Army of the 
Nizam, 2 2 ; victorious at 
the siege of Seringapatam, 
25; supplanted by Wel- 
lington as Governor of 
Seringapatam, 27; sent to 
Egypt instead of Welling- 
ton, 30 

Bautzen, battle of, 194 

Baylen, battle of, 56 

Beauharnais, Eugene, Com- 
mander of remnant of 
Grand Army after retreat 
from Moscow, 192 

Belgium, revolution in, 342 

Bentinck, Lord William, su- 
perseded Murray, 227 

Beresford, siege of Badajoz 
by, 150; raised siege of 
Badajoz, 150; battle of 
Albuera, 151; battle of 
Totilouse, 251, 252 

Bessieres, Marshal, rein- 
forced Massena in Spain, 
133; conduct at battle of 
Fuentes d'Onoro, 136; 
guarding territory between 
France and Madrid, 148 

Bliicher, Prince, weakness of 
France perceived by, in 
181 1, 140; battle of Sois- 
sons, 247; battle of Ligny, 
273-278; operations of 
June 17, 1815, 291; battle 
of Waterloo, 301, 302; 



3S7 



3 88 



Index 



Blucher — Cont'd 

invaded France with Wel- 
lington, 308; advance of, 
into France, 312; before 
Paris, 313; prevented from 
destroying bridge on the 
Seine, 316 

Borodino, battle of, 189 

Bourmont, treachery of, 265 

Bulow, General von, battle 
of Waterloo, 296-304 

Burgos, successfully defended 
against Wellington, 180, 
181 

Burrard, General, at Vi- 
meiro, 66 

Busaco, battle of, 11 9-1 2 2 



Caffarelli, General, succeeded 
Dorsenne in command of 
army of the North, 171 

Canning, George, policy of, 
320; distrusted by Welling- 
ton, 328; administration as 
Prime Minister, 329, 330; 
advocate of Catholic Cause, 
death, 330 

Cantillon, Napoleon's legacy 
to, 317 

Caroline, Queen, trial of, 320 

Castlereagh, Lord, replaced 
by Wellington in Vienna 
Assembly, 257 

Catholic Emancipation Bill 
carried, 337; significance 
of . 33 8 -34o 

Charles IV. of Spain, abdica- 
tion of, 54 

Chartism, failure of, 372 

Ciudad Rodrigo, fall of, 116; 
blockaded by Wellington, 
155; taken by Wellington, 
160 

Cintra, Convention of, 67 

Clare election, 335 

Clausel, Gen., at battle of 
Salamanca, 176, 177; ral- 
lied forces after Salamanca, 



179; with Joseph Bona- 
parte in 181 3, 203; battle 
of Orthes, 243, 244 

Coimbra, taken by Massena, 
123 

Conservatives, new name for 
Tories, 354 

Copenhagen, siege of, 50 

Corunna, victory of Moore 
over Soult at, 77 

Craddock, Sir John, in Lis- 
bon, 81 

Crawford, Lieutenant, at bat- 
tle of Busaco, 121; killed 
at siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
161 

Cuesta, Gen., colleague of 
Wellesley in advance up 
the Tagus Valley, 90 ; esti- 
mate of, 91; battle of Tala- 
vera, 94-97 



1) 



Dalrymple, Gen., at Conven- 
tion of Cintra, 67 

D'Angouleme, Due, rising 
against Napoleon organ- 
ised by, 246 

Davout, Minister of War, at- 
titude of, in regard to de- 
fence of Paris, 311 

D'Erlon, Gen., reinforced 
Massena, 128; at battle of 
Fuentes d'Onoro, 136; at 
battles of the Pyrenees, 
221-224; conduct of, on 
June 15, 1815, 265; battle 
of Ligny, 273-278; battle 
of Quatre Bras, 278-281; 
battle of Waterloo, 296- 

3°4 

Dhoondia Waugh, defeat of, 
29 

Disraeli, Benjamin, opponent 
of Peel, 368; brilliantly de- 
nounced Peel for his at- 
tempt to establish free 
trade in corn, 370 



Index 



3*9 



Dorsenne. General, successor 
to Bessieres, in command of 
French army in the North, 
148; responsible for loss of 
Ciudad Rodrigo, 162; suc- 
ceeded by Caffarelli in 
command of army of the 
North, 171 

Douro, crossing of, by Wel- 
lesley, 86 

Dresden, entry of Napoleon 
in triumph, 194; battle of, 
229 

Dubreton, commandant at 
Burgos, 180 



E 



El Bodon, escape of Welling- 
ton from Marmont at, 157 

England, condition of, after 
Wellington's campaign in 
Portugal, 148; conditions 
in, on return of Wellington 
from France, 318-323 

Espinosa, victory of Napol- 
eon over Spanish at, 75 



Ferdinand, acknowledged as 
King of Spain by Na- 
poleon, 241 

Fitzgerald, Vesey, appointed 
to the Board of Trade, 334 

Fouch£, intrigue of, against 
Napoleon, 309; made head 
of Provisional Govern- 
ment, 310; plans of, for 
the restoration of Loiiis 
XVIII., 311 ; council called 
by, to consider defence of 
Paris, 311 ; negotiations of, 
with Allies, 311: restora- 
tion of Louis XVIII., 314 

Foy , General , sent by Massena 
on mission to Napoleon, 
125, 127; with Joseph 
Bonaparte at battle of 



Vitoria, 205 ; at battles of 
the Pyrenees, 223 

France, discontent in, after 
failure of French campaign 
in Portugal, 141; fall of 
Bourbon dynasty, Duke of 
Orleans, made king, 342 

Fuentes d Onoro, battle of, 

G 

Gazan, General, at battle of 
Vitoria, 207, 208 

George IV., representative of 
life of ruling classes, 319; 
influenced by Wellington, 
328; opposition of, to Cath- 
olic Emancipation, 336; 
death, 343 

Gerard, conduct, on June 15, 
181 5, 265; battle of Ligny, 
273-278 

Germany, attitude of, toward 
France after Portuguese 
campaign, 140 

Gladstone, W. E., rising 
lieutenant under Peel, 369 

Gneisenau, Field Marshal 
Count, lack of sympathy 
with Wellington before 
Waterloo, 295 

Goderich, Lord, Government 

of, 33° 

Godoy, favorite of Charles 
IV. of Spain, 54 

Gough, Viscount, defeated at 
Chillian walla, 372 

Graham, Lieut., in command 
of Wellington's left wing in 
1813, 201; at siege of San 
Sebastian, 225 

Grey, Lord, leader of Whigs, 
speech of for reform, 344; 
made Prime Minister with 
Whig administration, 346; 
resignation of, 350; return 
of his administration to 
power, 350; second resig- 
nation of, 355 



39° 



Index 



Grouchy, Marshal, opera- 
tions of, before Waterloo, 
294, 295; battle of Water- 
loo, 296-304; retreat from 
Wavre to Givet, 309; in 
Paris, 313 

H 

Hanau, battle of, 230 

Hardinge, Lieut. -Col. Sir 
Henry, relief of Beresford 
at Albuera by, 151; praised 
by Wellington for exploits 
in India, 372 

Hill, Field Marshal Viscount, 
lieutenant of Wellington in 
Portugal, 116; at battle of 
Busaco, 1 1 9-1 2 2 ; detached 
to lay siege to Badajoz, 
150; destruction of bridge 
at Almaraz by, 170; at 
battle of Vitoria, 208-210; 
battle of Orthes, 243, 244; 
battle of Toulouse, 251, 
252; appointed Comman- 
der-in-Chief, ny, retire- 
ment of, 365 

Hundred Days, the 259; close 
of the, 309 

Huskisson, Mr., resignation 
of, accepted by Welling- 
ton, 333 



India, condition of, in 1798, 
16-22 

Ireland, condition of, in 
1807, 45; state of, from 
1818-1821, 321-323; grave 
disturbances in, 335; Cath- 
olic Emancipation Bill car- 
ried, 337; serious outbreak 
in 1833, 354 

Irish Catholic Relief Bill of 
1793. 6 



Joseph Bonaparte made King 
of Spain, 55; evacuated 
Madrid, 56; battle of Tala- 
vera, 94-97; retreated to 
Madrid, 97; government 
of, in vSpain, 143; abdica- 
tion of, 143; persuaded by 
Napoleon to return to 
Madrid, 146; in command 
of Army of the Centre, 
148; conduct after Sala- 
manca, escape from Mad- 
rid, 178; re-entered Ma- 
drid, Nov. 2, 1812, 182; 
retreat of, before Welling- 
ton in May, 1813, 202-204; 
battle of Vitoria, 210; dis- 
graced by Napoleon after 
Vitoria, 211 

Jourdan, Gen., battle of Tala- 
vera, 94-97; with Joseph 
Bonaparte in 1813, 203; 
before battle of Vitoria, 
207 

Junot, Gen., march of, 
against Lisbon, 52; con- 
duct of, in Lisbon, 60; de- 
feated at Vimiero, 66; at 
battle of Busaco, 1 19-122, 
relations with Massena ; 
133 

K 

Khyber Pass, tragedy of, 363 
Kutusoff, Russian comman- 
der during invasion of Na- 
poleon, 1 89-1 9 1 



Lafayette, intrigues of, for 
the deposition of Napoleon, 

3 IQ 
Lake, Lord, operations of, 

against the Mahrattas, 39 



Index 



391 



Lapisse, General, colleague of 
Victor and Soult in Spain , 7 9 

Leipzig, battle of, 229 

Leith, General, lieutenant of 
Wellington in Portugal, 
116; at battle of Busaco, 
119— 122 

Ligny, battle of, 273-278 

Liverpool, Lord, insisted on 
Wellington's recall to Eng- 
land, 256; recommenda- 
tions of, for the reduction 
of France, 315 

Lobau, General, at battle of 
Waterloo, 298 

Loison, General, in command 
of a division at Busaco, 
121; given command of 
Ney, 133 

Louis XVIIL, joined Wel- 
lington, 312; restoration 

of, 3*4 
Lutzen, battle of, 194 

M 

Macdonald, Marshal, defeat 

of, on the Katzbach, 229 
Mahratta War, 32-40 
Malo Iaroslavetz, battle of, 

190 
Marie Louise, Empress, 107 
Marmont, Marshal, at Sala- 
manca reorganising Mas- 
sena's army, 148; joined 
Soult at Badajoz, 153; de- 
clined battle with Welling- 
ton, 154; failed to attack 
Wellington at El Bodon, 
157; policy of, after fall of 
Ciudad Rodrigo, 162; pol- 
icy of, after fall of Badajoz, 
172; estimate of, by French 
soldiery, 173; defeated at 
battle of Salamanca, 176, 
177 _ 

Massena, Marshal, m com- 
mand of expedition against 
Portugal, 115; estimate of, 



116; advance of, into Por- 
tugal, 117; defeat of at 
Busaco, 1 1 9-1 2 2 ; estimate 
of his generalship in cam- 
paign in Portugal, 125, 137; 
retreat from Portugal, 129, 
130; defeat at Sabugal, 
130; defeated at Fuentes 
d'Onoro, 133-136; sup- 
planted by Marmont, 137; 
refused to take field in 
Southern France, 180; 
placed by Fouche at the 
head of the National Guard 
of Paris, 311 

Medellin, defeat of the Span- 
ish at, 79 

Melbourne, Lord, made Prime 
Minister, 355; induced to 
resign, 355; restored to 
office, 356; second resig- 
nation of, 362; returned 
to power as result of Palace 
intrigue, 362; fall of gov- 
ernment of, 364 

Metternich, chief power in 
Austria in 181 1, 140; dip- 
lomacy of, during Na- 
poleon's campaign against 
Prussia, 195; interview 
with Napoleon in 18 13,' 213 

Moira, Lord, in the campaign 
of 1794 in Holland, 10-12 

Moore, General, sent to Por- 
tugal, 58; campaign of, in 
Spain, 74-79; victory of 
Corunna, death, 77 

Mornington, Earl of, father 
of Wellington, 2 

Mornington, Lady, mother of 
Wellington, 3 

Mornington, Richard Welles- 
ley, Earl of, brother of 
Wellington, see Wellesley, 
Richard, Marquis 

Moscow, burning of, 190 

Murat, Gen., Governor of 
Madrid, 54 ; King of Naples 
55; entrusted by Napoleon 



39 2 



Index 



Murat — Cont'd 

with command of invalided 
troops at Smorgone, 191; 
treason of, 240 

Murray, Sir John, detached 
by Wellington to cross 
Douro, 87; forced to raise 
the siege of Tarragona, 
217; superseded by Lord 
William Bentinck, 227 

Mysore, settlement of, 28 



N 



Napoleon Bonaparte, birth, 
1 ; in Egypt, 1 6 ; resolved 
upon invasion of Portugal, 
52; extorted Crown of 
Spain from Spanish Bour- 
bons, 54; reverses of, in 
Spain, 56; interview with 
the Czar at Erfurt, 7 2 ; in- 
vaded Spain, 75; victories 
of Espinosa and Tudela, 
75-76; second triumphal 
entry into Vienna, 90; re- 
verse at Aspern, 90; vic- 
tory at Wagram, 103; 
supreme on the Continent, 
104; error in not conduct- 
ing Peninsular Campaign 
in person, 106-108; prepa- 
rations for campaign 
against Portugal, 115; di- 
rected campaign in Portu- 
gal, 127; prepared for 
Russian campaign , 132; 
Continent aroused to ac- 
tion against, as a result 
of Wellington's Portuguese 
campaign, 140; national 
apathy on birth of son to, 
141; policy of, after re- 
verses in Portugal and 
Spain, 144; invasion of 
Russia, 188—192; conduct 
after Russian disaster, 1 93 ; 
battle of Lutzen, entry into 
Dresden, battle of Baut- 



zen, t 94 ; armistice of Pleis- 
nitz, 196; policy for ending 
war in Peninsula, 198, 199; 
estimate of power of, after 
Vitoria, 214; battle of 
Dresden, 229; battle of 
Leipzig, 229; victories of 
Vauchamps, Montmirail, 
Montereau, 247; reverses 
of Laon and Arcis-sur- 
Aube, 248; fall of Paris, 
249; abdication of, 249; 
escape from Elba, 257; 
march from Grenoble to 
Paris, 258; offered to ac- 
cept settlement of the 
Continent made at Vienna, 
260; military preparations 
of 1 81 5, 260-264; plans for 
June 15, 1815, 265; gained 
advantage, 266; battle of 
Ligny, 273-278; estimate 
of position after Quatre 
Bras, 282; state of health 
before Waterloo, 284; 
operations of June 17th, 
181 5, 285-292; battle of 
Waterloo, 296-304; tribute 
to English soldiery, 304; 
treachery of Fouche, 309; 
end of the Hundred Days, 
309; second abdication of, 
310; at Malmaison, 312; 
sent captive to St. Helena, 
310; return of his ashes 
from St. Helena, 360 
Ney, Marshal, colleague of 
Soult, in Spain, 79; battle 
of Busaco, 1 19-122; battle 
of Redinha, 129; deprived 
of command by Massena, 
130; brave defence of the 
rear in retreat from Mos- 
cow, 191; at Dennewitz, 
229; failure of, on June 
15th and 16th, 1815, 270; 
battle of Quatre Bras, 278- 
281; battle of Waterloo, 
300; execution of, 318 



Index 



393 



o 

O'Connell, Daniel, efforts of, 
for Ireland, 322, 323; 
Catholic Association found- 
ed by, 327; opposed 
Fitzgerald at Clare elec- 
tion, 334; triumph of, 335; 
angered by coercive meas- 
ures towards Irish, 354; 
attitude of, in House of 
Commons, 358; Repeal 
movement of 1843, 367 
Oporto, taken by Soult, 79 
Orthes, battle of, 243, 244 
Oudinot, Marshal, defeated 
near Berlin, 229 



Pakenham, Gen., brother-in- 
law of Wellington, at bat- 
tle of Salamanca, 175, 176 

Palmerston, Lord, resigna- 
tion from Wellington's 
Cabinet, 333; successful 
policy in the East, 363; 
disliked by Queen and her 
Consort, 371 

Paris, fall of, 248 

Parliamentary Reform Bill, 
attempts to pass, failed 
three times, 350; passage 
and effects of, 351 

Peel, Sir Robert, sympathy 
of Wellington with, 328; 
with Wellington advocated 
Catholic Emancipation in 
Ireland, 336; made Prime 
Minister, 356; able conduct 
of, 356; resignation of, 356; 
estrangement with Well- 
ington, 358; installed as 
Prime Minister, but forced 
out at once by Palace in- 
trigue, 362; entire recon- 
ciliation with Wellington, 
364; for second time Prime 
Minister, 364; difficulties of 



his second administration, 
366; the great apostle of 
Free Trade 367; ascendency 
weakened by Free-Trade 
policy, 368; proposed sus- 
pension of Corn Laws to 
relieve Irish famine of 
1845, 369; second resig- 
nation of, 370; returned 
to office owing to Lord 
Russell's inability to form 
government, 370; excited 
great opposition by at- 
tempting to establish free 
trade in corn, 370; death, 

_, 37.1 

Philippon, defender of Bada- 
joz, 153; escape of, at fall 
of Badajoz, 169 

Pius VII., Napoleon excom- 
municated by, 141: con- 
cessions wrung from, by 
Napoleon, 144 

Portugal, rising of, against 
the French, 57 

Prague, Congress of, 213 

Provisional Government of 
France, proclamations of, 
310 

Pyrenees, battles of, 221-224 



Q 



Quatre Bras, battle of, 278- 
281 

R 

Redinha, battle of, 129 
Reille, General, with Joseph 
Bonaparte, in June, 1813, 
205; at battle of Vitoria, 
208-210; at battles of the 
Pyrenees, 222, 223; battle 
of Toulouse, 251, 252; bat- 
tle of Ligny, 273-278 
Reynier, General, battle of 
Busaco, 1 19-122; relations 
with Massena, 133; at bat- 
tle of Fuentes d'Onoro, 136 



394 



Index 



Rolica, battle of, 62 

Russell, Lord John, first Re- 
form Bill, introduced by, 
350; advocated repeal of 
Corn Laws, 369; failed in 
attempt to form govern- 
ment, 370; administration 

of, 37i 
Russia, attitude of, toward 
France after Portuguese 
campaign, 140 



Sabugal, battle of, 130 
Saint Helena, visited by Wel- 
lington, 43 ; Napoleon ex- 
iled to, 310 
Salamanca, battle of, 176 
San Sebastian, siege of, 224- 

226 
Scharnhorst, Lieut. Gen. von, 
policy of, to strengthen 
Prussian army, 140 
Schwartzenberg, Gen., con- 
duct of, on failure of Rus- 
sian invasion, 1Q2; battle 
of Arcis-sur-Aube, 248 
Seringapatam, fall of, 25 
Smolensk, battle of, 189 
Souham, General, in pursuit 
of Wellington in retreat 
from Burgos, 183; joined 
by Joseph, 183 
Soult, Marshal, left by Na- 
poleon in charge of Span- 
ish campaign, defeated by 
Moore at Corunna, 77; 
siege of Oporto, 79; esti- 
mate of, 8 2 ; compelled 
to abandon Oporto, 86; 
placed in supreme com- 
mand in Spain, 92; delay 
in reinforcing Massena, 
128; in Andalusia, 149; de- 
feated at Albuera, 151; 
joined Marmont at Bada- 
joz, 153; declined battle 
with Wellington, 154; pol- 



icy of. at time of fall of 
Badajoz, 169; recalled 
from Spain, 197; sent by 
Napoleon to try to repair 
disaster of Vitoria, 211; 
invested with plenary pow- 
ers for reorganising French 
armies after Vitoria, 217; 
estimate of ability of, 218; 
battles of the Pyrenees, 
221-224; attempt of, to 
relieve San Sebastian, 226; 
preparations against Wel- 
lington, 230, 231; difficul- 
ties in Spain in 1814, 240; 
battle of Orthes, 243, 244; 
estimate of, after battle of 
Orthes, 245 ; battle of Tou- 
louse, 251, 252; compared 
with Wellington, after 
Toulouse, 253, 254; made 
chief of French staff, 269; 
present at coronation of 
Queen Victoria, 361 

Spain, rising of, against Na- 
poleon, 55 

Suchet, Gen., in command in 
Aragon, 148; conduct of, 
in Spain, 149; Tarragona 
taken by, 158; created 
duke of Albufera, 181 ; op- 
portunity of, to attack 
Wellington after Vitoria, 
217; failure to act with 
Soult, 231 



Talavera, battle of, 94-97; 

indignation of Napoleon at 

battle of, 100 
Talleyrand, made guardian 

of Spanish royal family, 54 
Tarn worth Manifesto, 356 
Tarragona, taken bv Suchet, 

158 
Test and Corporation Acts, 

repealed, 333 



Index 



395 



Tippoo Sahib, plotting 
against British rule in 
India, 15; defeated and 
killed at the fall of Serin- 
gapatam, 25; indemnity 
paid to the sons of, 28 
Toulouse, battle of, 251, 252 
Tudela, victory of Napoleon 
over Spanish at, 76 

U 

United States, War of 181 2 
between England and, 187 

V 

Valencia, taken by the 
French, 159 

Vandamme, Gen., defeat of, 
at Culm, 229; at battle of 
Ligny, 273-278 _ 

Victor, Marshal, victorious at 
battle of Medellin, 79; bat- 
tle of Talavera, 94-97 

Victoria, Queen, accession of, 
360; coronation of, 361; 
the difficulty of the Ladies 
of the Bedchamber, 362; 
marriage and popularity 

of, 3 6 3 
Vimiero, battle of, 63-66 
Vitoria, battle of, 208-210 
Vitrolles, Baron, sent by 

Fouche to negotiate with 

the allies, 311 

W 

Wagram, defeat of Archduke 

Charles by Napoleon at, 

103 
Waterloo, battle of, 296-304; 

reflections on the battle of, 

304-307 
Wellesley, or Wesley, family 

of, 2 
Wellesley, Arthur, Duke of 

Wellington, see Wellington 



Wellesley, Richard, Marquis, 
brother of Wellington, 
scholarship of, 3 ; Governor- 
General of India, 16; 
changed name from Wes- 
ley to Wellesley, 16; made 
Marquis Wellesley, 28; su- 
perseded by Cornwallis, as 
Governor-General of India, 
41 ; returned to England, 
4 1 ; summary of his career 
in India, 41-42; Irish re- 
form, inaugurated by, 326 

Wellington, birth, 1 ; family, 
2 ; education at Eton, 3 ; 
education at Angers, 3; 
first commission, 3; on the 
staff of Lord Westmore- 
land, 5 ; a member of the 
Irish House of Commons, 
5 ; lieutenant-colonel of the 
33d Foot under Lord 
Moira, 8 ; distinguished 
himself in campaigns be- 
tween League of Europe 
and France, 9-13; applied 
for post in the Civil Ser- 
vice, 1 3 ; failed to secure 
civil post, 14; prevented 
from going, on expedition 
to West Indies, 14; sent 
with 33d to India, landed 
at Calcutta, 1 5 ; changed 
name from Wesley to Wel- 
lesley, 1 6 ; failed to capture 
an outpost, 24; command 
at the sack of Seringapa- 
tam, 26; made governor of 
Seringapatam, 26; made 
military governor of My- 
sore, 28; defeated Dhoon- 
dia Waugh, 29; suppressed 
corruption in India, 29; 
supplanted by General 
Baird in command of ex- 
pedition to Egypt, 30; the 
battle of Assaye, 36-38; 
ambitious and irritable 
spirit of, 41 ; visit of, to St. 



39 6 



Index 



Wellington — Cont'd 

Helena, 43; returned to 
England, 43 ; consulted by 
Pitt, 43 ; entered House of 
Commons, 44; made chief 
Secretary for Ireland, 47; 
marriage, 45; policy of, in 
Ireland , 4 7 -4 9 ; commanded 
a division at siege of Copen- 
hagen, 50; made lieuten- 
ant-general, 58 ; sent into 
Portugal against Junot, 
58-62; landed at Mondego 
Bay, 59; battle of Rolica, 
62 ; chafed at terms of con- 
vention of Cintra, 67; 
marked for distinction by 
Court of Enquiry, 67 ; 
placed at the head of Brit- 
ish and Portuguese army, 
at Lisbon, 79-81; crossed 
the Douro in his advance 
against Soult, 86; ad- 
vanced with Cuesta up the 
Tagus Valley, 90 ; battle of 
Talavera, 94-97; made 
Duke of Wellington, 99; 
placed at the head of all 
the Portuguese forces, no; 
defence of Portugal, 112- 
114; victory of Busaco, 
119— 122; estimate of cam- 
paign of 1 8 10-18 1 1 in Por- 
tugal, 137, 138; Portuguese 
Campaign of, aroused Con- 
tinent to action against 
Napoleon, 140; confidence 
of, after campaign in Por- 
tugal, 147; policy of, after 
campaign of 1810-1811, 
149; preparations for bat- 
tle near Badajoz, 153, 154; 
in danger at El Bodon, 
157; made English earl 
and Spanish duke in conse- 
quence of taking of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, 162; policy of, 
after fall of Ciudad Rod- 
rigo, 163; third siege and 



taking of Badajoz, by, 
164-169; policy of, after 
fall of Badajoz, 170; vic- 
torious at battle of Sala- 
manca, 176; entered Ma- 
drid, 178; not at his best in 
strategy, 179; raised in 
British peerage in conse- 
quence of Salamanca, 179; 
left Madrid, September 1, 
181 2, 179; failed to take 
Burgos, 180, 181; evaded 
united French armies, and 
reached Ciudad Rodrigo, 
184; severe condemnation 
of his troops, 184; estimate 
of, at time of retreat from 
Burgos, 184-186; position 
of, at close of 1812, 196; 
preparations against Na- 
poleon, in 1813, 200; battle 
of Vitoria, 208-210; esti- 
mate of his ability in cam- 
paign leading up to Vitoria, 
212; made Field Marshal 
of England, and Duque 
di Vitoria, 215; state of 
army after Vitoria, 216; 
siege of San Sebastian, 
225 ; policy of, after taking 
of San Sebastian, 227; en- 
tered France, 230; battle 
of Orthes, 243, 244; battle 
of Toulouse, 251, 252; com- 
pared with Soult after 
Toulouse, 253, 254; raised 
to the highest rank in the 
English peerage, 255; en- 
deavoured to compose dis- 
putes between Spanish 
Cortes and Ferdinand, 256; 
sent as Ambassador to 
France, 256; surveyed 
fortresses on Belgian fron- 
tier, 257; replaced Castle- 
reagh in Vienna Assembly, 
257; signed treaty pledg- 
ing England against Na- 
poleon, 259; proposed to 



Index 



397 



Wellington — Cont'd 

invade France, 261; poor 
strategy of, 266, 267 ; situa- 
tion before Ligny, 273; 
battle of Quatre Bras, 
278-281; battle of Water- 
loo, 296-304; tactics of, 
at Waterloo, 304; invaded 
France with Bliicher, 308; 
wisdom and moderation of, 
313; with Bliicher before 
Paris, 313; his service to 
France, 314-317; conduct 
of, before restoration of 
Louis XVIII., 314; fore- 
most man in Europe, 314; 
estimate of his ability, 314, 
315; prevented dismem- 
berment of France, 315; 
prevented Bliicher from 
destroying bridge on the 
Seine, 316; aided in reduc- 
ing charges made by coali- 
tions for operations of 
181 5, 316; adjusted com- 
pensation of France to 
Allies, 316; placed in com- 
mand of army of occupa- 
tion, 316; attitude towards 
in France from 18 15-18 18, 
317; made Master of Ord- 
nance and Commander-in- 
Chief, 318; return to Eng- 
land, 318; in the Cabinet 
of Lord Liverpool, 318; 
his position in the state 
after the war, 323-328; 
identified with Tory party, 
324; lack of sympathy 
with the Greeks, 326; atti- 
tude towards Ireland, 326, 
327; his influence over 
George IV. and leading 
public men, 327, 328; his 
sympathy with Peel, 328; 
break with Canning, re- 
signed office of Comman- 
der-in-Chief, 328; made 
Prime Minister, 331; his 



influence and position in 
European affairs, 331; at- 
titude on questions of the 
day in England, 332 ; resig- 
nation of Palmerston from 
Cabinet, 333 ; persuaded by 
Peel to advocate Catholic 
Emancipation in Ireland, 
336; outcry against, on 
passage of Catholic Eman- 
cipation Bill, 338; opposi- 
tion to, after passage of 
Emancipation Bill, 340; 
death of George IV. and 
accession of William IV., 
343 ; answer to Lord Grey's 
plea for reform, 344 ; popu- 
lar displeasure against, 
345, 346; fall of adminis- 
tration of, 346, 347 ; reason 
for his attitude towards 
reform, 347, 348; failed in 
attempt to form new ad- 
ministration, 350; attitude 
of, towards passage of Re- 
form Bills, 351, 352; great 
unpopularity of, 352 ; prac- 
tically made dictator on 
resignation of Melbourne, 
355; advocated Peel for 
Prime Minister, resigna- 
tion of Peel, 356; estrange- 
ment with Peel, 358; made 
Chancellor of Oxford, 358; 
attitude during Melbourne 
administration, 359; ob- 
jected to the return of Na- 
poleon's ashes from St. 
Helena, 360; coronation of 
Queen Victoria, 361; con- 
sideration for Marshal 
Soult, 361, 362; entire re- 
conciliation with Peel, 364; 
Peel for second time Prime 
Minister, 364; held seat in 
Peel's Cabinet, 365; re- 
turned to command of 
army on retirement of Hill, 
365; carried Peel's Corn 



; 9 8 



Index 



Wellington — Cont'd 

Law through the House of 
Lords, 371; most trusted 
servant of Queen, 371; 
vigour and ability in old 
a S e < 371—373 ; plan of de- 
fending London against 
Chartist outbreak, 372; 
desired to transfer com- 
mand of army to Prince 
Consort, 372; in last days 
held in universal venera- 
tion, 373; death, 374; fun- 
eral, 374; physical appear- 
ance, 375; public and priv- 
ate life, 375-376; estimate 
of the soldier, 377-382; es- 
timate of the statesman, 
382-384; estimate of the 
man, 384-386; 



William IV., accession of, 
343 ; appealed to Welling- 
ton to form an administra- 
tion, 350; death of, 360 

Wredc, Field Marshal, defeat 
of, at Hanau, 230 



York, Gen., conduct of, on 
failure of Russian inva- 
sion, 191 



Zieten, Gen. von, at battle of 
Waterloo, 303 




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ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. 

Rawlinson. 

ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. Prof. 

J. P. Mahaffy. 
ASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
THE GOTHS. Henry Bradley. 
IRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless. 
TURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PER- 
SIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
MEDIEVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gus- 

tave Masson. 
HOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold 

Rogers. 
MEXICO. Susan Hale. 
PHOENICIA. George Rawlinson. 
THE HANSA TOWNS. Helen 

Zimmern. 
EARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred 

J. Church. 
THE BARBARY CORSAIRS. 

Stanley Lane-Poole. 
RUSSIA. W. R. Morrill. 
THE JEWS UNDER ROME. W. 

D. Morrison. 
SCOTLAND. John Mackintosh. 
SWITZERLAND. R. Stead and 

Mrs. A. Hug. 
PORTUGAL. H. Morse-Stephens. 
THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. 

W. C. Oman. 
SICILY. E. A. Freeman. 
THE TUSCAN REPUBLICS 

Bella Duffy. 



POLAND. W. R. Mornll. 
PARTHIA. Geo. Rawlinson. 
JAPAN. David Murray. 
THE CHRISTIAN RECOVERY 

OF SPAIN. H. E. Watts. 
AUSTRALASIA. Greville Tregar- 

then. 
SOUTHERN AFRICA. Geo. M. 

Theal. 
VENICE. Alethea Wiel. 
THE CRUSADES. T. S. Archer 

and C. L. Kingsford. 
VEDIC INDIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
BOHEMIA. C. E. Maurice. 
CANADA. J. G. Bourinot. 
THE BALKAN STATES. William 

Miller. 
BRITISH RULE IN INDIA. R. 

W. Frazer. 

MODERN FRANCE. Andre Le 
Bon. 

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Alfred 

T. Story. Two vols. 
THE FRANKS. Lewis Sergeant. 
THE WEST INDIES. Amos K. 

Fiske. 

THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, 
Justin McCarthy, M.P. Two 
vols. 

AUSTRIA. Sidney Whitman. 

CHINA. Robt. K. Douglass. 

MODERN SPAIN. Major Martin 
A. S. Hume. 

MODERN ITALY. Pietro Orsi. 

THE THIRTEEN COLONIES. 
Helen A. Smith. Two vols. 

WALES AND CORNWALL. Owen 
M. Edwards. Net $1.35. 

MEDIAEVAL ROME. Wm. Miller. 

THE PAPAL MONARCHY. Wm. 
Barry. 

MEDI/EVAL INDIA. Stanley 
Lane-Poole. 

BUDDHIST INDIA. T. W. Rhys- 
Davids. 

THE SOUTH AMERICAN RE- 
PUBLICS. Thomas C. Daw- 
son. Two vols. 

PARLIAMENTARY ENGLAND. 
Edward Jenks. 

MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND. Mary 
Bateson. 

THE UNITED STATES. Edward 
Earle Sparks. Two vols. 



H 81- 79 



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